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iv 
 
Their house was a home away from home for me. I had great conversations with Msenga 
Mulungu and Dickson Mzumara who separately inspired some of my most original thoughts. 
In Hewe Joseph Munthali and his wife Leah were the most incredible hosts; their home 
was always a welcome sight after long travels. Frank Mtambo, Emmanuel Sichinga, Warasungu 
Muwowo, Omex Khunga and Kabisama Chawinga helped with so many practical things from 
lighting fires to splatting rats, from building my shower to fixing my bicycle, but more than 
anything they kept me company in the evenings, and knew how to cheer me up when things 
were not going to plan. There are so many more people in Hewe who assisted me, made me 
laugh and taught me something about their life. I hope they know how grateful I am to them. 
Special thanks must, of course, go to the present Chief Katumbi, Kelvin Chawinga, who made 
every accommodation for me to undertake research in his area. His senior advisor Martin 
Chawinga was especially interested in my project and was very open to my often irritatingly 
persistent and repetitive enquiries about family trees!  
I was so fortunate to receive many visitors in both Zomba whilst I worked at the 
archives and in Hewe, a slightly harder place to reach! Helen, Grace, Joanna, Sonya, Ceri, Tansy 
and Andrew brought so much joy to myself and to the people with whom I was living and 
working. I was particularly delighted with the extended visit of my brother Ed who purchased 
his very own Chinese bicycle and clattered around the Valley with me. He came at the right time, 
as my energy was waning and emotions a little frayed. He may not forgive me for being 
cornered into imbibing home-brew on his birthday but I hope his interactions with Munthali 
and Mfune made up for it. When I “came south” to Zomba and Blantyre I enjoyed some weird 
and wonderful moments with Maarten Bedert and his host family, he provided great intellectual 
stimulation and really sound advice; I feel really fortunate that our fieldwork paths crossed 
there. Shani Zour’s energy and passion for Malawi was infectious and I was so happy to share a 
house with her. My brief interlude spent at “the history house” with Julia Tischler has led to a 
lasting friendship, possibly based on her ability to create a salad dressing from tinned jam.  
Over the duration of my PhD I have benefitted from the kind assistance of staff at a 
number of different archives. In particular I would like to thank Christopher Chagwayapah and 
Stanley Gondwe at the Malawi National Archives and I must make special mention of Newton 
Zgambo who went out of his way to assist me, encouraging my early attempts at Chitumbuka to 
boot. Marja Hinfelaar enabled me to work quickly and easily at the Zambian National Archives 
when I only had a week to spare. Lucy McCann at Rhodes House library in Oxford helped me 
locate the files of colonial administrators and the staff at the National Library of Scotland 
assisted with my enquiries concerning the Livingstonia Mission. My visits to the National 
Archives at Kew were always fruitful and revealing; my thanks must go to all who helped me 
over the two months that I worked there. Staff at the History Department of Chancellor College, 
University of Malawi provided accommodation for me whilst I was in Zomba working at the 
archives, as well as arranging access to the university library. The small but perfectly formed 
gang of Malawianist historians with whom my path has crossed throughout this process is made 
up of some of the most supportive and encouraging people I have encountered within academia. 
In Zomba and San Francisco I had the pleasure of exchanging ideas with Joey Power, Owen 
Kalinga and Erik Green. John McCracken was supportive of my project from the start, giving me 
fantastic advice and some great references. Megan Vaughan has been a wonderful source of 
encouragement; she writes the sort of history I aspire to. The brief interactions I had with Kings 
Phiri and Wapu Mulwafu left lasting impressions. 
Over the five years I spent at Leiden I worked at both the CNWS and the History 




deserve particular thanks: Wilma van Trommelen and Ilona Beumer at the CNWS were the most 
welcoming and helpful people when I first moved to Leiden and whenever I needed assistance 
were only too happy to assist. Jose Birker, Rebecca Wensma and Efy Matulessy smoothed the 
way as I made my transition into the History department. Maaike Westra, Gitty Petit and Ella 
Verkaik at the Africa Studies Centre always treated me like one of the ASC family. For them, and 
for all the other administrative, library and research staff, much gratitude is due. Travel and 
research grants from CNWS, University of Leiden, LUF and the British Institute of Eastern Africa 
made fieldwork and conference trips possible. Affiliation with the Catholic University of Nguludi 
in Blantyre, and the help of Menno Welling in partiular, helped enable a smoother time during 
the often bumpy fieldwork experience in Malawi.    
I enjoyed the incredible hospitality of so many people whilst writing up. Stephanie 
Wynne-Jones and Mike Monaghan, George and Joseph Grummett, Yvonne McDermott, Jessica 
Johnson, Nima Shirvani and Setareh Pakzad provided me with access to beds, desks, mountains, 
cats and the occasional fish and chip supper. Sir Cosmo and Phillada Haskard welcomed me to 
their home and shared many of their memories of colonial Malawi with me. As I did the tedious 
work of checking footnotes and references my brother John provided me with shelter and much 
light relief. That I finished this thesis at all is down in large part to the loving support of my 
wonderful set of friends, Grace and Peter How, Charlie and Susie Walker, Guy Sheard, Karolien 
Vanmarcke, Sonya Bangle (who also designed my lovely book cover), Ceridwen Tallett, Nancy 
Judge and her amazing family, Sarah and Steve Trevett, Laura Hotchkiss, Felicity Stout, Charles 
Ford, Anna Bridges and Nuala Jackson. You have all contributed so much to my life. No words 
can express what the fierce loyalty and incredible friendship of Joanna Ecclestone Ford have 
meant to me; coming through in such epic style during tough moments, that is indeed what it is 
all about. Hossein Pourbagheri noticed this bird, fed and tenderly looked after her during times 
which were not always easy for either of us. I hope he knows how important he has been; for 
him, I will always have a song in my heart. 
My final thanks have to go to my family. Keeping things “nice and calm” in the whirlwind 
of the last six years my parents Margaret and Michael Davies have been unfalteringly constant; 
their boundless love and support have enabled me to lead a transient and nomadic existence 
with relative ease, and my brothers Nick, Ed, John and sister-in-law Nikki have been the most 
down-to-earth and entertaining of companions. Our mountain-climbing, wild-swimming, 
National Trust-going, tomato growing, cycle-riding, quilt-making, badger-watching, cinema-
going, ale-drinking activities fill up the reservoir needed to carry on with the harder things of 
life. I can track the life of this PhD from the birth of my nephew Lucca at the beginning in 2008 
to that of my niece Fleur as I was approaching the end in 2012; these precious children have 
injected so much life and joy into our family, spending time with them always recalibrated my 
perspective. Thank you all, for sheltering me in the storm. 
I have dedicated this thesis to my dear friends Milliam Inkosi, and her late husband 
James Khunga who passed away in Februrary this year. They welcomed me into their household 
and provided the ever-elusive but much sought after sense of belonging that everyone craves 
when they are far from home. My fixer, counsellor, teacher and foster father in Hewe, James was 
one of the most inspiring and determined people I have ever met; I will never forget him. 
Milliam looked after me with enormous sensitivity and concern; I would have been lost without 
her friendship. She taught me many things but watching how she cared for James with such 
dedication and such humility, in those moments she taught me what it is to really love well. 
 








BCAP     British Central African Protectorate 
BSAC     British South Africa Company 
CCAP     Church of Central Africa Presbyterian 
CO      Colonial Office 
DC     District Commissioner  
GVH     Group Village Headman 
KAR     Kings African Rifles 
MCP     Malawi Congress Party 
MNA     Malawi National Archives 
MYP     Malawi Young Pioneers 
NA     Native Authority 
NAC     Nyasaland African Congress 
NNNA     North Nyasa Native Association 
NRB     Natural Resources Board 
NWDF     Native Welfare and Development Fund 
PC     Provincial Commissioner 
PGVH     Principal Group Village Headman 
SGVH     Senior Group Village Headman 
TA     Traditional Authority 
















Over the period with which this thesis is concerned the spelling of proper names has 
varied. I will be using the contemporary spelling of names, except where I am quoting 
directly from a written source; for example I will refer to Rumphi District throughout, 
even though it was written as Rumpi during the colonial period. L and r are often used 
interchangeably in Chitumbuka, as with other Bantu languages, and the letter y is 
sometimes added in later spellings; so the more commonly spelled Chikulamayembe 
may have been written as Chikuramaembe or Chikulamaembe in historical accounts. 
This accounts for the variety of spellings to be found throughout the thesis. In Tumbuka 
custom the prefix Nya- is added to the maiden name of a married woman; so if Milliam 
Chavula married James Khunga she would be known to everyone, including her 
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This then, I thought, as I looked round about me, is the representation of history. It requires a 
falsification of perspective. We, the survivors, see everything from above, see everything at once, 
and still we do not know how it was.  
 












I ‘found’ Timothy Chawinga in the Malawi National Archives whilst investigating the sources 
that were available to write on quite a different topic, an agricultural history of the northern 
region of Malawi. Intrigued by this peripheral but active colonial Native Authority chief, who 
had attained demonstrable administrative authority, I decided to search for other strands in his 
story by following him to Hewe in order to discover how his leadership was understood and 
remembered there. Locally when people talk of Chawinga he goes by the expressive praise 
name of “Kamangilira”; this can be translated to mean “what he has done (or said) cannot be 
untied” and stands in reference to his famously dictatorial performance and practice of power in 
Hewe, an area of some 200 square miles in the north-western region of Malawi; it was here that 
Chawinga ruled as Chief Katumbi from 1942 to 1973. His reputation was amplified for me as 
more stories about him were recounted throughout my fieldwork. These stories challenged the 
ways in which I had thought about colonial chiefs in the past and encouraged me to explore 
further how presenting historical examples of individual chiefs might question the ways in 
which we look at and write about chieftaincy as an institution in Malawi.  
Timothy Chawinga was not a man who gave orders from behind closed doors; he 
dominated Hewe using public performances which were of administrative use and moral 
reckoning. He was seen at the maternity ward on a regular basis ensuring that fathers provided 
well for their newborns, ordering them to do piecework to earn enough for a new blanket for 
their child if they hadn’t already got one; he attended most of the funerals which took place in 
Hewe, however lowly the person had been; he paid school fees; he shot and killed lions that 
were threatening his people; and he regularly visited and encouraged his headmen who were 
located in even the most remote outlying areas. That he played the archetypal “Big Man” in a 
small place of apparently little consequence might not be seen as important enough subject 
matter to enrich the Malawian historiography; this could not be further from the truth. 
Chawinga’s story demonstrates that authority is not simply bestowed from on high, but 
that one has to reach in many different directions in order to produce it. It also shows that to 
understand the growth and consolidation of this authority in the colonial setting one must look 
not only at the customary or neo-traditional aspects engendered by indirect rule but also at the 
territorial opportunities it offered chiefs like Chawinga. What I mean by this is that colonial 
infrastructure and ideology helped to produce new spaces, not only new identities, which could 
be exploited by Africans in inventive ways regardless of their economic and political importance 
to the colonial state. Given the varied political geography of chieftainship throughout Malawi, it 
is unsurprising that the extent to which Native Authorities were able to exploit their newly 
defined customary areas for their own political and economic gain varied from place to place; 
this is why local studies and micro-histories provide such a crucial perspective.  
This “small” story of Timothy Chawinga and his community, numbering no more than 
3,500 people in 1944, strives to confront some big questions about the limitations of colonial 
state power and the nature of traditional authority. Furthermore it seeks to contribute to the 
developing discussions about the historical transition which has taken place from economies 
based on wealth in people to those based on wealth in land; and what this means in light of 
contemporary struggles over natural resources in Africa. The territorialisation of Katumbi’s 
chieftainship was, and remains, an ongoing process; it was a process which Chawinga learned to 
capture for his own benefit and an equally important factor in his eventual fall from grace less 
than ten years after Independence. This story may not be the most dramatic, but it is unique; 




































Part one. Approaching the scene of chieftaincy  
 
You cannot kill me, this is my land! 
On March 3, 1959 a State of Emergency was declared in the Nyasaland Protectorate.1 In the 
Hewe Valley, some 600 km to the north west of the colonial capital Zomba, the events following 
this declaration unfolded in their own way. As the final rains of the season fell and the beginning 
of the end of colonial rule took shape in this, one of the poorest of Britain’s imperial possessions, 
the local narratives around one man’s actions at this time emerge with some remarkable 
consistency. Timothy Chawinga, the possessor of many monikers, was the Native Authority 
(N.A.) Katumbi at the time, a position he had held since 1942. In popular recollections of this 
time, as soldiers searching for dissidents and “trouble-makers” beat down the door to his office, 
Chawinga is said to have prepared to sacrifice himself for his people. 
Whilst Timothy Chawinga was not known to be a very active member of the Nyasaland 
African Congress (NAC), his contribution to spreading the political message of the leading 
nationalist party of the time being more subtle than substantially supportive,2 as Native 
Authority he was nevertheless the first person whom the soldiers had wanted to interrogate in 
order to garner who the political ringleaders in Hewe were, and where they could be found.3 
Having told his people to run away and to hide in mountainous and bushy areas surrounding 
the Valley in order to avoid confrontation, arrest, or worse, the stories depict Chawinga more or 
less alone in this predicament. Faced with a group of soldiers who wanted to search his territory 
and arrest his people, he did not err. It was said that on refusing to assist the soldiers with their 
enquiries a line was drawn in the sand in front of him. Whether the line had been drawn by the 
chief or by the soldiers is unclear as different versions of the story circulate around the Valley, 
but in either case a warning was said to have been issued to the other party not to cross the line 
or be made to suffer the consequences.  
The scenario where Timothy draws the line goes something along these lines: 
 
“He remained in his office and when the soldiers came he drew a line and challenged them to step 
over it saying, ‘if you want to kill me, kill me alone and not any people’, he then took off his shirt in 
preparation and pointed at his chest, but the soldiers just left”.4 
  
And the scene describing the Federal soldiers drawing the line is recounted colourfully in the 
following two statements: 
 
“Soldiers came to sit in his chair, [Chawinga] said ‘no you shouldn’t sit here, I am sitting here’. […] 
[He] sent people to close roads, break bridges. I was young but I remember. He told everyone to run 
away, the soldiers drew a line saying you should not cross. He challenged them, and passed. ‘You 
cannot kill me’. He took his child and said ‘you will first kill my child and then me. You cannot kill 
me, this is my land’. These people were not to remain in his own home”. 5  
 
“During the Emergency he told people to build ridges to plant cassava, beans, and block roads. The 
soldiers were coming from Zambia. He stayed in his office and stood saying ‘just kill me’. The commander 
drew a line and said ‘if you cross I will shoot’, he crossed and nothing was done, he proved his power. This 
was right at the office in Katowo”.6 The central image of this “line in the sand” has become legendary 
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and many people, even outside of Hewe, know one or other of the narratives surrounding it.7 It 
delivers a powerful depiction of a brave, uncompromising leader; someone who, under the 
pressures of military confrontation, demonstrated a fierce loyalty toward his people and his 
territory. It cannot be known whether the local memory of Timothy’s statement, “you cannot kill 
me, this is my land” was captured verbatim or not; that it is commonly remembered in these 
terms, however, is significant. Chawinga’s response sets in motion the articulation of one of the 
major local motifs of his leadership, and one that is continually recollected by people 
throughout the region:8 his was an authority set in territorial terms.  
A local authority that was directly confronted during the Emergency, this was the first 
and only episode throughout the colonial period in which Hewe faced a direct threat of state-
managed force. Understanding how, and why, Timothy Chawinga behaved in the way he did, 
when he was known neither to be a determined nationalist nor in outright opposition to the 
colonial administration, is one of the major focal points of this present study; it will lead to the 
conclusion that the “locality” of chieftainship was a crucial factor in determining colonial chiefly 
identity and enabling the production of a certain kind of authority. Simply put, the “space” in 
which authority was produced must be given a more prominent role in these histories. 
 
To resist or not to resist, is that the question? 
The State of Emergency, so the historiography suggests, was a key moment for many Nyasaland 
chiefs; the time had come for them to either make a stand for their people or face the 
consequences of ‘abandoning’ them to be arrested or worse, to die. By supporting government 
actions during the time of the Emergency, either overtly or simply by doing nothing, a chief was 
said to have been almost certainly be condemned to a post-colonial future of limited or no 
authority. Attempting to retain this local authority through acting as guardians of their people, 
on the other hand, came with its own risk of being imprisoned and formally deposed by 
government. “The manner in which [chiefs] resolved the problem” suggests one historian of the 
period, “tended to affect the internal power and social relations which the indirect rule system 
had already complicated decades earlier”.9 
The historical evidence suggests, contrary to this more usual illustration of chiefly 
politics in late colonial Nyasaland, that in fact Timothy Chawinga was able to accommodate both 
these positions. He “rescued us from the colonial government during the Emergency”, 
remembers one man from Hewe, who says that Chawinga explained to them that they should 
not fear the whites at this time because “if they did anything we would get rid of them”.10 Yet 
typically throughout this tense time he was spoken about by the colonial administrators in 
similarly co-operative terms. Knowing that bringing about order in the countryside around 
Hewe would be impossible without his presence, Chawinga’s release from detention the day 
after this episode was immediately demanded by the District and Provincial Commissioner.11 
This “impossible” holding together of two apparently oppositional positions continued in the 
uncertain period in-between the Emergency of 1959 and the birth of Independent Malawi on 
the 6 July 1964; a time when a great question mark hung over the future role of traditional 
authorities throughout the British colonies.  
This is not to say that Chawinga was unique. There no doubt exist many other examples 
of such chiefs who simply do not feature prominently in the narratives of late colonial Malawi; 
Mandala, Mulwafu, Kalinga and Power all make suggestions to this end. Remaining of parochial 
importance these customary leaders, and the area over which they ruled, generally fall rather 
between the historiographical cracks created by the dominant state-centred nationalist 
narratives which encourage viewing shifting forms of leadership somewhat statically only 
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through the lens of indirect rule, and descriptions of agricultural change which focus on 
communities that have most visibly taken part in, or resisted against, state endorsed 
transformative processes.  
The accounts of Chawinga, and others, have been sifted out of the story as they do not fit 
with the questions which historians have typically tended to address of this period and with the 
political geography that has been favoured for contextualizing chiefly behaviour. This favoured 
political geography has rather drawn out examples from places where “things happen”: where 
significant cash crop schemes were implemented and radically transformed farmers lives for 
the better and worse; where co-operative movements politicised the local population; where 
conservation measures were harshly and violently enforced; and where chiefs rebelled and 
vocally took part in the nationalist struggles. The only scholar who has identified that Timothy 
Chawinga’s contribution may have intriguing implications on the way in which we understand 
Malawian history is Owen Kalinga. Even he, however, limits the assessment of Chawinga’s role 
as a ‘traditional intellectual’ to his influence on protest movements and subaltern struggles.12 
Concentrating on highly visible areas, which were economically or politically 
“important” to the state leads into making wrong assumptions about the character of the 
colonial state and the patterns of state intervention in Nyasaland. It was not a single-minded 
“monolithic entity” basing its rule on a “coherent and tightly orchestrated set of policies that 
remained unaltered by the forces of necessity or contingency” and neither were colonial 
administrators divinely omnipotent.13 Rather the forms of rule and governance were multiple 
and reflected the dynamic association between administrative institutions and other 
institutional practices found in the everyday associational life of people. When reading the state 
in this way the apparently stark dilemma faced by colonial chiefs during decolonization, to nail 
their colours to the mast of either the nationalist camp or the incumbent colonial 
administration, is dissipated into a much more vague set of negotiations over access to 
resources, land and claims to legitimacy; it is one of the aims of this thesis to place these 
negotiations in better context, paying particular attention to the spatial and historical factors 
which shaped it and which have been previously rather unexamined in the discussions of 
colonial chieftainship.  
 
Chiefly authority and the spatial turn in African history 
Many subjects of historical investigation have undergone a treatment of spatial analysis since 
the “cultural” or “spatial” turn began reworking “the relationship between the social sciences 
and traditionally hermeneutic fields within the humanities”14 over thirty years ago. This shift in 
analytical lens has moved the emphasis away from grand narratives of history and “toward 
more culturally and geographically nuanced work, sensitive to difference and specificity, and 
thus to the contingencies of event and locale”.15 In Africanist historiography the spatial turn has 
enabled scholars to move away from political narratives of the nation-state towards discussions 
about the ways in which a wide range of actors contest different kinds of political, economic, 
social and religious space for their own gain.16 Surprisingly, however, the spatial turn is only 
beginning to have an impact on the way in which the production of chiefly authority in Africa is 
understood.  
Discussions about colonial chieftaincy have tended to focus mainly upon the ways in 
which indirect rule structured and framed traditional authority in British colonial Africa. For the 
most part, the focus has remained upon how Lugard’s blueprint for effective “native 
administration”, The Dual Mandate, 17 invented, shaped, and restructured identity; for the 
majority of contemporary historians the question is to what extent indirect rule ethnicised and 
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tribalised African society.18 This is not a surprising question; by attempting to “preserve (or 
restore) stable systems of traditional social order”19 the policy of indirect rule institutionalised 
the notion that what was “customary” was necessarily implicit and unchanging. This body of 
work has rightly pointed out that this was not the case but that powerful actors, both European 
and African, were able to use the static presentation of “native law and custom” to their 
advantage. By interpreting and deploying “tradition” in the context of indirect rule they were 
able to ensure their continued hegemony and their continued access to resources.20 The focus of 
this thesis, however, whilst acknowledging the importance of this neo-traditional perspective, is 
concentrated on the notion that indirect rule was as much a spatialising process as it was a 
tribalising one.  
As colonial tools of territoriality began to map politics in geographically bounded ways 
associating power with place began to assume new importance in the ways in which African 
leadership was defined. By the time Chawinga had ascended the throne in 1942 the ways in 
which most African societies thought about and used space had already changed quite 
significantly. The somewhat inevitable shift from an economy based on wealth in people to one 
centred upon wealth in land began to have a more significant effect on local structures of 
governance in Africa once the European colonisers arrived in the later part of the Nineteenth 
Century. During the period of European expansion, newer territorial tools of control were used 
and new dimensions were added to the ways in which people related to space. Prior to this, 
claims to having a territorial identity hardly figured in the political imagination of African 
leaders who mainly grew their wealth and power by capturing people rather than gaining 
control over territory.21 With little use of, or need to reinforce boundaries, no reason to fight 
with neighbours over land, or indeed any aspiration to maintain close control over the 
agricultural activities of “their people”, the strategies which leaders had used to exert control 
over their domain was not focused on the materiality of the land but rather on the ability to 
extract the productive potential of the people. Having formal authority over people and the 
environment did not require having possession over the land on which such resources existed, 
and neither did its legitimacy rest upon its ability to be in control of the activities “their people” 
took part in.  
 
“Central governments were often not concerned about what outlying areas did as long as tribute 
was paid (sometimes in the form of slaves), and there were no imminent security threats emerging 
to challenge the center. This particular view of what control meant was made possible by the 
ability to separate ownership and control of land. Thus, a ruler might view a distant territory as 
owing some kind of tribute to him without any notion that he controlled the actions of the people 
in the outlying areas on a day-to-day basis”.22  
 
Europeans “discovered” and appropriated land, named it, and with the assistance of African 
elites gave it boundaries and put people in charge of it.23 At the same time as ethnicities and 
tribes were being named and categorised space was also being redefined. Yet the power to 
shape space, as with the power to shape tradition, was not driven solely by the colonisers. The 
power of colonial states may have “structured actors spatial possibilities” but they did not do so 
in “determinist ways”.24 As Engel and Nugent make clear in a recent edited volume, “within 
various constraints, Africans continue to contest, order, and give meaning to places”.25  
In the context of indirect rule, which drew up geographical boundaries for chiefly 
jurisdictions where they had never existed before, opportunities were available for chiefs to 
exploit these bounded spaces in new, sometimes highly productive ways, useful for both their 
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authority and personal wealth. For as much as indirect rule enabled the reach of the Native 
Authority, through customary law, to gain authority over “previously autonomous social 
domains like the household, age sets, and gender associations”26 it also gave many chiefs the 
opportunity to assert a territoriality over space, over land, and over fixed natural resources as 
they never had done before. As von Oppen suggests: “The appropriation of territoriality in the 
spatial and social sense generally appears much more to have led to an enlargement of the 
conceptual arsenal of the actors – adding to non-territorial ways of speaking and strategies of 
action”;27 so whilst many chiefs’ former monopoly over labour and production (wealth in 
people) might have been affected detrimentally by the territorial ambitions and 
instrument(alisation)s, of the colonial state28, there were also new opportunities available to 
exploit the resources under their control (wealth in land) in rather different ways to their pre-
colonial forebears. 
The prevailing concept of “custom” has vested in postcolonial chiefs as a group (and 
specifically the ones who win the disputes about boundaries) an almost uncontested ownership 
of land. This has been a particularly powerful device in the hands of chiefs who manage areas in 
which land has become a scarce resource, or in places where people are dependent upon 
agriculture; in this scenario the authority of traditional authorities has been bolstered as “most 
people would not […] afford to antagonize their relations with the chiefs because doing so 
would jeopardize the very core of their livelihoods”.29  Yet it is not only the grassroots who rely 
upon traditional authorities to ensure their access to land, as Chinsinga’s recent interview with 
the Malawian Chief Chikulamayembe shows, the colonial granting of rights over “native land” to 
chiefs has become a pervasive tool; “all people whether councilors, MPs or even the President” 
Chikulamayembe told Chinsinga, “are subjects of traditional leaders in which case we have to be 
primary institutions of leadership at local level otherwise nothing can happen on our land”.30  
However, whilst “indirect rule lent colonial authority to chiefly rent-seeking” by 
granting native authorities customary rights which allowed them to grant access to land to 
“natives” and potentially deny it to “strangers”,31 it also laid foundations for a post-colonial 
milieu in which “chiefs’ accountability for the rents they collected” were subject to fierce 
debate.32 This accountability has most often been achieved by their gaining hegemony in on-
going and generally “irresolvable” 33 disputes about boundaries; in other words, the main 
sources of authority for chiefs in the post-colonial period have become centred on struggles 
over land and disputes over borders framed in the language of autochthony. However it is worth 
noting that in a contemporary political economy geared towards individual property rights and 
a litigious spirit where people desperate for security have been looking to claim rights to 
resources in new ways, it has not only been chiefs who tap into narratives of “indigeneity” and 
“autochthony”.34 In order to gain advantage over one another “contestants” within these spaces, 
whether chief or commoner, variously wield narratives of “tradition”, use material wealth, and 
utilize wider networks of support in order to determine whose voice is most authentic at that 
point in time.35 
Timothy Chawinga’s reign spanned a period somewhere in the middle of this phase, 
where the dual processes of territorialisation and commoditisation of land were busy 
transforming the political economy of chieftaincy. Colonial rule was bringing to African leaders 
the novel option of claiming a territorial identity, heralding a new political culture where this 
territorial use of space intertwined with non-territorial (or pre-colonial) concepts of space.36 
Chawinga was in the vanguard when it came to understanding how a native authority might 
police his newly bounded political space and learn the language of custom to his advantage. 
Each native authority was positioned differently in terms of resources and relationships to the 
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state and whether or not the increased arsenal which the policy of indirect rule was able to be 
used by chiefs depended greatly upon this dynamic.37  In spaces which were not considered core 
to their interests, for example, the colonial state did not always pursue control through formal 
means.38 In those places in which “peasant society is neither threatening to the center nor, from 
the rulers’ perspective, worth trying to exploit […] the regime is not interested in incorporating 
the region into the national political space”. 39 In such situations chiefs, and other elite figures, 
could find themselves in a position whereby they could take even greater economic advantage 
of the new geographically-bounded political landscape, and appropriate the model of the 
territorial community for their own interest.40  
 
Territorialisation of the local 
A territorial ambition to “affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships”41 
within its geographical boundaries is often ascribed to colonial states. However, as Sack points 
out, “circumscribing things in space, or on a map […] does not by itself create a territory”; spaces 
become territories only if the boundaries – be they social or geographic – are actively used by 
some authority to pursue their political goals.42 Moreover, unlike “places” “territories” require 
considerable effort to establish and maintain. In some places it was often not worth the regime’s 
effort or resources to act territorially, particularly, as Boone highlights, if the area in question 
presented no serious threat to the state’s overall sovereignty. In this sense, it can be said that 
the consistently territorial character of the colonial state is overstated in much of the literature. 
Importantly, the ability to assert territoriality, the strategy used to control people and things by 
controlling an area, does not rest solely with the state. If given the opportunity, actors who 
preside over territories embedded within the state are also able to act territorially.43 The 
mechanics of these sub-territories – carved out as they have been by indirect rule - are often 
ignored but should be considered as an important way of re-examining the practices of 
chieftainship in Africa.  
The “territorialisation of the local”,44 was not simply driven by a state seeking to 
administratively demarcate people and space in order to better control and govern.45 Local 
actors appropriated these “new” territorial concepts of space for their own purposes in order to 
resist the state and build a retinue of “settled” followers. Evidence for this being that leaders 
and their people rarely contested the placing of boundaries and borders in and of themselves 
but, seeing what such boundaries enabled them to do, became increasingly interested in 
contesting where they ought to be located and who ought to be located within them.46 However, 
the extent to which local leaders were able to influence and negotiate the meaning and use of 
their territory depended much upon the relationship which these local settings had with the 
other “scales of organization and control” within which they were embedded.47  
So whether one concentrates on the endogenous perspective of Boone who concludes 
that this relationship is driven from within local society,48 the more explicitly exogenous 
perspective of Appadurai who focuses on the ability of “larger-scale social formations (nation-
states, kingdoms, missionary empires and trading cartels) to determine the general shape of all 
the neighbourhoods within the reach of their powers”,49 or the view of Lund who looks in both 
directions,50 the same conclusion is reached: that the ability to assert territorial ambition is 
premised upon the opportunity that is available to do so. Re-locating the historiographical gaze 
upon “regional” and “local” landscapes can help in cataloguing the diversity in opportunity.  
It was only on account of the physical, administrative, and imaginative distance between 
the Native Authority area of Katumbi and the central government headquarters that Chawinga 
was provided with so much room for manoeuver in the local setting. This “distance” is 
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important to note, and will be interesting to examine further later on in this introduction; it 
provides the key to understanding how in the context of decolonisation chiefs like Timothy 
Chawinga were able to negotiate a path that was neither on side with nor against the colonial 
state but was rather more focused upon the maintenance of a local sovereignty. Before the focus 
turns towards modelling a new framework on which to examine the differences engendered by 
this state-periphery relationship, and its importance for understanding the production of chiefly 
authority, the historiography will be reconsidered in light of these insights. 
 
 
Part two. Historiographical problems and conceptual solutions 
 
Caught in an administrative identity 
Richard Rathbone has emphasised that chieftaincy in Africa should be approached as an 
historical construction, one that is being made continually, “the product of constantly evolving 
and vividly contested imaginations”.51 This way of understanding colonial chieftaincy, as a 
product articulated by time, space and local politics, is indeed useful; unfortunately, much more 
ink has been spilled over the years by scholars trying to grapple with it in a somewhat more 
functionalist way. The obsession with “the typology of political systems”52 which 
anthropologists first set in motion back in the 1930s and 1940s has turned out ample studies of 
societies and their political organisation, most notably through the work of the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute.53 The legibility, and order, which these ethnographic ventures gave to 
certain ethnic groupings was liberal anthropology’s self-confessed contribution to the “practical 
affairs” of the colonial project. “The policy of Indirect Rule is now generally accepted in British 
Africa”, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard wrote in the introduction of their famous African Political 
Systems, first published in 1940, “it can only prove advantageous in the long run if the principles 
of African political systems […] are understood”.54 Embedding chiefly politics firmly within a 
governmental sphere of action, this work has left a powerful legacy on the way in which 
historians have conceptualised chieftaincy from this period.55  
Chiefs and chieftaincy, in this approach to the reading of rural order, were given much 
attention; they were analysed and codified as a key aspect of the administrative structure of 
segmentary societies, something which these early anthropological studies primarily focused 
upon, and which the colonial architects of indirect rule tried to use to their advantage.56 This 
functionalist approach, however, in failing to “relate that structure to its complementary 
political processes”,57 could not easily understand chiefs as individual actors who defined and 
pursued their own political goals.58 Whilst increasing attention was paid throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s to field methods that focused more on the agency of actors, “an anthropology that 
defined its subject matter as individuals making decisions rather than as social structures 
composed of interconnected social roles”,59 the notion that traditional leaders might have a 
strong influence on people’s behaviour became a rather anachronistic one. In such accounts 
“norm, legitimacy and authority” were taken out of the equation altogether, with social action 
being “reduced to the satisfaction of individual needs”;60 so whilst non-chiefly individuals were 
given prominence, there was limited attention paid to concomitant accounts of how the 
activities of these individuals might have been brought under differentiated forms of social 
control. Such an approach to social change concealed stories of local contestation and processes 
of power accumulation and ignored important historical factors in the production of authority. 
The emphasis upon indirect rule as the main purveyor of chiefly authority in the colonial 
period has persisted on into more recent histories despite the increasing focus which has been 
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given over to the observation of local political dynamics. It is true that this has led scholars to 
better understand how chiefs operated within the system; “Progressive chiefs were key figures 
in the policy of indirect rule” Eckert writes, and quoting Iliffe he concludes that “whether the 
new system strengthened or weakened an individual chief depended largely on how effectively 
he exploited it”.61 In this, the idea that chiefs could be political actors came to the fore; many 
examples emerged within these analyses of chiefs “working” the colonial system “as much as 
they were worked by it”.62 Primarily this manipulation is understood to have been executed 
through their, and the intellectual elites who surrounded them, considered use of traditional 
titles which, it is argued, had been “invented” at the onset of colonial rule.   
Keeping its eyes firmly, and almost exclusively, upon the interaction between chiefs and 
the state this way of seeing chiefs, for all its nuance, has also perpetuated the notion that 
chieftaincy in this period was forged and framed solely by colonial “tools of territoriality”.63 
Eckert boldly states:  
 
“The creation of native authorities did not mean the integration of pre-colonial systems of power 
into a modern administrative apparatus, but mainly an imagined reconstruction of supposedly 
traditional power structures which the colonial administration held to be useful for the realisation 
of its interests”.64  
 
Unfortunately, Eckert’s perspective surrenders too much power to the state in its ability to 
fabricate functional structures of authority at the local level. There may not have been an 
outright integration of pre-colonial systems of power into the administrative apparatus but it is 
likely, in many instances, that there was an integration of pre-colonial imaginations of power 
and motifs of authority, which had an influence during the (re)assemblance of these chiefly 
structures. The colonial state was in fact limited in its ability to “create wholly innovative kinds 
of local authority”, and “actions from below set limits to the invention of authority and 
tradition”.65 Chiefly authority in Condominium Sudan, Justin Willis argues, was rather a product 
which “drew on local moral codes and colonial forms of authority, but was not fully part of 
either”.66  
Summarising the legacies of the dominant “invention of tradition” discourse, Spear 
provides a helpful critique of the effects that these perspectives have had on the representation 
of chieftaincy and tradition in the historiography. For all their conceptual insights, these neo-
traditionalist perspectives have “led historians to neglect the historical development and 
complexity of the interpretative processes involved”.67 By retaining the nation-state as the main 
lens through which analysis takes place the “economic, social and political factors that help 
shape identities and the complex processes of reinterpretation and reconstitution of historical 
myths and symbols to define them” have been seriously overlooked in discussions about how 
tradition is conceptualised and used by both state and local actors.68 In this interpretation, 
where the hegemony of the colonial state is assumed, chieftainship remains as a largely 
unexamined categorization, a label for a group of government-sponsored actors who are 
shaped, even created, by external forces.  
The historiography has generally failed to grapple with the position of particular chiefs 
within their communities more closely and more critically, rarely placing these manifestations 
of local authority throughout the colonial period within a deeper time-scale. John Tosh implored 
historians to look beyond the colonial era with which they were interested and to analyse it only 
“as an episode in the total historical development of the societies in question”.69 However, 
almost thirty years later, different chieftaincies are still commonly thought of in terms of this 
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bounded, administrative identity, simply a bureaucratic part of a colonial machine of indirect 
rule which was thought to “break down […] as soon as the British tried to use the chiefs to 
enforce unpopular agricultural measures”.70 The discursive counter-narrative to this, of a 
political nationalism which seeks to liberate the colonial identifications, but in fact replaces 
them with equally state-oriented nationalist ones, is equally problematic; it subjects all chiefs to 
the same fate and tends to only consider as relevant the stories of those who either uphold or 
undermine this narrative.  
 
Where do colonial chiefs draw their authority from? 
Moving away from the endorsement which the colonial state gives or takes away, it is 
considered productive to observe and understand how chieftainships are constructed and 
contested within the context of rural histories and regional contestations, as well as through the 
eyes of the State. It ought not to be forgotten that chiefs in this period most often operated from 
at least three different positions, “as salaried functionaries of the colonial state, as chiefs among 
chiefs contending sometimes with struggles over ethnic or territorial limits, and as local rulers 
of hereditary status who could be popular or unpopular with their people”.71 All of these roles 
depended upon a combination of historical and contemporaneous positioning so as to ensure 
legitimacy and authority within each of these operational landscapes. Only by examining more 
historical examples of chieftaincies in this period, noting the ways in which chiefs understood 
and deployed both the discourses of both tradition and modernity, and examining the spaces 
they created to exploit resources, can better conclusions be made about the ambiguities, 
opportunities and tensions of “being” a Native Authority. Making statements as to what extent 
colonial chiefs were “invented” or “authentic”, “traditionalists” or “modernisers”, “collaborators” 
or “resisters” is largely ineffectual, instead questions should be posed which bring no structural 
or spatial assumptions. For this thesis it is thought that a more apt line of questioning revolves 
around the nature and use of authority rather than upon the structures in which authority 
supposedly operates: Where do chiefs in the colonial period draw their authority from? What does 
this authority enable them to do? And what are the stakes involved in having it? 
By doing this the focus does not remain on the “social fact” that is the institution of 
chieftaincy, but rather on the “relations that inhere in it”.72 Public authority, for example, the 
“type” of authority commonly claimed to be legitimated through institutions of the state, or at 
least expressed by actors or institutions which are supported by government recognition, 
cannot be simply passed around as a traditional title might be, neither can it be possessed as a 
thing. If recognised by the state for example, a chiefly position could provide the holder of the 
title the potential to exercise a public authority. However the legitimacy given by the state to an 
institution is “not a fixed absolute quality”,73 neither are the other avenues to status and power 
permanent, but they are “constantly under debate and must be negotiated”.74 Specific 
institutions do not have an enduring monopoly over symbols of public authority, and whilst 
they might exercise such authority in one moment, at another moment in time they are much 
less significant.75 Chiefly authority, much like that of the African state as described by Bayart, is 
therefore better understood as a produced event rather than as having an essential quality; “a 
plural space of interaction and enunciation [that] does not exist beyond the uses made of it by 
all social groups, including the most subordinated”.76 
Focusing upon one historical chiefly figure can help somewhat in the endeavour of 
better understanding the relations that make up, and possibilities that come with, using a chiefly 
identity. By also illuminating the many different spaces in which a chief is able to construct 
identities for himself, this focus can usefully ground chiefly authority, and the “tradition” that 
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seems to frame it, in locally relevant discourses; discourses that had historical importance,77 
were mediated by local political geographies, but that could be reinterpreted and reconstructed 
in the context of broader socio-economic changes.78 If a chief was able to tap into these 
discourses, and influence them to his advantage, then a vital channel for accessing other sources 
of power and new spaces of exploitation that lay beyond the state could be opened up.  
The chief ought to be understood not only as a representative of the primary institution 
through which he performed and sought legitimacy, but also as an individual ‘big man’, whose 
success was rather premised upon an ability to exploit as many “avenues to ‘bigness’” as he 
could by converting “social into economic and political ‘capital’, both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
(and vice versa)”.79 If Lentz’s framework for capturing the ways ‘big men’ operate in Ghana is 
adopted for understanding Timothy Chawinga’s leadership and authority then his position as 
“traditional ruler” would be understood as his major “field of action”; legitimised through 
‘custom’ and perhaps magic, as well as by the state this was his ‘role image’. However, other 
registers of power and alternative legitimating strategies do exist; “experience in education, 
vocational training, or performative qualities such as demonstrations of largesse, physical 
strength or higher morality. These avenues are ventured down whenever they are useful”.80  
Such a perspective provides a better foregrounding for the discussion around how 
“chiefly” authority, in all its composite parts, can be produced and used. However, it will be 
argued in the following chapters that whilst colonial chiefs could potentially reach in many 
directions in order to establish and continue to produce their often fragile authority, much 
depended upon an individual’s opportunity to do this. Such opportunity could arise if there was 
room to mold the formal authority on which chiefly legitimacy partially rested – this might 
include an ability to manipulate inheritance, adapt ritual, and access and use historical “raw 
materials” - and also, crucially, if there was a spatial context in which such opportunity might 
arise. Trying to understand the different opportunities that chiefs had requires a lens of analysis 
which looks beyond but does not exclude the spatial category of the state as an arena in which 
they gain legitimacy. It is to the historical development of the state and then the local arena of 
politics in Hewe that the introduction will turn. 
 
Malawian historiography: a tale of two provinces  
The Katumbi chieftainship of Timothy Chawinga must be placed in the specific historical context 
of a colonial state that developed certain regional characteristics, and that “broadcast power”81 
in uneven ways. The historiography has tended to emphasise the emergence of two distinct 
regions within the colonial state of Nyasaland; the Bua River, which cuts the country almost in 
half, was taken as the border between an agriculturally productive and thriving “South” and 
what became known as “the Dead North”. This division had its roots in physical geography but 
was shaped to a large extent by “competing colonialisms”, where the interests of European 
settlers, missionary activities and colonial officials all played a part in creating these different 
patterns of administration within the Protectorate.82  The fashion in which the colonial state 
developed provides a crucial context for understanding the emergence of differences in local 
structures of authority both during the colonial period and indeed in the development of 
regional identities in the post-colonial era. 
Whilst the argument put forth in these pages aims to demonstrate that such ways of 
seeing the state can hide stories of thriving local economies in the middle of “the Dead North”, it 
also acknowledges that there were significant differences between the north and south. The 
appellation “Dead North” had been “attributed in contrast” to the more productive south 
according to Barker, the Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province in the 1940s, but 
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had much to do with the fact that the dominant Tumbuka and Ngoni areas were characterised in 
the first half of the twentieth century by heavy out-migration of the population to other 
countries for employment. This was said to have left a huge number of villages “denuded of the 
very people required to take such an important part in developing the potential agricultural 
resources and in conserving the natural resources” of the northern region.83 By 1945 the areas 
south of the Bua had boasted tea, tobacco, tung and cotton industries “all flourishing under 
European and African enterprise”,84 whilst the northern region was generally understood to be 
“an isolated area far removed from the country’s centres of production, trade, and industry”.85 
Prior to this period there had been only one permanent departmental officer stationed north of 
the Bua in Karonga, the European Agricultural Officer, and there was just one solitary European 
planter.  
The roots of this bifurcated development have been traced back to before the colonial 
administration, however, when “the impact of commerce and Christianity” distinguished 
broadly separate paths for the people of north and south Nyasaland.86 The differences which 
were inculcated at the end of the nineteenth century as European influence made its way onto 
the African landscape had certain implications for the way in which political culture developed 
in colonial Malawi. The impact of slavery and environmental disaster had wreaked havoc on 
local communities throughout the region. In the south, and especially in the fertile Shire 
Highlands, “the combined effect of the slave trade and famine had driven settlement literally to 
the hills”;87 this left the once heavily populated lands “vacant”, and ready to be claimed by a 
combination of European settlers and Lomwe immigrants from Mozambique. Similar population 
movements took place in the northern region, especially in the areas where the Ngoni and 
Bemba raided Tumbuka settlements. However, in stark contrast to the south, no influx of 
European interest threatened African access to land in these areas.  
 The land grievances that had developed in the Shire Highlands were exacerbated at the 
turn of the twentieth century when the system of thangata, a form of coerced labour, began to 
be used in a widespread fashion by European estates as a way of dealing with the labour 
shortage they were facing. As Mulwafu points out whilst the newly established Protectorate 
administration had not encouraged the exploitation of Africans in this way, even legislating for 
the introduction of minimum working conditions through the Native Labour Ordinance of 1903, 
“in practice the government never enforced these regulations”, and it was left up to the 
discretion of individual planters to follow them.88 The Africans who had been dispossessed of 
their land proved the most vulnerable to these practices, especially after the introduction of hut 
tax by the British in 1894 when thangata was used in lieu of cash payment.  By 1910 the system 
was adapted again so that Africans who did not work on estates essentially paid twice as much 
in tax. All of these policies were designed so that an emerging colony might prove itself 
economically viable. Whilst in the north the African population continued to access and farm 
their land quite freely, the politics of southern Nyasaland became dominated by “the nature of 
the terms on which Africans would be permitted access to the mostly empty lands held by the 
European planters or the Crown Land that still remained under Yao chiefs”; dynamics which 
would underlie the terms of conflict throughout the colonial period.89 By 1907 when the 
Colonial Office took over the reins of the British Central Africa Protectorate, “the struggle to 
capture the peasantry and its productive capacity” had become “a key theme of colonial 
administration in Nyasaland”.90 
The early years of colonial rule then were times of great tension and much negotiation 
between the new “landowners” and the African population whose labour they were trying to 
exploit; something which became particularly acute in the years immediately before World War 
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I when the “establishment of labor-intensive plantation production” began to dominate the 
southern economy.91 At this stage, “3,705,255 acres, out of a protectorate total of 25,161,924 (or 
15 percent of all land), were held in freehold by a handful of foreigners”, and the majority of that 
in the fertile southern highlands.92 As Power has noted, this was the reason why the 
infrastructure of the colonial administration was first established there and why, perhaps, the 
northern and central regions suffered in comparison. In the economic vision of British 
administrators the population in what they saw as an economically unproductive and 
environmentally denuded land north of the Bua could best serve the interests of the 
Protectorate as migrant labour.93  
There was some hope that little Nyasaland would continue to develop along the lines of 
settler states such as Southern Rhodesia, but any “residual optimism” left at the end of the 
1920s for it to live up to an early labelling as “the Cinderella of Africa” was gone by the 1930s 
when the economic depression consigned the colony to become something of an “imperial 
slum”.94 It was always going to be a challenge for this most marginal of areas to thrive in the 
context of colonialism. As Lee describes it, pre-colonial Malawi existed between the regional 
economies of East Africa and southern Africa “in a transient zone of trade and regional power”; 
and with no one major African polity dominating it came to “fundamentally [exist] on the 
margins of regional, colonial and world economies”.95 Indeed, Power concurs; the cotton and 
coffee estates of southern Nyasaland may have been productive, experiencing some degree of 
financial success, but she argues that geographical isolation made plans to build the colonial 
economy on these activities difficult. “Nyasaland was not linked by rail to the coast until 1935, 
and reliance on river transport and human porterage made its exports relatively expensive”.96 
As a consequence settler interests quickly became “subsumed under more viable long term 
African productive capacity”;97 it is in this context that the colonial economy of Nyasaland had 
reoriented itself by the 1940s.  
 The “competing colonialisms” that existed within the Protectorate saw to it that 
alongside economic differentiation, the character of local administration was shaped not only by 
settler interests but by missionary influence.  The most significant European presence in the 
Northern Province at the end of the nineteenth century, and for the first half of the twentieth 
century, was the Livingstonia Mission of the Free Church of Scotland. The impact of this 
institution on the political culture of the north will be unpacked at some length in chapters one 
and two, and will indeed be referred to throughout the thesis, but for the purposes of 
comparison it should be noted that in contrast to the southern missions the Livingstonia 
Mission provided a space where Africans were given opportunities to gain an education; it 
comes as no surprise that the first tranche of indigenous clerks, teachers and preachers can 
overwhelmingly from this region. The introduction of the District Administration Native 
Ordinance (DANO) in 1912, and the choice of local headmen to run things in the rural areas, was 
therefore shaped on the ground in the Tumbuka and Ngoni areas where the influence of the 
Mission was most pronounced by these African “new men” who were able to collude with 
powerful indigenous leaders to gain the most.  
The Chilembwe uprising, an “African revolt” that took place in 1915 in the context of 
crippling economic and social injustices that were taking place within the estates of the 
southern highlands, had a critical effect on the unfolding of native administration south of the 
Bua. This event has been dealt with at some length, and from a number of different perspectives, 
most notably by Shepperson and Price, but also Landeg White, and DD Phiri.98 According to Vail 
and White the Chilembwe rising prompted the rapid imposition of indirect rule, a policy that 
had already been sketched out in the DANO of 1912. It was seen as a necessary attempt to 
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organise “the confusing tangle of African people in southern Nyasaland in an effort to check any 
possible disturbances by dissatisfied Africans through bolstering chiefly control”.99 The choice 
to use the ostensibly anti-Chilembwe and conservative Muslim Yao as their indirect rule chiefs 
inevitably had implications; these stemmed from the fact that in contrast to the Northern 
Province, where ‘tribal order’ was “shaped from below”, in the Southern Province it was “largely 
imposed from above”.100  
As African grievances were given shape and direction in the nationalist campaigns of the 
1940s and 50s these regional differences were articulated. The threat of Federation with 
Southern and Northern Rhodesia, for example, must be seen in the light of land shortage and 
thangata in the south where the idea of a new influx of European settlers “resuscitated African 
apprehensions about the oppressive labour system”.101 In the north, where the settler economy 
had not directly impacted on African populations, Federation posed a different threat which was 
articulated by nationalists in terms of possible reduction of indigenous chiefly freedom. The 
historical development of the colonial state of Nyasaland has, therefore, led to certain regional 
identifications that had implications on the nationalist struggle.  
Whilst this present study will question how useful this overarching depiction of the 
“dead north” versus the settler south is when it comes to understanding the dynamics of local 
histories, it is considered essential to highlight the consequences that this discursive 
separateness has had on political culture, and hence customary politics, in the postcolonial 
period. The emergence of regional sensibilities, and their manipulation by political elites, in the 
democratic transition which took place in 1992 and ever since, justify the time spent trying to 
understand the historicity of regional politics in colonial Malawi. Whilst Banda outwardly 
emphasised nationalism over tribalism, the impact of colonialism in shaping difference and 
Banda’s own manipulation of it, meant that these identities quickly resurfaced as democracy 
dawned.102   
 These differences are crucial to understand but should not lead us away from the 
“precise nature of local political topography”103  in which chiefs operated, and in which they 
attempted to accumulate wealth and power. If it can possibly be imagined that differences were 
driven as much from within rural society as they were shaped by external dynamics, the 
importance of better understanding colonial chieftaincy – as a factor within this local context – 
assumes new meaning. It is paramount, therefore, that comparative and more closely observed 
examples are carefully unpacked for what they can reveal about the nature of colonial rule as 
well as the nature of leadership and power in Africa during this time. As Carswell notes the 
ways in which colonialism played out on the ground, and in the everyday details of peoples’ 
lives was highly differentiated, as such “the non-political factors that influenced the reception 
[of colonial policy] […] need to be considered too”.104   
 
Approaching authority; constructing a local lens  
Taking Catherine Boone’s conceptualisation of the African state as a departure it is possible to 
rethink the way in which both actor and institution are depicted in historical narratives.  Whilst 
they clearly remain important, she shifts the emphasis away from the usually posed exogenous 
determinants of regional variations, for example the policy and structures from colonial 
metropoles, nationalist politicians’ political ideologies, and the impact of global economic events 
and opens up a new avenue of inquiry.105 Boone suggests that regional variations, and the 
unevenness in the colonial experience, can be understood as rather being endogenously 
determined; on account of the political struggles and contestations which take place within 
African society “between rulers, their rural allies, and their provincial rivals”, and due to 
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differences in agrarian sociopolitical organization and rural modes of production.106 It is the 
“political capacities and interests of rural societies and rural notables”,107 she argues, that 
determine the various strategies which are used to govern the countryside. Boone’s framework 
presents the possibility that a colonial chief’s authority is neither completely determined by the 
state, nor geographically indistinct; the characteristics of chiefly institutions and performance of 
customary leaders are highly locally and regionally contextualised.  
Taking the example of the Hewe Valley, the area over which Timothy Chawinga had 
formal administrative authority from 1942, the description of peripherality fits well: as late in 
the colonial period as 1946 the Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province described the 
Valley as “for the most part remote from civilisation as represented by administrative Bomas, 
infested with game and tsetse fly, and as far as I can see at present, unlikely to be of any 
economic advantage to Nyasaland”.108 As far as it was a political threat to the central 
government, no serious discontent was ever really registered in Hewe other than the “parochial 
battles” and “trivial jealousies” which district commissioners wrote about in their handover 
notes. There were no significant reports of organised protests against conservation rules, no 
boycotts and few outlets for considerable political agitation to be expressed through, unlike in 
other parts of the country which had developed co-operative networks and active native 
associations Hewe was much more tangential to the national economy; partly this was on 
account of physical distance from government Bomas and agricultural markets, and the 
logistical difficulty this brought, but it also had much to do with stronger historical regional 
connections across the colonial border which made the area more politically and economically 
independent.  
The focus of colonial agricultural histories on areas of large-scale cash crop production 
so favoured during the “second colonial occupation”109 has led us away from a better 
understanding of non-agricultural relations within rural communities at these regional levels 
and, as Carswell’s study of Kigezi brilliantly highlights, tends to write off as irrelevant the critical 
role that thriving local food crop markets had in peripheral areas. Carswell has shown that the 
farmers of Kigezi might have seemed irrelevant to the colonial economy, having “failed” to adopt 
the specified cash crops, but they were in fact producing great quantities of “food crops [...] for 
sale on a vibrant, regional market”;110 it was one of many regions “producing surplus foodstuffs 
for export to surrounding areas”.111 Much like Hewe Kigezi was viewed as peripheral by colonial 
administrators; it relied on a labour intensive agricultural system which did not yield “cash” 
profit, and for tax money the population was dependent on wage labour. However, by ignoring 
the production and marketing of local foodstuffs a trick has been missed in the analysis of social 
and political change in these regional “back waters”.  
Crucially if this complex regional system of exchange is understood in light of the 
historical interaction between certain areas which were bound together through non-
agricultural relations, then it can be seen that local food markets did not simply reflect an 
exchange from food-deficit to food-surplus areas. As Mandala puts it, even if an area produced 
all the foodstuffs required for survival “pre-capitalist societies were more than agriculture and 
therefore could not be self-sustaining entities” they needed to maintain ties with other 
economies in order to reproduce their internal relationships.112  
In places like Hewe and Kigezi interactions in the regional setting involved the trade in 
non-food items as well as with royal chiefly taxation flows. These external non-agricultural 
relations were important “mechanisms through which the flow of food from surplus-producing 
to food-deficit regions was made possible”;113 and Carswell argues that rather than becoming 
irrelevant in a colonial economy these peripheral local economies were in fact stimulated as it 
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became safer and easier to trade widely and as population growth increased the demand for 
foodstuffs. The reason why this is important in an analysis of local authority is that such vibrant 
food production systems, which “crossed colonial boundaries”,114 were resilient and, to a large 
extent, evaded colonial control through marketing.  
According to Mandala, the general failure of the historiography “to relate” the “standard 
paradigm of the position of traditional leaders in the colonial administrative structure” to 
“peasant production” has resulted in incomplete analyses of chiefly authority.115 In the Lower 
Tchiri Valley, for example, the subject of Mandala’s research, cotton was the major cash crop but 
he goes to some length to demonstrate that “different chieftaincies felt the impact of the cotton 
economy differently”.116 Whilst areas not so involved with cotton production certainly did not 
see the rapid rise in population and swelling treasuries that the chieftaincies that had 
participated in cash cropping on a large scale did, what this meant was that when the collapse of 
cotton agriculture devastated these local economies the chiefdoms that had not the 
“opportunity” to get involved with cotton were largely unaffected by this significant shift in 
global trade. So, “the collapse of cotton agriculture shattered the economies of the southern 
chiefdoms and put an end to the euphoria of “indirect rule” for the Mang’anja mafumu” as his 
authority was secured primarily through frameworks controlled by the state.117 Other 
chieftaincies, whose successes were perhaps grounded in non-agricultural and regional 
networks, were not undermined in the same way.  
In Hewe, as in Kigezi and the non-cotton growing parts of the Lower Tchiri, the functions 
and processes of the colonial state interacted with a regional political economy which ostensibly 
posed no economic or social threat to its sovereignty and was fine largely “left to its own 
devices”; “the regime” in these scenarios somewhat abdicated authority neither seeking “to 
engage or impose”.118 With an independently thriving local market of food stuffs seemingly 
irrelevant to the colonial administration, a significant amount of autonomy could however be 
maintained by traditional authorities in these peripheral zones.  
 
Historical geographies of authority 
The physical, administrative, and imaginative distance between less prominent chiefs like 
Timothy Chawinga and the central government headquarters provided much room for 
maneuver in the local setting. Linking the opportunities which these contemporaneous political 
geographies gave with historical landscapes of authority can be even more illuminating. As a 
chiefly successor of the Balowoka migrant traders, the tradition from which much of the 
dominant leadership in these northern Tumbuka area stems and the history of which will be 
explored in chapter one, Timothy Chawinga inherited a title which was loaded with certain 
meanings but was an economic and political leadership that was flexible in its inheritance 
structures and rested upon an authority that could be easily co-opted by charismatic 
individuals. Unlike neighbouring chieftaincies to the south where chiefs ruled over more defined 
areas and authority was framed in more ritual terms,119 the legitimacy which personality alone 
could evoke was relatively strong amongst the Tumbuka chieftaincies.  
Less marked by centralised ritual authorities and more by mobility, interdependence 
and varied involvement in trading networks, these chieftaincies had been highly adaptable even 
in the pre-colonial period. Disruption and reorganization provoked by Ngoni and Bemba 
invasion and, latterly, a strong association with the Livingstonia Mission of the Free Church of 
Scotland (later to become the Central Church of Africa Presbyterian when it merged with the 
Church of Scotland in 1929) meant that further specific distinctiveness, especially the 
importance of education, was layered in to the form that political leadership took in this region 
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and the spaces in which it performed. The distinctiveness between the different regions is nicely 
illustrated by a comment made by District Commissioner Cosmo Haskard in the 1951 Rumphi 
Annual Report, the district in which NA Katumbi was administered. He observed that there was 
no longer any strong hereditary organisation of chiefs and headmen in this Tumbuka region. 
With little historical evidence to go on and a general period of raiding and partial subjugation to 
the Angoni in the latter part of the nineteenth century events had not, he writes, enabled “the 
development of an indigenous administrative organisation such as exists in the Ngoni areas to 
the south”. Haskard concludes by suggesting that the “troubled history” of the area has rather 
“developed in them strong individualistic tendencies”.120  
Wielding only a loose grasp on ritual authority, as they did and still do, the fight to grab a 
more formal authority is therefore a constant feature of the chiefly political landscape of these 
Tumbuka communities. Chieftaincy in this area is a particularly porous and plastic institution;121 
the rules which constitute it change easily and can be manipulated from ‘below’ as well as 
invaded into from ‘above’.122  With each chiefly succession, authority has needed to be 
reasserted and maintained, stories of authentically glorious and extraordinary arrival needed to 
be adapted, and claims to seniority inserted to compete with challenges from both external 
chiefly dynasties, and internal royal clan disputes. Since these chieftainships had been 
established with new royal lineages which “lacked any significant depth or span”123 there was 
plenty of room in these types of chieftaincy for new interpretations of authority and more 
spaces in which individual people with power could challenge the tradition. Apter describes a 
matrix of factors which, given this flexible context of chiefly power in Hewe, might enable a 
reappraisal of its history of authority:  
 
“If authority regulates power, power also reproduces, revises, and in revolutionary situations 
subverts authority structures. It does so by changing the rules of the game – the depth and span of 
the royal lineage, the prerogatives of high office, the ranking of chiefs, the influence of Big Men – 
and can do so because authority is not simply given or imposed, but it is constructed, negotiated, 
and reconstructed by actors, myths and rituals that can uphold the status quo, but they can also be 
invoked and performed to oppose it”.124  
 
The proliferation in non-authentic elements penetrating chiefly institutions increased as 
their potential to access power, economically and socially, grew with the onset of colonial rule; 
they were able to challenge the lineage “rules” in this flexible chiefly landscape and create 
“customary resources” for themselves with which they could contest power. The Yoruba 
chieftaincies’ mechanisms for transforming authority which Apter presents have some 
applicability for the situation in Hewe and Nkamanga; “competitions for office generate […] 
factions in which powerful rivals can uphold or modify rules of succession and condition of 
eligibility and can transform authority by appropriating it”.125 As authority became more easily 
sanctioned through performance than heritable privilege, at least by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, personality politics thrived amongst the Balowoka chieftainships. Just as 
personality had been a key factor in the establishment of the dynasties, so now the ability to 
carry and control the historical narrative of their own legitimacy did hinge somewhat on 
individual personhood rather than what that person was seen to sovereignly represent. In these 
Tumbuka chieftainships, it is clearly demonstrable that personality played, and continues to 
play, a key role in capturing the “formal authority” which Apter speaks of.  
Bearing this milieu in mind, alongside Boone’s suggestion of spatial re-orientation, it is 
interesting to observe the emergence of Timothy Chawinga as a regionally significant, 
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charismatic personality. This thesis will document how his concern lay primarily with the 
protection of his position within the regional political and moral economy; his personal vision 
did not extend much beyond the pursuit and production of authority within his own and his 
immediately neighbouring territories. That he was able to pursue this agenda, and develop a 
strong territorial claim over the Hewe Valley, as a geography and a place of social relations, with 
such a free hand has much to do with the limited geographical and economic significance which 
Hewe had, if we “see” it as the colonial state might have;126 it’s position in the eyes of the 
administration inevitably enabled this regional locality to emerge as it did, and as such enabled 
Timothy Chawinga to practice a territoriality that served, in various ways, to augment his 
chiefly authority.127  
 
 
Part three. A different lens of analysis 
 
Constructing and using locality  
Just as there were limitations to how far the colonial government could wholly invent structures 
of authority, there were limitations too on how far chiefs could manage and manipulate social 
and geographical boundaries for their own benefit. To understand why this might have been 
more possible requires the introduction of the spatial concept of locality. 
Much like the nation-state, or other large-scale identities, “the local community, as a 
socially and usually also territorially bound unit, distinct from its neighbours and with some 
degree of autonomy” also has to be “‘constructed’ and ‘imagined’”;128 it is not, and never can be a 
static “container of historicity”.129 This spatial construction, much like that of the chiefly 
institutions which have been discussed above, is in perpetual transformation,130 being 
“constantly created anew by social interactions and imaginations”,131 and the forces which carve 
out this space interact with it in a dynamic way. Finding an appropriate spatial concept in which 
to observe the activities of Timothy Chawinga which is flexible enough to accommodate all the 
influences that make and continue to recreate it becomes paramount for this study. The Hewe 
Valley as a “local” place was, and is, maintained through its connection to “non-local” 
contexts,132 understanding the ways in which Chawinga contributed to the shaping of “Hewe”, in 
collusion with, and counter to, colonial forces forms the major part of this work. In order to do 
this most effectively it is decided that the more flexible concept of locality will be employed as it 
reflects the continual production of a space and can accommodate both the historicity and 
spatial specificity of chieftainship.  
Whilst it has characteristics driven from within a specific geography, ecology and 
politics, a “locality” is shaped most significantly by relational factors: with regard to 
neighbouring localities, in relation to the state, and through processes that are global. 
Importantly for this thesis, locality can provide a useful lens which accommodates the dynamic 
forces which shape it, as well as being presented as a forceful arena which compels change itself. 
The production of locality, in the succinct words of Appadurai, is both “context-driven and 
context-generating”;133 an elastic concept which can be used in a variety of ways and which is 
able to be re-shaped again and again by “the contingencies of history, environment and 
imagination”.134 Bearing this in mind, the research seeks to move away from treating Timothy 
Chawinga’s Hewe, the place of his chieftainship, as merely a conventional geographical space.135 
Rather, that it represented a set of relations between things as well as a space which contained 
and dissimulated social relations.136 At the height of his powers, this thesis will argue, Chawinga 
contributed significantly to the production of Hewe as a locality, by constructing as a structure 
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of feeling, a property of social life, and an ideology of a “situated community”137 for his own 
purposes; primarily the extraction of wealth and power. The result being that in between 1942-
1974 the space in which Timothy Chawinga practiced his authority was used by him as a 
powerful “tool of thought and of action”,138 not simply as a place in which he could perform his 
administrative, and formal, role as Native Authority.  
Whilst Chawinga reshaped the political geography of Hewe in a number of different 
ways, which will be drawn out more thoroughly in chapters three and four, the increasingly 
centralised character of the chieftaincy, and the visibility which the Royal Family of Chawinga139 
had within the area by the time Timothy came to the throne, was greatly influenced by certain 
former Katumbi chiefs. The petitioning of the government, and the activities of Timothy’s 
predecessors within Hewe which helped to reposition their family locally, are dealt with at 
some length in chapter two, but it should be noted here that the material – and particularly 
infrastructural – elements which had been introduced into the Valley in the couple of decades 
before he himself was crowned, such as the road (in 1932) and the labour recruitment camp 
(1937), created an economic and social space in which the Katumbi chiefs could act publicly for 
the first time. Once Chief Katumbi had been officially recognised by the government as a Native 
Authority in 1933, and a chiefs house and office had been constructed in this more ‘appropriate’ 
public place, at the new crossroads where shops, small resthouses and restaurants had begun to 
emerge, the chieftaincy which had formerly been a scattered collection of families settled in 
more remote areas, found a new place in the landscape; one that was economically well 
positioned and more visibly powerful. Von Oppen too has noted the significance which the 
demarcations of new “political centers” have for the people in these places. Whereas before 
centres of authority might be unknown or hidden – this spatial invisibility adding a mystery to 
their role – increasingly public gathering places, administrative buildings, court rooms, 
missionary stations and schools vied amongst one another as “rival centers within the 
locality”.140  
The spatial concentration and reinforcement of the institutional structure and 
geographical boundaries of the Katumbi Chieftainship was a process continued by Timothy 
Chawinga who used various other resources available to him in order to produce a sense of 
place and ensure his claim to ruling Hewe was continually legitimised. Assembling a story 
about, boundaries around and relationships within, a particular locality can be done in a 
number of ways but one of the most significant of these activities in the history of Timothy’s 
chieftainship was through hunting. It is perhaps too great a leap of the imagination to suggest 
that when he became chief he consciously used the symbolic power of hunting as an activity to 
demarcate and give form to his territory. There is no doubt, however, that he worked this to his 
advantage, especially after seeing the effect that both his killing of dangerous game and 
management of garden pests had upon his authority. Both protective and – through the 
provision of meat – clientelistic, hunting did play some role in his claim to the area and perhaps 
enabled him to link his authority over a space with a right in managing the natural resources 
within it; this is especially so after the government “formalized” this resource management role 
by making him an honorary game warden of the game rich area to the south of the Valley. 
Hunting had the effect of reinforcing the boundaries containing these resources, keeping 
animals in, and keeping other potential exploiters out; an official role and right to prosecute 
anyone contravening these boundaries bolstered this claim to territory. 
The successful production and reproduction of a local identity is commonly done most 
successfully with the formulation of a distinct local history.141 Such use and referencing of 
history, in this spatially re-ordered landscape where claims to autochthony and belonging 
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became key aspects of legitimation, more effectively wed identity to place. The useable past 
could be more easily “commemorated or commiserated with reference to space”.142 
Furthermore history could be used to develop a strong local identity in contrast to other 
neighbouring localities, an important technique for reinforcing, and potentially extending, its 
own boundaries, it is able to “enhance a community’s prestige in relation to its neighbours, by 
stressing difference and even conflict with competitors”.143 In Hewe, Timothy Chawinga did not 
only prioritise a discursive idea of his territory, through an annual performance of the history of 
his ancestral arrival, he also practiced this contemporaneously with regular tours of his area, 
visiting his people in every far-reaching place. This was a practice considered a most crucial 
instrument of colonial territoriality. Fields points out that “the symbolic aspect of touring” was 
an important element of colonial control.144 Chawinga himself knew the benefits of visiting the 
far-flung places of his territory, and his practicing of this is often attributed to D.C. Cosmo 
Haskard, who as the first district official based in Rumphi itself, had a big influence on the 
administrative style of Timothy Chawinga. 
 
Limitations to Territoriality 
If the possibility is set out, as it is here, that territories are able to be contained within territory 
then it is also important however to note the territories that existed within Hewe. These spaces 
were forged by other trans-local relationships and institutions, for example the introduction of 
the Catholic Church within Hewe, or indeed the base of the Witwatersrand Labour Native 
Association (WNLA), and could potentially work as territories. These new types of community 
model which had never existed before or which had never before been highly territorially 
oriented – the religious congregation, which developed in the vicinity of the local evangelical 
mission station; the economic cooperative (“society”), a union of merchants or producers; local 
branches and wards of political parties – which developed with the struggle for independence 
and later converged with other models of communal locality which had been developing since 
1940s (parishes, village groups, wards).145 At times, these organizations might have been 
enabled to work more effectively as territories than at others. Much depended upon the ways in 
which Timothy Chawinga practiced his own territorial ambition and as such suppressed the 
ambitions of these places within his area. Observing how Chawinga dealt with these places 
within Hewe is interesting as they provided some of the only major threats to his sources of 
authority. No more easily is it to see how Chawinga’s territorial activities were fundamental to 
his grip on legitimacy and authority than when a new territorial order emerged in the post-
colonial period.  
Timothy Chawinga was arrested in 1974; ten years after the coming of Independence. A 
number of incidents he had been involved with saw him fall out of favour with the Malawi 
Congress Party government of Hastings Banda. From 1966, when Banda adopted a republican 
constitution and Malawi became a one-party state, the place of the Hewe Valley – and the 
Katumbi Chieftainship – was, in effect, redefined. In this new context Hewe became much less 
peripheral in the eyes of the state. Its proximity to the Zambian border transformed it from 
“remote” place to “threatening” border-zone and as such was monitored heavily by state agents. 
This shift, which encompassed many other changes, transformed the opportunities which 
Timothy Chawinga had to accumulate authority through territoriality, and it could be argued 
that the tension which this produced between this chief and the post-colonial state ultimately 
led to his downfall. 
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The importance of a historical example 
This introduction has discussed the opportunities that the new geographical order offered 
chiefs. These opportunities are only notable, in all their specificity, if a spatial analysis is used 
rather than a neo-traditional one which has focused the debates on custom and its use and 
manipulation. Understanding the ways in which Timothy Chawinga shaped the place of Hewe, in 
collusion with, and counter to, colonial forces forms the major part of this work. Using the 
notion of locality as the main spatial framework, rather than state, it is easier to observe the 
techniques that Timothy Chawinga employed to enable his rule over this territory.  
 Acknowledging that whilst there are commonalities within the colonial chieftaincy there 
are also “important variations in [their] functional and territorial scope, legitimacy, and 
embeddedness”, these include “differences attributable to preexisting forms of political 
authority […] such as lineage structure, land tenure relations, and religion”.146 A holder of a 
chiefly title will always, therefore, depend upon a combination of sources of authority - spiritual, 
moral, economic – and most tend to rely more on one source than another. The space in which 
one accumulates authority, and active exploitation of the opportunities which this space offers, 
also matters greatly to the success of a chief.  
In the context of an uneven colonial administration, Chawinga established and enhanced 
his own position. He did this through writing and performing “the” local historical narrative, by 
developing a strong local identity in contrast to other neighbouring localities, through 
contesting territorial boundaries, asserting control over and exploiting natural resources, and 
maintaining strong regional economic and social ties; together these all had the effect of 
spatially concentrating and reinforcing the institutional structure and geographical boundaries 
of the Katumbi’s Chieftainship. He was in a strong position to contribute significantly to the 
dialogue between textual and physical space that produced the hegemonic constructions of 
native authority boundaries. Building this locality and being able to assert territoriality over it 
enabled new path ways for Chawinga to accumulate wealth and power. His was an authority 
that was set very definitely in territorial terms. 
Unlike some of the Native Authority chiefs more well-known to the Malawian 
historiography the freedom Chawinga had to act within the area under his jurisdiction was 
considerable. The lack of obvious economic opportunities for the government – on account of 
the seemingly poor connectivity of the Hewe Valley within the colony – and the low political 
threat it posed to the regime with Chawinga at the helm,147 all contributed to the need for only a 
limited interaction with colonial agents. Chawinga regularly fulfilled the somewhat limited 
expectations which the government had of him, and with these most basic of boxes ticked they 
left his area relatively un-examined. This comparative independence combined with Hewe’s 
position as a border-zone comprising strong regional connections to people and markets in 
Northern Rhodesia were major factors contributing to Chawinga’s more successful money-
making and power-accumulating activities. Whilst he did take advantage of the position which 
the state enabled to use tradition and custom, perhaps most important was his ability to build 
his authority through a material exploitation of his land; this had not been a main pathway to 
power in the past. The fact that Native Authority chiefs contested borders and boundaries in 
ways their forebears had never considered useful speaks to how the transition from wealth in 
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Part four. Methodology and sources 
 
Historiography and sources 
That this story is a detailed local study comes as a result of an early commitment to collecting 
oral historical knowledge and doing situational analysis in “the field”. Whilst the more usual 
archival research was undertaken over the course of eight months in Malawi and Zambia, as 
well as London and Edinburgh, seven months of fieldwork in northern Malawi formed a critical 
aspect of the data collection. During this time over 120 interviews were conducted, most of 
which took place in the vernacular language of the region, Chitumbuka. Research assistants 
helped to locate and conduct these semi-structured exchanges and some of the informants were 
visited two or three times during the fieldwork period. The recording of people’s life histories 
was an aspect of the research which built up a general picture of the struggles, both quotidian 
and extraordinary, that were experienced in Hewe. The contribution of these discussions is 
reflected in the general picture, as well as the specific quotations, painted in this thesis. 
Oral historical methodologies are not, however, without their problems. In fact it quickly 
became clear that the processes behind the production of knowledge which was taking place in 
the encounter between researcher and informant, and in the context of local political tensions 
about chiefly successions, were more interesting to analyse than the oral texts themselves. As 
chiefs and headmen told their clan histories it became clear how important the performative 
element was in producing authority; something which became a key aspect underlying the 
argument of this thesis. Aside from the empirical information collected during the interviews, 
which is central to the analysis, the time spent in Hewe was enlightening in a variety of other 
ways. As Moore and Vaughan emphasized in their study of the Bemba in Zambia, everyday 
“practices” are revealing in what they can tell us about the ways Africans constitute their own 
agency. Furthermore, spending an extended period of time in the place one writes about enables 
the location of structures of feeling, geographical insight, as well as visceral understanding of 
distance and landscape that cannot be found in written accounts.  
  The written source material was found mostly in archives. In the Public Records Office 
in London Colonial and Foreign Office files were consulted, and in the National Library of 
Scotland in Edinburgh relevant papers from the Livingstonia Mission held in the Church of 
Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) archive were read. It was, however, in Malawi and to a lesser 
extent Zambia, where the majority of written material was consulted. The Malawi National 
Archives hold the provincial and district records which were central to the “discovery” of 
Timothy Chawinga and the administrative context in which he ruled as Chief Katumbi. Archived 
newspapers, colonial information pamphlets and vernacular literature were also available here, 
as well as some additional material from missionaries and leading African nationalists. Material 
from the post-colonial period was less well catalogued and therefore proved harder to 
consistently find but it was an insightful source of information about the Malawi Congress Party 
government nevertheless. Potentially important missing files, from the late colonial period, 
were lost through fire and insect infestation and others had been misfiled or removed. 
Statistical records were patchy and the absence of local court records, a possible casualty of 
these unfortunate circumstances, disabled certain pathways of knowledge about the chieftaincy 
of Chawinga.  
The limited historiography on northern Malawi posed its own challenges. Much 
excellent history has been written on the region; the work of John McCracken, Owen Kalinga, 
Joey Power, Leroy Vail and Wapu Mulwafu, has contributed in a wide variety of ways to 
understanding the economic and political changes that took place in this area over the past 
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couple of hundred years. There is no doubt, however, that the emphasis on political nationalism, 
the impact of labour migration and the role of the Scottish missionaries, have remained the 
most common research concerns. The legacy of Hasting Banda’s thirty year rule on the 
production of knowledge in the country must be mentioned. With access to the archives tightly 
controlled and the development of Malawian academics severely hampered during this time it is 
clear that historians of Malawi faced many difficulties; this has had an impact on the breadth 
and depth of the historiography. This can be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity for 
new researchers. A challenge because one has to orient oneself in a field with fewer reference 
points, but a definite opportunity in as much as the wealth of subjects and sources that remain 
unearthed and untapped enable truly original histories to be written; histories which can 
challenge the chronological and geographical orthodoxies that have framed the historiography 
for so long.  
 
The boundaries of research 
Before going on to discuss what this thesis hopes to challenge in its own way, it is perhaps 
important to indicate what is not addressed, and why. Regrettably a more rigorously gendered 
approach to chiefly power will not be found within these pages. On reflection this is possibly 
one of its most glaring of faults, especially given the embedded patriarchal nature of both pre-
colonial and colonial chiefly institutions, but it is one that to adequately redress would require 
rebooting the whole project. Gender has to be applied from the outset: to run through data 
collection methods, to fashion questions, and to rethink categories of analysis. Such a 
perspective would likely have rendered visible many aspects of chiefly power and authority that 
could have informed perspectives on: the relationship between Chawinga and the livelihood 
strategies of his people; the social and economic implications of Chawinga’s own interpretations 
of “customary law”; and the varying extent of authority which Chawinga extended over the 
household level and how this changed over time. As such new conclusions about the daily 
struggles of people, especially women, and how these struggles interact with and inform chiefly 
authority could have been reached. That said there are crucial threads throughout the work that 
indicate the importance of women in shaping Chawinga’s continuing authority. That he tried to 
assert power over his rivals through attempting to gain control over their wives is telling; 
furthermore, the gendered responses given to questions about his leadership highlight the fact 
that the “commoners” of Hewe cannot be understood as one homogenous group.  
 As has been mentioned, local court records exist for only the first few years of 
Chawinga’s leadership. Since these constitute one of the most regularly tapped sources for 
understanding the relationship between the institutionalized patriarchal authority of chiefs and 
the women under their jurisdiction this has been a disappointing discovery. Chanock’s still 
unsurpassed survey of customary law and social order in colonial Malawi and Zambia shows in 
some detail how people used native authority courts, which were by no means all powerful 
during the colonial period. With “a lack of ability to enforce judgement of civil compensation” as 
well as “the co-existence of unofficial courts both in village and town”,148 the decision which 
many made to take a case to these courts is intriguing. It is shown again and again that when it 
came to the control of women, at a time when traditional structures of social order were being 
transformed in the colonial economy and “a foreign legalized form of defining and enforcing 
rights was becoming dominant”,149 these courts were used by large numbers. Court fees did not 
deter those bringing cases of matrimonial breakdown in particular as people could see that they 
could benefit from having “these kinds of rights enforced in this way”.150  
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These examples have illustrated how members of the African patriarchal elite allied 
with colonial officials in order to establish “a mode of control of women and marriage suited to 
new conditions”.151 The way in which this was done, through the “criminalization of adultery 
and the legalization of customary marriage”,152 certainly had implications for the ways in which 
local authorities could control domestic reproduction. As would be expected the court records 
that do exist are overwhelmingly concerned with marital disputes in Hewe too. A closer reading 
of a set of data over a longer period of time from Chawinga’s native courts could possibly have 
shown some more specific ways in which he used customary law to his advantage; or indeed 
present cases where less powerful actors, especially women, were able to wrestle some control 
themselves. 
 It was an early decision to spend time looking at the pre-colonial institutions in the 
region; thinking before and beyond the colonial timeframe has been crucial to this research and 
the understanding of chiefly authority it enables. Looking beyond the nation state boundaries 
was also paramount to this study of what amounts to a border-zone chieftaincy. The fieldwork 
undertaken for this thesis made a definite start by collecting oral narratives and written sources 
from the Zambian as well as the Malawian side of the border, however the merest of scratches 
revealed how much more needs to be done in this regard. Clan histories from chiefly families 
located across the border in Malambo and Muyombe need to be more rigorously collected, and a 
fuller investigation into the economic and social connections between these communities and 
those in Hewe would add great richness to the ongoing debates about colonial chieftaincy in 
southern Africa more generally. 
Inevitably there are leads which one gets in the process of research which are not 
followed up on, either due to a lack of time or as a consequence of limited evidence. The life 
histories of individuals around Timothy Chawinga – his councillors, the messengers, the local 
African agricultural assistants and tax collectors – were tantalizing in the depth that they might 
have brought to discussions around the daily practice of power in Hewe. The voices of these 
characters were difficult to find, though perhaps a more dogged pursuit would have produced 
results. The personal and professional relationships between Chawinga and other chiefs in 
Malawi, especially Mwase and Kyungu were not given as much attention as they ought to have 
been. Neither were the contributions of the educated and politically minded individuals in Hewe 
excavated as extensively as they might have been, especially the background of the first 
Members of Parliament from the area Mikeka Mkandawire and Levi Kaleya. More attention paid 
to these people would have bridged the discussion between the struggles of the general 
population in Hewe and the ambitions of political elites.   
Whilst the history of Chawinga’s chieftaincy has been built up through the examination 
of normal peoples’ everyday experiences, the choices and decisions these people made as 
individuals, and as members of households, do not take centre stage in this thesis. That is not to 
say that they are not vitally important to understanding the practice of colonial chieftaincy, after 
all what is a chief without people? It has been made clear throughout that the economic 
strategies of the people of Hewe and the reproduction of their labour are strongly linked to the 
production of chiefly power; furthermore, the impact of the international labour migration 
economy on structures of local authority have, hopefully, been sufficiently acknowledged. 
However, the emphasis of this work has been intentionally put on the dynamics of the local 
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Part five. Outline of the thesis 
 
The first chapter outlines the pre-colonial landscapes of authority in northern Malawi. By 
considering the changes that took place before the colonial and post-colonial period within the 
societies that the thesis is concerned, the chieftainship of the fifteenth Katumbi, Timothy 
“Kamangilira” Chawinga, is placed within a deeper time-scale. Historical relationships with 
other authorities in the region are highlighted as are the motifs of authority on which Chawinga 
draws to assemble his own claims to the past.  
 
Chapter two will deal more explicitly with the early colonial period when territories were 
forged. It will probe the processes behind the delineation of colonial geographies, especially the 
creation of native authorities in northern Nyasaland. It will examine the relationship between 
textual and physical space and the extent to which chiefs were able to involve themselves in the 
dialogue which produced these new territories. Whilst recognising that colonial visions of 
territorial space were hegemonic the chapter will investigate the voices of Africans in Hewe 
who were sometimes able to appropriate these visions for their own benefit. By mastering the 
language and tools of colonial territoriality – the commissions, reports and surveys, as well as 
the formulaic demarcation of tribes and ethnicities – the Katumbi chieftaincy, under the 
leadership of Dukamayere I, had the opportunity of struggling for and eventually shaping the 
territory over which it became Native Authority.   
 
Chapter three will discuss the local and national political context surrounding Timothy 
Chawinga’s crowning as Themba Katumbi Kamangilira. It will establish a sense of why the 
timing of his ascent was crucial to his success and will introduce one of the central ideas of this 
thesis: that by observing national policy changes alone, or by focusing on the chief solely as 
“Native Authority”, one cannot get a sense of how varied chiefs’ position and roles could be. 
Whilst national policy had some bearing on what was expected from them it did not create the 
same framework of opportunity for everyone, and likewise local conditions had the effect of 
producing different expressions of indirect rule chief. By unsettling assumptions about the 
central role of the state in producing local authority chapter three will use Timothy’s story to 
probe: the uneven nature of local government reform; the importance of constructing local 
narratives of legitimacy even in the context of indirect rule; and the use by Chawinga of various 
non-chiefly sources of authority available to him.  
 
Chapter four tracks the relationship between the exploitation of agricultural resources and the 
accumulation of chiefly power; something that this thesis argues played a key factor in 
differentiating the position of native authority chiefs. Coinciding with a period of development 
after the Second World War, it will be argued that Chawinga’s early leadership was impacted 
upon significantly by the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1945 and 1949. This period 
of administration, often referred to as the “second colonial occupation” on account of the 
resolve on the part of the British Colonial Office to refocus its efforts in Africa, saw a huge 
investment in production. This new focus on environmental control and agricultural reform, 
and the attendant increase in resources and training through initiatives such as the Natural 
Resources Board and the Native Welfare Development Fund that came with it, saw new 
opportunities emerge for native authority chiefs to grow their authority. These reforms and 
interactions enabled local leaders such as Timothy Chawinga new ways of extracting and 
increasing their power in the local context. However, these opportunities did not always get 
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translated in successful ways; it will be argued that the presence of a thriving regional and cross 
border food market which gave a certain amount of autonomy from the state ensured that 
Chawinga had more chance of doing this than some of his fellow native authorities.  
 
Chapter five will concentrate on how Chawinga managed to contain the challenges to his 
leadership in the run up to independence whilst chiefs around him struggled to do the same 
during the eventful decade of the 1950s; and how he negotiated his way through the myriad 
political alliances each promising to protect the future of native authorities in an independent 
Malawi. It was not necessarily chiefs’ interactions with national level politicians that would see 
their future secured though, the ways in which a chief performed his role in the eyes of his 
people at this time of political “crisis” could have a significant impact on his future legitimacy. 
Furthermore, his ability to guarantee secure livelihoods at this time was of much greater 
significance to the colonial government than his political views. In light of this it will be shown 
that dividing chiefs into “nationalists” and “stooges” is neither helpful nor insightful.  
 
Chapter six will put forward the argument that what happened between Timothy Chawinga and 
the local Malawi Congress Party faithful at this time of political transition, and in the early years 
of independence was absolutely crucial in determining how his relationship with the 
postcolonial state and its leadership would be shaped. It is through this lens of analysis that the 
shifting fortunes of Chawinga will be examined, rather than simply through the changes which 
were taking place at the national level. Having thrived within the colonial framework, where a 
new territorial politics enabled Chawinga to grow in personal wealth and power, certain of the 
new challenges he faced as the opportunity for other individuals to increase their influence will 
be confronted, and his responses examined. This chapter will conclude by considering the 
consequences of Hewe’s transformation from peripheral “border zone”, with little attention 
being paid to it, to that of crucial “border post”, a key check point in the war against Hastings 
Banda’s political rivals and unwelcome neighbours.   
 
                                                             
1 The Nyasaland Protectorate was a British colony created in 1907. It was formerly administered by the 
British South Africa Company which had taken control of the area, and consequently from 1891 known as 
the British Central African Protectorate, after the British Foreign Office took control of it. 
2 The role played by Timothy Chawinga at this time is not entirely clear as there are many different 
stories that describe his orders and instructions at this time. Some remember that Chawinga “listened to 
the people but did not show his actions directly as he was also part of the government. He told people not 
to break bridges and block roads because they will suffer in the future if they do”, Interview Mary Davies 
[hereafter MD] with Lyton Karua, Mgugu village, 23 January 2009. Others remember, however, that it was 
Chawinga himself who had ordered the disruption of the areas roads and bridges (see Interview MD with 
Samson Mumba, Chipofya Village, 27 January 2009, and MD with David Chawinga and Principal Group 
Village Headman Mikule, Mikule Village, 16 January 2009).  
3 “Soldiers were coming from South Africa and Zimbabwe and came straight to chiefs asking who the 
party leaders were. Chiefs were showing who were the party leaders and then they were arrested”. 
Interview MD with Jato Kawonga, Nguwoyang’ombe village, 29 January 2009. 
4 Interview MD with NyaGondwe, Yiteta village, 10 January 2009 
5 Interview MD with Acting Village Headman Thanila, Godwin Chawinga, 16 January 2009   
6 Interview MD with Norman Chawinga, Yiteta village, 21 January 2009 
7 Personal communication with Joey Power and Owen Kalinga, 21 November 2010 
8 Many other interviews brought up this motif. During an informal discussion between the author and 
Dickson Mzumara on 10 January 2009, he said that Chawinga had remained in the office saying: “shoot 
me”. 
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Stories of chieftainship: 




Part one. Pre-Colonial Landscapes 
 
Hewe before the Balowoka: ecology, people and politics  
The Hewe Valley lies in the western most part of what is today Rumphi District, a 
predominantly Tumbuka locality in the northern region of Malawi. In pre-colonial times this 
area formed part of a “healthy tsetse-free land bridge that […] functioned as a natural funnel of 
people into the hospitable highlands of Malawi”;1 this “Tumbuka-Zone” welcomed a variety of 
people, over a long period of time, from southern Tanzania and north-eastern Zambia and 
developed a distinct character which was quite different from Tumbuka areas to the south, both 
in terms of inheritance, settlement patterns and, indeed, structures of authority.2 It is generally 
agreed3 that before the arrival of a group of traders-turned-chiefs known as the Balowoka4, the 
communities that lived here were, whilst unified by language, pretty fragmented. Vail infers that 
the physical landscape itself accounts for both the nature of settlement and the structures of 
religious authority to be found there: 
 
“The territory in which the Tumbuka lived was not conducive to large settlements, partly because of 
the dryness of the land and partly because of the rough and broken nature of the terrain. 
Throughout the area there were no strong political leaders. The people lived scattered in small 
groups over the face of the countryside, and it is natural that the most frequent manifestations of 
the religious spirit of the people should have been local and personal in nature. Ancestor veneration 
was basically a family affair, and witchcraft detection and peripheral possession were village 
matters”. 5 
 
Whilst Chondoka asserts that there existed a wider Tumbuka Kingdom from as early as 1460,6 
under the “chieftainship” of M’nyanjagha, there is no strong evidence to be found in Hewe 
amongst the earliest known occupants7 that they gave tribute to an authority elsewhere, or 
indeed that they had allegiances other than to their own clan.8 Regardless of whether there had 
existed some wider structure of organisation amongst the Tumbuka in the past, by the latter 
part of the eighteenth century, when the influence of the caravan trade was making its presence 
felt in this region, no political or economic polity of any note was in evidence.9 Furthermore any 
wider influence a central figure such as the M’nyanjagha King, as Chondoka would have it, could 
have exercised would certainly have been swallowed up in the new economic landscape that 
was emerging. A landscape where experience of trade and contact with coastal markets, which 
the Balowoka had, were the decisive factors in determining who would wield both economic 
and political power in the future. 
The economic landscape had, in fact, been in the process of major change for some time. 
A large trading space existed which extended from the Luangwa Valley, across the Tumbuka 
highlands and down to the Lakeshore; exchange in bark-cloth, local cotton cloth, tobacco, grain, 
various foodstuffs, reed-mats, arrow poison and arrow heads, local salt, and basketry meant 
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that there was already much interaction and interdependence between the Tumbuka, Bisa, 
Bemba, Lakeshore Tonga and Nkonde.10 Whilst it is commonly narrated that it was the groups of 
Balowoka who had first brought hoes into the area11 there is much oral and archaeological 
evidence to suggest that people already cultivated their land with Phoka, and sometimes Chewa, 
hoes which they exchanged goats, chickens or sometimes maize for, and even that they had 
begun to use these precious iron tools as a form of bridewealth.12 Furthermore the Tumbuka 
living in this area were also not completely ignorant as to the value of ivory, as some have 
suggested that they were. Official narratives state that when Katumbi arrived in the area around 
1770-80 he “found people putting on bark cloth and using ivory as props on which to spread 
their mats”,13 but there is much reason to believe that by this time the Bisa, skilled hunters 
arriving from the west, had already started collecting ivory from Tumbuka areas.  
According to tradition the Bisa had quite an impact on the pre-Balowoka society in 
Hewe. Coming in teams, they were “wanderers” who would rarely settle for long but who 
brought varied skills with them such as new ways of hunting with arrow poison (ulembe),14 
novel items of trade such as the copper wires they had fashioned into bangles and that are 
remembered to have been worn by village headmen,15 and even new forms of dance.16 But 
whilst the Bisa influenced a number of changes in Tumbuka settlements they did not seek to 
have a lasting impact on the political structures of the communities to the east of the Luangwa 
River.17 It was the migrants who travelled from the east at the end of the 18th Century who took 
trading and the organisation of monopolies over it, to a new level. 
 
An economic step-change: broader markets and better bargaining 
If the people living in the Hewe Valley knew something of the value of these “bones” through 
their interaction and exchange with Bisa, Chikunda and other groups,18 to what they had not 
been yet exposed was a more sophisticated and extensive coastal trade that had been in the 
process of reviving through the Kilwa route from around 1785.19 Described often as “coming 
from ‘the coast’ (mbwani)” and “dressing like Arabs” the Balowoka group brought with them a 
different kind of trading mentality, a commercial perspective, and experience from the busy 
markets in the east.20 Whilst there remains some debate as to whether these migrants came into 
the areas that they eventually settled specifically as traders or simply as people skilled in 
trading who had come looking for land on which to stay,21 what is apparent is that they were 
able to use this experience to further stimulate, extend, and eventually take control of the ivory 
trade as it passed through the areas in which they stayed; and to increase their personal wealth 
and status in doing so. The clan histories which the missionary Thomas Cullen Young collected 
during the early part of the twentieth century demonstrate that “a marked political change, 
namely the centralization of power” occurred at this time with the coming of these “strangers”; 
and that a “reliable” historical tradition emerges only once this settled contact has been made 
with “the commerce of the coast”.22  
Indeed the official dynastic tradition which has been inherited by the descendants of 
these trading migrants has tended to commence from this “political” moment, when the 
Balowoka are remembered as offering a form of sub-chieftainship to the people living in the 
areas they had been trading in:  
 
“Chieftainship was introduced by people who came across the lake for trading purposes, such people 
as Katumbi and Chikulamayembe. They came here with ideas and practices which were already 
developed where they had come from, and because they brought many good things with them, they 
were easily accepted as chiefs by the people who were already living in this area”.23 
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This is, of course, a rather simplified version of events; the process of what might have taken 
some decades compounded into one easily remembered sentence. It nevertheless captures the 
essence of the changes taking place. Impressed with the new commodities they brought with 
them and with their proficient bargaining skills, it is likely that local Tumbuka clan heads began 
looking to these “more superior”24 men who were pointing out the value of ivory, and skins, to 
them. Whether they were migrants seeking greener pastures or traders seeking markets they 
were in a good position to secure their residence in these areas through exploiting the presence 
of abundant game and negotiating economically prudent trading agreements with “the locals”. 
Then, through what is likely was a combination of strategies, which corresponded to the 
economic and political conditions which the different migrant groups found themselves, the 
various Balowoka moved beyond the setting up of key commercial alliances by marrying into 
the loosely organised local populations and associating themselves with local religious 
institutions.  
It is important, however, to note a crucial periodisation in the way in which this 
leadership took shape, which isn’t reflected in the official narratives. From the wider oral 
evidence it seems as though some of these first generation migrants, at least, did not 
immediately “settle” and they wielded no more power than that which their practiced bartering 
skills could create for them. As the coastal trade began to boom, and expand, this new pattern of 
authority was ushered in. The early incursions of such foreign intrusions in to the interior, as 
exampled by the Balowoka, marked the beginning of “the set of the tide from the Arabised east 
toward the interior”.25 As Cullen Young argues, using the example of the Yao who were also 
moving deeper into the country to the south of the lake, “it was not until the Arabs began to 
realise to what an extent the more pushing and mercantile-minded of the inlanders were 
enriching themselves as middlemen that they began themselves to penetrate the continent”.26  
The oral evidence available suggests a distinction between two periods; a time when the 
first generation Balowoka travelled and traded freely and widely, possibly even “going back” to 
the markets at the coast, and afterwards when “the Arabs began to come” to them in order to 
collect the ivory which was being “made ready for them”.27 A local historian of the Hewe area 
once told of the fact that the famous Arab King Mlozi, who operated from a base in Karonga at 
the lakeshore, sent his people to go straight “to house of Katumbi that was where the hunters 
who had ivory went to sell it”. 28 This distinction is important because, as one village headman 
emphatically asserted in an interview with the anthropologist and linguist Leroy Vail in 1970, “a 
chief does not leave his people to go and trade”.29 A significant change had taken place, a 
founding that marked the beginning of the chieftainship narratives that are seen in Hewe, 
Nkamanga and Muyombe today.30 
 
From Trader Barons to Chiefs 
So what had facilitated this turn of events, this shifting of priorities? And what were the 
implications of it? As far as the limited evidence shows it seems that this conscious and 
extensive Arab incursion had the effect of shifting the scale of trading in the northern Tumbuka 
Highlands up yet another level. Increased traffic on the routes which the Balowoka had in fact 
played a major role in opening up, and the resultant dwindling amount of game, provoked the 
need for new tactics of accumulation. Kalinga sums it up as follows: 
 
“It was not long before elephants became scarce in the region and the new chiefs were forced to 
depend upon tribute and tolls extracted from the caravans passing from the Luangwa Valley to the 
lakeside ports. It seems likely that the second generation coincided with this depletion of resources. 
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The sons either had to seize political control to tax the caravans or never expect to equal the 
affluence of their hunter-trader fathers”.31 
 
So whilst the first generation of Balowoka chiefs might feasibly be described as “trader barons” 
the “second generation used their fathers influence and prestige to take over political control”;32 
they were no longer able to rely on their trading prowess alone in order to accumulate wealth. 
Even whilst the extent of this new ‘political control’ has been debated,33 it is evident that some 
form of adaptation in authority was made amongst these different factions quite early on. In 
Nkamanga, for example, it seems increasingly likely that at this time the ancestor of 
Chikulamayembe, Gonapamuhanya, began “tactfully [building] political power in the area” by 
making “commercial visits” into the areas of the leading Tumbuka clans;34 by the time that the 
second or third generation of Balowoka had been established, the trade was coming to them as 
they had established their seats of power as nodal points on the caravan route. For example 
Bwati I, the son of Gonapamuhanya (the second generation Mlowoka, known also from this 
stage as Chikulamayembe), “was not a travelling trader, but when the Arabs came, he sold some 
of his ivory to them and distributed the goods which he obtained among the people”.35 
On account of their new political position the second-generation of Balowoka (if a 
generalisation like this can be permitted) wielded new responsibilities of patronage. With this 
patronage there came a right to draw labour from amongst their people and when necessary to 
“hire the services” of appropriate representatives to conduct business at coastal markets on 
their behalf.36 This had become essential, not only in order to maintain the display required of 
chiefs of their ability to accrue agents to act for them, but also to enable them to maintain their 
new territories effectively. The caravan routes which opened up by the early nineteenth century 
engendered an extremely competitive landscape; chieftaincies were made and broken in such 
circumstances. With the journey to and from market places such as Zanzibar taking upwards of 
a year to complete these envoys enabled chiefs to maintain their territory, secure local markets 
and fight off competitors when necessary. The importance of these representatives was 
reflected in the rich rewards these travelling salesmen were thought to have received on their 
return.37  
Oral sources suggest that the presence in the interior of Arab traders, and their 
representatives, was increasing throughout this time. Remembered as being associated with 
“Arabs from Mwela”, the Ruga-Ruga are one such example38 who are said to have traded just 
like them bringing better cloth, “superior” guns, and high quality metal tools.39 Mlozi was said to 
have used them as his representatives in the interior40 and they are often recalled in oral 
histories as having operated in Hewe.41 A superiority and sense of confidence that people saw in 
Katumbi as he dealt with these errant and unpredictable groups is expressed clearly in local 
sources:  
 
“People differed from one place to another in their evaluation of goods. There were those like 
Katumbi who had come from the East (Mbwani), where they knew trading ways, and hence could 
deal successfully with the Ruga-Ruga. Then there were others in the area who didn’t know that ivory 
was valuable and were willing to have it exchanged for a small amount of cloth”.  42  
 
These people would mainly trade with “chiefs” like Katumbi because “they were the people who 
had a lot of wealth […] The Ruga-Ruga would come to Katumbi’s court with cloth, guns and 
beads […] They bought all the ivory and slaves that they wanted and then made friendship with 
the chief so that they could come again”.43 The caravan trade did not simply enrich these men 
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however; it offered new opportunities for accumulation amongst the local people themselves, 
and new avenues for hierarchies to emerge. This ‘new’ commodity, ivory, enthused a local 
population into tracking down the source of this wealth for themselves; “classes of professional 
hunters (Fundi) and professional traders who became rich and highly respected in society” grew 
up.44 Furthermore people “specialized in manufacturing weapons with which to kill elephants 
and other large animals”45 began organising themselves to make knives, spears and axes but 
also “excellent imitations of the European guns and […] locally manufactured ammunitions”.46 It 
is unlikely, however, that such people sold this ivory directly to the traders. Whilst some 
accounts emphasise that “the parties of Arabs” in fact traded with “anyone who had ivory”,47 in 
reality this must have rarely happened. The Balowoka had effectively developed monopolies 
over the ivory business in their area. Whilst there was some space for village headmen (and 
occasionally commoners) to sell their ivory and skins, even slaves at times,48 independently of 
the new chiefs, they had tended to win out with their skilled negotiation and sufficiently 
developed patronage network; this had kept them well stocked with the commodities the 
traders required, and the loyalty the chiefs needed.49 The different Balowoka families had 
accumulated a lot of wealth as traders by this point, and with this wealth they were able to 
distribute widely to increase their prestige and power. 
Whilst all these changes were taking place within the sphere of influence of individual 
chiefs, new forms of trade diplomacy and competitiveness were being shaped between them; a 
competitiveness that, it will be argued, has remained embedded in their royal narratives up 
until today. This change in interaction with each other, from being interrelated migrants less 
than 30 years before to becoming commercial rivals, is more easily understood if we take into 
account the growing need to assert a form of territoriality in this “fluid and mobile space” 50 of 
exchange. Likely comprising a “patchwork” of activities and interactions, this space might have 
looked something like how Gray describes certain mid-nineteenth century southern Gabonese 
trade routes, “with those districts near commercially active and nodal points being more fluid 
and those in the peripheral areas being more stable”. His use of the notion of territoriality can 
be employed by us to analyse how the commonly expressed narratives of competitiveness might 
have been shaped in Hewe and Nkamanga:  
 
“Territoriality was exercised in two ways in pre-colonial districts: In the efforts of commercial big 
men to regulate the movement of goods and people as well as controlling access to neighboring 
districts and in the organization of self-defense from external threats. Those districts more fully 
integrated into the long distance trade spent considerable energy trying to control trading activity 
but at the same time this increased activity was creating instability and paranoia. Thus, leaders in 
districts that contained key commercial nodal points were generally unable to organize effective 
resistance to colonial rule as they did not trust each other nor were willing to jeopardize their own 
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The Hewe Valley and the Nkhamanga Plain, the territorial bases of the Katumbi and 
Chikulamayembe dynasties respectively did not of course behave in the same ways as the 
Gabonese, but that they were “nodal points” on the coastal trading caravan route is in little 
doubt; whilst ivory was collected from the interior in several places and several routes 
developed around the northern end of the lake, most of these routes are remembered to have 
passed through the areas of these chiefs. Indeed, it has been posited by Kalinga that the political 
culture of these chiefdoms was influenced to a large extent by their competitiveness between 
one another and their need to maintain (and increase) their power so as to ensure collection of 
tax from passing trade and open access to the lakeshore trade points.52 As Gray suggests, 
leaders at such nodal points were “more likely to exercise territoriality to control access to 
neighboring districts and obtain toll revenue”.53  
It is unlikely, given that this fluidity of territoriality existed, that there could have been 
one centralised kingdom under the rule of Chikulamayembe as has been claimed by a long list of 
people beginning with the European missionaries at Livingstonia54 and the African elites who 
informed them, on in to the creators of the history syllabus of high schools in present-day 
Malawi. Aside from the fact that no common dynastic narratives exist to suggest this anywhere 
other than in Nkamanga itself, from a purely economic standpoint it is clear to see that the 
Balowoka, whilst certainly interdependent on each other ensuring the safety of goods and 
people from the other Balowoka regions, were each trying to establish their “own economic 
region from which he ensured the safety of the local trade routes and tapped ivory and other 
resources for his long-distance trade with the East coast”.55 
In the early stages of their arrival within these communities the traders were evidently 
operating as classic Big Men; by their own efforts they were able to take up leading roles in local 
politics without the need of obtaining a local title. The special position they held in the economic 
landscape of their localities meant they controlled labour and received tribute; key factors 
which enabled further accumulation and the maintenance of their position. However, whilst 
their economic activities were useful in establishing prowess, they maintained a rather 
precarious position; as Apter points out with Nigerian examples, such men held no “formal 
authority”, because “a Big Man’s power is sustained solely by his clients”.56 An authority 
premised on economic power alone is always vulnerable to the vagaries of external factors. 
Furthermore, and for the most part, the Balowoka struggled to establish strong social 
control over their populations. Kalinga argues that this was their strategy of rule, 
accommodating indigenous institutions by adapting “them to suit their convenience”.57 Rather 
than imposing a strange new system their approach, he argues, was to give themselves an 
advantage over their fathers by gradually intermarrying with leading families,58 enabling them 
now to “be considered as native sons because of kinship connections on the maternal side”.59 
Chondoka is rather less impressed by their strategy, describing it more or less as the only option 
that was open to them. He argues that they could only rule the “scattered” Tumbuka “through a 
system of indirect rule […] through the existing political structures”.60 Whether their methods 
were innovative or pragmatic, in the end the results echo the same conclusion: “wherever they 
ruled, the Balowoka left the Tumbuka local traditional authorities to rule over their people 
according to their custom and creed. Thus, the grassroots rulers at village level […] were the 
indigenous people. The appointing authorities were the local people and the Balowoka rarely 
rejected such appointments. This system of rule made it difficult for the Balowoka to change the 
Tumbuka way of life”.61 The people of Nkamanga and Hewe put it another, though not entirely 
contradictory, way:   
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“Chikulamayembe was a man of traditions and he took it a responsibility of his to preserve the 
traditions he had found among the ancestors who were here before he came. This was the case in 
the field of religion because he patronised a number of priests at various places in his area”.62   
 
“As far as I know, the Balowoka did not change anything that they found here. Instead they listened 
to the owners of the land – the Tumbuka.”63 
 
The reasons for the “preservation” or “persistence” of local custom must have rested partly on 
the nature of the political and spiritual landscapes which were most commonly found in this 
Tumbuka-Zone. Unlike the Chewa chiefs to the south, who “ruled over defined areas and who 
enjoyed considerable power and authority”,64 the Balowoka were attempting to centralize their 
authority over small pockets of country which contained only very localised notions of territory.  
The people in these areas had a parochial sense of theology and only a very intermittent 
relationship with wider-based territorial spirit cults,65 which they consulted rarely, largely only 
during times of disaster or general drought; “with such basically local foci for territorial 
worship, and with such a locally-oriented theological pattern”66 control over land, fertility and 
agricultural production would also have been localised affairs.  These dynamics did not make it 
easy for the Balowoka to truly establish themselves amongst the people, and produced a more 
fragile type of leadership. 
 
History and Ritual: constructing a place in the landscape 
In order to counter the pessimistic prognosis for their long-term authority, a more significant 
control over the social and political life of the Tumbuka communities and a more substantial 
authority in the land was required. Over time the way in which these chieftaincies did this, with 
varying degrees of success, was by founding a political tradition around a centralising historical 
narrative, as well as by penetrating or manipulating indigenous religious institutions;67 linking 
themselves and their clan histories with the practices of ancestral worship that were found 
across this zone. They made connections (usually through marriage) with ancestral shrines and 
rain-making cults, bringing ritual specialists under their control and taking on the exercise of 
ritual power themselves; this role being “one of the most potent sources of chiefly authority”.68 
The bringing into existence of an enduring, though flexible, historical narrative of the royal 
lineage which could be co-opted and performed to suit was equally important. 
It was by shifting the focus from the many local ancestral cults to that of the ‘new’ 
centralising royal lineage that several of the Balowoka dynasties tried to move beyond their 
purely commercially anchored credence; they wanted to create an authentic credibility derived 
from more esoteric underpinnings. At Pwezi, for example, in the Henga Valley where another 
Balowoka chief, Mwahenga, had established himself, worship began to be conducted “at a pool 
controlled directly by the chiefly family and took the form of the cult of the ancestors of the 
chiefly lineage itself”.69 This was in essence the only way that such chiefly institutions, whose 
power was premised so much on commercial prowess, could shift people’s allegiances; in order 
to have longevity they would need to be able to offer protection over crops, favorable weather 
conditions, and the authority to resolve local disputes ensuring the health of the community.  
But whilst “ancestors of chiefly lineages came to be most important as rain-cult spirits”70 
in many places, there is little oral evidence to testify to the role of pre-colonial Balowoka chiefs 
in organising and controlling the day-to-day agricultural affairs of the people. They received 
tribute – from people’s harvests as well as the obligatory animal skins and ivory – but the 
practicalities of land management, and the connection that people had with their natural  
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environment was still left largely to the individual family institutions. This distance was not 
really surprising given that in the pre-colonial setting authority over a given group of people did 
not necessarily correlate to a control over their land. 
As the introduction has made clear, a substantial link between sovereignty and control 
over territory was only established once the colonial administration came in. There was some 
direct control over the land once the royal families began marrying into autochthonous lineages, 
but anything more was unimaginable. This nebulous relationship between these Balowoka 
chiefs and the land on which they settled is important to remember once the analysis turns to 
assessing the impact of the colonial administration. The Nyasaland government wanted to 
create a framework of authority where a close relationship between chiefs and the land was at 
the heart of what it was to be a Native Authority; this assumed set of customary rights was 
bestowed upon them, with certain power to manage arenas of farmers lives where they had had 
borne no such responsibility before.71 
 
Divergences and Difference: establishing fault lines in the chiefly narratives 
Until now little differentiation has been noted amongst this ‘group’ of travelling, trading, 
migrants; rather more broad strokes of economic and political change have been painted. The 
preceding story of “arrival” and the “establishment” of various dynasties – Chikulamayembe, 
Katumbi, Muyombe, Mwahenga, and Mwamlowe – across this Tumbuka Zone has been a 
somewhat generic one. As crucial as their commonalities are, and as interesting as they are in 
highlighting trends in the formation of these chieftainships, it is in the foundation of their 
diverging narratives that we can find ruptures that are played out throughout the colonial 
period, and are referred to even today. Certainly as these men made transitions over a 
generation or two from trading migrants to chiefs their trajectories into leadership varied 
significantly. On account of geographical opportunities or constraints, relationships within and 
external to their territories, and individual “techniques of rule”, their patterns of power 
diverged from one another. Furthermore, and sometimes on account of the aforementioned 
divergence, they experienced significant differences from one another during the Ngoni and 
Bemba wars, and so on then with the dawning of missionary influence, and later as the colonial 
administration was established.  
Some of the key motifs of difference that can be seen in the oral sources had implications 
on colonial expressions of chiefly authority in these areas and many still have currency today as 
disputes over the past have significant implications for the present. Whether these 
contestations are about who wielded power over whom in the past, as a way of increasing their 
political status or they are statements about indigeneity and autochthony, “who was here first”, 
as a way of ensuring priority access to land and natural resources in an environment of land 
shortage and private property rights, they are always premised on a debate which references 
“unresolved and irresolvable”72 histories. For this reason it is useful to highlight a few of these 
diverging stories now. These differences centre on the following three aspects: their “arrival” 
and the establishment of the dynasties; their interaction with spiritual and ancestral shrines of 
Tumbuka inhabitants they found living there; and finally their geographical position and 
ecological setting and the relevance these factors have in particular during the period of Bemba 
and Ngoni Wars. 
Dealing first with arrival we come to see quite different integration patterns. In 
Muyombe where the Wowo clan founded themselves as the ruling dynasty the establishment 
process was described similarly to Chikulamayembe’s dynastic origins: “the Wowos became the 
uncontested rulers, and their chief, whose praise name is Mlowoka (“he who crossed over”) 
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gained control of the external trade in ivory”;73 it is in their potential subordination to Kyungu, 
king of the Ngonde at Karonga, where key differences are noted. Bond goes on to explain, “It 
would seem that the Uyombe chiefdom was a tributary of the Ngonde and that Yombe chiefs 
were nobles of the Ngonde rule, Kyungu, and sent him tribute”.74 This is borne out in some of 
the oral testimony collected by Vail in 1970 and 1971. Vinkakanimba (the other name for 
Mlowoka or later Chief Muyombe) is described as almost passively taking on the mantle of 
leadership under direction from Chief Kyungu and with the consent of an uninformed local 
population, who appear to have handed over ivory and political power to this stranger with no 
second-thought. The local praise of both Kyungu and Muyombe by Kumwenda, the main clan 
found in the area by Muyombe, depicts the tributes he paid first to Kyungu, and later Muyombe 
and how he lost his political power to a stranger without shedding blood: Ine Kumwenda vyande 
vyaminyanga ya zovu na peleka kwa Muyombe na Kyungu.75 The oral testimony of Chief 
Muyombe taken in 1971 confirms this somewhat passive shift in the balance of power: 
 
“Vinkakanimba killed elephants and, as was customary in the place from which he had come, he 
took some of the ivory and went to give it to the Mbambala [Kumwenda] but they did not know that 
the ivory was worth anything. They rejected the ivory, saying, “These are bones, so why are you 
bringing them to us?” So Vinkakanimba carried the ivory to Chungu at Karonga. Chungu was 
delighted, and he made Vinkakanimba an induna for the hills of Nthalire and for Uyombe”.  
 
The testimony of Muyombe does open up some new questions as to the much debated role of 
Kyungu at the time of the Balowoka migrations. Neither time nor the focus of this present work 
allow us the opportunity to indulge too much in the evidence but it is clear that Kyungu had 
been an influential figure at this time and may or may not have had some role in establishing the 
chieftaincies of several of the Balowoka.76 However whilst there are some sources that suggest 
certain of these chiefs may have occasionally repaid him for showing them “good land” with 
some tribute and gifts the economic accumulation within their own territories remained firmly 
under the control of the individual Balowoka. During the later colonial period, however, as these 
historical performances of Royal clan history began to be established, members of the Royal 
Wowo clan strongly denied any political subordination to the Ngonde, claiming that Uyombe 
had always been an independent chiefdom and that in the dispute over chieftainship, “Kyungu 
was consulted as an equal among equals”.77  
Quite in contrast to Chikulamayembe and Muyombe’s dynastic beginnings, the emphasis 
in the story of the establishment of the Katumbi dynasty lies rather less in the “arrival” of the 
first generation trader and his immediate interaction with the owners of the land. Mulindafwa,78 
the name given to the grandfather of the Katumbi clan, is said to have probably only “passed 
through” Hewe and it was not he, but his nephew Chipofya who played a key role in leading the 
way for the chieftaincy to be established in Hewe. It was in fact only with the second generation 
that the family developed connections in the Hewe Valley. Whilst Mulindafwa went through to 
Malambo and then Chipera (both now in Zambia) searching for ivory and other trading 
opportunities it was Chipofya who stayed back in the area of Nkamanga and Hewe. He would 
eventually go and look for his uncle, passing through Hewe he asked the people there if they had 
heard any rumours about this man called Mulindafwa. The oral narratives asserted at the time 
of Timothy Chawinga’s chieftainship recall that the notable people Chipofya met at that time in 
Hewe were “Zolokere, Nchuka and Kanyerere who very soon after his arrival became his 
friends”; they claimed not to have any knowledge of Mulindafwa though having not met him on 
his way to Malambo. It was only as Arabs “passed through Hewe from Chipera or Chigoma in 
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Nthalire area” that Chipofya got information that Mulindafwa was dead, but that his children 
Chimbavi, Kasalika and Yapatula were still living.79 It is remembered that Chipofya then went to 
find his cousins, expressed his condolences and ordered them to pack up and leave for Hewe.  
On their arrival at Hewe the children of Mulindafwa reported to Zolokere who is said to 
have come to greet them and to have given them gifts of ivory. They built a headquarters at the 
Makongowa stream and nearby the spirit of Mulindafwa was buried at Vuvu; the first 
connection had been made to the land. Whilst the arrival narrative appears to differ from the 
others previously mentioned, of Muyombe and Chikulamayembe, it is clear that the essential 
aspects of establishing authority nevertheless remained the same. Katumbi Chimbavi, the eldest 
son of Mulindafwa, took on the mantle of leadership, gave the headmen in Hewe gifts of cloth, 
beads and shells and they respected him. The oral sources go on to explain that: 
 
“While at Makongowa, Chimbavi was given the title of Themba Katumbi in place of his father. He 
successfully won the friendship of the inhabitants, then he had a chance to introduce to the head 
men the use of a black cloth on the headmen’s head. He advised that a headman in order to win the 
respect of his subordinates must tie a black cloth on his head, which is the sign of a crown and so he 
tied black cloths to the heads of all the headmen, namely Zolokere, Kanyerere, Nchuka, and 
Mwavithinthiza. This introduction has been carried on and on until now”.80  
 
We have already noted how these new families were “determined to establish their 
positions firmly through consolidation of their political powers with the religious territorial 
cults of their respective areas”81 however each area was quite unique in this regard too. In some 
places it was possible that a new shrine could be established, as happened in Nthalire where 
Muwoma Hill became the main centre of worship. This happened also in Henga, as was 
mentioned above. In Hewe the localised rain cult at Mwanda Mountain enabled further 
differences in the establishment and augmentation of authority between Katumbi and some of 
the other Balowoka chiefs. Due to the small and parochial nature of the Mwanda cult it was 
easier for Katumbi to bring it under his leadership and consolidate his political power with it 
(this was something that the Phiri chiefs did in the Chewa area). It is said that Katumbi 
Chimbavi, quickly established a relationship with Mlomboji the rainmaker whom he recognised 
as priest of the area and he asked him if he would act on his behalf. Katumbi was able to take 
over a certain level of control at Mwanda despite the fact that the family in charge of the shrine 
was itself autochthonous.  
Whilst Chikulamayembe was able to do this to some extent with Chikang’ombe Hill, its 
much greater spatial scope meant that it was harder to focus all outlying ancestral worship sites 
of the area on this one sacred site. According to Vail, the Chikulamayembes did reach some level 
of success in establishing “a monopoly over the administration of the mwavi poison ordeal in 
Nkhamanga”. Controlling mwavi administration, a significant part of the overall religious 
complex of the Central African peoples, represented a significant attempt to “weaken the 
religious primacy of the Chikang’ombe shrine […] and “substitute for it a new centralization of 
religious authority around the new chiefly lineage”. The decision to control mwavi 
administration was important because it gave the Chikulamayembes a moral position in the 
society; traditions maintain that pre-Balowoka Tumbuka society had been “unaware of the use 
of mwavi, that people were punished unjustly as a result of their ignorance, and that the 
Tumbuka dwelled in a most turbulent and uncertain society”. With the coming of 
Chikulamayembe “orderly judicial administration was rendered possible”. The wide acceptance 
of this does argue “for the success in Nkhamanga of the Chikulamayembe’s attempt to control 
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mwavi and, through such control, the eradication of witches”. 82 Despite this clear advantage it is 
nevertheless argued that Chikulamayembe lacked spiritual legitimacy; crucially unlike Katumbi 
he had no ‘priest’ to intervene on his behalf. All of the chiefs established themselves in slightly 
different ways; evidently the trajectories of chieftaincy emerging from this time were quite 
divergent. 
Not long after these traders had managed to convert their authority into a form of 
chieftainship it was challenged in a different way. The intensity and frequency of raiding from 
the mid-nineteenth century began disrupting the patterns of power that the Balowoka had been 
successfully developing over the previous seventy or so years. Had the missionaries and early 
colonial administrators found these chiefly families “intact”, rather than dispersed across the 
region it might be easier to imagine how they were identified to be the significant political 
authorities of the region. Indeed it is true that Europeans and the African elites with whom they 
collaborated did not have a problem with excavating a great number of customary authorities 
out of the past; however these traditions did need to have some resonance with local people for 
them to convert into successful Native Authorities. Before the reason for this resonance is 
considered, the chapter will turn to illustrate some of the ways in which the Bemba and Ngoni 
raiding reshaped the landscapes of authority in the region. 
 
The impact of the Bemba and the Ngoni: the dispersal of chiefly ‘tradition’ 
There had always been some threat, especially of slave raiding in these areas of broken country, 
but it was only once the Bemba began making concerted forays around 1840 into the areas to 
their east, including Muyombe and Hewe, that settlement patterns in these places began 
responding to the increased danger. Throughout this period of uncertainty the Tumbuka had 
begun living in fortified villages or, if they were not numerous or militarily strong, “in small 
scattered hamlets hidden in the bush”.  These Tumbuka chieftainships had no significant army 
so were very exposed at this time and quite unable to defend themselves effectively against a 
large invading force. This might not have been the case had earlier trade competitiveness 
amongst them, and their desire to exercise territoriality at relatively small scales in order to 
build wealth and prestige through the ivory trade, not bred a lack of wider solidarity.  The way 
they then dealt with such external threats was to remain mobile. Chiefs ruled from capitals 
which were not permanent settlements at this time and as such were potentially able to move 
easily to places of safety.  
The Bemba invaded Hewe in around 1840 which prompted Katumbi and many of his 
people to move to Mawuwu, in the centre of the Hewe Valley, “there they built a strong stockade 
for fear of invaders [here] they stayed peacefully for many years but he continued to trade with 
people in Hewe and in all the adjacent tribes”.83  In around 1845 the Bemba warrior Chepela 
invaded and captured the Mawuwu stockade which forced the Themba to hide with his people 
at Mwanda where his priest Mlomboji lived. Chepela is said to have made the stockade his camp 
from where he continued to raid the surrounding country. As the trouble in Hewe increased it is 
said that “word was sent to Chikulamayembe and Kyungu who came, heated arrows on the 
blacksmiths fire and they shot them on the roofs in the stockade and as a result all the houses 
were on fire. Chepela was force to run away” and Chivwalenkwende Katumbi was able to 
resettle.84  Not long afterwards, the Ngoni campaigns wreaked further havoc upon the Tumbuka 
communities found here. But whilst the Bemba campaigns had targeted Hewe, the impact of the 
Ngoni was more significantly felt by the Nkamanga chieftainship of Chikulamayembe than 
Katumbi. Nkamanga and Henga were subsumed fully under Ngoni domination, smashed-up by 
1855, these “Tumbuka-speaking peoples who were not conquered or assimilated were raided or 
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forced to give tribute”.85 Hewe and Uyombe, meanwhile, remained only on the periphery of 
Ngoni raiding activities. Some raiding did force the Themba to find refuge in Zolokere’s stockade 
in Khata (a marshy place in Vwaza covered in reeds), whilst others fled to the area near Yembe 
Hill in Songwe, in the far north of the country.86  
Of key importance to our story are the specific ways in which the Katumbi Dynasty was 
able to preserve itself at this time of disruption in contrast to the Chikulamayembe family in 
Nkamanga, and what implications these alternative patterns have for the colonial period. One 
possible reason is that the ecological setting of Katumbi’s territory provided for Katumbi 
Chivwalenkwende (at the time of the Bemba) and Katumbi Chimgwayo (at the time of the 
Ngoni) safe-havens to where they could move their chiefly capitals and survive in relative 
safety. Katumbi’s territory consists of a relatively small fertile valley, surrounded by 
mountainous areas in the north and west and bordered to the south by a marshland that was 
un-navigable for anyone but the most local of people. They also had the advantage of being able 
to shift their geographical base to the neighbouring community of Sitwe which sat in the hot 
depression over the mountains in “the Malambo country in present day Zambia” where many 
familial ties existed.87  
As Ngoni raiding proliferated and threats from within Sitwe also accumulated, Senga 
chief Kambombo was “threatening to invade” Katumbi’s country in Malambo, so it was at this 
point that Katumbi Mtengacharo, who replaced Chimgwayo, could no longer remain in Hewe 
country and moved to Sitwe. In the years just prior to colonial administration it was here that 
the Katumbi chieftainship was based. This is evidenced by the fact that the Presbyterian 
missionaries who moved into the area to set up the Livingstonia Mission in 1891, and early 
colonial officials who came touring the northern areas a decade or so later, record very little 
about Katumbi and give no sense that he had had jurisdiction in the area of the Hewe Valley. To 
the contrary, the ability to simply move the chiefly capital and maintain the chiefly line was 
much more restricted in the open country of Nkhamanga where the Chikulamayembe 
chieftainship was smashed completely by the Ngoni in around 1855. For these reasons of 
mobility and dispersal it is easy to see why scholars struggle to understand the complexities in 
the marriage, descent and inheritance systems of the Tumbuka. As Vail notes, “such confusion is 
not surprising, considering the disruption of settlement patterns occasioned in northern Malawi 
by the coming of the Ngoni into the area in the mid-nineteenth century”.88   
 
Political tradition as discourse 
The pre-colonial landscapes of authority and territoriality which were in existence immediately 
prior to the coming of the colonial administration provide an important context from which to 
discuss the chieftaincy of Timothy Chawinga. It will be argued that the way in which these 
institutions came to manage the societies in northern Malawi during the nineteenth century has 
certain implications for how authority was shaped in this region once it found itself a part of the 
colonial state of Nyasaland at the turn of the twentieth century.  
 The centralised political traditions which were developed across the region were 
fashioned some time before the introduction of indirect rule; however they became powerful as 
historical tools only as they began to be collected, written down, and eventually used to 
demarcate administrative boundaries. As this process took place suggestions towards the extent 
of these chiefdoms boundaries and hints about the hierarchies that might have existed between 
them were recorded. Whilst there was something authentic about the political traditions that 
the missionaries and colonial officers dug up, there is some doubt as to whether they would 
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have experienced a renaissance in the area, being restored to the positions which they did hold 
prior to the Ngoni and Bemba campaigns, without the British administration’s help.  
 This is particularly true for the Chikulamayembe chieftaincy which had been completely 
smashed by the Ngoni some forty years earlier. Once representatives of the shattered 
Chikulamayembe dynasty were in a position to accumulate power again on behalf of the Royal 
line, this time largely through their early contact with mission education, they set about dusting 
off the narratives of authority and reshaping them to their requirements once more. Educated 
Tumbuka elites, who had their own interest in re-establishing the chieftainship of 
Chikulamayembe, prepared the way by producing the first written accounts of Balowoka 
history; little could have served as a more powerful interpretation of authentic authority at this 
time. 
 For the Katumbi leadership it was a bit different. Despite the disruption of the wars, the 
dynasty had maintained a clear line of succession throughout this time; with the ‘displaced’ 
chiefs still inheriting titles and being recorded by oral accounts.89 In fact, it could well be the 
case that during this time of raiding when a large number of Hewe based families all gathered 
together in fortified settlements, a sense of unity around the royal narrative might well have 
been strengthened. However, one factor which did weaken the potential for the Katumbi 
narrative at the dawning of the colonial administration was the split which took place in the 
family some time in-between the time when they took refuge by moving to Malambo (in present 
day Zambia) and the decision of certain clans in the royal family to “move back” to Nyasaland 
after it had been demarcated and appeared to offer opportunities for power.  
 Suffering from a lack of educated and connected representatives, the Katumbi family 
fared much worse than the Chikulamayembe leadership at the dawn of colonial administration. 
The writing of Andrew Nkhonjera and Saulos Nyirenda, both with connections to Livingstonia,90 
and then Thomas Cullen Young (inspired by the writing of these other two) advocated for the 
revival of the Chikulamayembe dynasty by claiming that before the Ngoni it had presided over a 
great kingdom.91 This was the Tumbuka leadership that the colonial administration had been 
searching for. With the stakes now higher than ever, a hierarchical set of migration narratives 
quickly became a useful political weapon. With handsome rewards on offer for those who could 
prove their historical authority, the Katumbi family needed very much to up its game. 
 The chiefly migration narratives and the centrality of various “royal” families which 
emerge from them have grown increasingly important over time, especially on account of their 
being privileged by the colonial state. They have become the basis from which people who are 
fighting over resources and access to land argue their legitimate rights to them. The 
performance of Balowoka chieftainship throughout the colonial period draws continually on 
these narratives and rituals; for the different chiefdoms throughout this region in northern 
Malawi the construction, negotiation and renegotiation92 of these tools of formal authority 
signify new ways of competing for resources, land and power. 
 Plainly it was not the colonial structures alone that served to re-establish the position of 
such men as Timothy Chawinga within their communities; they also depended on the existence 
of a local historically embedded political discourse which they, or their agents, could effectively 
reformulate along the way. As Spear notes, “intellectuals need historical raw materials to 
construct their stories if their reinterpretations are to ring true”, but raw materials cannot be 
fashioned from nothing; “Precisely because struggles over tradition, custom and ethnicity are so 
embedded in local discourse and so emotionally fraught, they are readily evoked but not easily 
created”.93 
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Part two. Debating the raw materials of history 
 
Writing hierarchies into history: the impact of missionary and colonial writings on the 
Balowoka chieftainships 
As Hamilton has noted, claims to traditional legitimacy do not emerge from no-where, but they 
have their own constructed historiographical past; the creation of the narrative of custom very 
definitely has roots in the missionary, anthropological, amateur historical studies from the early 
part of the twentieth century.94 The influential writings of the Scottish Presbyterian missionary 
Thomas Cullen Young, in particular the 1923 “Notes on the Speech and History of the Tumbuka-
Henga Peoples”, represent some of the first written historical accounts of the region,95 and they 
have had an enormous impact on the historiography of the region. Contrary to the work of other 
missionaries such as Elmslie and Fraser, who concentrated on chronicling the “noble” 
conquering Ngoni,96 Young was clearly trying to make a case for the indigenous Tumbuka in his 
writing. In the light of this, Young’s fascination with illustrating a powerful unifying Tumbuka 
figure in the shape of Mlowoka (Chikulamayembe) is given new significance. Peter Forster, who 
has provided an extremely comprehensive analysis of Young’s work – and the various scholarly 
responses to it – states that “Young clearly admired Mlowoka” in whom he saw “a synthesis of 
the Tumbuka virtue of open-handedness and the idea of ‘legitimate commerce’ which 
Livingstone had advocated”; he painted a benevolent picture of the chief, kindly, skilful in 
hunting and “in no way connected to slaving”.97  
The unfolding of Young’s specific historical production of the Tumbuka was a process 
defined by several factors, primary among them was his receipt of a manuscript in Chitumbuka 
around 1909 from an ex-Livingstonia pupil Saulos Nyirenda which laid out a version of history 
concerning the Chikulamayembe Dynasty. Nyirenda, along with another ex-Livingstonia student 
who had the Henga-Tumbuka agenda on his mind, Andrew Nkhonjera, expressed in their 
writing a growing desire amongst many Tumbuka for the need to ‘re-establish’ the 
Chikulamayembe Chieftaincy, restoring it to its ‘former glory’. It is worth noting that at the very 
time when Young was preparing his history, he was teaching John Gondwe, the son of Chief 
Chikulamayembe, and was hence in direct contact with the font of 'official' history. This union 
between a missionary eager to understand and integrate into a local culture and several 
Tumbuka elites who, since the Ngoni, had found themselves with only limited access to power, 
saw an opportunity to gain new authority via the mission and the colonial state; this politics 
within the production of the 1923 edition of Notes on the Speech and History of the Tumbuka-
Henga People’s is plain to see. 
The debates that Young’s 1923 book provoked demonstrated an interest in the past 
from “enthusiastic, and in the majority of cases, far from impartial clansmen who desire that the 
story of their fathers may not be under-estimated”.98 In a 1932 revised edition of events, called 
Notes on the History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples, Young laid out these different versions 
unexplored in his earlier text, including the Ngonde and Tonga points of view, claiming to make 
no judgement upon the new evidence; the tone of the text, however, remained strongly in favour 
of his original thesis. One only need observe the date of the revised text to garner its political 
significance; Indirect Rule was being put into practice in Nyasaland and this was the ideal 
opportunity for people to try and assert their rank. Largely on account of this context, and for 
the fact that Young gives no information on his informants, Vail is damning of the text as 
inaccurate and simplistic. Concerned with the uncritical circulation of Young’s ideas within 
political and academic literature alike Vail’s own scholarship works hard to overturn their 
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hegemonic representations. In regard to a later publication of Young’s most famous work Vail 
wrote determinedly “his lack of appreciation of the complexity of Tumbuka history, and his 
uncritical acceptance of traditions”, made the reprinting of the book “a positive menace to an 
accurate knowledge of northern Malawi’s history”.99 Forster illustrates the influence of the 
book, explaining that “Young’s historical studies frequently were quoted by colonial officials 
when information was needed upon which to base Indirect Rule”.100 There grew something of a 
special relationship between the Livingstonia Mission and the Tumbuka communities they came 
to live alongside. When the mission established itself at Kondowe (Livingstonia) in 1889 these 
‘victims’ of the Ngoni campaigns were ready, and open, for the new opportunities. Until the 
colonial administration moved officers to the north certain other aspects of the administration 
of this part of Nyasaland was to a large extent undertaken by the Mission. As a result, their ideas 
about local customs and traditions, not to mention their notions of local power structures, had 
already become very influential by the time that the District Administration Native Ordinance of 
1912 came in to effect.  
Whilst Young’s ideas about the Tumbuka have been largely discredited from an 
academic point of view following the in depth and convincing critiques of Vail,101 amongst the 
people who continue to construct their histories within these localities they retain much power. 
It is easy to observe how the histories which he assembled have been clearly used and 
assimilated into the narratives of local populations as well, and it is directly and indirectly 
referenced when headmen across the region narrate their clan histories. Such publications 
radically affected the oral historical culture of the region, and their connection to the creation of 
legitimacy was clear, peddled about as they were by African mission teachers and ministers 
bent on demonstrating their influence. Collecting oral histories from people in Hewe today one 
is only too aware of the power that Young’s rendition, along with a later vernacular publication 
from Livingstonia Mission, Midauko Gha WaNgoni (1948), displays. Large sections of Young’s 
book are quoted at length by people re-telling their clan histories in Hewe and who are thankful 
for the useful ‘truths’ it provides them.102  
If the depictions of the crucial historical moment of “arrival” is considered, and 
especially how different versions of “arrival” are popularized through these publications, it can 
be noted that each are performed with subtle differences by the chiefs in question at different 
times; the importance of the telling is plain to see. Take, for example, the now famous story of 
Chikulamayembe’s dynastic beginnings:103 Cullen Young writes that in establishing himself in 
Nkamanga, Mlowoka’s “dealings were marked by great liberality. In this sense he seems to have 
differed from several of his companions who […] appear to have taken advantage of the 
ignorance of the local population”.104 This is a key point of difference, especially as the authority 
of these chiefly dynasties became increasingly hinged upon a benevolent entry into Tumbuka 
society. In making this statement the missionary anthropologist was delivering to the 
historiography a narrative of hierarchy amongst these groups. Throughout his later Notes on the 
History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples the emphasis remains on Chikulamayembe’s rise to 
precedence amongst the group of people with whom it is most commonly thought he travelled 
with; Katumbi (Mulindafwa) and Chipofya. In the revised version Young “sets right” an apparent 
historical wrong by acknowledging that Chikulamayembe had not always been the prominent 
member and that although “we have been calling Mlowoka the leader of the party so far, certain 
evidence suggests that actually his supremacy came later, and at the time with which we are 
dealing, Katumbi was in charge of the expedition”.105 Yet, in some ways this altered narrative is 
more damning for the Katumbi leadership as it is suggestive that he lost prestige on account of 
Mlowoka Chikulamayembe’s more strategic decisions and benevolent performances of power:  
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“The elder nephew, whom we only know as Mlowoka, stayed where he first settled – that is, on the 
Runyina River, in the centre of the Nkamanga Plain – and before he died had succeeded in 
establishing his authority to such an extent that the Chikuramayembe title which his successor 
inaugurated stood for a form of centralised chieftainship such as the country had never previously 
known […] Mlowoka did not, however, confine his activities to the comparatively small area which it 
is geographically correct to call Nkamanga. He seems to have moved through the whole country in 
some sort of state, and with sufficient proofs of wealth to secure for himself recognition as 
“superior””.106   
 
This story has remained an extremely powerful motif in the Chikulamayembe dynasty 
and the fact that today his chieftainship is now recognised by the government as being of 
Paramount status, superior over all other Tumbuka chieftaincies, surely stems from this early 
depiction of historical precedence and the power it had on local political imagination, despite 
the fact that local chiefs now assert that this narrative is somewhat over exaggerated.107 As has 
been outlined above, however, these historical depictions need nevertheless to be produced and 
maintained if other powerful actors aren’t to come and usurp a certain amount of that 
apparently established authority; this shifting of hegemonic discourse was something that 
Timothy Chawinga proved skilful at, but he had his work cut out if he was to effectively 
represent Katumbi as the senior authority. Due to the wider political aspirations of Tumbuka 
elites who wished to ‘reinstall’ Chikulamayembe into his supposed pre-Ngoni seat of authority, 
Hewe’s own individual historical processes became a rather parochial consideration at this 
early stage of colonial administration. It was assumed that such ‘local’ political issues as 
headmanship and hierarchy within the chieftaincy could be addressed once the ‘correct’ and 
‘proper’ structures of local native administration were set up; local chiefs could discuss these 
issues amongst themselves rather than deal with the colonial administration directly. What 
administrators didn’t consider was that these ‘local’ issues might not be local at all but about 
politics and access to power at a much broader level, and that they could not be contained 
within one particular native authority, namely that of Chikulamayembe. The result of this was 
that the Hewe Valley and the chiefs who held authority throughout it were incorporated into the 
Henga-Nkamanga division; the assumption being that in pre-colonial history it had been 
incorporated within the authority of Chikulamayembe’s Nkamanga Kingdom. In 1912 when the 
District Administration Native Ordinance was passed Katumbi was placed as a Village Headman 
under the authority of Principal Headman Chikulamayembe.  
Whilst Young is the most powerful advocate of Chikulamayembe’s pre-eminence, for the 
Katumbi dynasty the written text that is most often referred to when recounting history is that 
of the later Livingstonia publication, written in the vernacular, Midauko Gha Wangoni. Published 
in 1947 it was produced, unlike Young’s monograph, by a number of local African elites, all 
mission educated.108 Midauko plays a major role in defining Hewe’s history, especially in 
distinction to other places around it and particularly in regard to the chieftaincy. As mentioned 
it reappears time and again in oral testimony as people use it as a reference point for ‘their past’. 
It was to showcase the research, writing and more ‘undisputable’ local knowledge of African 
mission elites. People like the Hewe born the Reverend Isaac Khunga and teacher Levi Kaleya, as 
well as the ambitious and political the Reverend Edward Bote Manda, who was to become the 
advisor to John Hardy Gondwe (Chief Chikulamayembe XI) during the 1930s and 40s; all would 
play key roles in shaping the ‘official’, ‘local’ and ‘authentic’ production of the history of the 
north. These local voices represented some of the most influential of actors in the unfolding 
history of the northern region; their discursive starting point being the need to engage and 
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counter or confirm the earliest representations of their areas. These characters went on to play 
significant roles in the local politics of the region and, as will be illustrated later, often provided 
the backbone to the African provincial council meetings of the 1940s and 1950s.   
As more native missionaries were trained and ordained the Mission’s power to influence 
the landscape grew in local communities. Combined with these people’s own interests they 
began to redefine areas powerfully; this was no more evident than in debates about chiefly 
succession. This issue of succession has been looked at most systematically by Vail who tries to 
understand more fully aspects of pre-colonial succession amongst the Tumbuka. For this 
argument it is important to consider the impact of the Mission on inheritance structures and 
how through local mission elites traditional options were subverted in order to establish 
leaders in these communities who were shaped themselves by mission values and education.  
 
Using the past in the present: fighting with “unresolved & irresolvable histories” 
In 1954 Timothy Chawinga, the fifteenth Themba Katumbi, initiated a ceremony in Hewe to 
celebrate his grandfather Mulindafwa. This was the first time that a public performance 
dramatizing the historical story was held; the first time that symbols of the chieftainship were 
circulated and celebrated at an occasion where representatives of government attended 
alongside local dignitaries from neighbouring Tumbuka communities across the border in 
Northern Rhodesia. It had political ambition and consequences which reflected both external 
and internal struggles, including the need for Katumbi to assert his authority over the northerly 
parts of Hewe that did not wholly support him at the time;109 a 1970 interview with Group 
Village Headman Mwachibanda bears out this tension:  
 
“All clans ruled themselves independently – there was no clan that exercised authority over others. 
Zolokere, for example, feared us (the Nthali), and we feared him and his powers. The same with 
Katumbi; he feared Zolokere and Zolokere feared him, and so on and on. This is the way things were 
in the past. There were no extensive chiefdoms as there are now”.110  
 
These tensions will be elaborated upon in later chapters, for now it is simply necessary to place 
the “arrival and establishment” story told at this ceremony in the context of the knowledge 
production dynamics that have been described in the section above.  
The only source that currently exists to investigate this production is a text written by 
Timothy and his advisers describing the “official” history that would be performed at the 1970 
Mulindafwa ceremony. This version can only be used to reflect upon the contemporaneous 
situation, one in which Chawinga was well established as chief and was thought of in prestigious 
terms by the Malawi Congress Party government, despite the relative insignificance of his 
geographic area. However, it is a useful piece of public relations to analyse; instructive in its 
emphases, it displays a clear narrative of superiority. In 1970 Chawinga had all the political 
clout required to make such bold public declarations; after all it is one thing to have a clan 
history that asserts superiority but quite another to have the confidence to perform it publicly. 
Chapters three, four and five will all pay some attention to the other aspects of Chawinga’s 
character and behaviour which enabled him to build his power and continually recreate his 
authority in different arenas but here, in the analysis of the story he tells, the major motifs of his 
chieftainship can be brought out.    
The first motif in Timothy’s narrative is a bold statement of superiority in relation to 
Chikulamayembe. He does this not only by suggesting that he was the more senior member of 
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the migration party but that it was he who had developed the trading activities in Rumphi. Here, 
he says: 
 
“Katumbi [...] became a monopolist and his activities were soon known by the Tumbuka. While 
carrying his trade far and wide among the Tumbuka, he easily became an acquaintance of all the 
people in Tumbuka land. North of Rukuru region he married many wives, the daughters of 
Tumbuka. The children he bore are now the heads of many families in Tumbuka country”.111  
 
Chawinga describes how it was only after some years that both Chikulamayembe and Katumbi 
agreed to explore the surrounding country, south of the Rukuru River, as Chipofya remained “at 
the centre”, and goes on to say that eventually “Chikulamayembe asked to go back to the trading 
centre at Rumpi”. There is no room in this narrative for Chikulamayembe to take any credit in 
having established himself without Katumbi’s help.  
Another crucial statement is that Katumbi had never paid any tribute to either 
Chikulamayembe or Kyungu. Mulindafwa had met with Kyungu in Chilumba after initially 
crossing the lake, and indeed Kyungu had pointed him in the direction of good places to hunt for 
ivory but it is made quite clear that he had not been bound into any hierarchical relationship 
with him on account of this. Mulindafwa is said to have remembered Kyungu’s help later on 
when “he sent him gifts of goods. As his sons were acquainted with hunting, he had a big stock 
of ivory, rhinoceros and skins. That is why Chungu could get gifts regularly”; this statement 
crucially speaks of Katumbi’s generosity rather than his subservience.  
Other aspects of Mulindafwa’s memorable personality are drawn out in Timothy’s 
narrative: that he was a great hunter and a successful trader becoming rich in cloth, beads, salt 
and shells. Furthermore he had important spiritual legitimacy. After Mulindafwa died in Chipera 
and before the children left with their cousin, “Chipofya took a whip and he went to the grave 
with it. He whipped on the grave which traditionally meant that he was calling the spirit to 
accompany the family. When they reached Hewe Chipofya buried the whip at Vuvu Stream. This 
was the beginning of the chiefs’ graveyard at Vuvu stream and a centre of worshipping the 
spirits of the Balowoka”. He is keen to highlight also that he was the one who ordained Mlomboji 
the high priest of religion in Hewe and that it was his job to conduct special services at Mwanda 
mountain to ensure rain during droughts but his power was not all encompassing; 
“intercessional services during times when disease and deaths overtook the village […] were 
conducted by assistant priests, at the chiefs’ graveyard at Vuvu stream”, where Mulindafwa’s 
spirit was buried. He ends his text with what seems a rather incongruous contemporary 
political point, which perhaps lets us in to his motives for the tone of the whole document. He 
describes how he wrote a letter to the colonial office “pleading that the boundary should be 
disbanded because it has lessened my authority and has broken the ties of relationship with the 
Tumbuka of Ruangwa Region”. The Colonial Office, in reply, pointed out that it was difficult to 
break that boundary because a large sum of money was spent on making it. His pursuit of 
“justice” on this matter of boundaries would be a key aspect of his politics. 
 Chawinga’s 1954 chiefly celebration was said to have been the inspiration for the 
establishment of a number of other annual ceremonies in the region, including the 
Gonapamuhanya ceremony of Chikulamayembe (1961) and Vinkakanimba Day for Chief 
Muyombe (1963). Whilst the reason behind these might well have been excuses for a good 
party, they are more likely to have been prompted by competitive motives. Swathed in 
legitimizing tradition these displays were ideal ways for chiefs to reassert their stake in the 
land, position themselves against one another and, as the threat of chiefly decline lay on the 
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horizon publicize themselves amongst their people, some of whom were looking to African 
nationalists to represent them instead. Perhaps one of the reasons why these ceremonies grew 
in popularity across the Tumbuka highlands was the greater opportunity contained within these 
chieftaincies for the flexible interpretation and adaptation of traditions and lineages. Unlike the 
more formally structured and centralized states such as those of the Chewa, Balowoka 
inheritance structures were open to interpretation; there was more opportunity for those 
wanting to contest legitimacy to do so and throughout the colonial period the number of royal 
lineages within families generally increased to accommodate “more appropriate” individuals. 
The apparent “order” of things was being reshaped by “new men” and their representatives.  
For separate reasons the ways in which the highly decentralized, clan based leadership of the 
Lakeside Tonga, for example, responded to the imposition of colonial administration was 
different again. Whilst the Balowoka chieftainships had the “historical raw materials” they 
needed in order to perform their pasts effectively through a central narrative of leadership, the 
Tonga, whose fractured and multiple historical narratives were based around clans rather than 
one dominant chief, did not have this same option for accessing power from either the local 
population or the colonial administration.112  
 The see-saw nature of the chiefs’ hegemony – particularly in contests concerning 
Katumbi and Chikulamayembe’s seniority, but also to some extent between Chikulamayembe 
and his “subordinate” chiefs Mwamlowe and Mwahenga – is reflected in the boldness with 
which the “facts” are told. This boldness, more often than not, has much to do with the strength 
of personality and experience of the chief proposing the version, their position in relation to the 
local population as well as the government. Alongside the copy of Chief Katumbi’s version of 
events from 1970 there exists the history of Chikulamayembe, as constructed by the current 
chief not long after he first took up his position in 1969. It is a much more deferential account, 
depicting Katumbi in an honorable way; it sets quite a different tone to his successor’s most 
recent displays of superiority within the region. These performances are political events and 
require the observance of diplomatic behaviour; an honourable and respectful language is used 
throughout. However, even in his position as a young newly installed chief his his rendition of 
events still attempts to subtly undermine Katumbi; the role of Chikulamayembe in enabling his 
establishment in Hewe runs throughout the narrative: 
 
“So coming back to Rumphi, [Chikulamayembe] told Chipofya to go and settle in Hewe and also to 
look for Katumbi, who had strayed towards Karonga. So Chipofya began looking and eventually 
found Katumbi at Yembe. Coming from that village on the way to Hewe, Katumbi died. Chipofya 
came to Hewe with mother and son only. They came to Hewe and after a few years, Chipofya 
brought the son to Chikulamayembe. Rejoicing, Chikulamayembe gave them three bundles of cloth 
and told Chipofya to raise up the young Katumbi”.113 
 
Evidently, these battles conform to a pattern found by Berry amongst contemporary Ghanaian 
chiefs; they have “learned the value of history for the pursuit of property and power in the 
present”.114 The battle to produce authority in the Hewe-Nkamanga region had become 
concentrated within a battle over authentic stories; whichever of the two chiefs – 
Chikulamayembe and Katumbi – had more influence at different times meant that the narratives 








An understanding of the pre-colonial past is essential in rendering an accurate portrayal of any 
colonial chief, however much they might be considered to be an invention of empire. Most 
native authority chiefs worked within certain cultural and political parameters which were 
unique from place to place; some found more room to manoeuvre than others, and some were 
masters at manipulating history for their own benefit. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
present the historical problems and advantages that “big men” in the Tumbuka Highlands faced, 
as well as a sense of the socio-economic conditions that prevailed here in the run up to 
colonialism in order to better appreciate the historical context in which Timothy Chawinga 
acted. This chapter has illustrated the significant connections that existed between the area and 
peoples of what we now know as Hewe and the regional economy, especially in relation to 
communities and chieftaincies which were cartographically separated from them during the 
colonial period and are now in Zambia. The production and exchange of goods and people 
across this area played a significant role during the chieftainship of Timothy Chawinga.  
Another aspect that has been worth reflecting on is that the Balowoka became chiefs in a 
region which had not known their type of political leadership prior to their arrival; it was one in 
which they gained ascendancy through economic prowess rather than religious or spiritual 
legitimacy. Since there was no tradition of dynastic kingship and no tradition or cult that went 
alongside it this meant that the Balowoka arrivals, the forefathers of Katumbi and 
Chikulamayembe, had room to construct their own history and traditions. The innovation of one 
such chief, if he had the personality to bring about its transformation, could easily become 
custom in the short matter of his lifetime.115 The pliability of inherited historical narratives was 
put to good use by Timothy Chawinga, especially as he found new ways to exploit the “native 
authority” space he inherited in 1943. The colonial demarcation of borders was significant for 
chiefs such as Chawinga, “not as fixed or binding constraints on social action” but rather more 
importantly as “focal points for further debate”.116 According to Berry, the production of 
historical narratives about a given space became one of the most significant ways in which 
power was derived in the colonial period. 
Within the framework of the colonial administration, whilst “chiefs enjoyed multiple 
opportunities”, they were only able to “appropriate surplus if they could successfully argue their 
claims to land and subjects”.117 As such, historical “knowledge” and the tools to project this 
became one of the most crucial weapons in a chief’s arsenal. Once representatives of chiefly 
interest were able to literately present their accounts of space they were quickly able to allot 
primacy to their versions of local history by linking it to the territorial model of colonial rule. 
Furthermore, those chiefly elites who were in a position to fashion the local “historical raw 
materials”118 to suit their needs were able to produce an hegemonic discourse which had the 
effect of concealing alternative stories of authority within the said locality,119 as well as in 
relation to neighbouring zones of influence. Highlighting the “purely dynastic basis of local 
history” which obviously gives precedence to those chiefly elements around which it is 
constructed, Mazarire shows how this has the effect of reducing to mere “imagined geographies” 
the political facts that these other places, and other authorities, once represented.120 
Of course, it is hardly original to suggest that the colonial state and African elites 
colluded to produce new political geographies by demarcating and mapping spaces and 
ethnicities. What is much less explored is how this process silenced the histories of other 
authorities, subsuming them within the dominant landscape of chieftainship.121 Trying to 
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excavate past “places” from these dynastic local histories when they had no territorial character 
but rather consisted of “a number of points in interaction with each other”122 is not an easy task; 
it is made less easy as political histories of more definable and recognisable chieftainships are 
purposefully wielded by both the administration and the local political elites in the colonial 
setting. It should be noted that the ability of a chief to control and manipulate these potentially 
dangerous alternative local narratives and political geographies would have been vital to the 
success of whosoever is vying for control of a given place; as the thesis continues by exploring 
the case of Chawinga it will be illustrated that this was something he managed well.  
The next chapter will focus upon the various historical materials available to both the 
colonial administration and local African leaders in northern Malawi as control over the land 
was being contested. The dialogue which emerged between textual and physical space that 
came with the arrival of Europeans at the start of the nineteenth century forged new political 
spaces; the stakes of chiefs “knowing their boundaries” in these spaces and the ways in which 





                                                             
 
1 H.L. Vail, ‘Religion, Language, and the Tribal Myth: The Tumbuka and Chewa of Malawi’, in J.M. 
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almost certainly emerged at this stage, before the arrival of the trading parties of the Balowoka, there 
existed some key differences with the Chewa to the south who ruled over large, defined areas and who 
“enjoyed considerable power and authority”. Vail, ‘Religion’, 212-216. 
3 Leroy Vail, Shadreck Chirembo, Yizenge Chondoka and Frackson Bota, and Thomas Cullen Young all 
collected oral testimony on this region over different times, and their work will be referenced throughout 
this thesis. Whatever their many contradictions they do generally present a similar picture regarding 
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activities of the Bisa, the Bemba and the “Arabs” in Hewe.  
4 The Balowoka were the famed group of migrants who were skilled in trading. Their name originates 
from the oral history which states that they ‘crossed over’ the lake (Malawi) from Tanzania at the end of 
the Eighteenth Century in search of ivory, skins and new places to settle. They probably came from 
Unyamwezi via Mwera, but it is likely that they were exposed to various trading influences along the way 
and furthermore that they didn’t come together but in various groups. As Cullen Young pointed out, “It is 
[…] doubtful whether or not the names by which individual members of the party have come down to us 
are those by which they were known on arrival. It is also far from certain that all of those whose families 
nowadays describe themselves as “wamlowoka” all came together in the first party. The chief man is only 
known as Mlowoka, that is to say, “the crosser” […] it is likely to have been applied to him or self-assumed 
on the successful issue of his lake venture”. (Cullen Young, Notes on the History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga 
Peoples (1932), 33) 
5 Vail, ‘Religion’, 213 
6 The area is said to have covered, at its greatest extent, 20,000 square miles, from Songwe in the north to 
Kasungu in the south, and from the lake in the east to the Luangwa River in the west. Chondoka and Bota 
make some very interesting assertions that ought to be followed up, especially as they provide limited 
information about the sources that they cite from. The discussion they have made around Tumbuka state 
building is particularly worth noting. Their suggestion is that “The Tumbuka kingdom was created 
through what we may accurately call a voluntaristic state building strategy […] where people or chiefs 
voluntarily leave their individual sovereignties to unite with other communities or chiefs to create a 
larger political unit”. Y. Chondoka and F. Bota, A history of the Tumbuka from 1400 to 1900: 
the Tumbuka under the M'nyanjagha, Chewa, Balowoka, Senga, and Ngoni chiefs (Lusaka, 2007) 37. 
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the power to receive tribute, mobilise men for war or work, and enforce laws. With the lack of primary or 
other secondary sources to suggest that this society had an established communication or trade network 
during the fifteenth century, this remains unlikely. The focus of this thesis, however, is rather limited to 
the colonial and post-colonial period and so a more rigorous study of these historical claims cannot be 
undertaken. For further discussion around “The Tumbuka Proper” see: K. Phiri, 'Traditions of Power and 
Politics in Early Malawi: a Case Study of the Kasungu District from about 1750 to 1933', in The Society of 
Malawi Journal, 35:2 (1982) 24-40;  H. L. Vail, ‘Suggestions towards a reinterpreted Tumbuka history’ in 
B. Pachai (ed.) The Early History of Malawi (London, 1972); and S. B. Chirembo, Chieftainship and 
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Northern Malawi, from pre-colonial to colonial times, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Chancellor College 
Zomba, Malawi, 2007; D. Fraser, Winning a primitive people: sixteen years' work among the warlike tribe of 
the Ngoni and the Senga and Tumbuka peoples of Central Africa (London, 1914); and P. Banda, ‘Some 
Reflections on the History of the Tumbuka Proper’, Chancellor College History Seminar, 1970/71 
7 For the clan histories see interviews undertaken by Mary Davies [hereafter MD] with: Sub-TA Zolokere 
Khunga, Chatumbwa Village, 4 February 2009; G.V.H. Khutamaji Kachalie, Khutamaji Village, 5 February 
2009; Edson Chilembo, Group Village Headman Nchuka, Nchuka Village, 19 February 2009 and 21 
September 2009; P.G.V.H. Mowa Nyirenda, Mowa Village, 16 February 2009 and Bwanyonga Village, 12 
May 2009 
8 The only reference to a unifying Tumbuka leader found in the oral sources collected in Hewe by myself, 
Shadreck Chilembo or Leroy Vail is to that of Baza. This information was gathered from an interview with 
Nthawathawa Zgambo which the anthropologist and linguist Vail recorded in 1970. In the interview notes 
he is described by Vail as the “official historian of Hewe”, although it appears that he was also influenced 
heavily by the available written histories on the matter, in particular the missionary Thomas Cullen-
Young’s publications (see Interview Leroy Vail [hereafter LV] with Nthawathawa Zgambo, 17 October 
1970). His reference to Baza is likely a reference to the Tumbuka leader Baza Dokowe who did emerge as 
a semi-heroic unifying figure leading a group of Tumbuka to rebel against the Ngoni. However, given that 
the rebellion did not take place until around 1880, this figure cannot be mistaken for a leader who may 
have lead the Tumbuka before the Balowoka arrived. See T. J. Thompson, Christianity in northern Malaŵi: 
Donald Fraser's missionary methods and Ngoni culture (Leiden, New York, Köln; 1995), 26. 
9 Chondoka asserts that whilst Mlowoka (in this case he refers specifically to Chikulamayembe) was 
accepted as the ruler of some local Tumbuka who belonged to the “chiefdom of Mutimbula”, what most 
people today understand to be the leadership of the Luhanga clan, “it is very important to understand that 
many Tumbuka in Mutimbula’s territory did not recognise the authority of […] Mlowoka. They only 
recognised the authority of chief Mutimbula who was a sub-chief of the Tumbuka King, M’nyanjagha” 
(Chondoka and Bota, A history of the Tumbuka, 158). However, with scant evidence to prove this assertion 
it is difficult to use Chondoka’s argument to demonstrate a different story. More convincing is the oral 
testimony of V.H. Mwachibanda Munthali taken by Vail in 1971 in which he is quite clear that in Hewe “all 
clans ruled themselves independently. There was no clan that exercised authority over others […] there 
were no extensive chiefdoms as there are now”, (Interview LV with V.H. Mwachibanda Munthali, 7 August 
1971). This is clearly also the line of argument taken in Cullen-Young’s 1932 version of Notes on the 
History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples, in which he employs a Portuguese reference from 1798 to paint 
a picture of the political landscape before the Balowoka arrived: “It was a state of matters involving the 
presence of many family divisions without any federating centre beyond the possession of a common type 
of language; a medley of names without that of any king or ruling superior […] A certain number of 
‘locality names’ also exist which suggest aggregations of clans or communities within clearly known 
districts. There was, however, no clan or aggregation of clans possessing any authority outside its own 
narrow bounds, and no chief of any sort wielding suzerain power over any federated groups” (Cullen-
Young, Notes on the History, 27-28).    
10 Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 83-85; see also O. J. M. Kalinga, A History of the Ngonde 
Kingdom of Malawi, (The Hague, 1985); O. J. M. Kalinga, ‘Trade, the Kyungus, and the emergence of 
the Ngonde Kingdom of Malawi’, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 12:1 (1979), 17-39; 
H. W. Langworthy, ‘Swahili influence in the area between Lake Malawi and the Luangwa River’ in African 
Historical Studies, 4:3 (1971), 575-602; and M. Wright and P. Lary, ‘Swahili Settlements in Northern 
Zambia and Malawi’, in African Historical Studies, 4:3 (1971), 547-573 
11 The most common translation for the name Chikulamayembe is, after all, “bringer of hoes”, and is cited 
in most clan histories from the area as the major reason why he was accepted so easily as leader of the 
people.   
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Interviews, LV with Nthawathawa Zgambo and Zolokere Khunga, 1971; For discussions around the value 
of these hoes see Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 82-3. 
13 Interview LV with Nthawathawa Zgambo, 17 October 1970; see also Interview LV with Tadeyo Harawa, 
10 August 1970; Vail with Nkhota Kachale, 12 August 1970; and Vail with G.V.H. Ntumbatumba Luhanga, 
13 August 1970 who describes that “when Chikulamayembe came, he found the Luhanga sleeping on 
ivory. He told them that the ivory was great wealth in Mwela where he had come from. He asked them to 
give him all the ivory that was just lying about in their villages; he took these to Mwela where he came 
back with cloth, beads, mphande shells and wrings (ear-rings). He distributed these among the people 
who had helped him collect the ivory, and they were amazed at the amount of wealth which he brought 
back”. The “official historian” of the Gondwe clan (the clan of the Chikulamayembe dynasty) was at this 
time, according to Vail, G.V.H. Mcinangub(w)o. He was interviewed by Vail on 3 August 1971 and said: 
“Kakalala came with a lot of wealth in the form of cloth and beads, coming here to look for ivory. He asked 
the people for ivory, which the people of Nkamanga regarded as merely bones. The ivory he took to 
Zanzibar where he used it for buying more cloth and beads. Back home, he distributed the cloth among 
the people, and for this reason they liked him […] In order to make him stay, they said, “Let us give him a 
wife!”; the same story has been recounted at the annual Mulindafwa Ceremony in recent years. Local 
people did have reputations as being expert elephant hunters though. “There was the Chembe family near 
Mwanda Hill. They were the ones who went as far as Mphasa and Moba through to Zambia to kill 
elephants” (Interview LV with V.H. Mwachibanda Munthali, n.d. 1971). There was Mfundi and Malikwata 
in Nkamanga (Interview LV with S.G. Gondwe, Village Headman Bongololo, Chipula Gondwe, J.L. 
Chilambo, 11 August 1970). These hunters only killed for meat though, which would “feed a village for 
many days [...] our ancestors were fools in not knowing that ivory was great wealth. In those days, there 
was no trade; people only exchanged what local products they had, one person had food, the other had a 
goat and the two could be exchanged”. Interview LV with GVH Chicinde Luhanga, 12 August 1970.  
14 Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 83 
15 Nthawathawa Zgambo describes how the head of the Zgambo clan in the past were distinguished 
themselves by wearing ““sambo” (bangles) around the arms and legs. These sambo were made by Bisa 
[…] [they were] made from sisal and wire” (Interview LV with Nthawathawa Zgambo). The Bisa are 
reputed to have traded with Zolokere bringing these “wires which they sold for ivory and food (maize)” 
(Interview LV with Walutundu Luhanga, 5 August 1972); “Some of them came long before Katumbi […] 
They used to come in teams and made their settlements in locations west of this place. They had varied 
skills and made wires which they gave to village heads (benemizi)” (Interview LV with Sub-Chief Zolokere, 
5 August 1971); Cullen-Young even records that it was the Bisa who brought the use of fire and hoes, 
“when Zolokere first came he did not understand the use of fire […] they had no hoes, and we understand 
that they were hoeing with bits of wood. When he had been there for several years he found a group of 
strangers coming from the west; they belonged to what we call the “Biza” tribe, and it was these strangers 
who introduced the use of fire. They begged permission to stay with him, and he agreed because they 
knew many things, including the manufacture of hoes. He admired them greatly as a wise people”. Cullen 
Young, Notes on the History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples in the Northern Province of Nyasaland (2nd 
edition, London, 1970), 163-64. 
16 Interview LV with Nthawathawa Zgambo 
17 The Bisa are said to have taken over the “Kingdom” of Chamanyavyose in what is now Luangwa Valley. 
18 It has been posited that the Chikunda came to Hewe and also bought slaves. See interview LV with Chief 
Zolokere. 
19 E. A. Alpers, Ivory and slaves in East Central Africa, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), 172-203 
20 Cullen Young rightly points out that in fact whilst only the names of leading men are mentioned they 
would have been accompanied by something of a caravan, no women are mentioned “but carriers must 
certainly have been there”, Notes on the History, 1st edition, 36.    
21 Tradition varies widely on this. Whilst Zgambo concludes that “the first chief was Katumbi in this area, 
before him this area had no chiefs […] Katumbi was one of the Balowoka because he crossed the lake. 
Originally, he came from Uganda and stopped in Mwela in the area of now chief Mapunda” […] [they were 
not traders] they were just looking for country where to settle. They also had dogs, because these helped 
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them secure meat through hunting. As a result, they were given the surname “Chawinga” because they 
hunted with dogs. From the verb Kubinga – which means to hunt, especially used in connection with dogs 
which roam through the bush looking for animals” (Interview LV with Nthawathawa Zgambo); Cullen 
Young, however, seems convinced that they were “traders with a coast connection” (Notes on the History, 
1st edition, 32), “and probably elephant hunters” who found themselves in “an El Dorado, a cheap buying 
market for what they most desired. It was not surprising, therefore, that the travelers decided to settle 
down and to make the most of a golden opportunity” (Ibid., 36).  
22 Cullen-Young, Notes on the History, 1st Edition, 31-32. Whilst Young’s notion, that a historical tradition 
begins only once there is a centralized chieftainship, is perhaps questionable his collection of oral 
histories do certainly demonstrate that a significant change did take place once the Balowoka arrived. He 
goes on to predict that “the traditions of other tribes will bear out the statement that centralised 
chieftainship was inaugurated either by some adventurous coast man or by some ambitious local 
individual after contact with the riches and enterprise of the coast”; and indeed he was right on this.  
23 Interview LV with V.H. Mwachibanda Munthali, 7 August 1971 
24 Ibid., 41. 
25 Ibid., 37 
26 Ibid., 37. In his 1975 book Ivory and Slaves, Alpers argues that around 1785 there was a “revival” of the 
Kilwa route; this seems to reflect this interest which Cullen Young speaks of.  
27 Interview Vail with Nthawathawa Zgambo 
28 Ibid.. This is also described to Vail by Sub-Chief Zolokere who says that Katumbi never went to Mwela 
to sell the ivory himself, rather “the Arabs were the ones who came to buy the ivory. We called them 
Baloli, they visited one chief after another looking for ivory” (Interview LV with Zolokere). When asked if 
commoners might be able to sell ivory as these Arabs passed through the village, Zolokere replied by 
suggesting that “they could if they had some but most common people didn’t so the Baloli men went to 
the chiefs” (Ibid). It is worth noting that whilst he is convinced of the fact that “Katumbi” never left his 
area to trade this probably reflects the fact that the first generation of these Balowoka from whom 
Katumbi came was never known to be called “Katumbi” and had never been settled in Hewe in the first 
place.  
29 Interview LV with Kabazamawe Cilambo, n.d. 1970. He also said that “the first Chikulamayembe – who 
was Mlowoka – [he] was the person who had been trading”. 
30 The classic narrative of: they came, they crowned, and they conquered. This process will be explored in 
a little more detail later as the politics of history writing is examined. 
31 O. J. M. Kalinga, ‘The Balowoka and the establishment of states west of Lake Malawi’, in A. I. Salim (ed.) 
State formation in eastern Africa, (Nairobi, 1984), 49 
32 Ibid. 
33 Chirembo, Chieftainship and accumulation, 50-51, in this thesis Chirembo argues using oral sources that 
Katumbi never did establish political control as Kalinga alleges. He bases this, however, on only one 
informant who says that “all clans ruled themselves independently – there was no clan that exercised 
authority over others. Zolokere, for example, feared us (the Nthali), and we feared him and his powers. 
The same with Katumbi; he feared Zolokere and Zolokere feared him, and so on and on. This is the way 
things were in the past. There were no extensive chiefdoms as there are now”, c.f. Vail’s interview with 
GVH Mwachibanda; see also Chondoka and Bota, A History, 162-3.  
34 For example that of the Mutimbula (or Luhanga) clan; as discussed in, Chondoka and Bota, A History, 59 
35 Interview LV with S.G. Gondwe, V.H. Bongololo, Chipula Gondwe, J.L. Chilambo, 11 August 1970 
36 Interview LV with G.V.H. Chicinde Luhanga 
37 Interview LV with Gondwe, Bongololo, Gondwe, and Chilambo 
38 As described by Roland Oliver, Africa since 1800, (Cambridge, 1981), 96. These warrior bands are 
known to have been called Maviti and Magwangwara elsewhere. 
39 Interview LV with Mwachibanda Munthali 
40 Mlozi, the Arab King at Karonga did not come into the area himself “but his boys did…the ruga-ruga 
about whom you have been asking, Mlozi was a chief and he had people at Mpata. He only sent his people. 
There was Kopa-Kopa (he was well known in this area) some say he was a brother of Mlozi, some say a 
son”. Interview LV with Zolokere. 
41 Mlozi’s representatives would go straight to house of Katumbi “that was where the hunters who had 
ivory went to sell it”. These people brought their own slaves with them to help carry the ivory.  
42 Interview LV with Mwachibanda Munthali 
43 Ibid. 
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44 Basambazi can be translated to mean wealthy, or privileged; see Chondoka and Bota, A History of the 
Tumbuka, 172 
45 Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 172 
46 Ibid. 
47 Interview LV with Kabazamawe Cilambo 
48 See also Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 150-152. Very little has been written on the 
selling of slaves by the Balowoka. The oral evidence suggests opinion is divided over whether or not 
Katumbi would have allowed the trade to take place within his area but it is likely that he was involved in 
some way given that “in those days the lives of people were not as important as they are today”. 
Furthermore “one only had to be suspected of doing evil in a village and that was enough for others to sell 
him away to the Ruga-Ruga”, Interviews, Vail with V.H. Mwachibanda Munthali, 7 August 1971. Munthali 
went on to tell Vail that the Arabs [Mlozi, Kopa-Kopa, and Msalemu] came to Utumbuka to buy slaves for 
which they would give cloth, guns and gunpowder.  
49 It was the chief who had “a lot of ivory derived from the taxes he collected from his people” so they 
would mostly interact with Chikulamayembe, Katumbi and other “big chiefs”. Interview LV with 
Kabazamawe Cilambo 
50 G. Pourtier, Le Gabon, Tome 2: Etat et developpement (Paris, 1989), 307-308 cited in C. Gray, ‘The 
Disappearing district? Territorial transformation in southern Gabon 1850-1950’ in, A. M. Howard and R. 
M. Shain (eds.) The spatial factor in African history: the relationship of the social, material, and perceptual 
(Leiden, 2005), 240 
51 Gray, ‘The disappearing’, 231-32 
52 Kalinga, ‘The Balowoka’ 
53 Gray, ‘The disappearing’, 231-32 
54 The Livingstonia Mission was established in the Tumbuka Highlands at Khondowe in 1891 after having 
to relocate away from the lakeshore. Their former mission had proved somewhat of an unhealthy place to 
live and the high death rate from malaria and other tropical diseases prompted this move. For more on 
the history of the mission see J. J. McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875-1940: The impact of 
the Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province (2nd edition, Blantyre, 2000) 
55 Chondoka and Bota, A History, 161 
56 A. Apter, Black Critics and Kings: The Hermeneutics of Power in Yoruba Society, (Chicago and London, 
1992), 89 
57 Kalinga, ‘The Balowoka’, 36. This is corroborated by many oral sources collected from across Nkamanga 
and Hewe. 
58 They also benefitted by seeing their maternal relations rise from being situated in leading families in 
insignificant polities to become branches of the royal families in states of size, importance and wealth 
59 Kalinga, ‘The Balowoka’, 49 
60 Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 169 
61 Ibid. 
62 The various priests are noted as: Mwakhaka at Nkamanga; Mwandandambi at Luviri [chikang’ombe]; 
Mlomboji at Hewe; and Tunduru in Henga. Interview LV with Gondwe, Bongololo, Gondwe, Chilambo 
63 Interview LV with Walutundu Luhanga 
64 A second difference commented upon by Vail between the Chewa and Tumbuka “was that most Chewa 
chiefdoms possessed the nyau closed society, an institution which is interpreted by Schoffeleers as being 
aligned with local interests in balance against the interests of the central authorities”. H.L. Vail, ‘Religion, 
Language, and the Tribal Myth: The Tumbuka and Chewa of Malawi’, in J.M. Schoffeleers (ed.) Guardians of 
the land: essays on Central African territorial cults (Blantyre, 2nd edition, 1999), 216.  
65 For example the Chikang’ombe cult in Nkamanga. 
66 Vail, ‘Religion’, 224 
67 Kalinga, ‘The Balowoka’, 49 
68 J. Tosh, Clan leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of an East African Stateless Society 
c.1800-1939, (Oxford, 1978), 68 
69 Vail, ‘Religion’, 224  
70 Vail, ‘Religion’, 226 
71 Controlling the productivity of individual gardens, farming techniques, and advising on the type and 
variety of crops to plant and when to plant them were responsibilities which were only assumed by 
Katumbi chiefs from the 1930s onwards. 
72 S. Berry, ‘Debating the land question in Africa’, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44:4 
(2002), 638-668, 659 
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73 G. C. Bond, The politics of change in a Zambian community (Chicago, 1976), 14 
74 G. Wilson, The Constitution of Ngonde. No. 3. Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1968. Cited in Bond, The 
politics, 14-15 
75 This is translated as: I Kumwenda who gave the pieces of elephant tusks to Kyungu and Muyombe. 
Chondoka and Bota, A History of the Tumbuka, 61 
76 In fact a document produced by Chief Katumbi (Timothy Chawinga) in 1970 acknowledges that after 
they had crossed the lake to Chilumba, Kyungu, whom they found there, “told [his grandfather] that the 
source of wealth was on the hills and on the other side of the hills”, in other words the Henga and 
Nkamanga-Hewe areas. See Interviews, Vail with Chief Katumbi Timothy Chawinga - “History of Katumbi 
Mulowoka”, November 1970  
77 Bond, The politics, 15-16 
78 There are several interpretations of the name Mulindafwa each of which suggests slightly different 
origin and migration stories of Katumbi’s ancestor. Chondoka suggests that it means “the watchman is 
dead”. In Hewe itself no one I came across was certain of its meaning, nor was any consistent 
interpretation given to me. Indeed it is not even explained during the Mulindafwa ceremony itself. 
79 Interview LV with Chief Katumbi Timothy Chawinga, 1970  
80 Ibid. 
81 Vail, ‘Religion’, 221 
82 Ibid., 223-224 
83 Interview LV with Timothy Chawinga 
84 Ibid. 
85 Bond, The Politics, 15 
86 Another Katumbi chieftainship can be found there today dating from that time. 
87 Chirembo, Chieftainship, 67 
88 Vail, ‘Religion’, 211 
89 Chivwalenkwende translates as meaning “to put on barkcloth”, this relates to the fact that whilst he was 
being given protection from the Bemba by the priest Mlomboji at Mwanda Mountain it was cold for him 
high in the hills and so he was forced to start wearing barkcloth. The Katumbi called Chimgayu had a 
suffix of “ku Khata” to his name, meaning “of the swamp”. It was in the Vwaza marshes that he hid from 
the Ngoni. 
90 McCracken, Politics and Christianity, 338 
91 T. Cullen Young, Notes on the Speech and History of the Tumbuka Henga Peoples, (Livingstonia, 1923); T. 
Cullen Young, Notes on the Speech and History of the Tumbuka Henga Peoples, (London, 1932); T. Cullen 
Young, Notes on the History of the Henga-Kamanga Peoples in the Northern Province of Nyasaland, 
(London, 1932) 
92 Apter, Black Critics, 94 
93 T. Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, 26 
94 C. Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Imagination, 
(Cambridge MA, London, 1998), 30 
95 His version of history was not, however, the first written account. Cullen Young had been famously 
influenced by a manuscript given to him by Saulos Nyirenda, who had gone to Livingstonia in 1897 for 
teacher training. Cullen Young translated and published the manuscript some decades later as, S. 
Nyirenda and T. Cullen Young, ‘History of the Tumbuka-Henga people’ in Bantu Studies, 5:1 (1931). 
Another article of some importance to the written tradition of Tumbuka history is, A. Nkhonjera, 'History 
of the Kamanga Tribe of Lake Nyasa. A Native Account’, in the Journal of the Royal African Society, 10:39, 
(1911). See P. G. Forster, T. Cullen Young: Missionary and Anthropologist (2nd edition, Blantyre, 2003) 72-
75  
96 W. A. Elmslie, Among the wild Ngoni: Being some chapters in the history of the Livingstonia Mission in 
British Central Africa (Edinburgh, 1899); A. Fraser, Winning a Primitive People: sixteen years' work among 
the warlike tribe of the Ngoni and the Senga and Tumbuka peoples of Central Africa (London, 1914); T. J. 
Thompson, Christianity in northern Malaŵi: Donald Fraser's missionary methods and Ngoni culture 
(Leiden, New York, Köln; 1995) 
97 Forster, T. Cullen Young, 82 
98 Cullen Young, cited in Ibid., 91 
99 Vail, cited in Ibid., 97 
100 Ibid., 101 
101 Vail made it clear that more historical research ought to be done on the history of communities further 
to the west of Nkamanga, the areas in which he himself concentrated. The areas of Hewe, Muyombe and 
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beyond further into Zambia would bring new perspectives which would have a significant effect on the 
history of the Tumbuka.  
102 In line with the argument that was outlined in the introduction to this thesis, as land becomes scarcer 
and its value increases the benefits of claiming autochthony and indigeneity not only in relation to 
headmanships but also as individual clan members have increased. Various clans throughout Hewe are 
drawing upon these historical texts as ways of legitimising their access to certain resources over other 
people.  
103 It has been a powerful narrative which is still included in a similarly triumphant form in school history 
books in Malawi. The annual celebration of this chieftainship, the Gonapamuhanya ceremony, is also often 
broadcast to the nation. 
104 Mlowoka is one of the ancestral names of Chikulamayembe’s “grandfather”; the first settled chief was 
known as Gonapamuhanya. Cullen Young, History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga People’s, (1st ed..), 41  
105 Cullen Young, History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga People’s, (1st ed.), 35 
106 Ibid., 37 
107 G.V.H Mcinanguwo for example when interviewed by Vail on 3 August 1971 said that indeed the 
missionaries had helped a little in reviving the Chikulamayembe chieftainship but that really the credit 
should go to the people of Nkamanga themselves. In particular, Chitupila the nephew of Bwati 
Chikulamayembe, Mhangala Nyirongo, an adviser (nduna) to the Chikulamayembe’s, and also Mwachilwa 
(then Kabazamawe) who originally pacified the country using mwavi. All of these people pressed for the 
installation of Chikulamayembe in 1907. He said that whilst Master Brooke [a.k.a. D.C North Nyasa, Arthur 
Dove Eastbrook] and Dr Laws came to supervise the installation, they were not the initiators of it.  
108 There was a repeated use of ‘Midauko’ within the oral testimony collected from Tumbuka informants, 
not only in the interviews undertaken during fieldwork when people would wave photocopied sections, 
or dog-eared parts of it as though it offered definitive proof of their claims, but it’s influence is also often 
mentioned on the cover sheet of Vail’s interviews from 1970-1971. 
109 Chondoka and Bota suggest that Themba Katumbi Mulindafwa introduced the Mulindafwa Ceremony 
in order to legitimise and strengthen his political power in the area, “especially after he did not receive 
much support from the Tumbuka in Hebe (Hewe) area, north of his palace”. It was also a way, they 
suggest, of making the younger generations of Tumbuka believe that his family was indigenous by origin. 
The ceremony was said to have attracted thousands of people, including many from his brother 
Limilazamba Katumbi’s kingdom, in the northern part of Chief Chamanyavyose’s territory (A History of 
the Tumbuka, 172). These suggestions are somewhat confusing. As the other oral evidence has shown, 
Mulindafwa had not settled at any time in Hewe. It was only once his children were brought by Chipofya 
that they tried to establish a chieftainship there. Their argument does give some indication that there was 
tension between the northern areas of Hewe and the indigenous peoples, and this is borne out by 
evidence from Hewe. However these tensions, as well as the Mulindafwa Ceremony itself, emerged at a 
much later date than Chondoka and Bota suggest. More research needs to be undertaken on the Katumbi 
chieftainship in Sitwe, Chama, in order to get a better picture of the interconnections between the two.    
110 Interview LV with Mwachibanda Munthali 
111 Interview LV with Timothy Chawinga 
112 Vail and White, ‘Tribalism’, 157 
113 Interview LV with Mcinangubo 
114 S. Berry, ‘Debating the land question’, 660 
115 J. Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: towards a history of political tradition in Equatorial Africa (London, 
1990) 195 
116 S. Berry, Chiefs Know their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996 
(Portsmouth, Oxford, Cape Town, 2001), 7-8 
117 Ibid., 26-27 
118 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, 26 
119 G.C. Mazarire, ‘Changing Landscape and Oral Memory in South-Central Zimbabwe: Towards a 
Historical Geography of Chishanga, c. 1850-1990’, in Journal of Southern African Studies, 29:3 (2003), 701-
715 
120 Ibid., 704 
121 C. Vijfhuizen and L. Makora, ‘More than one paramount chief in one chieftaincy? The gender of 
maintaining worlds’, in Zambezia, 25:1 (1998). Alongside chiefly landscapes of authority there were 
hunting landscapes, landscapes of danger and refuge, trading landscapes and migratory landscapes, all of 
these have their own narratives and history but are less often remembered in oral tradition or asked 
about by historians. 
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Infrastructure and Indirect Rule: 




“What Chikulamaembe says is true. Our forefathers always worked together in the past but, since 




The thirty years running up to the implementation of indirect rule in Nyasaland (1933), and the 
decade afterwards, was a time in which African societies’ relationship to space embarked on an 
intense period of change. This was a period in which the indigenous economies of northern 
Malawi were hit hard by ecological disasters such as the rinderpest epizootic, by plague and 
influenza which wiped out huge numbers of people, and on account of the heavy involvement of 
northerners in the East African Campaign of World War One. These significant new economic 
and social pressures wrought on the population during this period of time forced a large 
number of the male population into labour migration. Firstly they went to Livingstonia, the 
largest mission in the area, but by the time the hut tax was introduced in the north in 1906, they 
were departing “in all directions”.2 Yet this period was not only characterised by disaster and 
disrepair, it was one which had a formative effect upon structures of local authority, the 
definition of internal territorial boundaries, and the development of a closer link between chiefs 
and the land.  
During the second decade of the twentieth century, running alongside the more visible 
struggles of the administration over hut tax collection, war recruitment and famine prevention, 
a process involving the tribalisation of African space – or, a spatialisation of tribal identity – 
began to take place. It was a process which discursively and practically wedded the 
“appropriate” tribal chiefly stories and their practices of governance to the land for the first 
time. This process is useful to understand as we explore the ways in which Timothy Chawinga 
built his authority several decades later. The battles which he fought over boundaries, the 
“irresolvable” contestations he involved himself with over history, and the construction of new 
rights to the resources in his area, all of which were crucial to his legitimacy, had their roots in 
this period where customary authority attained a distinctly spatial quality. 
Some thirty years ago Chanock already observed the misguided connection which had 
been made by the colonial legislators in Central Africa at this time: that rights in land must be 
“derived from the political authority”3 found to be in charge in a particular area. For the 
administrators this assumption was useful as it enabled them to charge these political 
authorities with responsibilities for the control of labour and agricultural practice; ways of 
managing people and production which were vital for ensuring the success of colonial 
territoriality in the early twentieth century. These were a set of responsibilities which would be 
institutionalised under the District Administration Native Ordinance (DANO) of 1912. Before 
indirect rule formalised the relationship between tribe and space, it had already been 
articulated. Amongst the most important element introduced at this time was the way in which 
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these new responsibilities entitled chiefs to pass judgment upon who was a “native” and who 
was a “stranger”, creating a situation “where access to land was contingent on chiefly 
approval”.4 Whilst this had fewer implications when land was relatively plentiful, it is a dynamic 
which has played a significant role in conflicts over land in more recent history. 
This process of bestowing these new responsibilities upon chiefs unfolded gradually 
however. Whilst these shifts simmered away on one level, at another the first two decades of the 
twentieth century in Nyasaland still represented a time of great opportunity for various other 
independent African voices to emerge. Having forged new links to imperial capital and mission 
education some new “grand figures” did find chances to gain authority. Especially if they could 
read and write, such people could gain considerable respect as they were able to “quickly pass 
for an oracle” within their communities; these big men’s prestige, if they learned “how to 
maintain it, kn[ew] no bounds”.5 Even after the DANO had been introduced there was still a lot 
of room for such figures to thrive, especially in the northern part of the country where access to 
education was so much greater.  
When the Native Administration Native Ordinance was eventually passed in 1933 and 
these other voices were effectively silenced within the preferred dynastic narratives of the 
selected “Native Authority” chiefs they did not simply disappear. Hierarchies had been laid into 
the landscape throughout this time: among the “royal” clans; between neighbouring chiefs; and 
between religious authorities, political authorities and economically powerful actors. These 
would be dug up to form the basis of the many battles and contestations over space and custom 
throughout the period of indirect rule, during the process of decolonisation, and in post-colonial 
Malawi where “first comer” claims to indigeneity gained legitimacy as a way of contesting land 
access.6  
 The silencing of alternative authorities within the landscape of Hewe, and the 
obscuring of local historical geographies, which had no literate means of representation, 
certainly worked to Timothy Chawinga’s advantage. He came to power at a time when the 
colonial administration was still wedded to the idea of using dynastic histories wherever it was 
possible. Once the Katumbi chieftainship had eventually been granted the status of native 
authority it found itself in a powerful position in the regional landscape of politics after several 
decades of anonymity. With the help of educated allies the Katumbi clans developed a viable set 
of historical materials which were pliable and could be powerful as they came to compete in the 
political spaces forged by indirect rule. Another part of the reason why these royal narratives 
gained influence has to do with the colonial infrastructure. The roads, trading centre and 
recruitment centres, which from the 1930s began to be focused around the headquarters of the 
native authority, all helped to centralise the chieftaincy in the landscape.  
 This chapter will consider the context into which Timothy Chawinga emerged and began 
to practice his territorial behaviour. His predecessors and the policy reforms which were 
introduced in the twenty years before his crowning played a significant part in setting him up to 
develop his strategy to “affect, influence or control resources and people” in the area of Hewe;7 a 
strategy that would be effectively used by Chawinga to gain wealth and power up until the early 
years of independence. The chapter will consider the geographical and political infrastructure 
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Part one. A dialogue between textual and physical space 
 
Shaping a body of knowledge 
As was shown in the previous chapter, the production of written histories was important in 
assisting imperial ambition to go beyond simply possessing space with an “appropriating gaze” 
to controlling it physically by mapping and naming it.8 Across the continent, at this time of early 
colonial exploration, “modern territorial practices” enabled a dialogue “between textual and 
physical space through which […] territorial units […] were forged”.9 This involved more than 
just mapping space, which was not the end goal. Populations needed to be fixed and controlled 
within this space for the strategies of territoriality to be effected; after all, and to reiterate Sack, 
human territoriality as an approach only works to “affect, influence or control resources and 
people” if those wanting to use it have control over an area.10 Colonial administrations took part 
in these processes, seeking to “fix the population in spaces under [their] jurisdiction, first on 
paper and then in physical reality, so as to facilitate their movements and activities”;11 this was 
most commonly done in the first instance through census taking and tax collection.  
Population movements, unfamiliar naming practices,12 and shifting residential patterns 
were conducive neither to census making nor to tax collection. Furthermore, not all political 
structures seemed so easy to pin down within these dynamic spaces. In this sense the pursuit of 
“identifying tribes” and their political leaderships, through which these colonial territorial 
practices could be mediated, was crucial to their effectiveness. In doing this, an area which 
might have been characterised by a less “stable” or “fixed” identity was given boundaries and a 
name, and was now defined as a particular “socio-geographic space”.13 These territorial 
techniques, suggests Mazarire, were the “most useful means of establishing settler hegemony”.14 
Crucially, this process of framing and naming space also had the effect of obscuring local 
historical geographies and, henceforth, the “spaces and practices of the non-literate peoples” 15 
became hidden within the “textual spaces of colonial bureaucracy”.16  
However, whilst the dialogue between textual and physical space was at first articulated 
by the hegemonic voices of missionaries, colonial surveyors and ethnographers, these territorial 
units were not set in stone with the first arrival, and first cartographic expressions, of 
Europeans; the dialogue about them was, and remains, ongoing. From 1904 to 1933, the early 
years of colonial administration in Nyasaland before the Native Administration Ordinance 
definitively demarcated “boundaries to conform to tribal distribution”,17 ideas about political 
geography in the colonies were in fact shifting all the time. Practical considerations related to 
the appropriate size of governable units, the impact of ecological and political events, and the 
preferences and workload of individual colonial officials all had a dynamic effect upon the 
administrative framework in which African societies were categorised.  Furthermore, as the 
previous chapter already hinted at, the forces shaping space were also mediated by local voices 
whose own power to contribute to the dialogue ebbed and flowed throughout this period.  
 There were various entry points to this official discussion about space. The most 
commonly consulted set of knowledge about local traditions, history and key personalities were 
contained in the district books of officers working most closely with the population. Whilst 
much of this information was passed down from one district official to another, debates around 
the validity and “truth” of this information were common. In the remote places of northern 
Nyasaland where a handful of officers undertook “incessant travelling” over vast distances,18 
and received little support from their superiors in the south,19 they relied greatly upon local 
people to help them practically and advise them politically.20 On account of the vast areas that 
officers had to manage and the very rapid turnover of staff,21 hand-over notes became a vital 
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way of orienting new arrivals to the diverse political and cultural landscape they found 
themselves having to administer;22 “I would quote from the notes of my predecessor left for my 
guidance”23 wrote the District Commissioner Karonga in 1929 regarding aspects of native 
administration in the north, and this was a common place of reference. Being able to contribute 
to such a body of knowledge could therefore be a significant entry point to the shaping of 
political space at this time. 
From an early stage Africans were complicit in constructing the spaces of 
administration, either on account of this close relationship with mission or colonial staff or as 
dissenting voices to the narratives which were rapidly becoming “official”. All began to realise 
the importance of being represented in these historical narratives and sought arenas in which 
they could make themselves heard. Some were given this opportunity at the official 
commissions which were set up before significant pieces of legislation were put in place. The 
Land Commission (1928-1931) and the Bledisloe Commission, a Royal Commission set up in 
1937 to examine the possibility of closer union between Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, both 
offered new chances for the definition and classification of certain spaces to be debated.24 As 
local voices found for themselves influential intermediaries or learned for themselves the value 
of crafting “historical raw materials” to their advantage they used these platforms and forums 
for discussion to challenge and contest the history which shaped the territory in which they 
acted.  
 
Competing voices in the dialogue: patterns of power at the dawn of colonial rule 
In the previous chapter, a discussion around the highly mobile nature of the Balowoka 
chieftaincies in the pre-colonial period presented that, to some extent, the integrity of the 
Katumbi Royal Dynasty was preserved because of this ability to move to “places of safety” 
throughout the turbulent latter half of the nineteenth century. Unforeseen consequences of the 
clan’s movement out of danger into the hot dry valley of Malambo to the west of their 
settlement in Hewe was that they were also moving out of the area that was to be demarcated as 
the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1907.25 Across this new border, and now firmly under the 
jurisdiction of a different colonial territory [at this stage administered by the British Central 
Africa Company], the Katumbi chieftainship raised little interest for the nascent British 
administration. Scottish Presbyterian missionaries who had come touring these areas at the 
turn of the century record almost nothing about the figure of Katumbi and their journals give no 
sense that he retained any influence in the area of the Hewe Valley. The chieftainship’s apparent 
physical absence perhaps understandably equated to an absence of an established authority in 
the minds of missionaries and colonial surveyors, and Hewe was recorded rather as a place 
lacking in any strong leadership and presenting no significant presence as far as established 
Tumbuka chieftainship was concerned, if indeed anything was recorded about it at all. 
Prior to 1912 the colonial government had yet to fashion a hierarchical framework, in 
which chieftaincies were used differentially to carry out separate tasks. As such, there were no 
substantial implications derived from Katumbi’s “absence” from the political landscape; chiefs 
had little to gain or lose from being associated with a particular space in this scenario. At this 
stage the northern most regions of the Protectorate, of which Hewe formed a part, were 
supervised in a rather arbitrary, even casual manner. The government relied upon the 
assistance of missionaries from the Livingstonia Mission of the Free Church of Scotland who 
provided opportunities for work and education from 1878, and the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) who began collecting taxes on behalf of the government from 1891.26 These 
activities did have implications. The earliest written histories of Hewe, for example, were 
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produced on account of these encounters, and they did have an influence on the representation 
of certain figures. Furthermore, with their minds on Christianity and commerce rather than 
administration, the activities of the Mission and BSAC also had the effect of elevating certain less 
historically important actors from relative obscurity as their areas became small centres of 
trade and education.  
Two major events took place in 1904 that would change the stakes, and would mark a 
shift in how local authority was recognised and accumulated in Hewe. Firstly, a small mission-
run school was built in the village of Mwachibanda in the northern most part of the Valley. 
Secondly, a government Boma was built in Karonga, enabling the first official visit to Hewe by a 
colonial official who came to tell the Katumbi chieftainship and his headmen “about his work as 
a Government Agent, and that his people must pay three shillings as tax to the Boma”.27 Both of 
these events reshaped the geographies of opportunity in Hewe, and prompted a new set of 
priorities for the Royal family who had to begin work on becoming more visible in the 
landscape.   
 
A threat in the landscape, the rise of Headman Mwachibanda 
As has been explored, the Livingstonia Mission has been responsible for the production of some 
very powerful hegemonic visions of chieftaincy in northern Nyasaland. Aside from the 
narratives which they promoted and authenticated in print (see chapter one), another way in 
which these hierarchies were developed and perpetuated was through the new infrastructure 
which the mission brought to local communities. When the missionaries arrived in Hewe they 
initially interacted with headman Mwachibanda, who presided over what they considered to be 
a fertile and productive land.28 Situated at the confluence of two rivers, the Hewe River and the 
Chisimuka stream, Mwachibanda village lay in a valley nestled amongst hilly terrain where 
alluvial soils accumulated. Its relative altitude and lack of tsetse fly meant that cattle thrived and 
people kept large herds. For these reasons it eventually became known locally as “Greenland”.29 
Deriving this reputation from its abundant harvests it was a place missionaries had been drawn 
to. Crucially, Mwachibanda had been astute enough to welcome the missionaries permanently 
into his area by granting them a plot of land on which they could locate their school; this was a 
project which others in the Valley, including the recently “returned” Katumbi Chipiri, are said to 
have been reluctant about.30 Many people remembered its past glory that “this area [of 
Chisimuka] was important, people were friendly, welcomed the missionaries and accepted 
Christianity very well.31  
The prestige bestowed upon headman Mwachibanda for having one of the first mission 
primary schools in the region established on his land was no small matter; it facilitated his fame 
not only in the local area of Hewe and Nkamanga but fashioned a reputation for him in the 
eastern province of Northern Rhodesia, and from as far and wide as the students of the school 
were being drawn from. So successful was this decision to associate with the mission at this 
early stage that at the dawning of Indirect Rule it was Mwachibanda’s name which was known 
throughout the region, not so Katumbi’s who was barely recognised as being more senior. The 
school presented the people of Hewe a new possibility of accumulating knowledge, wealth and 
status, quite away from the traditional ways that had been previously only open to men of ritual 
or chiefly prestige. By taking a more independent position within commercial and mission 
networks Mwachibanda was in a good position to “undermine existing practices [of power] and 
open the way for the imposition of modern ones”.32 
As plans for further infrastructure and markets were discussed by colonial and business 
interests, it increasingly made sense to locate such facilities at this new focal point. With no 
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visible ritual or residential base in the Valley it seems likely that the Katumbi chiefs merited no 
special prioritising in the eyes of the administration. Honouring a barely visible seniority by 
locating business at Katumbi’s headquarters was not an important factor as the Africa Lakes 
Corporation looked in 1912 for a place to set up shop in Hewe that would make good business 
sense. This shop, one of the Mandala Store franchise, offered the possibility of purchasing good 
quality salt, cloth and iron hoes to people in the area for the first time. The shop and school 
enticed people from far and wide.33 It clearly retained its importance well into the 1920s; when 
the store was burned down sometime around this time it only relocated a small distance away 
to a place called Kaphumphu in the valley between Chisimuka stream and the Hewe River. It 
was said that at this time, “a very large village had been established” in Chisimuka, “where 
people came from Muyombe and Malambo [in present day Zambia] to trade”.34 Whilst there is 
no evidence of other stores opening in Hewe until the 1930s there would certainly have been an 
increase in trading activities in the wider region. It is clear that the area of Chisimuka 
maintained its position regardless, and because of this it became a large settlement. Already a 
highly productive part of Hewe the commercial attention which was focused upon it enabled 
local markets to develop and thrive; Mwachibanda benefited greatly from this, accumulating 
further wealth and prestige.35  
These infrastructures also had an effect on the community immediately surrounding 
them. Foremost was the privileged access to education which it suddenly provided. Many of the 
early pupils of the village school were from the Chisimuka area, and it is clear from the life 
histories taken in Hewe that a greater proportion of the people selected to go on to attend 
secondary education and technical training at Livingstonia Mission itself were from Chisimuka. 
These people were amongst those who were to go on to become the first raft of African teachers, 
carpenters, and civil servant clerks. Some would go on to play significant roles in the anti-
colonial campaigns of the late 1940s and 1950s. To this day Chisimuka retains its reputation as 
a place of intelligent and skilled people. Clearly the growing importance of Chisimuka within 
Hewe, and certainly the prominence of headman Mwachibanda, had implications for a Katumbi 
chieftainship attempting at this stage to re-establish some sense of authority in the region, 
particularly in the eyes of the new government Boma at Karonga.   
Though it is not possible to accurately date when Katumbi Chipili “returned” to the area 
of Hewe and began to campaign for his political recognition it is likely that it was prompted by 
this increased level of activity by the Mission and the BSAC, and on account of the new 
infrastructure that were introduced alongside them. Chipili’s emergence in the area, which 
would become Nyasaland, had been necessary for the chieftainship to recapture a position of 
importance in this new colonial setting. Without further research being undertaken amongst the 
Katumbi chieftaincy now in Zambia it remains difficult to understand fully how, why, and 
precisely when, a split took place in the royal family. However, sometime in-between the end of 
the seventh Themba Mtengacharo’s rule, a chief who had continued to practice his power in 
what would become Northern Rhodesia, and the ascent of the eighth Themba, Chipiri I, who 
chose to base himself in Hewe, a severance did occur which resulted in the existence of two 
separate but closely connected genealogies.36 On account of this rupture, new lines of succession 
were introduced on both sides of the border. In any case, when the Government Agent visited 
Hewe in 1904 to take account of the population and their political organisation, some elements 
of the Katumbi chieftainship must have been found. Oral sources suggest that Chipili himself 
was met by a representative of the government, “Mr Wales”, and it is certainly true that by the 
time the District Administrative Native Ordinance (DANO) was implemented in 1912 the 
Katumbi royal family were recognised as the most senior of headmen in the area, if not the most 
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influential. The frameworks of native administration, which were set in motion in 1912, did 
promise more benefits for the recognised chieftaincies. In light of these new opportunities, 
elements of the formerly ‘invisible’ and insignificant Katumbi leadership must have pushed for 
permanent re-location across the border, and to remain there as a settled presence.   
Being recognised as the most senior headman in Hewe by the DANO did not guarantee 
an immediate transferral of prestige from other authorities who had gained status during the 
time of dispersal following the Ngoni wars. Mwachibanda, for example, maintained his 
reputation. Neither did it amount to an assurance of equality with other Tumbuka chiefs. The 
revived Chikulamayembe chieftainship was regarded as the most senior Tumbuka chief and was 
granted the position of ‘Principal’ amongst them. Themba Katumbi Chipili and his successor 
Yiteta struggled to assert their narratives of seniority during their rule and were quite unable to 
convince the government of their right to more formal authority in these circumstances.  
The DANO did not have the same commitment to observing the (illusory) “customary 
practices” of tribal law and administration, as the policies of indirect rule eventually would. As 
such its organising principles were more oriented around practical concerns such as the size of 
territorial units and the convenience of their management. The comments made by O’Brien, the 
District Commissioner of North Nyasa, in a 1928 Annual Report summarise the administrative 
logic of the DANO with an example drawn from a discussion about the relationship between the 
role of headmen and the land: “Each section is divided into groups of villages under a group or 
area headman who in most cases is the owner of the land”, however he goes on to say that 
“some areas are very large so are divided into two whilst other headmen although calling 
themselves the owner of the land, were so small that they were lumped together under the most 
influential headman available”37. The direction taken by the DANO was that tribal histories 
would, as much as possible, be made to fit ‘appropriately’ sized territories. Despite having a 
specific historical identity, chieftainships which were not economically or practically suitable to 
administer, might be considered “too small” to be given their ‘own’ administration under this 
legislation. This logic worked against Katumbi whose small 200 square miles of jurisdiction - his 
territory in Nyasaland amounted to just half of his ‘rightful’ area with a large part of it having 
fallen under the jurisdiction of the government in Northern Rhodesia – provided a very weak 
claim to having his authority independently recognised.  
 
A new process begins: chief of a tribe and chief over land 
The period leading up to the implementation of the District Administration Native Ordinance in 
1912 was marked by an atmosphere of political possibility for Africans in the northern region of 
the Protectorate. Perhaps the example which demonstrates these dynamics most clearly 
concerns the revival of the Chikulamayembe Dynasty in 190738 after which the “new chief and 
his educated supporters set about building an historical image for their new Tumbuka ‘tribe’”39. 
Whilst the DANO allowed for this image to be formalised within an administrative framework, 
and the position of the chief who represented this image likewise, it was ultimately the context 
of the political economy in the northern region which meant these formalities resonated with a 
large number of the population, and hence were transformed into sustainable political 
identities.     
The period between the introduction of DANO in 1912 and 1923 was a particularly 
unsettled one for the people living in the northern region of Nyasaland. Administering this area 
in the early years of government had never been an easy task; its remoteness from European 
industry presented particularly serious problems for revenue collection. There were limited 
opportunities for natives to sell their labour, particularly in North Nyasa given its “peculiar 
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difficulties”.40 Apart from a couple of cotton estates run by Mr Maxwell, the Africa Lakes 
Corporation (ALC) was the only employer of native labour in the district at this time, and both 
seemed to prefer employing Africans from Rhodesia and Mombera (present day Mzimba 
district).41 In 1920, the Resident in North Nyasa wrote with concern that “the provision of 
suitable employment for natives near their homes remains one of the paramount problems of 
this district”.42  
As an area generally “unsuitable for the production of saleable crops”43 and with a lack 
of local market for them, there were even fewer ways for these natives to obtain money for hut 
tax or indeed for the payment of school fees, an increasingly desirable good in the north. It is 
argued by Vail and White that a combination of this increasing need to access cash – for tax, 
education, consumer goods – and decreasing opportunities to strategically deal with the 
“external” demands made on the rural areas by the market economy,44 saw to it that there was 
“an abrupt emigration of the male population from northern Nyasaland with as many as 70 per 
cent of the men absent from home at any one time”.45  
One of the most major of these “external” shocks was the impact of the First World War 
which saw the British increase its demands upon the local population.46 Though perhaps Vail 
and White do not geographically nuance the impacts of the war enough, they are correct in 
identifying it as a watershed in the political as well as economic history of the northern region. 
As “men were drafted to serve as porters in the British army for periods of up to three years”, 
they argue, a serious shortage of labour was caused which “adversely affected food production 
in the village gardens”47 and increased the burden of production upon the women; a burden 
which was intensified as many villages were also required to provide extra food to feed the 
troops.48 Indeed whilst it could be argued that the end of the war improved the “cash-flow” 
situation in the north, providing an injection of money into the local economies as disbanded 
soldiers and porters returned home,49 this did not represent a long-term opportunity. Once this 
extra money diminished over the next couple of years the usual problems returned; high levels 
of emigration, absentee husbands and the lack of opportunities to work presented themselves, 
leaving the Boma with limited expectations for revenue collection once again.50 The exhaustion 
of this “war wealth” was noted by the Africa Lakes Corporation (ALC) agent who confirmed that 
by 1920 there was “a considerable falling off in the amount of money spent in their stores too”.51 
It is not hard to imagine, therefore, a significant and increasing pressure on Africans from these 
areas to migrate in order to find work.  
The figure of seventy per cent of employable men as being absent from their homes in 
the northern region does hide a rather uneven reality however. Counted among the reasons for 
this apparent “exodus” are the impact of a decline in cattle trade on account of bovine pleuro-
pneumonia (in 1912) and Rinderpest epizootic (1919), this would not have affected Hewe as 
significantly as it affected the Ngoni areas to the south, given that cattle had never played a 
major role in their local economy.52 Nor did the recruitment of porters for the First World War 
have as devastating a consequence in these western parts of the region as it had done amongst 
the more commonly recruited Ngonde and lakeside Tonga. Nevertheless, whilst the change 
across the region may well have been uneven and geographically variegated, it can be said 
confidently that the opportunities for chiefly authority certainly increased over this time. The 
war routinized and increased the responsibility of chiefs to organise labour within their areas of 
jurisdiction. They were relied upon to recruit both carriers (tenga-tenga) and soldiers for the 
war effort from amongst their people, spreading “the propaganda, often calling meetings of their 
followers to encourage enlistment, clarifying when necessary, and cajoling their subjects into 
agreement”.53 Such participation foreshadowed the way in which chiefs would be used during 
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the struggle for independence. With a state creating anxieties about the implications of being 
conquered by another nation through this war, and what that would mean for African land, 
people “acquiesced in deference to their traditional leaders”54 who represented a tried and 
trusted, if not ideal, context. They stuck with conservatism over change. This worked to the 
benefit of these traditional leaders, in whose hands they increasingly placed their confidence.  
Once the war was over the role of chiefs did not diminish as the war wealth had. The 
expense of the First World War meant that a consolidated civilian government which could 
implement plans for economic development was some way off; indeed before 1920 “occupation 
was by no means yet synonymous with administration”.55 Chiefs and headmen were asked to 
participate increasingly in local life by both the government and the population. The former 
required a more stable administrative presence to assist the “Thin White Line” – a fluctuating 
cadre of colonial officers56 - by collecting taxes and attending to the “general conduct and 
welfare of village life”,57 whilst the latter looked to these local leaders to attend to their interests 
in the uncertainty of the age. The chiefly elite were to “maintain order in the village while they 
were far away, working as labour migrants”,58 to represent their interests in the home and in 
the fields. These changes in the political and economic landscape certainly bolstered 
opportunities for chiefs across the region to take more control over people, their land, and their 
resources where they had not had the prospect of wielding such authority before.  
The DANO also created opportunities for appointed Principal Headmen such as 
Chikulamayembe, and their subordinate village headmen, “to keep the district officer informed 
of births, deaths, crimes, disputes and disturbances, and immigration”, as well as being able to 
allocate “village gardens and pasturage” under the direction of a colonial officer.59 Year on year 
further duties were added and by 1924, after a major amendment had been made to the 
Ordinance, the power of the Principal Headmen grew significantly. Now able “to administer 
‘sections’ made up of ‘village areas’”, a new spatial demarcation of power tied him ever closer to 
a bounded territory (for which there was a necessity to have a parallel narrative of 
authenticity). The 1924 Ordinance provided for the fact that these Principal Headmen: 
 
“could hear cases referred to them by the village headmen and could charge a fee; they could 
officiate at weddings and grant or refuse divorces; they were responsible for tax collection which 
conferred advantages in the control of labour; they issued beer licenses which brought a major 
industry engaged in by women under their jurisdiction; they controlled afforestation, which 
involved house building and much local industry; and they acquired for the first time clearly defined 
powers over village headmen, with profound consequences for the allocation of land”.60 
 
Vail and White conclude that these responsibilities not only bolstered chiefly authority 
but, in the northern province where an educated African elite was available to manipulate the 
narratives, they also “opened the way for a general acceptance of an identity and consciousness 
defined in terms of ‘tribe’.”61  The legislation of the DANO combined with the political economic 
context of these areas to enable a particular ‘tribal’ expression of territoriality. The dialogue 
between textual and physical space begun by earlier generations of travellers and missionaries 
continued to be articulated but now with a more explicit ethnic or tribal accent. It was a highly 
employable accent which enabled Africans – particularly the educated elites – to enter the 
dialogue more easily, revising stories about “native” territories along the way. These educated 
elites saw a new opportunity of gaining a more powerful voice through the DANO, and more 
specifically the local administrative councils which were set up as a result of the new legislation. 
With many of them leaving Native Associations and joining chiefs’ administrations a much 
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stronger “political alliance of traditional leaders and new intellectuals” took place in northern 
Nyasaland.62  
 The DANO represented quite a different set of opportunities and constraints for people 
in the southern province, and especially the Shire Highlands. As the introduction highlighted, 
the impact of the Chilembwe uprising in 1915 – a response to the exploitation of African labour 
by estate owners in the region – saw to it that this legislation was used to a much greater extent 
to police discontent. On the whole Yao chiefs, who were “keen to distance themselves from 
Chilembwe”, were appointed as DANO headmen;63 and it was the “rebellious” Lomwe 
immigrants from Mozambique who lost out. As Power has noted whilst these immigrants did 
have the choice to work for African headmen or European planters, in reality they were limited; 
they needed a tax certificate to undertake the work, and this had to be acquired through a chief 
or headman.64 The introduction of DANO in the south contributed to a host of consequences 
which would play out over the next couple of decades, and culminate in bitter local 
contestations in the context of the nationalist struggle. In the northern region, by contrast, any 
discontent engendered by the appointment of certain headmen over others under the DANO 
might have created local flashpoints of conflict but did not pose too great a threat to stability. 
There was enough land, and a notable lack of social and economic differentiation in the north; a 
situation which meant that it took until the 1950s until any serious discontent against the native 
authorities manifest itself. 
 
The spatial implications of the DANO: burying hierarchies within the landscape 
Whilst the DANO did not bestow the same responsibilities upon native chiefs which the later 
indirect rule legislation of 1933 would, it did grant Principal Headmen certain privileges which 
would prove rankling for Katumbi chiefs who believed themselves equal or superior to their 
neighbours tipped for more significant positions. Chikulamayembe’s new privileges as Principal 
Headman (P.H) which were different from the paltry benefits Katumbi received caused tension 
within the relationship between these historically related families. One of the most egregious 
aspects of this legislation to Katumbi and his followers was Chikulamayembe’s new found 
ability to “call for carriers and arrest tax defaulters in Hewe”.65 This Ordinance had a significant 
effect on the Katumbi chieftainships of both Chipiri I and Yiteta; by undermining their ability to 
control labour and production in their area and displacing their authority to “officially” meet out 
local justice the Ordinance dealt a serious blow to the reputation of these chiefs, which had 
already been re-imagined in the light of their long displacement from Hewe.  
Lacking any recognition under the DANO, other than that of village headman, it was 
Katumbi Chipiri’s aim, and the continuing aim of the two chiefs who succeeded him, Yiteta and 
Dukamayere I, to claim before the colonial government an historical authority which they 
asserted had been misunderstood and passed over. One of the ways in which they did this was 
by resorting to accusations of deception directed at Chikulamayembe. They claimed that their 
rival chief had cheated them out of their rightful position during the period when plans for the 
DANO were being formalised and positions of chiefs decided. It is said that when the D.C O’Brien 
sent a letter from Karonga informing all the Tumbuka chiefs that a meeting was to be held at the 
boma to discuss their roles and position in the district, and in particular to discuss the idea of 
making Chikulamayembe Principal Headman, it mysteriously went astray before reaching 
Katumbi. The local stories make out that when Chikulamayembe received the letter “he told the 
messenger not to send the message to Katumbi until the next day. He started on his journey to 
Karonga and spent some days, on the third day the D.C. said you should be the one who is 
principal as Katumbi is not even here”.66 Whether the intention was there to cheat Katumbi or 
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not, evidently he did not make it to the meeting and was marked down simply as a village 
headman.  
From this time onwards Katumbi chiefs blamed Chikulamayembe chiefs for their 
inferior position. This motif of injustice is recounted continually and can be seen as one of the 
disagreements on which moral and political authority is fought. As borders became a powerful 
symbol of sovereignty and authority, conflicts over the accuracy of their demarcation became 
another central point of contestation between the two chiefs.67 More stories emerged about how 
the colonial tools of territoriality were used by the chiefs to contest their narratives of historical 
seniority. Time and again throughout the colonial period the ownership of two villages, 
Chelanya and Kapemba, located within the border-zone areas between Chikulamayembe and 
Katumbi, was disputed. In some ways the place in which they were now to be found was a 
largely irrelevant aspect of the contestation; villages had neither been static in the past nor 
were they known as belonging within demarcated territorial boundaries. However, as soon as 
taxation was introduced as a way of tying authority to place, and place to the people, the first 
major contestation took place which flagged up how battles for authority oriented around new 
spatial forms of control. 
Entering into the spatial dialogue as a way of “re-claiming” some authority in the 
situation of the DANO, Chief Chipiri Katumbi is said to have flagged up another historically 
unjust event between the two chieftainships. With the backing of his chiefs’ council he went to 
Karonga to give testimony to a story from the past which tried to demonstrate the cunning of 
Chikulamayembe. One Katumbi was said to have advised his chiefs Chelanya, Kapemba and 
Kalindamawe to carry some ropes to Chikulamayembe, the rope from Hewe was strong as a 
certain tree grew there which was suitable for such things. This, Chikulamayembe was happy 
with as it assisted him to make nets with which to catch animals.68 When taxation began it was 
assumed that this rope giving tradition was in fact a form of tribute rather than a gift from a 
neighbouring chief and as such these villages starting giving tax as well as rope to 
Chikulamayembe. By the time Katumbi began to claim that these people were in fact under him 
Chikulamayembe refused. After going to the provincial commissioner to discuss the matter it 
was decided that they should go to Katumbi and a boundary should be made. Thus began a long 
engagement over the “original” ownership of these villages.69  
 After Chipiri died in 1923, his successor Yiteta brought some new tensions perhaps 
prompted by the increasing responsibilities given to Principal Headmen over their subordinates 
in the 1924 revisions to DANO. Neither Chipiri nor Yiteta had many responsibilities under the 
government, at this time such headmen were only directed to clear roads or build bridges, but 
the latter chief was active when it came for campaigning for the acknowledgment of the 
Katumbi chieftainship as historically important;70 some suggest that he was in fact the first chief 
to be recognised by colonial officers, even if it was only unofficially.71 His chieftaincy spanned 
from 1923 to 1932 during which time several commissions were formed in which the history of 
land ownership and traditional authority came under the spot light. The 1929 North Nyasa 
Native Reserves Commission, part of the country wide Land Commission (1928-1932), was one 
such platform on which he could voice his disgruntlement, and officially put in a claim for 
independence from Chikulamayembe.  
Yiteta’s bad behaviour in the eyes of the administration perhaps reflected his increasing 
frustration at not being recognised and from this time he is characterised as a troublemaker, “a 
little rat of a man”.72 D.C. O’Brien looked upon Yiteta’s claims as purely self-seeking, and an 
attempt to take advantage of the opportunity which the DANO offered chiefs to better their 
position. Yiteta on the other hand took this subservience to Chikulamayembe under the DANO 
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as humiliation and he insisted that he be placed under the authority of a non-Tumbuka Chief 
than face the dishonour of subjugation to his ‘nephew’: “Katumbi got so frustrated that he 
decided to visit Kyungu and offered to place himself under his authority. He could not stomach 
the idea of being a sub-chief to Chikulamayembe whom he considered to be historically his 
junior”.73 This, O’Brien considered as a tactic; knowing that he had no hope of succeeding with 
his “false claim” to seniority, he had planned out “an alternative scheme”.74 The request was not 
considered.  
Both personality and practicalities had their part to play in this. Chipiri and Yiteta were 
not well educated, nor did they have a useful ally to articulate their demands for them, or the 
intellectual resources to give them leverage (see chapter one).  Furthermore, these Katumbi 
chiefs found themselves ruling an area which was considered to be too small to be administered 
separately. The DANO practically did away with any expressions of leadership that did not 
match size of territory or type of chieftaincy that the colonial government wanted to deal with. 
These alternative narratives did not present a significant challenge to the official structure of 
native administration or alter the state-sanctioned subservience to Chikulamayembe which the 
Katumbi chieftainship found itself performing under; Katumbi would remain headman and 
Chikulamayembe would perform the role of his Principal until the dawning of indirect rule in 
1933. 
Even after the Katumbi chieftaincy had been granted the status of native authority, 
becoming equal under the law to his neighbouring chief, the psychological hierarchies which 
had developed during this time were to remain a humiliating tension buried within the 
relationship between Katumbi and Chikulamayembe, and to a lesser extent with Headman 
Mwachibanda, and they still have some resonance today.75 This tension most frequently played 
out in ways which were articulated by spatial factors, with debates over borders and village 
ownership, something that the interaction between Chikulamayembe and Katumbi had rarely 
fought over in the past. Hierarchies were written into history by missionaries and early colonial 
techniques of rule as the previous chapter concluded, and these hierarchies became spatialised 
through the DANO. Tensions between Chikulamayembe and Katumbi can be seen borne out in 
discussions about shared borders, treasuries and courts throughout Timothy’s reign (1943-73); 
what colonial officers describe as “petty jealousies” are in fact meaningful contestations that 
have resonance in local imaginations of chiefly power, even if they have become unrecognizable 
on account of their spatial articulation. These contestations will be explored in the next two 
chapters as the politics of Timothy’s chieftainship is unpacked. Before this is done, a section will 
be devoted to a discussion of how the Katumbi chieftainship did eventually regain its place in 
the landscape and how the political and economic milieu developed into which Timothy 
Chawinga, the main protagonist, was crowned Themba. 
 
 
Part two. The spaces of Indirect Rule 
 
The end of the DANO and the politics of Indirect Rule  
The ‘local concerns’ which seemed at first of limited importance to the efficient functioning of 
government under the DANO were given more credence after the First World War as chiefs 
were increasingly relied upon to administer local government. After some investigations it 
became clear that the administrative structure the DANO created was now barely effective. In 
one of the monthly North Nyasa District Reports from 1919-20 it was recorded that regular 
district councils had not taken place for two years and if headmen were even occasionally called 
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to report their work no record was ever taken of their activities or minutes taken of the 
meeting. In the district books attempts to call meetings were recorded as almost always a 
failure, and this was attributed to the fact that headmen were “indifferent and unresponsive”.76  
To some extent this “indifference” was not entirely about the system’s inherent flaws; it 
also had much to do with the political and economic difficulties of this time. Aside from the 
demands of war, the years 1919 and 1920 had seen influenza, plague and rinderpest put 
economic pressures on people in the north. In addition to this, the inadequate staffing in North 
Nyasa District tested the opportunity for regular and functional meetings whilst the physical 
terrain and lack of infrastructure put paid to the efficient collection of tax.77 In order to mitigate 
these difficulties some amendments were made to the DANO within the first decade of its 
existence. There was a call to increase the responsibilities of chiefs within their own village 
areas. Furthermore, and for the first time, members who were not headmen but rather 
“representatives of the more educated and progressive classes of natives” were to be included 
within District Councils.78 These amendments would not, however, prove long term solutions to 
the problem of “native administration” which was beset with difficulties relating not only to 
socio-economic context of early colonial rule but also to political jealousies and new hierarchies 
weaved into this context on account of the DANO itself. 
District officials whose close interaction with communities allowed them to observe 
firsthand the troubling situation which the policy had incubated began to flag up the local 
grievances more systematically. The DANO, they argued, had set rather unsatisfactory 
arrangements in motion which were, though advantageous from an administrative point of 
view, “unquestionably a departure from native practice in the past”.79 Officers working in the 
district of North Nyasa, long dissatisfied with the arrangements for native administration, cited 
the incongruities and “artificial nature” of the polities which the Ordinance imposed upon the 
people, “contrary to their customs”.80 The new position of “group village headman”, required as 
a way of organising areas, was confusing and provoked jealousy as it seemed to encourage these 
selected headmen to think themselves of having a small chiefdomship. It was even said in one 
report that this system had predisposed these new group headmen to “despise the principal 
headman” whose authority over them they now disputed.81 “The title of group village headman, 
an “impossible and artificial” measure, was a confusing role for the people, especially when it 
came to the custom of land ownership.82 At the same time the heads of individual villages, who 
played an essential role in the administration of day to day life, often remained unrecognised as 
“village headmen at Law” by this Ordinance. All of these measures had the cumulative effect of 
undermining the Africans’ “interest in their own affairs”, so much so that they were described as 
“fatalistically lethargic in matters which concern them”.83 Through these investigations it was 
concluded that the DANO could not provide a “satisfactory basis on which to build up an 
efficient system of native administration in the Northern parts of this territory”.84  
 From 1929 the disgruntled district officials of Northern Province who had been 
complaining that the Ordinance had no future were satisfied. With the introduction of native 
courts in that same year at which the principal headman were given the responsibility of 
hearing civil cases the district commissioners’ calls for a new system to be put in place was 
finally heeded. This system, they had said, would only work if the local administration was 
“based upon native tribal institutions”, otherwise there would be no hope of the courts in 
particular being effective.85 It was in light of all these changes that the claims coming from Hewe 
calling for independence from Chikulamayembe was given another hearing. O’Brien maintained 
his dislike for Katumbi Yiteta when these claims to be acknowledged as equal emerged from the 
1929 North Nyasa Reserves Commission.86 Eventually, however, even he would come to 
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acknowledge the historical importance of Katumbi amongst the Balowoka chiefs in the region. 
Several things would have to take place before this could happen though. Primary among them 
were the deaths of the old Chikulamayembe in 1931 followed shortly afterwards by Katumbi 
Yiteta in 1932; the new chiefs, and their Livingstonia Mission allies, would alter the balance of 
local power significantly. Their relationships with each other and the government reshaped the 
political boundaries in the northern Tumbuka areas significantly.  
O’Brien had formerly been convinced of Chikulamayembe’s sovereignty over the whole 
area from the lakeshore in the east to the border with Northern Rhodesia in the west. Cullen 
Young’s 1923 book had been influential in this regard, as had O’Brien’s genuine dislike for Yiteta 
who he had no intention of promoting. In an annual report in 1930, whilst considering the 
implications which indirect rule would have in these parts, he wrote that he was quite sure that 
it could be introduced without difficulty in North Nyasa, as the power of the two Principal 
Headman in this district, Chikulamayembe and Kyungu, were “universally acknowledged”.87 A 
change took place in the discussions amongst missionary elites, educated Africans and 
government officials in the north not long after this, however, which drove the impetus for a 
revision of these emphatic conclusions about northern history; this change can be noted in the 
1932 publication of Cullen Young, Notes on the History of the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples of 
Northern Nyasaland.88 In this publication some of his earlier conclusions about the hierarchy 
between Chikulamayembe and Katumbi, amongst other changes in tribal history, have been 
significantly altered. 
 In 1934 O’Brien became the first district commissioner of the new district of Mzimba 
which had been created through the merging of Chikulamayembe’s Henga-Nkamanga area and 
Katumbi’s Hewe area with the old Mombera District, then presided over by the main Ngoni chief 
M’mbelwa. Less than one year after he had confirmed Katumbi’s subservience to 
Chikulamayembe under the original Native Administration Ordinance, O’Brien took this 
opportunity to overturn the decision. The short period in-between the introduction of the NAO 
and the meeting at Ng’onga is worth examining as a way of getting to the bottom of these shifts 
in appraisal of chiefly status; this can give some idea about the delicate balance between the 
production and use of historical narratives, and the politics of relationships between the 
mission and the chiefs. 
 
New chiefs and the rise of non-chiefly advisors 
Neither John Hardy Gondwe nor Zakeyo Dukamayere Chawinga had been in line to inherit their 
respective titles of Chikulamayembe (in 1931) and Katumbi (in 1932). Their chieftaincies 
represented a new era where education mattered more than hereditary right and progressive 
ideas more than laws of succession. It has already been noted at some length that the Balowoka 
chieftaincies were flexible and adaptable enough to easily accommodate new rules which 
conformed less to the inheritance structures which had variously managed the perpetuation of 
the Royal Dynasties, but rather more to the choices of powerful external interests. Both were 
mission backed candidates, the kinds of men that the government sought to install as chiefs. 
However, whilst the mission at Livingstonia had forged a cadre of men who were championed 
by the government as suitable chiefly candidates, it also promoted an unhelpful political 
ambition among them and their advisers; the influence which the Reverend Edward Bote Manda 
began to have on the new Chikulamayembe, John Hardy Zibange Gondwe, for example troubled 
the administration more than it reassured them.  
Having been in poor health for several years before his death in 1931, the tenth 
Chikulamayembe, Mbawuwo Chilongozi Gondwe, had begun to lose control over the affairs of 
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his chiefdom; it was in this context that Manda began to increase his influence.89 Under his 
pressure the “customary” successor of Chilongozi a man called Gogoti Gondwe was pushed to 
one side and the elders were persuaded to choose John Zibange Hardy Gondwe, to become the 
eleventh Themba. He was only 26 years old, and he was educated, he “knew white men and 
modern affairs”;90 but he was pliable and susceptible to the ideas of Manda. In this way the 
radical minister began to use the Chikulamayembe chieftainship as his own instrument. In some 
ways the selection of John Hardy was also a boon for the Katumbi campaign, particularly once 
Zakeyo Dukamayere had replaced Yiteta. Both Manda and John Hardy wanted Katumbi to be 
recognised as of having historical importance in the region, possibly because it helped them 
with their claims for the much bigger project of “recreating” Utumbuka, a Tumbuka land to 
reflect an historical claim to a huge Kingdom and which would swallow up the Ngoni authorities 
in its wake.  
At a meeting in Ng’onga which was held on 13th December 1933, it was hoped that 
various contentious issues could be resolved – including which of the chiefs could lay claim to 
the hotly contested villages of Kapemba and Chelanya. Dukamayere took with him a crack team 
of eight negotiators, amongst them the senior headmen Chembe, Zolokere, Chilikunthazi and 
Walutundu, as well as Daniel Kaira and the Rev. Levi Kaleya, both Livingstonia graduates and 
respected men. It was hard for John Hardy Gondwe to do anything other than admit to the 
administration that although Katumbi was not a senior chief to Chikulamayembe, he was indeed 
independent from him and he “had no objection to the fact that Katumbi should be independent 
and elevated to the position of Native Authority”.91 It was decided at Ng’onga that Katumbi 
should be promoted; he was designated his own section three, given a junior court of appeals, 
and allowed to report directly to the D.C.92 A clerk, Ben Mpitankhwakwa Munthali, and two 
messengers, Guza Ng’ambi and Mwambazi, were appointed to him, making his rise complete.   
The importance in this overturning of inferiority, reclamation of lost prestige and 
statement of independence by Katumbi amongst the local community is acknowledged with the 
bestowal to Zakeyo, after his rise to Native Authority, of the praise name Dukamayere. 
Dukamayere refers to the action of jumping or overcoming witchcraft and trickery;93 not 
knowing the reasons for the promotion, local people looked upon Zakeyo as being cunning 
enough to overcome the magical tricks which had hitherto undermined the chances of his 
predecessors.  
In fact, in some ways they were right. Zakeyo was a more senior and salubrious 
character than his predecessor Yiteta. In many ways he even appears to have been a more 
conducive chief to work with than John Hardy, but he had been greatly assisted into the position 
by the personable figure of the Reverend Isaac Khunga. Khunga was a native of Hewe who had 
turned down his own chance to become a senior chief, Zolokere, in order to pursue a life in 
Christian ministry. He retained many advisory roles within his home area and with his concern 
for the well being of the population was regularly to be found around the place encouraging and 
counselling chief and commoner alike. It is likely that it was Khunga who played the major role 
in influencing the elders of the Katumbi Royal clans to select Zakeyo as the most suitable 
successor to Themba Yiteta; it is widely accepted that he was not selected through the usual, 
traditional, processes of election.94  
If a comparison is made between the personality and ambitions of Khunga and those of 
Manda it is not hard to see how much more palatable and trustworthy a figure the former was 
for the administration to work with. Khunga had been a strong campaigner for the restoration 
of the Katumbi chieftainship and for the unification of the area of Hewe and Malambo where the 
split of the royal family had created a separate Katumbi chieftaincy in Northern Rhodesia. He 
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had organised the appeal of Zakeyo Dukamayere with Kaira and Kaleya, in an effort to convince 
the D.C. to restore parts of Chikulamayembe’s territory – most notably the villages of Kapemba 
and Chelanya - to Katumbi. Yet, his ambition seemed genuinely geared towards the welfare of 
the local population; he was a pastoral character, and had no political goal beyond the influence 
he could lend to the Katumbi chieftaincy. The goal of Manda, however, was much bigger than 
augmenting the local prowess of chiefs. For this reason he was seen by O’Brien as a more 
problematic presence, especially since the government Boma at Karonga was unable to keep 
such a watchful eye on activities in Henga and Nkamanga. Manda had developed a role for 
himself in this loose system of administration, playing a crucial role on account of the distance 
from the Boma and therefore “of necessity a liaison between Chikulamayembe and the D.C”.95 
Not only was this was bad practice, the D.C admitted in the 1930 annual report, this influence by 
the mission over local populations was “unfair on chiefs”.96  
 Manda’s most ambitious plan had been hatched some time before the time when he 
began encouraging the young Chikulamayembe to expand his territory, and push to become 
paramount chief by establishing a Tumbuka chiefdom in the heart of Ngoni country south of 
Nkamanga (see Vail and White). Manda had been collaborating for some years with others 
including the Hewe born Simon Masopera Gondwe, a former clerk and a character to whom the 
thesis will return later, to develop a strategy aimed at reconstructing what they claimed to have 
been a vast Tumbuka kingdom; this was revealed later during the 1940s when an investigation 
into the activities of Masopera Gondwe were undertaken by the District Commissioner H. C. 
Foulger. “Whatever the disguise Manda and Gondwe are imbued with the idea of deposing the 
Angoni chiefs and replacing them with the “original owners” of the country, harking back to the 
rather mythical “Karonga” who is repute to have held sway over this country and as far as the 
Zambezi”,97 he wrote to his Provincial Commissioner in 1943. The Principal at Livingstonia 
admitted in the same year that whilst at Livingstonia Masopera Gondwe had undertaken a 
commercial course and then worked as a clerk from 1936 to 1940, he had at the same time been 
“he was the leading light of a little association which he called the Tumbuka Tribal Council or 
Association”.98 
  There had been no immediate objection to the idea that there existed Tumbuka 
chieftaincies south of Henga that might recognise Chikulamayembe as their chief. In light of the 
imminent change in legislation a thorough examination of Manda’s claims was undertaken but 
once the Government was finally convinced that all Tumbuka authorities within the Ngoni 
territory were no longer known, any future attempts to “reunite” their people fell on deaf ears. 
“Claims fostered by E. Manda such as Nyanjagha on the Rukuru River, and the Baza people at 
Hora had been fully investigated and found to be entirely without support”,99 O’Brien recalled 
when the issue was discussed again in 1935. Various other of Manda’s proposals of a similar 
vein, including his prompting of Chikulamayembe to challenge the British South Africa 
Company’s right to the land in North Nyasa, were also invalidated; the D.C. reminding them that 
at that time “there was no Themba Chikulamayembe and no Kyungu, both had succumbed to the 
Angoni and Arab slavers [...] [they] received the Europeans with open arms as their 
protectors”.100  
 Their hopes for an enlarged territory had been raised by the North Nyasa Reserves 
Commission, where the idea for the creation of a distinct Henga District had been mooted. With 
a Boma located at Mburunje it was suggested that it include southern parts of North Nyasa 
District and northern parts of the Mombera District, and with no regards to tribal distribution 
the suggestion was to draw a line across the country.101 The provincial commissioner was quite 
happy to contemplate this idea as it would have created a much needed intermediary 
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headquarters in-between Karonga and Mzimba. However, once the policy of local 
administration was altered upon the introduction of the NAO, Native Authorities were to be 
strictly bounded according to tribal divisions and the chiefs of these units were to have 
authority only over people “who bore tribal allegiance to them”.102 It was in this context that the 
lack of wider recognition for Chikulamayembe was compounded. The people of Mwafulirwa, 
who had also had a long standing debate concerning their independence from the Themba, were 
given the opportunity to switch allegiance to Kyungu in 1931 and then eventually to become 
autonomous in 1932. There is little doubt that the constant “high handed” behaviour of Manda 
created this opportunity for Mwafulirwa. Annoyed by Manda’s arrogance, Murray, the 
provincial commissioner, had decided to penalise Chikulamayembe by allowing Mwafulirwa to 
separate from him and by bringing Chikulamayembe into Mzimba District.103   
 Concerned about the backlash that this potentially unfair treatment would create for the 
Government, especially since the plans for a Henga District had also been put on hold, it was 
later decided that an apology for the confusion be issued and that a rest house at Njakwa in 
Henga be built as a small base from which Hewe and Nkamanga areas could be more closely 
administered. Having a district which only covered these areas, however, was considered 
completely out of the question. “The Chikulamayembe and Hewe units are so small” wrote the 
PC Northern Province, “that they do not demand a separate Boma to watch over them”.104 He 
argued that a proposed new Boma in Rumphi, if established, would provide any officer stationed 
with such little work “that he would simply be a nuisance to Chikulamayembe supervising every 
trivial thing that he does”.105 This arrangement, he said, also left Chikulamayembe free to return 
to North Nyasa District if he wanted; something which of course he considered far too shameful 
to even contemplate. The activities of Manda – who would continue to play a significant role in 
the administration of Chikulamayembe throughout the 1940s and an increasingly seditious one 
pressing for recognition of “the whole land of our ancestors”106 – had caused anger to the 
administration and unsettled the traditional elders of Nkamanga. By 1935 the intense 
campaigning for change had settled down but the dialogue about these injustices continued on 
throughout the colonial period.  
As opinion of Chikulamayembe went down in the context of indirect rule Katumbi’s 
steadily increased. Officers on the ground who dealt with border areas had been long of the 
opinion that a single system of administration common to all territories who shared boundaries 
was needed. With so much of the northern and central provinces of the Nyasaland Protectorate 
“adjacent to other British territory with identical tribes on each side of the border”107 there was 
much sense in creating a compatible system. On account of this new arrangement which 
acknowledged that native territory could indeed straddle borders, chieftainships such as 
Katumbi’s, found a new chance to increase their authority.  
With fresh perspectives driven by information collected from the Northern Rhodesian 
side of the border, O’Brien wrote to his Provincial Commissioner in the July of 1934 about the 
unfair situation that Katumbi had found himself in; it is, he said “the most blatant example of the 
unsatisfactory conditions brought about by adopting a purely artificial boundary to the 
Protectorate in the West…The bulk of Katumbi’s people have been cut off from him, leaving the 
chief with some 300 hut tax payers only within this district”.108 His historical authority and 
ritual importance amongst the people in Hewe and Malambo were also brought into the picture; 
he is “now consulted concerning matters of headmanship and chieftainship by the Rhodesian 
Katumbi, and the Rhodesian Katumbi has approached the Nyasaland Katumbi on more than one 
occasion with a view to the alteration of the boundary including him within Nyasaland”.109 The 
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attempt to make boundaries conform to the limits of tribal custom meant that Katumbi now 
became a chief with potential subjects across the international border.  
The voices of colonial officials and the occasionally tense politics of administration in the 
north ought not to be forgotten as major contributors to the local debates about space. The 
contestations over the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland border in particular, where personal 
tensions and biases between the two local district administrations embedded themselves in the 
understandings of local history and politics of the adjacent native authorities is one example of 
how colonial officers ways of seeing land were taken onboard by chiefs and headmen, especially 
when it suited their own agenda. A memorandum discussion which took place on 1 October 
1934 between the DC Mzimba and DC Lundazi, officers on either side of the inter-Protectorate 
boundary, demonstrates these dynamics. “It is a regrettable fact” so goes the memo:  
 
“That the relationship between the D.Os in charge of these neighbouring districts has not always 
been as harmonious as efficiency and mutual understanding demands […] it is apparent that 
extreme antipathy has existed. As is natural, this antipathy spread from the European officers to the 
chiefs on both sides of the boundary and the Rhodesian chiefs and Boma became obsessed with the 
idea of encouraging the watershed boundary with utter rigidity regardless of what hardship this 
may initiate upon natives hoeing and cultivating in its vicinity”.  110  
 
This tension is reiterated in correspondence just a week or so later as DC Lundazi writes to 
O’Brien, the DC Mzimba:  
 
“In the matter of the revision of the present boundary, perhaps I have not made it sufficiently clear 
that the attitude of my three chiefs has been taught to them by a jealous succession of officials, who, 
with an eye on the obligations of natives on this side of the boundary have not, perhaps, fully 
realized the difficulties in the way of the Nyasaland natives. In the matter of tax, guns, law etc… do 
you not think that difficulties would arise? An undefined boundary would be a release from 
supervision of the more lawless and taxless individual”.111 
 
Furthermore, the production of political spaces within borderlands involved input from agents 
and institutions on the ‘other side’ of the boundary too. In Hewe, this was certainly the case; the 
lines which were drawn to the west of the Valley have been long negotiated lines and Northern 
Rhodesian officials and local communities alike played as significant a role in shaping these 
boundaries as those on the Nyasaland side. Northern Rhodesian attitudes to native customs and 
boundary demarcation were different from Nyasaland policies and this is reflected in the 
reports. This interaction of the colonial imagination with local political issues is vital to 
understanding how an area becomes “a place”. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the 
interaction of colonial infrastructure with local geographies of power.  
 
 
Part three. Places of power: how infrastructure reshaped chieftaincy 
 
Resthouses, recruitment centres and remote places 
Despite the new opportunities presented to the Katumbi chieftainship with the coming of 
Indirect Rule it is important to note that at this time Hewe was an area which had developed 
within it many places of power rather than a strong focal point which oriented solely around the 
Royal Family. As the colonial economy had gradually embarked upon capturing these peripheral 
areas it was rather in Chisimuka to where their attentions were drawn: crops were bought and 
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sold here, people were picked to go to school from here, and a lot of business was conducted 
here. Headman Mwachibanda had become a wealthy man, and his name had secured a fame that 
Katumbi could not easily equal. In contrast to the public presence of Mwachibanda, the Katumbi 
chieftaincy remained largely invisible in this new landscape based as it was in a private sacred 
space and dispersed in the different parts of the territory belonging to each of the royal clans. 
The chieftainship of Dukamayere, and henceforth that of the Katumbi Chieftainship, was 
therefore powerfully redefined and made “public” with the impact of colonial infrastructure. 
Roads, rest-houses and recruitment centres were developed in Hewe from the 1930s onwards 
and these infrastructures had the effect of reorienting and centralizing power within the Hewe 
Valley: the alliance of chieftaincy and mission education meshed powerfully at this time with a 
place that is newly defined by colonial infrastructure. 
Whilst the administrative and territorial frameworks of the new Protectorate 
government reshaped power in Nyasaland in the ways in which we have described above, the 
people of Hewe experienced very few material differences in their lives up until the 1930s. 
Beyond the accumulation of individual wealth, the infrastructures and amenities which 
accompanied, or grew from, the broader economic changes of this time – specifically the growth 
in labour migration - were to have significant effects not only on the lives of those who managed 
and interacted with these facilities, but also upon the broader context of political struggle in 
Hewe. The rest-houses that accommodated migrants, the dispensaries that ensured their health 
for the journey ahead, and the canteens that fed them were all eventually established in Hewe, 
which had become not only a departure point for local people but also a common resting point 
for those coming from the south on their way to either Tanganyika or the Copperbelt in 
Northern Rhodesia.  
By 1933 when the Native Administration Ordinance was introduced, and a closely 
monitored collection of taxation became increasingly feasible, it was rather through labour 
migration than agriculture that the majority of northerners sought to make the money they 
needed to pay for it and for the other commodities that were increasingly available, and 
desirable, to them. The people of Hewe were no exception to this. Gideon Luhanga’s first job was 
portering luggage for the Mandala stores to Karonga in a period sometime before 1930. He 
received “only 2 tambala” most of which, he complained, he had to give to the government in 
tax. Rather than continuing in this more localised work he decided to travel by foot to 
Tanganyika, to the Lupa Goldfields, whilst others too set about similar journeys to cut sisal or 
sugarcane in other parts of the country:  
 
“Anyone was just going there. If someone was poor they would go. I heard I could make money there 
so I punished myself footing to go there. We imagined we could go and buy clothes…once we arrived 
we said we were looking for employment, they wrote our names and we started. They gave us a pick 
and shovel; we worked 30 days and at the end got 9 shillings. The ones who stayed at home were 
afraid to go footing for 2 weeks”. 112 
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Map 6.  
Adapted from Vail, H. L., ‘Suggestions towards a reinterpreted Tumbuka history’ in B. Pachai (ed.) The 
Early History of Malawi (London, 1972) 
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Quietly, Hewe became a place of significance for thousands of migrating labourers who were 
going to Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia in search of work. Migrant-related infrastructures 
developed alongside other momentous processes of material change such as the clearing of the 
road though the Valley and the proliferation of trading facilities in the region. The ways in which 
people organised themselves for labour,113 the arrangements of how they ate and slept, and the 
order by which people respected others; all of these social and economic fibres began 
transforming.114 Understanding the impact of labour migration upon rural communities, as well 
as upon individuals as they travel away from their homes in search of work, has been a major 
pursuit of historians and anthropologists working on colonial East and Southern Africa from the 
time of the detailed ethnographic Rhodes-Livingstone investigations onwards.115 What is less 
often established is how the actual physical by-products of these processes, be they roads, 
labour recruitment centres, maize mills, or tea houses, impacted upon the production of local 
authority and how they shaped the landscape of chieftaincy in not immediately obvious ways.  
As Hewe became redefined further by certain other emerging infrastructure, besides the 
Mission, the Katumbi chiefs were given new opportunities to regain prestige. The focus of 
inquiry so far has been on the production of formal authority throughout different periods. If 
these new sites of modernity within Hewe are taken as a context in which this authority is to be 
produced then it is possible to note how it offered both opportunities and challenges to the 
Katumbi leadership. Such understandings of the production of chiefly power are not adequately 
captured when Hewe’s politics are understood through the colonial archive alone. Indeed even 
by looking through the memoirs and memories of colonial officers who worked closely with 
such communities at the time that these profound changes were taking place, the negotiations 
of chiefly power in this emerging landscape are not obvious. Setting these material 
consequences of the colonial economy within the framework not of the State but local 
perspectives of the place and the power within it can help in understanding how formal 
authority is captured and recreated.  
 
Dukamayere: consolidating official power and capturing local authority 1932-1939  
The figure of Dukamayere Katumbi was able to gain much greater authority than his immediate 
predecessors on account of his close connection to the Livingstonia Mission; this has already 
been discussed. His approval as a Native Authority was a combination of the long campaign for 
recognition which the Katumbi Royal family had been fighting since the DANO of 1912 and the 
implementation of the Native Administration Ordinance (NAO) of 1933 which necessitated a 
closer and more local management of rural communities which he was in a position to provide. 
However, whilst these changes guaranteed ‘official’ recognition at the level of mission and 
colonial administration a quite different process of power accumulation was required at the 
local level in order for the Katumbi chieftainship to regain prowess in the eyes of the Hewe 
population; this thesis argues that the local legitimacy accorded to Dukamayere was given a 
greater chance of success on account of how the new road and the expanding trading centre in 
the 1930’s, was able to assist him in centralizing his power base and bringing the territory of 
Hewe more substantially under the chieftainship of Katumbi once more. 
The clearing of the road from Mzimba to Hewe which travelled on from there in to 
Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika coincided with these changes in framework and personnel 
in 1933. This, a section of the Great North Road, had a transformative effect on the communities 
through which it passed, expanding trade and increasing the traffic of both people and goods 
along its course. Charles Munthali’s most vivid memory of it is that during the war from 1941-3 
troops from the Kings African Rifles marching from Zomba northwards and then west into 
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Northern Rhodesia via the Great North Road would camp in Hewe all the way from Kaduku in 
the eastern part to Thanila in the west. He remembers scavenging with friends for the soldiers 
leftover food tins; amongst them Fray Bentos pie tins.116 
Hewe had always been a nodal point in terms of trade and markets and it was only with 
the onset of colonial rule that its identity was reoriented to become a peripheral borderland in 
the eyes of the state. The passage that people took through the Hewe Valley had been long 
established as an important local route of migration and exchange. The proximity of the 
settlement at Hewe to its neighbours in Muyombe and Malambo - with whom it exchanged 
cattle, millet, maize and beans – ensured that there was a thriving local trade; movement which 
was guaranteed by the fact that the local political connections with these same neighbouring 
communities were historical and interwoven. It is likely that the road route was designed 
around ‘popular resting places’, as far as it was topographically possible to do so, with Hewe 
accommodating labour migrants on their ways north already it was an obvious choice to snake 
the road through the Valley before making a small diversion through Northern Rhodesian 
territory.  
Whilst the road may not have initiated these movements it did a good job of making it 
much safer and quicker to travel the well trodden route, even if it would take several more 
years for bus and car transport to become a feature of the road. The road might not have passed 
through Hewe at all though had the North Nyasa Residents Association (NNRA) had their way. 
This small group of European settlers and businessmen who were based in the north protested 
strongly against the route of the road cutting through the Hewe Valley. They argued that it was a 
bad choice, both for the poor scenery and for the fact that it passed through country “infested 
with tsetse fly”.117 The lack of attention paid to the NNRA demands, who wanted the route to 
accommodate more of the feeder roads so that they could increase the flow of products from the 
areas in which they had invested, indicates the government priorities in the north. European 
settlers in southern areas, where business interests mattered greatly to the economy and 
logistical concerns were given much attention, contrasted hugely. In the north stimulating the 
peasant economy had been of much greater import. In line with this a notable change took place 
in 1937 which opened the way for Hewe and its markets to grow in importance: a way was 
cleared through the Njakwa Gorge which saw the road extend to the lakeshore. This opened up 
a host of new transport and marketing possibilities, as well as to the instigation of various 
agricultural schemes which had been long devised but for which the prohibitively high 
transport costs had previously been shelved. It was from then on, remarked Jato Kawonga, 
when “people could move freely here and there […] many came through these roads. That is 
when trade first started at Chiteshe, selling maize and other things”.118  
 
Chiteshe, at the crossroads in Hewe: A new place of power 
‘Chiteshe’ refers to the area in Hewe which became a thriving trading centre during the 1930s 
and 40s; its name coming from the Tumbuka/English word, siteshoni, or station. This flourishing 
area soon became recognised as the heart of Hewe. From the early 1940s once a Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association recruitment base was established here, and from which time the 
name Chiteshe came in to existence, local canteens opened, people began converting parts of 
their homes into local rest houses, local women found jobs there cooking for the migrants and 
portering luggage of returning migrants,119 a maize mill was built by the Boma, and WNLA 
representatives moved to live nearby. The area grew and extended to new parts of surrounding 
settlements which became known as ‘Shasha’, from the Chitumbuka word ‘kusaska’ meaning to 
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offer for sale or to hawk about. The area from Chiteshe to Shasha is remembered today as 
having been one big trading centre.120 The Great North Road ran right through the middle of it.  
In addition to the trade and business which this new space encouraged, the impact of 
the social development that took place here cannot be overstated. Communicating to the DC of 
North Nyasa the DC of Mbeya in southern Tanganyika asked for help making estimates for as 
many rest camps as he considered necessary in this district to provide shelter for the labourers 
who were walking to Tanganyika for work. He stated that they should be brick structures with 
floors of cement, cement plastered walls and a corrugated iron roof. Additionally there was a 
budget for a caretaker at each camp and a hospital assistant.121 It was made very clear by the PC 
that the siting of the shelters should follow popular resting places and not be altered to simply 
bring them within their own territory:  
 
“If it is considered advisable to provide for these emigrants, four rest camps must be built…The 
provision of medical facilities would be a boon to the travelers and dispensaries might well be 
established near the Chitipa camp…and at Katumbi, where NA Katumbi has been asking incessantly 
for medical facilities”.122  
 
The economic and social development of the area then is clear to see, but observing the 
emergence of Chiteshe is also instructive when analysing the political history of Hewe, showing 
how a certain combination of infrastructures were able to produce a powerful new type of 
settlement; one which became the central point for the whole of the Hewe Valley for the first 
time in its history at this moment. The new road (1933), the Native Authority headquarters 
(1934), which was the first building to be constructed by the government for Katumbi and the 
first brick building with an iron sheet roof to appear in Hewe, and the WNLA recruitment base 
(1937) together produced a place which easily surmounted the challenge which Mwachibanda 
had posed and even rivaled neighbouring settlements for the goods and services that began to 
be offered there. Whilst Dukamayere had gained a reputation as a strong chief from early on, he 
had taken the throne when the Royal family’s power was dispersed and weak. The economic 
and geographical power base which the place of Chiteshe became enabled Dukamayere to 
consolidate his local power and centralize his chieftaincy which had been lacking a territorial 
focal point up until that point. This was the opportunity that was needed to re-establish the 
Katumbi family, centralize its power and make public its position.  
With its “literate instruments of administration, classification, communication and 
enforcement”123 and its insistence upon demarcating “political place” with borders, maps and 
surveys, it has already been noted how the colonial tools of territoriality had a powerful effect 
on local politics. At no time before had there existed such a need for those in positions of 
traditional authority to demonstrate a strong connection to a particular space as proof of their 
legitimacy; territorial behaviour was “an aspect of the group, but not the basis of the grouping. 
Pre-colonial clans and lineages were social groups within territorial dimensions but were not 
territorial entities in themselves”.124 In the pre-colonial period royal family clans occupied a 
number of different spaces within the Hewe Valley and, as has been shown, they had always 
needed to be relatively mobile so as to respond quickly to the threats of raiding and 
opportunities of trade. This ensured the ease in which the chieftaincy, and its royal narratives, 
survived as it ventured into new spaces. The Native Administrative Ordinance bound space and 
authority together very specifically. The new colonial order released the population from the 
threat of violent conflict however it also inflicted upon the chiefly families restraints on their 
usual patterns of accumulation and authority. Such chieftaincies had to sedentarise and 
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centralise in order to continue as a recognised institution by the government, and it had to 
absorb itself into the new patterns of wealth accumulation to ensure that new economic and 
political rivals from within the community itself were not able to usurp formal authority from it. 
 
New territorial dimensions: Chiteshe redefining chieftaincy 
The first chief’s office was built by the Government and still stands, 70 years old, at the road 
junction in Chiteshe. It was the first time that a Themba Katumbi had relocated from his clans’ 
residence to a public place.125 It was a visibility which was further extended when Native Courts 
were established in 1934. This not only increased the power native authorities could wield over 
their people, as disputes were increasingly dealt with by chiefs courts rather than headmen and 
severe penalties could be doled out by them as a result, but it also gave them a new public 
platform on which to perform. Prior to this time the most important places of the chieftaincy 
had been the ritual spaces of the clans’ burial grounds and at Vuvu stream where Mulindafwa’s 
spirit had been buried. This shift from the private to the public is important when considering 
how Timothy Chawinga was later able to establish himself amongst the people. By the time that 
he became Themba in 1942 the school, the market and the main trading stores Mandala and 
Kandodo had already shifted from Chisimuka to Chiteshe. It made sense for business that all the 
amenities were brought together in one central area; but whether it was on account of the 
increased administration authority of Katumbi that these changes took place or simply as a 
result of economic pull of this new centre is unclear. What is clear is that a major ambition of 
Dukamayere, the reduction in the power and influence of headman Mwachibanda, was fulfilled 
in the process.126  
The movement of the school was a key factor in this shifting political geography. 
Dukamayere, himself a Livingstonia educated man, knew the importance of providing access to 
education in a place if it was to be considered “progressive”. Once the school had moved from 
Chisimuka he called upon John Mwangonde, another person with whom he had had contact at 
with at Livingstonia, who accepted Dukamayere’s offer to come and become the first qualified 
African teacher to teach in Hewe. Mwangonde provided the people of Hewe with a high level of 
education but also crucially proved an invaluable friend and ally to Timothy Chawinga when he 
became chief. His role in the chieftaincy of Timothy will be explored later, but it is mentioned 
here in order to stress how significant the period of Dukamayere’s reign had been.   
Dukamayere I did not only bring this well respected teacher to Chiteshe. He gathered people 
from all over Hewe with skills that would be usefully employed there. Jim Ngwira was one of the 
few people in the northern region who knew how to fix bicycles in the early 1930s. He had been 
living and working out of Chisimuka but was asked by Dukamayere to relocate to Chiteshe 
where he was given workshop premises and a key for a place to keep his tools.127 Abraham 
Munthali, a skilled carpenter newly trained at Livingstonia, was also coaxed to work in 
Chiteshe.128 All of these changes saw to it that business, population, and tax revenue all 
increased, and Dukamayere’s reputation and power grew. The impact which the infrastructures 
around which Chiteshe was built changed peoples day to day lives. This might have been due to 
the new opportunities for wealth, as Charles Munthali, NyaKhunga and Nyamfune have 
mentioned.129 It might also have been on account of their access to the dispensary and school. 
Whatever these changes were attributable to did not matter so much as the fact the general 
shifts in conditions amongst the people reflected well upon Dukamayere and he was able to 
consolidate his authority as a result.  
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Map 7. Native Authority Katumbi, showing the main roads and clan authority 
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There is a growing presence of Katumbi’s voice in the archive around local matters, furthermore 
the Bledisloe Commission Report records Dukamayere as fighting for his territory in Northern 
Rhodesia, and appears to semi-acknowledge his right to it. 
Mwachibanda maintained advantages over the Katumbi’s in some respects as the 
market and the amazing fertility of his land was still able to empower him. Government Ulendo 
notes recorded as late as the 1950s highlighted the area as a place of incredible fertility; “[It is] 
remarkable”, wrote the Agricultural Officer for Northern Province in 1950, “that there is a 
surplus for sale from so small an area”.130 The increased value which had been placed on 
agricultural commodities, especially at a time when famine was taking its toll on the Nyasaland 
population across the country, put Mwachibanda in a particularly strong position. It had even 
been slated as one of the places where Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) maize could 
have been grown to be supplied to the workers on the experimental plantations near Mzuzu, 
and whilst these plans came to nothing Mwachibanda and Chisimuka remained economically 
crucial places for Hewe. Since it was an area that still might have chosen to establish 
independent economic ties outside of the Native Authority jurisdiction, it was also an area with 
which the Katumbi chiefs had to cultivate especially strong links. As the local political economy 
became oriented toward agricultural production the Katumbi chieftainship had to rethink its 
relationship to the agrarian spaces of the Hewe Valley if it was going to keep control over its 
rapidly altering landscape. 
Headman Mwachibanda grew to become a ‘Big Man’ over the first decade of the century, 
but there was a limit to his authority, especially when certain external forces which had shaped 
the political space he operated in shifted. He had neither the time-span nor likely the ambition 
to convert this economic prestige into something more formal as the Balowoka big men had 
done one hundred years beforehand. The context of colonialism, which reoriented legitimacy 
around a broader “tribal” identity, looked to more established narratives of legitimacy to form 
the shape of native politics, even if they had to be dusted off a little. In Hewe these were much 
more easily found in the clan histories of the Katumbi royal family, the Chawingas. 
Mwachibanda was a well-known man but he had limited and very parochial historical raw 
materials to work with and was not, therefore, in a strong position to claim a role as an “indirect 





This was a time of great change in Nyasaland, but change that was broadcast differentially; a 
product of the different histories of north and south. Whilst in the south the fault-lines which 
had developed in the context of the early European exploitation were beginning to cause 
problems amongst the population, in the north there seemed more room for African 
advancement through the Livingstonia Mission which was helping to shape political space and 
personal ambition.  
Timothy Chawinga inherited a geographically centralised chieftaincy. The area of 
Chiteshe gave the chief new opportunities to politically control an area and direct resources and 
people through it. However this area also created an environment in which other non-chiefly 
characters could thrive. Whilst access to mission education and support had strengthened the 
Katumbi claims to recognition with the government and had enabled Dukamayere to assume 
the leadership in Hewe it also enabled local artisans and Livingstonia trained teachers and 
pastors to carve for themselves an important place amongst the people of Hewe. The moral 
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authority which had previously lain only within chiefly institutions became dispersed and the 
increasing economic power that these non-chiefly characters wielded began to pressurize the 
various roles of the Katumbi chieftainship. The concentration of services and skilled people 
within the Chiteshe area enabled Hewe’s economy to grow but by the late 1940s where once the 
chiefs had been the only people identified as prestigious there were now many growing 
numbers of people who challenged this order.  
 Within the chiefly clans tensions were also mounting. The impact of mission education 
was blamed for confusing the succession process by bringing new royal clans – from families 
that had been influenced by Christianity and education - into the line for Themba Katumbi. The 
new opportunities for power and wealth which clans in the position of native authority would 
now benefit from created jealousies within the Chawinga family. Vwende, the immediate 
successor to Dukamayere who took the throne in 1939 died within six months of his 
appointment under somewhat suspicious circumstances thought to have stemmed from these 
internal conflicts. It took another two years to find an appropriate successor who agreed to be 
crowned in this atmosphere of dangerous competition. 
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Establishing authority as a chief in 1940s Nyasaland 
 
 
“I understand that Timothy Chawinga at first declined to be selected as chief”.1 
 
“They started calling him ‘Kamangilira’ after he killed this lion at Mowa. [It means] whatever he 





Becoming a Native Authority chief in 1940s Nyasaland was neither a comfortable route to 
power nor a guarantee for a secure future. Whilst rents on land could bring in some money for 
chiefs in areas where European’s wanted to farm like Ntcheu and Lilongwe, chiefs salaries in 
Nyasaland rarely amounted to £300. Unlike some of their counterparts in Tanganyika, “almost 
all of (whom) could afford a car”, in Nyasaland, whilst most had more money than their subjects, 
they “were more likely to own a bicycle”.3 The Traditional Authorities of today might enjoy the 
benefits which the discourse of “indigeneity” has won them, especially in terms of their 
protected rights over land,4 but their Native Authority antecedents had no such advantage.  
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, custom was being wielded as a tool to gain 
advantage in Nyasaland from as early as 1912, but each chief still had to work hard to prove his 
right to brandish it. The colonial archives are brimming with evidence of these leaders’ attempts 
to convert their historical narratives into useable “customary” identities in the context of 
indirect rule. In this new political and economic landscape where territorial units formed the 
basis of local administration, these usable identities had also to correspond to a piece of land, a 
defined place whereupon the custom could be contained. Colonial chiefs, therefore, spent much 
of the colonial period producing the historical evidence needed to demonstrate their customary 
legitimacy over land. 
Complicating the chiefs’ largely local ambitions were the machinations of various 
mission educated Africans who used these platforms, in which chiefs contested their legitimacy, 
for their own political purposes. The previous chapter highlighted the activities of the Reverend 
Edward Bote Manda in this regard, and introduced the character of Simon Masopera Gondwe; 
both operated in northern Mzimba amongst their native Tumbuka communities, and both were 
motivated by a vision to restore to the landscape a Tumbuka kingdom which they claimed had 
once been vast but had been lost on account of the Ngoni wars. In the context of these external 
agendas, chiefs, particularly young and inexperienced ones, could be easily manipulated to 
perform on behalf of these ambitious elites who were well informed and developed in their 
political ideas; Masopera Gondwe is said to have subscribed to the Ghanaian newspaper the 
Daily Graphic which he would let people in Hewe come around to read.5 As much as these men 
had enabled chiefs to enter the dialogue which shaped political boundaries in the first place, by 
the 1940s it was becoming the case that being represented by one of these figures could be as 
problematic as it could be helpful. 
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For all of these reasons it was not easy to become a respected and influential chief 
during this period. It required a strong personality, a good grasp of history, a decent level of 
education but also great sensitivity to the needs of the elders and advisers within their own 
communities, the alienation of whom could easily result in native authorities falling from grace 
in the local setting. Zakeyo Dukamayere had been a senior and stable chief who kept things in 
order amidst this wrangling, but when he died in 1939 the Katumbi leadership was left exposed 
to succession disputes and made vulnerable to renewed territorial challenges from its 
neighbour. It was not only changes in the local setting which caused instability in the 
chieftaincy. The pressures of the Second World War had created a systemic problem of human 
resources for the Colonial Office. As the number of colonial officers dropped steadily throughout 
the early 1940s as they were recruited into the British Army, different priorities were set in 
terms of local government. The need to streamline native administration by federating native 
authority treasuries and shifting district boundaries prompted a re-ignition of old disputes; the 
fragile peace which had held together for the first ten years of indirect rule was about to end in 
northern Nyasaland.  
In the context of these precarious arrangements it is unsurprising that Timothy 
Chawinga “at first declined to be accepted as chief”.6 His two immediate predecessors had died 
fairly swift deaths and the district was on fire with battles to define boundaries and assert 
dominance. Furthermore, it was starting to look as though perhaps the policy of indirect rule, 
and hence the centrality of using native authorities to run local affairs, had run its course. From 
this time onwards there was a move towards opening up chiefs’ councils to “progressive” non-
chiefly individuals, and as a result another plane of potential conflict opened up for new chiefs 
like Timothy. However, under some duress and some encouragement from senior members of 
the family, and with the added fortification of protective medicine, Timothy Chawinga did take 
up the position as fifteenth Themba Katumbi in January 1943.   
By the end of the War and certainly by the time Governor Geoffrey Colby arrived in 
Nyasaland in 1948 with an agenda to bring development to the Protectorate there began a brief 
period of time – sometimes known as the “second colonial occupation”7 – in which chiefs like 
Timothy were able to develop the territorialising legacy which the DANO and NAO had passed 
on to them. When government policy had been focused upon distribution rather than 
agricultural production there were fewer benefits that native authorities could gain from their 
institutionalized responsibilities for land. However as the government began investing in the 
local setting and the potential value of land began rising the opportunity for augmenting their 
authority increased hugely. In peripheral areas the possibility was more so. These years were 
important for Timothy; they enabled him to gain a real foothold in the landscape, prove his 
worth locally and to the government, and gather resources and allies for future. The 
longstanding local conflict with Chikulamayembe with which Timothy also became involved 
was particularly important as a symbol of his pre-eminence; their battles over borders, villages, 
treasuries and historical superiority are central in understanding the rise of Timothy Chawinga 
and his reputation amongst his people during this time. This was the time that he began to 
master his territory and lay down what could be done in it and on it. This was the time he 
needed in order to earn himself a worthy praise name, Kamangilira; “whatever he has said he 
will do, he will do it”. By 1953 the political situation in Nyasaland changed dramatically. Had 
Chawinga ascended to the throne at this juncture there might have been limited time for him to 
establish himself before the politics of Federation and Nationalism took hold in the local setting.  
This chapter will discuss the local and national political context surrounding his 
crowning. It will establish a sense of why the timing of his ascent was crucial to his success and 
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will introduce one of the central ideas of this thesis that the relationship which the state 
developed with chiefs varied hugely throughout the country, and whilst national policy had 
some bearing on what was expected from them it did not always create the same framework of 
opportunity for everyone. 
 
 
Part one. The local politics of succession 
 
A divided Chieftaincy: The crowning of a new chief 
Timothy Chawinga knew that there were plans afoot to install him as Themba Katumbi from as 
early as 1938, Dukamayere had openly named him as one of a number of possible successors 
before his death in 1939, and a move to crown him had even been attempted in the early part of 
1942 on an occasion when, during leave from his job in South Africa, he had briefly returned to 
Hewe. Born in 1913 he was a good age to become chief and with his experience of working 
outside Nyasaland as a capitao in Tanzania and a waiter in the army in South Africa he was 
considered worldly enough to deal with the inevitable difficulties that came with this position. 
Furthermore he was married to NyaBota, a woman from Malambo the place where the other 
Katumbi chiefs had settled; this was no doubt considered an important factor when selecting 
the candidates as good relations with their Northern Rhodesian counterparts would have been 
crucial.  
It was Timothy that was most likely the mooted popularly heralded “successor” 
mentioned in a letter that the Reverend Isaac Khunga had written to H. C. Foulger, the District 
Commissioner of Mzimba in 1942.8 Being crowned as Themba Katumbi was for Timothy not 
such a pleasing proposition; he knew the dangers associated with such a role, especially in the 
increasingly competitive atmosphere of chiefly politics, where magic was being used by factions 
to secure prestigious positions. An influential role it might have been, but it was not without its 
pitfalls and in many ways Chawinga was happy with his life as it was; at first he rejected the 
‘honour’ which was destined to befall him.  
When Timothy eventually assumed the position of Themba Katumbi he finally put an 
end to the perpetual uncertainty that the now controversial succession was creating following 
Dukamayere’s death in 1939. His installation as chief, however, was not the ‘solution’ which the 
colonial administrations on both sides of the border had envisaged. They were aware of the 
problems that were being caused by, what they had interpreted correctly as, a ‘crisis in 
legitimacy’ surrounding the Katumbi chieftaincy. Local narratives about this time confirm these 
official suspicions; they speak of a serious power vacuum which had emerged following three 
uncertain years of chieftaincy troubles. The suspicious death of one of the chiefs who was 
crowned after Dukamayere plays an important role in the local stories around the chieftaincy 
disputes of this time (1939-42); these stories reveal not only an ambivalence toward the 
institution at this point in its history but a serious confusion regarding the ‘rules’ surrounding 
succession and a set of problems relating to inheritance patterns which have to do with the 
proliferating number of legitimate clans within the royal family of Chawinga. 
Isaac ‘Vwende’ Chawinga, of the royal clan Chikunguweya ascended to the throne at the 
end of 1939 following a brief period of caretaking by Zakeyo Dukamayere’s brother Eliya (both 
of the Bongololo clan) who died later in the same year as his brother in the December of 1939.  
Vwende’s appointment had not been greeted with enthusiasm either by the people of Hewe or 
by Foulger, the district commissioner, who described him in the District Book as having “little 
authority or personality”;9 but, possibly on account of the ‘under-representation’ of the 
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Chikunguweya clan in the more recent history of Katumbi chiefs, the crowning went ahead. 
Vwende died in 1942 having never established himself successfully as Themba Katumbi in the 
two short years he reigned as chief. It had been a difficult role to live up to from the beginning. 
Foulger remained insistent even after the appointment had taken place that Isaac was not the 
“rightful successor” and that as a result serious problems would surely arise; there has “been no 
chief in the proper line since the death of Zakeyu”10 he fretted in 1942.   
Notions about Vwende’s illegitimacy in the local setting can be explored through the 
narratives surrounding his suspicious death. He was “struck by lightning” said many who were 
asked about the end of his chieftaincy;11 this is both narrated and interpreted by Hewe residents 
to mean that he was killed magically, ‘through ufwiti’.12 The royal clans in Hewe, which by this 
stage amounted to five13 and who had managed to keep their tensions at bay until this point, 
were unable to make a decision about who should be taken next to rule. The clans divided more 
fundamentally after accusations flew over who was to blame for Vwende’s death. These splits 
have remained as a fault-line in the Katumbi chieftaincy up until now, the perception being that 
the successor to his throne ousted him with underhand tactics.14 Meanwhile the figure of 
Yakobe Chawinga loomed large in the imagination of both the colonial administrators and local 
mission elites as the silver bullet in the resolution of the chieftaincy disputes. Yakobe was from 
Sitwe in Northern Rhodesia where certain branches of the Katumbi royal clans had been based 
since just prior to colonial occupation. The chieftaincy disputes, it was thought, were largely 
borne out of this division of the chieftaincy on account of the split in the royal family, the 
imposition of the colonial border, and the confusion of the succession of royal clan lines which 
followed. The crowning of Yakobe, the ‘rightful Katumbi’, would bring both sets of people from 
Hewe in Nyasaland and Sitwe in Northern Rhodesia under the authority of one chief once more, 
even if the territories remained administratively separated. His perceived legitimacy would, it 
was thought, bring present fighting to a stop, prevent future disagreements, and ensure a host of 
beneficial knock-on effects which would enable a more efficient native administration.  
The Reverend Khunga became convinced that Yakobe’s ascendancy was vital to 
achieving stability. Having been an important consultant during the discussions about native 
authorities in the Tumbuka areas prior to the 1933 indirect rule bill he had initiated many 
conversations about the history of these areas and had been influential in urging administrators 
to reflect again on the local formations of power. He had authority in these matters as he had 
worked for some time as a minister in some of Livingstonia’s Northern Rhodesian stations and 
knew the areas and histories well. Outlining his understanding of the local chieftaincy in a letter 
written to Foulger, in November 1942, just two months before Timothy was crowned, he 
articulated what appears to have been the wish of both the previous Katumbi Dukamayere 
before he died (in Nyasaland) and the still reigning Katumbi in Northern Rhodesia, that the two 
areas be ‘reunited’ under one authority and Yakobe be crowned Themba over all: 
 
“Since I met you…after hearing your suggestion of Katumbi’s two areas to be ruled by one chief, I 
was very pleased and also expected to hear from Hewe if what the DC had suggested had been 
approved by the Government. So I am writing to you to ask if that suggestion of yours will be 
carried out early next year – I think people should be warned so as not to make any confusion on 
considering the election of a chief […] About a month ago, I heard that the Hewe people had 
mentioned the name of a successor, but since I has (sic) in mind what you said, I simply reminded 
them what was agreed to by both the late Duka and Citanda (the present Katumbi Sitwe). At their 
meeting they said, ‘what will be future position if one of us die?’ They then both of them came to the 
conclusion that even if the Govnt. (Sic) would hesitate to unite the Rhodesian part to Nyasaland, we 
shall have one chief under the other so that if the Government makes two countries into one there 
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should not be any quarrel or claim for superiority. Therefore in my letter addressed to Councillor 
Zolokere and V.H Chipofya I told them (without telling them any thing you spoke of to me) that 
they must change the method of selection, the real Themba is at Sitwe. Duka himself was not 
satisfied with the division of the chieftainship into two, even in 1906 at the very beginning when 
there were first two Katumbis, my father [the then Zolokere] was also against it very badly; he only 
agreed after he realised that it was not the peoples’ wish to divide the land into two, but it was the 
Government which had done so by its authority”.15 
 
This lengthy passage is illuminating for a number of reasons. It points to the very fluid 
nature of succession at this time; the expedient and pragmatic way in which the method of 
selection is handled is clear to see.16 Another key issue that this excerpt points to is that one 
chief is needed to rule across the territories so that “if the Government makes two countries into 
one there should not be any quarrel or claim for superiority”.17 This is a conclusion that had been 
made in response to the Royal Commission of 1938 led by Lord Bledisloe which was set up to 
investigate the opinion about and possibility for closer federation between the Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland. Whilst it hoped to only garner ‘native opinion’ about amalgamation it stirred up local 
feelings and raised hopes about the possibility of border alterations which would accommodate 
people “of the same tribe”18 within one country. The ideas generated and outcomes which were 
associated with the Bledisloe Commission investigations in Hewe certainly cast a shadow not 
only around the Katumbi Chieftaincy successions in the early 1940s but they would make a 
mark on the early career of Timothy Chawinga; his claim for reunification with Northern 
Rhodesian relatives would be a more or less annual affair, and always inflected with tones of 
local political significance. 
 
A dangerous power vacuum 
The crisis of legitimacy amongst the Katumbi clans only became a pressing issue which the 
Government felt they needed to get involved with on account of the political activities of Simon 
Masopera Gondwe on the one hand, and the reanimated border disputes between 
Chikulamayembe and Katumbi on the other. After failing to have any success with the 
“Tumbuka National Association” which he had set up with Edward Manda in Nkamanga, 
Masopera Gondwe set his sights on control in the context of local politics in his home area. 
Having been dismissed from his position as Clerk to the Native Authority in Fort Manning on 1 
May 1942 for his “political leanings”,19 and after a brief stint as working temporarily with the 
Native Tobacco Board in Lilongwe, Simon Masopera Gondwe fixed his efforts on challenging the 
native administration in both Nkamanga and Hewe. 
Masopera Gondwe saw a chance to take advantage of the power vacuum that the death 
of Dukamayere had created and set up the Hewe Improved Council (HIC) in 1941 when the 
royal family was in some disarray, bitterly fighting over who ought to take the crown next. The 
activities of Gondwe were clearly designed to undermine the moral authority of the 
chieftainship by querying their “wandering ways”. At his meetings he stirred the situation by 
asking members why there was so much misunderstanding between the Themba, his village 
headmen and their people.20  
The disrespect and discontent amongst the chieftainship led Gondwe to direct the Hewe 
Improved Council to try to make resolutions on witchcraft and marriage, which had always been 
very much the realm of local chiefly authority. He suggested that if there was a permanent 
council then it would improve the living of everyone there, keen to capture Katumbi’s chiefly 
council within his own.21 Concern grew in the Government that the council was having too 
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radical an influence in Hewe and with the lack of an established chief at the helm of the Native 
Authority when the council was set up, Foulger was determined that it be shut down since it 
was “usurping the functions of the legally constituted NA in that area”.22 Despite the 
government’s suspicions of it, the Hewe Improved Council (HIC) remained in existence as 
Timothy took the throne and his activities – in their various forms –continued to irritate 
Chawinga and compete with his authority even after HIC had been disbanded, up until his death 
in around 1958.23 Yet Masopera Gondwe’s activities were just a symptom of a deeper more 
protracted problem of chiefly authority in this region. Had the conflicts with Chikulamayembe 
not been reanimated in 1941 then there might not have been as pressing a need to arrange the 
ideal successor in Hewe. 
 One of these conflicts, concerned with the contested border villages of Kapemba and 
Chelanya, prompted Foulger to write to his counterpart in the District of Lundazi (Northern 
Rhodesia) to ask him if he could set up a meeting with Yakobe Chawinga in the May of 1942, 
whilst Vwende was still on the throne in Hewe. His concern is expressed as follows: “A dispute 
between my Native Authorities, Chikulamaembe and Katumbi, as to the ownership of two 
villages has existed for many years. I hope to settle it but my efforts are unlikely to succeed 
unless Yakobe Chawinga, the rightful Katumbi, is present”.24 His presence, and the moral 
authority that was perceived would accompany his appointment, was portrayed as capable not 
only of healing the rifts amongst the Chawinga’s but it was envisaged to be enough to stem, even 
resolve, external disputes, more especially those associated with Chikulamayembe. All these 
expectations did not have anything like as much impact on the man in question; Yakobe 
Chawinga refused to come to Hewe and take the crown25 and the discussions around the 
chieftaincy once again fell in to confusion. These expectations for a superior moral authority, 
however, did not simply fade away as Yakobe fled the scene; they were swiftly transferred on to 
the shoulders of the next Themba, who was to be Timothy Chawinga. 
 The contestations over Chelanya and Kapemba had been reanimated in 1941 when 
discussions about the federation of native authority treasuries were put on the table as part of 
the policy to cut the costs of administration. Rather than easing the burden on district officials 
this decision proved time consuming and disruptive. It reopened a bitter dialogue around a set 
of disputes that had been discussed at the meeting in 1933 but had evidently not been 
concluded to any of the parties’ satisfaction. When Chikulamayembe had conceded some 
authority to Katumbi in December 1933 at the meeting in Ng’onga which was called to work out 
the boundaries and jurisdictions of native authorities in the Mzimba District, it seemed that a 
new period of co-operation had dawned. In fact, after the meeting was concluded a great many 
unresolved issues remained hanging over the district; something that the principal of Overtoun 
Institute, Galbraith, was quick to point out to Foulger when they reared their heads again in 
1941. Regarding the decision to federate treasuries Galbraith warned “that any scheme 
restricted to Katumbi and Chikulamaembe will not be acceptable to the former as it will seem to 
be too like the compulsory amalgamation with and subservience to Chikulamaembe which 
existed from 1913 to 1933 and which was a constant source of complaint”.26 His suggestion was 
that for no suspicions to be aroused and for an easier management of the changes, the 
federation would have to include chiefs Mwafulirwa and Mbwana too and that the new sub-
Boma in Lura (Henga) would have to expand to include these areas in their remit.  
Having avoided being put under the authority of Chikulamayembe in 1933 neither 
Mwafulirwa, nor his ally Kyungu in Karonga, was likely to take kindly to any suggestion of 
future administrative association with him. They would see the change of boundaries as the 
“first step to absorption under the Ahenga”, cautioned Adagh the D.C. at Karonga.27 As the 
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expansionist ambitions of Manda and the Chikulamayembe chieftainship became obvious their 
not so subtle attempts to gain paramount status were increasingly checked by neighbouring 
chieftaincies. Chikulamayembe’s claims of having once reigned over a vast zone of influence 
were undermined continually by the will of the people across the district whose loyalties, it 
seemed evident, lay elsewhere. The chief’s anxiousness to claw back some lost prestige in this 
regard was in evidence during the series of meetings and discussions which took place in May 
and June 1941, meetings which would set the tone of conflict for Timothy Chawinga’s 
chieftaincy.  
 On the 15th of May Assistant District Commissioner Thatcher, who had been based at the 
experimental sub-Boma at Lura in the Henga Valley for four months, attended two meetings, 
one at Katowo and the other at Bolero, the headquarters of Katumbi and Chikulamayembe 
respectively. He reported back to the D.C from both concluding that it would be quite impossible 
to federate the treasuries if the issue as to the ownership of the villages of Chelanya and 
Kapemba was not settled. Whilst Chikulamayembe was happy to talk only of federation in this 
meeting thinking perhaps that it offered the “prospect of regaining a proportion of his old 
ascendancy over Katumbi”,28 the meeting at Katowo was used as a platform to raise what they 
believed to be past wrongs rather than a discussion about federation. The delegation from Hewe 
reminded the colonial officials that they had a longstanding challenge relating to the boundary 
with Chikulamayembe, especially in relation to the ownership of Chelanya and Kapemba. 
Having been told at the Ng’onga meeting in 1933 “that the matter could not then be discussed” it 
had become clear to Thatcher when investigating the possibilities for reforming the native 
administration boundaries in 1941, that this “sore has festered ever since”.29   
 Whether the village of Chelanya had been tricked into paying tribute to 
Chikulamayembe or not, and regardless of the “real history” behind Kapemba’s own 
strategically shifting loyalties to both, the debates around these pieces of territory were about 
much more than righting the wrongs of history. They were symbolic contestations of 
territoriality; a territoriality that had not existed in this form before colonial rule. The colonial 
response to these disputes reflected this way of thinking about authority as having clear 
geographical dimensions. Assessing the situation for himself the Assistant D.C. confirmed the 
conflicting “historical accounts as to their original allegiance”, but taking his evidence from the 
“well-defined physical boundary between the Nkamanga and Hewe” he concluded that “it is 
reasonable to assume that they were originally in the area of Katumbi’s influence”.30 This debate 
raged on, along with various other long-standing disagreements between other chiefs regarding 
seniority and historical allegiance; all were articulated in terms of territory.  
 In this context of insecurity it is not surprising that the Government and the senior 
advisers within the Katumbi chieftaincy were desperate to find a suitable candidate to resolve 
what they perceived to be resolvable. It is also understandable that the possibility of drawing 
one from the Northern Rhodesian side of the border increased after the Bledisloe Commission 
confirmed the linkages between the Katumbis on either side of the border. When Timothy 
became the successor these issues were all unresolved and how he dealt with them would go a 
long way to establishing his legitimacy amongst his people. The chapter will continue by 
discussing how he managed to overturn some of the disadvantages which he inherited and how 
he began to set the key motifs of authority for his chieftaincy.  
 
Chairman no more: the Mikule clan and the Katumbi chieftainship 
Timothy was from the Mikule clan within the Chawinga family. Historically, chiefs from Mikule 
could hold only the title of ‘chairman’ amongst the clans.31 Whilst never destined to be Themba, 
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these leaders who hailed from the Mikule clan held an important position which needs to be 
better understood in this context. The role of chairman was in place in the past, most probably, 
as a way to mediate conflict amongst the other family lines in order to avoid the sort of disputes 
and dangerous rivalries which are now commonplace amongst the Chawinga’s. The clan history 
of Mikule, corroborated by other Chawinga family clan histories, convincingly tells us that this 
family is the senior. The name ‘Mikule’ having only been adopted during the Ngoni period,32 this 
clan line, originally known as Chimbavi, descends from the original Balowoka Mulindafwa’s 
senior son:  
 
“The house of Chimbavi, which is the bigger house, [received more respect]. In the past when there 
was a big occasion they were calling him to be the chairman and he was the one who would 
conclude everything and he was the one who could declare that someone is guilty or not [...] In the 
past he was not supposed to be the chief because he already had respect but these days people have 
seen that chieftaincy is something sweet but in the past he was not chosen as the chief”.  33 
 
This position, of chairman,34 neither translated well in the colonial context as it could 
not be converted to a specific role in either the administrative system or the colonial 
imagination of how ‘native’ power was constructed in relation to defined territorial 
responsibility, nor did it serve well the campaign of Dukamayere and the other Katumbi’s who 
had spent many years desperately trying to claw back some power from Chikulamayembe and 
establish themselves as a Native Authority in their own right. The idea that there could be 
someone more powerful than ‘the Chief’ but who simply did not wield power in the same way 
was never discussed by passing district administrators, indeed it is not to be found in any 
official discussions, and this clan’s almost invisible authority was sidelined as colonial 
structures began to be layered on top of local ones. This grave misunderstanding of the 
landscapes of power in Hewe could be at the root cause of the disputes that are seen today. 
Timothy hailed from Mikule making him, in this sense, an ‘illegitimate’ candidate; the fact that 
he had not been foremost in people’s minds as successor, and his refusal to be crowned Themba 
at first might well be on account of this. Notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy had, however, 
been radically altered in the local imagination by this time, and as far as the colonial state was 
concerned chiefly succession had always been a matter of efficacy and pragmatism. In the event 
once their first option had fallen through Timothy appeared a worthy enough replacement. 
Educated and well travelled, he belonged to a powerful heritage;35 a heritage which elders in the 
royal clans understood would now need to be included in this new way of interpreting the 
Katumbi chieftaincy.36 He was the first and, until present, the only chief to be crowned from this 
clan. 
After Timothy was eventually caught at his cousin’s home in Monga37 and crowned by 
Councillor Zolokere in January 1943,38 Foulger wrote to the Provincial Commissioner telling 
him of Chawinga’s initial refusal to be crowned: “I understand that Timothy Chawinga at first 
declined to be selected as chief. As you are aware the rightful chief is Yakobe Chawinga the 
Native Authority Katumbi who now resides at Sitwe in the Lundazi district”.39 The ambiguous 
position which Timothy immediately found himself in, a chieftaincy ritually bestowed upon him 
by his grandfather but with limited legitimacy amongst his people and with the Government, left 
him in a position similar to Vwende before him. How then can his rise from a reticent and 
‘illegitimate’ leader to a masterful and authoritative one be explained? And furthermore, given 
the dangerous context which the disputes created, how did he manage to reign for so long? Not 
only did he have to establish himself amidst this local ambivalence but with much change taking 
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place at the local administrative level, and a Government lessening its expectations regarding 
the effectiveness of Native Authorities, Timothy Chawinga’s practice of chieftainship reveals 
perhaps an unexpected story. By asking questions around how Timothy was able to establish 
himself as a chief in this period, and in particular how he managed to increase the influence he 
had with his people and within the government structures throughout his reign, his chieftaincy 
can provide an example which can be set nicely against the background of ‘official’ discussions 
at this time, and indeed much of the historiography, that the Native Authorities to be found in 
Nyasaland were more likely to be a ‘hindrance to progress’ rather than the effective agents of 
change which had been so desired.  
 
 
Part two. Chiefs and the Colonial State: expectations and opportunities 
 
Reforming the Native Administration Ordinance 
By the time Chawinga was crowned the Native Authority Ordinance had been in place for ten 
years. Early ambitions for what it might have been expected to achieve had dampened as the 
decade had worn on and as the expectations of the native authorities’ role increased. Native 
Authorities had always been envisaged within the logic of this indirect rule legislation as an 
extension of the state in local areas, essentially a cost-effective way of assisting an under-
resourced administration to deliver basic services and oversee economic change, especially in 
places where colonial staffing was thin on the ground. However, in a post-Second World War 
atmosphere of austerity, when the contribution of even the most peripheral of colonial 
economies mattered a great deal more than before, new pressures were put upon these native 
agents of the state. Under a new modernizing impetus, designed to increase the efficiency in 
agricultural, industrial, health and education sectors, the British delivered a new batch of 
colonial “experts” to their colonies, full of “reformist zeal”.40 Believing that these “development 
initiatives would make colonies simultaneously more productive and ideologically more stable” 
the reorganisation of local government during the 1940s and 1950s was a continent wide 
phenomenon meant to serve as one of the “steps towards political modernization, towards more 
effective and – at least rhetorically – more democratic rule”.41  
These different bundles of reforms, the new direction which they appeared to beckon in 
across many African colonies, and the increasing attention that went with them seemed to 
represent such a step-change from the previous approach that this late colonial phase has come 
to be known by most observers of this period as the “second colonial occupation”.42 Whether or 
not there was a marked ideological shift in this post-war period, or simply a shift in the scale of 
intervention, as Green has suggested,43 the inclusion of reforms around the Native Authorities 
and their administration were noted as of paramount importance to the success of the 
reinvigorated developmental agenda. In Nyasaland this reorganisation, in principle, was to take 
two major routes: increasing the Native Authority capacity to deal with the rapid 
transformations that were taking place within rural economies at this time;44 and the 
introduction of non-chiefly, ‘democratic’ elements into local government to ensure the ongoing 
‘modernization’ of political institutions.  
From 1945 the Nyasaland Government set an initial agenda for this local government 
reform in a Five Year Development Plan.45 With the broad aims of increasing production, 
purchasing power, and encouraging consumption within the domestic economy – as a way of 
pulling Nyasaland out of a serious budgetary deficit – the plan focused on the Protectorate’s 
only profitable option: the management and improvement of agricultural resources. With more 
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resources and staff available there was a return to the earlier inter-war emphasis on controlling 
bad agricultural practices, as well as new initiatives: encouraging cash-cropping, co-operatives 
and local industry as ways of being able to generate domestic income.46 It was the native 
authorities who were charged with implementing the new developmentalist visions by 
undertaking tasks which specifically promoted the economic growth of their areas. They were 
urged, in particular, to take on responsibility for the most pressing developmental concern of 
the 1940s and 1950s: improvement in the use of native land.47  
As a part of this push to increase the value of land district commissioners in Northern 
Province were charged with collecting and summarizing all Native Court cases which dealt with 
land in order to establish what rights existed over Native Trust Land and what the powers of 
chiefs, village headmen and other person regarding these matters actually were;48 an 
assessment considered vital if solutions “to cope with the problems posed by an enhanced land 
value produced by efficient methods of cultivation” were to be found.49 Funds made available by 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, along with the establishment of the Native 
Development and Welfare Fund (1944) and Natural Resources Board (1946) ensured that this 
focus on African agriculture could be supported through increased numbers of extension 
workers, more training opportunities, better marketing facilities and more forums through 
which the African farmer’s needs could be represented; in 1949 the first agricultural officer in 
the Northern Province was able to be employed, reflecting the greater importance now placed 
upon the sector.50  
Native Authorities were charged with overseeing these agricultural and infrastructural 
‘innovations’ by being empowered to create their own place appropriate native rules and 
orders, and prosecuting according to them. But that these local authorities were capable of 
taking up the pressing new challenge of overseeing the “development” of their areas was a 
doubt in many officials’ minds. Chiefs and headmen could cope with rudimentary tasks of tax 
collection and judging local civil disputes but after little less than a decade in operation it was 
increasingly thought that the Native Administration Ordinance, and the native authority 
position which it authorized, was rather ill-designed to successfully manage the effects of the 
rapid social and economic change that had begun to take place within the agrarian communities 
of Nyasaland. During a Provincial Commissioners conference called to discuss and consider a 
particular Colonial Office despatch, regarding the 1945 Agricultural Development Plan, the 
official recognition of village group councils was first mooted as a way of assisting native 
authorities in their increasingly important role. Furthermore the delegation of some of the 
native authorities’ authority to executive officers who would be trained and charged with acting 
on their behalf in ‘departmental’ spheres such as agriculture, forestry, public works, and public 
health was discussed. It should be possible, some of the delegates concluded, that native 
authorities could be deposed if they were proved to be incapable of carrying responsibility as 
regards the proper use of lands under their control and with this their role could be substituted 
by direct rule through the D.C. acting as native authority. In addition to these factors the 
nomination of possible heirs of chiefs and their education and special training was discussed.  
 
Agricultural production and the machinery of Government 
When a new Governor arrived from Nigeria in 1948 this reimagining of native authorities 
moved from theory to implementation. The direction of Geoffrey Colby, given the moniker of 
“the Development Governor”,51 typified the attitude of the Colonial Office at this time which was 
taking its lead from visions of high modernist agriculture.52 From his experience in Nigeria he 
was aware that the new infrastructure and increasing pressure on production would require a 
c h a p t e r  t h r e e  | 115 
 
much better trained and well-prepared civil service to manage it than had hitherto been 
available in Nyasaland and he invited Hudson, a consultant from the Colonial Office, to survey 
the local government situation in the Protectorate. He came up with the following conclusions 
about the potential of the present system to respond to the challenges of development:  
  
“Education, health and sanitation; roads and bridges; water supplies, good buildings and all the 
things that people now want in their own country and in their villages. These new things which 
have been introduced during the last 50 years cannot be provided and controlled and organized by 
the old machine, and therefore that machine, the old machine of the chiefs and the elders, has to be 
strengthened and changed in order that it may be able to do the new work as well as the old 
work”.53    
 
Inherent in this approach was the notion that the local government system ought to open up to 
include more “educated” “progressive” members of society, and that it move along the lines of 
political modernization ascribed to in the Colonial Office correspondence. As Eckert points out, 
most of these changes in approach took place within the context of an undertaking by the 
Colonial Office from 1946-1949 of “a major reassessment of British constitutional policies 
throughout Africa”.54 In this evaluation it was concluded that the forces of nationalism and the 
push for self-government would come to bear increasing pressure on the colonial governments, 
a pressure, it was said, which had been especially enhanced by the impact of war. The Secretary 
of State for Colonies at this time, Creech-Jones, asserted on several occasions that the 
development of a “democratic system of local government” was paramount so as to ensure that 
the “growing class of educated men”55 had a place in which they could not only express 
themselves but be enabled to develop “appropriate political values” alongside which an 
opportunity to provide voters and politicians “with valuable experience in the operation of 
democratic institutions” would be created.56 
So with Colby’s arrival a clear step-change took place which saw a more committed and 
determined political reform of local government and a more targeted investment in agriculture. 
Such ideas for reform are notable in the correspondence and policy since the development plan 
of 1945 but no accompanying increase in investment had ever been exercised as a way of 
facilitating these improvements; it was Colby who brought the impetus and, importantly, the 
resources to make a difference and his fortified administrative system cranked into action not 
long after he arrived. He had been adamant from the beginning of his appointment that the 
“machinery of government” which he had inherited would need to be progressively improved 
and it was his belief, in keeping with the reforming mood of the time, that plans for development 
could only be effectively implemented and sustained if there was a “considerable increase in 
Government staff and in government service”.57 Aware that with little private enterprise, no 
mineral deposits and “limited financial, entrepreneurial and managerial resources”,58 the only 
real potential in Nyasaland lay in agriculture; his three-fold agricultural policy concentrated on 
the “conservation of natural resources, production of ample good food, and increased and more 
economical production of cash crops – and each was pursued vigorously”.59  
In addition to the soil conservation and agricultural improvement schemes which were 
rolled out across British Africa, Nyasaland had its own economic particularities to manage. As 
Governor Colby was eager to point out the Protectorate suffered heavy financial losses on 
account of the labour migration patterns which had developed over the previous couple of 
decades. Whilst this trend had meant that the purchasing power of many rural Nyasas had 
increased significantly over this time, the trading facilities had not kept pace and as a result 
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many were spending their income outside of Nyasaland. It was espoused that along with better 
marketing, communication and transport infrastructure, trading facilities must expand.60 
Furthermore, in an attempt to reverse the trend of heavy out-migration, he brought attention to 
the fact that there was actually a labour shortage internally and concluded that “more people 
would enter employment locally if the commercial community provided ‘consumer goods in 
adequate variety’, since ‘harder work is bound up with incentives’: he was clear that increased 
production could be achieved only by harder work by all”.61 It was hoped that such initiatives 
would not only encourage people to spend their income within Nyasaland, but that they would 
also have a significant effect in stimulating domestic native markets and trade. In a peripheral 
economy such as Nyasaland Colby surmised that “the state” was the “only realistic medium 
through which sufficient development could be generated”.62 As such those departments 
concerned with ‘production’, fundamentally the natural resources departments, were massively 
invested in63 and by the time Colby left office in 1956 these had grown to become the largest in 
the civil service; the Agriculture Department’s annual expenditure alone rose dramatically from 
£17,132 in 1948 to £314,054 in 1956.64 
 
“A good council can wed chieftainship to democracy”:65 chiefs, commoners and local 
government  
Alongside these agricultural reforms the government sought to convince everyone that the 
chiefs were still “the true voice” of the people; this became increasingly necessary as a growing 
number were beginning to feel unrepresented. For some, “detribalised” elements of society, in 
other words those who had migrated outside of Nyasaland, or who had worked as teachers, 
traders, or agricultural assistants within the Protectorate, neither native authorities nor the 
distinctly non-political Native Associations seemed to provide useful platforms for their views.66 
The government had reason to want to strengthen the chiefs’ position in this context as they 
rightly feared that this “clerk class” of marginal men67 were looking to the emerging Nyasaland 
African Congress (NAC) as a way of making their voices heard. Their experience and education 
made them “dangerous”, especially as they could no longer be controlled through tribal 
organisation; they needed to be incorporated into the administration and given a forum where 
their views and issues could be aired if they were to be prevented from becoming too 
politicised. 
As one way of trying to neutralise the increasingly political atmosphere the government 
tried to modify the native authority system making them more institutionally inclusive to these 
“marginal men”. This was done primarily by reviving and reforming the somewhat forgotten 
district council system. The system of District Councils had nominally come into being in 1933 
when the Native Authority Ordinance was first instituted but in reality there were “few areas of 
the Protectorate where [the council system] was working effectively as an integrated structure 
providing an unbroken chain of representation from villager to the Protectorate Council, and an  




Map 9.  Mzimba District, adapted by M. Davies from a sketch made by DC Mzimba, 





See Map 7 for 
enlarged 
section
118 | b e c o m i n g  ‘ k a m a n g i l i r a ’  
 
 
effective link between the central Government and the villager”;68 let alone any regular contact 
between the chief and his people living remote from his headquarters. However, as the 
shortcomings of the indirect rule administrative ‘machinery’ could no longer be ignored the 
revitalization and expansion of this council system was put forward as one possible way in 
which local government might be able to “start bridging these gaps” and become more 
representative.69 District native authority councils were given more clout, village councils, 
group village councils and a chiefs’ administrative council were created, and Native Courts of 
Appeal were established;70 furthermore Provincial Councils were set up in 1944. Crucially, the 
educated “marginal men” were to play a major role within all of these arenas: 
 
“It was considered necessary to extend the local government system with the purpose of giving 
scope to more progressive elements of the population to take a hand in local government and in fact 
to develop bodies fully representative of all the people, and enable the councils on varying levels to 
afford opportunity to all sections of the community to make their wishes felt”.71 
 
Despite the obvious potential for undermining chiefly authority, the government proclaimed 
that the new system was not designed to reduce the power of chiefs: “As I see it”, Hudson went 
on to say, “the formation of district councils will not weaken the Native Authorities or the chiefs 
but will strengthen them. The Native Authorities will still have a very important part to play in 
looking after their areas, as they always have done, but when all the chiefs of an area sit together 
and also add all the wisest men they can get to help them, then it is going to be a very strong 
government indeed”;72 ‘wiser’ elements of society were required to deliver the strongest system 
possible of local governance.  
This way of thinking about local government reform at this time was common across 
British Africa. In Tanganyika where a similar system was in operation a variety of councils were 
also created, with the intention of evolving more democratic structures from the existing bodies 
of native authorities “by adding commoners”; teachers, clerks, doctors, agricultural assistants 
and traders, all who had “so far had little or no influence in local politics”, were hastily ushered 
into the executive.73 Some of these educated and progressive individuals, who on paper could be 
seen to threaten chiefly power, found in the late 1940s a colonial state keen on assisting them in 
achieving more power. Happy to be shaking up the old system, these educated non-chiefly 
figures were often nurtured and promoted by provincial and district colonial administrators 
who perceived them as the key to the democratic and efficient local governance which was now 
anxiously sought after. Those required to strengthen the machine, “the most progressive, best, 
most educated, the wisest and the most modern”74 simultaneously posed a major threat to it. 
Therefore, managing these new elements within their advisory structures increasingly required 
strong chiefly leadership with a credible power base within the community themselves. It also 
meant that chiefs would have to become more developmental in their thinking if they were not 
to be bypassed by the administration. 
 
Remaining Useful: Nationalist politics and the threat of Federation 
It was a time where there was much room for negotiation. Reforms in Nyasaland brought about 
a new “channel of expression for western educated young men in the districts”, but they were 
also supporting chiefs to retain “control over law and order, and the power to issue oral or 
written orders of rule” just as had been the case in Tanganyika.75 It was a fine line between what 
these state endorsed spaces to compete directly with chiefly authority (such as district councils, 
African Provincial Councils) represented and the unmanaged inappropriate competitiveness of 
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nationalist groups such as the Nyasaland African Congress, set up in 1943. The former were 
encouraged by the government to improve local native authority structures, to bring 
progressive ideas and as a way of potentially stemming their desire to find a more radical 
platform elsewhere. Those who did prefer such a platform were to be found in the latter 
category and mostly threw in their lot with the NAC. Whilst the African Protectorate Council and 
African Provincial Council meetings were full of nationalist sentiment they were not seen as 
particularly useful arenas for the committed nationalists as they could not hope to bring about 
much of the change which the sentiment would have hoped to provoke. The 1940s was 
therefore quite pedestrian as far as radical national movements were concerned, especially 
given that Congress was disorganized, factional and underfunded. Most activities associated 
with these African elites were taking place at the very local level – through the likes of Manda 
and Masopera Gondwe – but they were agendas articulated in terms of the local politics of 
custom and tradition.   
 Before the serious, and controversial, move to federate with Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia became an imminent prospect there were few galvanizing issues that could move the 
NAC to increase their popularity amongst the grassroots of the country and become effective 
nationalist campaigners. During the early negotiations around Federation the native authority 
chiefs occupied an effective position as intermediaries to negotiate with the government. They 
were seen and promoted themselves as having the potential to temper the nationalist influence 
amongst their people. With most of them desperate to stop Federation on account of the 
perceived threat it posed to their land some tried to use their connection to the grassroots 
support of the Congress as a bargaining chip to prevent Federation. Chief Mwase of Kasungu 
started the Chiefs’ Council, which was independent of the Protectorate Council, in 1952.76 It was 
a body that claimed it could put an end to Congress activities in the areas of their jurisdiction, 
and would do so immediately if plans for federation were shelved. This turned out to be a small 
window of opportunity for native authorities to prove their worth. Federation was not shelved 
and as it grew closer the chiefs’ opportunity turned to a threat over their future role. The 
government used examples from the recently independent Gold Coast to appeal to the Chiefs’ 
Council to turn against Congress whose fight for independence could well “spell the reduction of 
chiefs to mere ornaments”.77  
 The first ten years of Timothy Chawinga’s chieftainship were built upon a dynamic 
political context, where the future of traditional authorities’ role was uncertain. Once the 
country embarked upon the federal period the chiefs’ position grew ever more precarious. Many 
had been able to productively negotiate their way around the various arenas of local politics 
during the 1940s, but as soon as Federation took place in 1953 these finely balanced 
relationships were upset and a new decade of more decisive campaigning dawned; as Power 
puts it, Federation “fractured the coalitions and alliances that had made the colonial system 
workable and set the terms of political protest”.78 In this situation, certainly if one looks at it 
from the perspective of nationalist historiography, native authority chiefs found themselves 
involved in much less flexible relationships with both Congress and the colonial administration. 
In the period of time running up to the State of Emergency in 1959, Congress took advantage of 
a growing peasant discontent that was said to have emerged within the Protectorate on account 
of how these new interventions shaped their productive capacity, as well as their food security. 
The nationalists could persuasively file chiefs into those who would support them and those 
who were “Federal” (or pro-government) and would use these labels as a way of increasing 
their leverage in the villages.  By linking the changing access to resources with the fight against 
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federation they “fostered the kind of grassroots populism that became the hallmark of 
nationalism in Malawi”.79 
Keeping the discussions about political change focused upon the chief-nationalist-state 
set of relationships does not necessarily allow for an investigation into the changing nature of 
chiefly authority per se. The introduction to the thesis stated emphatically that this arena 
cannot be the only one in which chiefly authority ought to be analysed. Firstly it does not give 
room to understand the impact which the various identities that a chief constructed for himself 
had. Secondly it does not give room for the different kinds of relationship with the state that 
native authorities could potentially have beyond being political and therefore dangerous, or 
cooperative and therefore friendly. The geographies of colonial rule can help to bring out 
different conclusions in this regard. There were other layers of contestation and negotiation 
that existed not simply at the level of national politics.  
This was a period which also dramatically shifted native authorities’ relationship in 
terms of agricultural production and environmental control, heralding not only a political shift. 
Too often only considered in the context of political processes, the relationship between 
development schemes and their implementation ought to be observed bearing non-political 
factors in mind. By examining the nature of these schemes, and especially the methods used to 
introduce them, they can be re-imagined in environmental, agricultural and technical terms, as 
Carswell has done in Kigezi80; local agendas, based in other desires and grievances were also 
affected at this time; it wasn’t purely shifting the scene for the nationalist agenda to play its role. 
“As commercialisation led to new demands for land and labour, Africans increased their efforts 
to negotiate new relationships in order to gain access to additional productive resources”;81 in 
this context Timothy Chawinga turned ever more to the agricultural setting as a source for his 
authority. Chawinga maximized the potential which the state had given him to manage the 
agricultural landscapes of his territory, weaving their increased commercial potential with an 
historical narrative which created an authentic connection to these landscapes of Hewe; the 
empirical dynamics of which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
Part three. Geographies of authority, going beyond the role of chief 
 
Magically equipped: local narratives of power in Hewe 
In Hewe, with its history of strong personality driven chieftainship,82 Chawinga operated in an 
arena in which he could easily engage and use, what Lentz has termed, his charismatic “role 
image” as a customary leader;83 something which would have been understood by the colonial 
administration as essential to perform effectively in the arena of native authority politics. Yet he 
also had in his armoury a whole host of alternative “registers of power”;84 identities which drew 
on economic, spiritual and political sources, enabled and necessitated by the historical and 
geographical context of the region.85  
Returning to the episode of Timothy’s crowning can stimulate the discussion around 
other possible sources of his authority. When he was ‘caught’ and crowned at his cousin’s home 
in Monga on the south-eastern edges of Hewe, rumours began to circulate, and tellingly 
continue to be recounted today, that his visit here had been a pre-emptive move. Knowing that 
his being crowned had become inevitable, he had gone with his cousin, a well known ng’anga or 
witchdoctor, to get “medicine from outside” as a means to protect him in the job that he was 
soon to be given.86 Some say he was simply hiding out at his cousins home when ambushed, 
c h a p t e r  t h r e e  | 121 
 
however it is unlikely; had he really been intent on avoiding being crowned he would never 
have returned to Hewe at during this time at all.  
Timothy would have certainly sought advice as to how he should prepare himself for 
leadership and it is thought that his cousin, well-versed in the ways of the rituals that were 
required prior to chiefly installation, was the first person that he went to when he returned to 
the Valley in late 1942. The stories variously describe the places and methods that were used to 
fortify Chawinga; the most dramatic amongst them involving a journey to Tanganyika, to a 
famous African doctor whose method of “making men”87 was to cook them (kuphikika) with a 
concoction of medicinal herbs, in a large pot.88 Whether or not he had been ‘cooked’ in a pot in 
Tanganyika, the effect of the rumour has had a powerful effect on the community of Hewe both 
in the past and in the present, and on the ways in which Timothy was perceived in the eyes of 
his subjects. It is a motif that keeps returning as people narrate his story; his authority or 
mazaza has its roots in this, they say, and they tell additional tales which seem to prove this 
mysterious power.89  
This idea of Timothy as a heroic, magically powerful leader is, in many ways, a 
retrospective construction. It is based on reflective understandings of events which attempt to 
qualify how Timothy ‘stayed’ as a chief for such a long period of time, relative to his 
predecessors and indeed to those chiefs that followed; “clearly he had strong medicine” people 
reply. An alternative narrative about his longevity turns on quite a different notion, that “he 
stayed long” because of his “morally acceptable” behaviour. He didn’t sleep around, say those 
who believed in his image as a “good Christian”; unhealthy morality the culprit, they imagine, for 
the sexually transmitted diseases perceived to have killed other chiefs before him. Thompson 
Nundwe, senior headman Chipofya, stood by this measured behaviour as being the main reason 
for his longevity: 
 
“It is difficult to talk about the life of someone. Other chiefs didn’t stay long, sometimes this was 
because they were careless, marrying anyhow. He [Kamangilira] was very careful, he moved by 
himself. He was a well respected man. It was not about medicine, he had discipline […] it is not true 
that he had medicine in his office; it is not medicine that can keep someone in office so long. I think it 
is discipline itself. People killed each other through beer parties and food poisoning [and he avoided 
these]”.90   
 
The people of Hewe usually express either one or the other of these opinions. Whilst 
they seem to be wholly contradictory narratives both suggestions in fact contain 
complementary notions about Timothy, and his authority. There is an assertion in both versions 
that he had an additional strength – a morally and/or magically exacting one – which he was 
able to use to defend himself against the spiritual threats which all chiefs faced when they came 
into power. These apparently very different stories and rumours, which are a feature of any 
conversation about the late Timothy Chawinga, also demonstrate the ambiguous role which 
chieftaincy, and the authority it represents, played and continue to play in people’s lives. What 
Chawinga was able to do successfully was to control this ambiguity, the ambivalence which 
certain people had towards him as a person and his chieftaincy, and the various ways in which 
people chose to engage with him as a leader. Furthermore, given that he was able to operate in 
so many of the varied landscapes of power within and external to his immediate chiefly terrain, 
in some sense, the seemingly opposing narratives about the sources of his power both reflected 
a version of the truth.  
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Constructing “customary” rights and finding prestige through the royal clan 
The framework of “customary” rights and responsibilities on which indirect rule was premised 
suggested that the colonial government was aware of these local narratives, and the power that 
they had to build and erode chiefly authority. Fields has suggested that the colonial government 
in Northern Rhodesia only realised this connection between what she calls “foundational 
routines” which underpinned local leaders legitimacy and their ability to effectively implement 
indirect rule once they tried removing certain rights from chiefs to manage their people. She 
comes to this conclusion by way of the example of Chief Citimukulu, paramount chief of the 
Bemba.91 Noting that his inability to exercise his “traditional” right to call for labour in order to 
build a new capital – a customary requirement – was leading to a serious undermining of his 
perceived ritual power amongst the local community, the government hurriedly “gave back” 
these tasks to them. They concluded that the removal of their rights to deal with cases of 
marriage and divorce, the collection of tax, and the repression of deviance in their areas, had 
threatened the effective working of indirect rule and its ability to maintain colonial order.  Their 
“ability to obtain voluntary obedience”92 was seen as a crucial aspect of their ritual and 
administrative success.  
For all its insights into a specific case of customary authority, Fields example of 
Citimukulu does not represent patterns of power accumulation in northern Nyasaland. For the 
Balowoka chieftaincies, there were no such “foundational routines” which enabled them to call 
for tribute or demand voluntary labour. The Katumbi chieftainship had never had a strongly 
embedded set of customary rights and any that had existed had already undergone massive 
rupture in the previous fifty years of warfare with the Bemba and Ngoni. Jurisdiction over 
marital and land disputes, rights to exact customary labour tribute, which was in the later 
colonial period “given back” to chiefs through salary increases to pay for “communal labour” for 
example, and the ability to make rules and orders about agricultural production in particular 
were novel additions to Katumbi’s customary repertoire, which had previously retained only 
limited rights over the land his people worked and had little part to play in the resolution of civil 
discord. Balowoka families established themselves as royalty but customarily they carried “no 
distinctive or special economic privileges, rights or opportunities”;93 their prestige was based 
mainly upon the fact that they had achieved this position through their trading activities.  
Having lost the economic basis of their power – ivory and trading prowess – one of the 
major ways left open to Katumbi chiefs was to attain distinction by fighting to assert “their 
rights and status within the royal clan and their attempt to control the chiefdom and its 
affairs”;94 as a result the royal clan, and histories around it, became the focal point in the search 
for prestige.95 Carswell notes similar attempts by chiefs in Kigezi to redefine their authority in a 
competitive colonial economy by “recreating authority through their position as clan leaders” as 
opposed to chiefs.96 Katumbi used colonial legislation, which sought to “formalize” the 
succession process of chieftaincy, to his advantage for his own exploitation of the clan. The new 
colonial practice of officially naming successors in advance so that their education and 
suitability for the position could be discussed saw the rotation system of chieftainship – from 
one of the five royal clans to another – get easily manipulated. Timothy Chawinga understood 
that in a context where education, good sober behaviour and Christian faith would get someone 
selected to be successor much more than hereditary right alone, he could manoeuvre his son 
into position regardless of the fact they both came from the Mikule clan. Indeed it is recorded in 
1950 that the heir in Hewe, as nominated by the chiefs’ council, was “Pearson Cawinga (sic), 
eldest son of chief”.97  
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Timothy Chawinga’s establishment of a strong centralising narrative and celebration of 
his ancestor was important in the setting of regional politics and within the highly competitive 
royal clan setting which had been the downfall of several of his immediate predecessors. By 
creating a public celebration of this history further cohesion and concentration of power was 
achieved. Said to have been inspired by the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, the first official 
Mulindafwa ceremony was held in September 1954. This celebration of the founder of the royal 
clan became an important performance of power which has taken place every year up to date. 
Van Binsbergen has highlighted with the example of the Kazanga Cultural Association in 
western central Zambia, such ceremonies are enormously useful as a way of exchanging “the 
one resource which one locally has in abundance, competence in symbolic production, for 
political and economic power”.98   
The fact that the Mulindafwa festival inspired several other ceremonies across the 
region in the 1960s is telling. One of these, the Vinkakanimba Day which celebrated the arrival 
of Chief Muyombe, was observed at close hand by the anthropologist George Bond. Bond noted 
the way that the new Deputy Chief Edwall Muwowo had engineered this new public occasion 
himself in the context of African nationalist politics, and how it served several useful purposes. 
The day would “emphasize the position of the royal clan as the rightful rulers vis-à-vis the new 
politicians”, and “within the framework of the royal clan it would reinforce the claims of the 
descendants of Vinkakanimba, and it would bring the residents of the chiefdom to the capital, 
emphasizing it as the political and, for many, the religious center of the chiefdom”.99 It is said by 




Fighting for a place in the landscape: rivalries, historicity and authority 
The success of individual chiefs in these northern Tumbuka areas was connected very closely 
with their ability to build and maintain authority in the regional context. With such an emphasis 
on the prestige of royal families, they had to maintain their standing in the local setting by also 
performing sufficiently well in a regional setting, especially vis-a-vis the other royal families 
with which they had connections. Certain motifs of authority for these chiefs were set as new 
territorial units were being forged for them in the early part of the twentieth century. The 
hierarchies that were written into history and as a result the native administration at that time 
were key points of conflict which had implications for the building of local authority. The fight 
for recognition by the Katumbi chiefs from 1912 to 1933, for example, had not only been about 
getting a salary it had equally been about saving face in order to keep people believing in their 
leadership. There is no point in glorifying ones past if the situation in the present suggests their 
weakness. The naming of Zakeyo as ‘Dukamayere’ is interesting in this regard. By associating his 
victory over Chikulamayembe with defeating witchcraft the popular stories about his success 
suggest that winning battles such as these are crucial to ones authority. 
The long debates about the federation of Chikulamayembe and Katumbi’s treasuries had 
such a layer to it. It might have been simpler from an administrative point of view and “easier 
for the Boma to deal with one unit rather than two”,101 but since it would have been perceived in 
the local context as an undermining change, a symbolic defeat, “the first step towards 
(Katumbi’s) small administration being absorbed by (Chikulamayembe)”,102 it had to be fiercely 
fought against. Whilst Foulger stressed ‘partnership’ in this move, Timothy Chawinga continued 
the policy of his predecessors (who had protested against it when it was first mooted in 1940) 
by absolutely disagreeing with the idea when it was brought up again in 1946. He was too 
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concerned about appearing subordinate in the eyes of his community and surrounding 
authorities, knowing that such a status would have serious implications on his ability to control 
labour and effectively administer his area. The last thing he was going to do would be “to throw 
his lot in with that of N.A. Chikulamayembe”.103 Hodgson, the Provincial Commissioner of the 
Northern Province when this discussion came up again, appeared baffled as to why 
Chikulamayembe and Katumbi would not want to federate their treasuries given that the way 
they “stand at present they have no power whatsoever, but if they combined they would be in a 
much stronger position”.104 He seems not to have had the understanding, as Foulger had in 1940 
when the federation of these treasuries was first brought up, that it would be difficult to do such 
a thing “without arousing the jealousy of Katumbi who would naturally conclude that his 
acknowledged independent chieftainship was being abolished”.105  
These tensions were perceived by the administration to be “trifling” battles of legitimacy 
amongst the Tumbuka chiefs but they were firmly held views unlikely to be affected by the 
changing government policy that was taking place around them; from a local perspective these 
institutional shake-ups simply altered the scene rather than the content of these battles. From 
early on Timothy turned these battles about treasuries, village disputes and borders, into 
symbolic stages on which he could perform his chieftaincy. Rather than seeing Chikulamayembe 
as a local partner, his people required Katumbi to dominate him; his assertion of power over 
Chikulamayembe was a very important process in the early of his chieftaincy as he was 
establishing himself. It remained more important for chiefs such as Timothy to control local 
narratives and manage historically embedded hierarchies in order to maintain status as a ‘big 
man’ than to hold relatively more power through national structures or seemingly more 
powerful positions in terms of the State.106 This was something that Hudson had noted across 
the country when, having undertaken his extensive survey into local government, he addressed 
members of the African Protectorate Council in October 1950 on the issue of co-operation. He 
told the chiefs and elders that they had the opportunity to take on more responsibility in terms 
of administration if they really proved they could facilitate change but “if, of course, you all want 
your own little areas to yourselves; if you are jealous of each other, then you will never get 
anywhere at all”.107 Managing their little areas themselves, however, was a fundamental part of 
the local success that the administration actually needed them to have.  
Chawinga looked increasingly seriously at the opportunity to gain prestige by pursuing 
the campaign begun by his predecessors of “getting back under his control those of his Kamanga 
people who are at present living in Northern Rhodesia”.108 This focus worried the district 
administration who noted a change in Chawinga from his more compliant earlier years of rule. 
On account of his determined pursuit of this ambition he was described in 1946 as being “a 
disappointment” and not “entirely straightforward in his dealings with the Boma”;109 the fears 
were that this distraction would hamper “the efficient administration of his area”.110 The 
administration ought not to have been so critical; after all it had been down to their colleagues’ 
willingness to consider the Bledisloe Royal Commission findings a few years earlier that had 
given the campaign some hope of success in the first place.   
 With further investigations shelved on account of the war the notion that this 
reunification might happen had never been fully put to bed. It had become a real possibility for 
local people and had even taken root in the thinking of the district administration. Foulger had 
the idea of it in the back of his mind when thoughts turned to the federation of treasuries. He 
admitted that under current conditions it was a good idea because Katumbi had a small area 
with very few people under him. However, he did not rule out the possibility that these 
conditions could change; “if the recommendations to the Royal Commission are accepted”, he 
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wrote to his P.C. in 1940, “and Katumbi obtains his lands and people in Northern Rhodesia, he 
would be in a better position altogether and one which might not justify federation”.111 
Encouraged by the Reverend Khunga, whose early experience as Supervisor of Schools in 
Nkamanga and Uyombe in Northern Rhodesia had given him a sense of how people felt about 
the idea, the point was raised in one of the first meetings of the African Provincial Council in 
1945 when it was suggested that the boundaries be altered “so that all the people of the same 
tribe are in one country [...] [and] under one chief”.112 ‘Reunification’ with neighbouring 
territory in Northern Rhodesia had become one of the motifs of the Katumbi chieftaincy. Whilst 
Chawinga never succeeded in achieving the reunification, he repetitively involved himself in 
performances which asserted his territorial right over this area.  
The sense that Timothy Chawinga was an administrative liability did not last into the 
1950s as he began to show that he had the diplomatic skill to manage the different interests 
within Hewe in the midst of the rapid changes which were taking place. This was particularly 
impressive when observed in contrast to his rival Chikulamayembe who struggled to deal with 
the repercussions which the jealousies between headmen in his area were having on his ability 
to work with councillors and advisers. He was accused of generating “a lot of heat in discussion 
of proposals for change” and worried the administration who wrote that the “relationship 
between him and his subordinates is on an uneasy footing”.113 His chiefs’ council was a place 
where there was “too much talk for the sake of talking and a great deal of manoeuvring for self-
aggrandisement”; any decisions taken within this forum, even if unanimous, were always 
“treated with caution – since the council might change its mind next time it meets”.114 As 
Chikulamayembe and Katumbi were involved in their own battles, and were continually being 
compared by the administration they played off each other to gain advantage. 
 It was not only against other native authorities and amongst village headmen that 
Chawinga had to stake his claim. He put up a fight against the introduction of a Catholic mission 
in Hewe, something which will be explored in Chapter five, as well as making sure that any 
European presence, limited though it was, knew who was boss. The Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association had a depot in Chiteshe from the 1940s and was managed for a time by a 
European, Mr. Brisley. Whilst there is not a great deal of archival material about the activities of 
this particular depot, or about the man that ran it, the little information that does exist gives 
some insight into the tense relationship that developed between the chief and Brisley, and about 
Chawinga’s desire to take control. In a letter dated 4 September 1947 Chawinga wrote to Moore, 
the District Commissioner of Mzimba at the time, complaining that the WNLA manager recently 
“spoke to me many things and some of which have made me to write to you”; this included the 
accusation that he was “against wenela” and “talked too much at the Provincial Council at 
Livingstonia” about it. With the feeling he had been treated with disrespect by the chief, Brisley 
warned Chawinga, “you must consult me before you send questions to the District 
Commissioner which are in connection with wenela”; something the chief was non-too pleased 
about.115 
By referring the case to Moore Chawinga clearly hoped to undermine the activities of 
Brisley as he accused him of “preventing market fees to be obtained from the people who 
bought their produce to the market”. He also took the opportunity to make some another 
accusations, that WNLA recruits were not sufficiently briefed about the work they were signing 
up and that the costs of repatriating WNLA recruits had not been sufficient enough, “I leave all 
this in your hands” he wrote, hoping to gain the upper hand over Brisley as he did so.116 Moore 
acknowledged that indeed the WNLA representative had no right to know what was being 
discussed at Provincial Council meetings, however Chawinga did not get it all his own way; “I 
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am satisfied that all persons going to the mines are given full information before they go but 
some do not listen”, wrote Moore, “further if conditions were not good recruits would not sign 
on time after time, which in fact they do”.117 His closing comments provide the merest of hints 
that Chawinga’s behaviour in Hewe reflected that he thought he owned the place and believed it 
was his right to get involved in every aspect of its management:   
 
“I would remind you that WNLA compound belongs to WNLA and if you wish to talk to the WNLA 
representative when he is up there you should ask if he will see you and not shove in with your hat 
on when he is busy. You and your people derive much benefit from WNLA and you should be on good 
terms with them”. 118 
 
Economic registers of power 
Understanding a chief as an economic individual brings an important alternative opportunity 
for their accumulation of authority; this aspect of their identity must not be forgotten. There 
were increasing opportunities for “commoners” to accumulate wealth in Nyasaland from the 
1930s onwards, but having “overlapping” identities at this time was not unusual; one could 
simultaneously be a labour-hiring farmer, a cash-cropper, a businessman, a trader, and a chief. 
Austin, an historian who has focused on the economic behaviour of chiefs in Ghana, provides 
examples from South Asante of traditional leaders who acted and performed as economically 
motivated individuals to maintain their position among an emerging rural elite. Whilst the “old” 
ways of establishing a material base for chiefly position did begin to change as the colonial 
economy managed and restricted the forms of accumulation which had been used in the past - 
such as hunting and taxing the caravan trade - chiefs were not all sidelined in this process. Many 
maintained their material position by reorienting themselves in the colonial economy where 
they could, often by using their “old” ritual identities, create “new” positions for themselves and 
become a part of the new rural elite.  
In the context of the growing cocoa farming industry in 1920s and 30s colonial Ghana, 
Austin charts how chiefs “participated in these sources of wealth while retaining non-market 
instruments of enrichment in addition”,119 and were in fact remarkably successful in adapting to 
the new economic opportunities in South Asante. Many were “in the vanguard of the cocoa 
industry, and used diverse means to extract income from it, thereby off-setting in large part the 
reduction of their old fiscal powers”.120 In colonial Malawi Peter Mwakagunsulu, who became 
Chief Kyungu from 1932 to 1965, even “abandoned all claims to divinity”, and placed a much 
greater emphasis on his experience as a teacher and trader. 121 Having set up three stores and 
become a successful investor in cattle and cotton he won the respect of district officials, but he 
also paid heed to his people through his promotion of indigenous practices.  
These new sources of wealth put certain individuals in a good position to negotiate their 
role within the chiefly families too. In Hewe, chiefs who had been better educated and had more 
opportunity to accumulate wealth had more influence in the decision making processes around 
who should be crowned. That an overwhelming majority of chiefs since 1933 have come from a 
clan based close to the commercial trading centre of the Hewe Valley, the Bongololo clan, shows 
that this economic influence on succession was powerful.122 This fits with Austin’s conclusion 
that “success in cocoa-farming came to be one of the ways in which candidates for a stool could 
load the genealogical dice […] a candidate’s chances were helped if he would improve the 
finances of the stool and, indeed, those of the elders”.123 The impact of Timothy’s own economic 
activities in this regard will be considered in the next two chapters, but the space in which he 
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was free to accumulate wealth should be understood in the context of its relationship to the 
colonial state. 
 
Achieving new popularity and projecting old power 
If the context was malleable enough, when a chief played the right moves it mattered little 
whether or not he had customary resources at his disposal or a strong government mandate to 
rule. If he could achieve popularity and get people on side he could then “transform a newly 
created public consensus into new power”.124 Not only did Timothy achieve this popularity 
through the Mulindafwa ceremony, he was a master in public performances, and he used 
rumour and gossip to his advantage. When asked how Chawinga had managed to become a 
strong leader the most frequent answers from those interviewed in Hewe suggest that it was his 
promotion of the interests of his people that was most important. He built up the trading centre, 
including the maternity ward and the community hall; when there were funerals anywhere in 
Hewe he would go and contribute money; when government officials came he seemed to stand 
up to them; on most days before he went to office he would visit sick and then go to the school; 
he would close the road when there was snakes and lions and would go to shoot them.125 The 
fact that he had inherited a concentrated institutional structure from the Dukamayere 
chieftaincy, which he could use to his advantage and to build his economic and political clout, 
was a crucial platform on which he could build all of this.  
Due to the fact that his chieftaincy was considered of little importance or threat to the 
colonial state, but that it was strong enough institutionally to be an effective leadership, Hewe 
was left as a rather “non-incorporated” area; this played very much to Timothy’s advantage who 
used it to accumulate power and wealth, attributes that successfully enabled him to non-
coercively mobilize people into collective action. Such people, according to Boone’s analysis, 
could then increase further their bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre; with a colonial state that 
had limited resources to project its sovereignty, if it could rely upon others to take on that role 
within their own areas then - if they were places of limited interest to the state - they could be 
largely left alone to practice their own sovereignty. An effective native authority had the 
potential to lower the costs to the government (and indeed to the chief himself) of social control 
which might otherwise have had to be achieved through coercion, enforcement and/or much 
closer monitoring of agricultural and other productive activities in the area.126 
In his important article about the size of the colonial service in British Africa, Kirk-
Greene spends some time discussing the performance required of a district official in order for 
him to be effective at administering the vast area under his charge. He argues that he 
“administered with the aid of an authority erected upon his own self-confidence” and that “it 
was a probably indispensable sense of one kind or another of superiority, at once unquestioned 
and unquestioning, which enabled the expatriate colonial administrator to advise, to act, to 
accomplish, and indeed to be”;127 this was the way in which Timothy Chawinga also operated. 
Aside from his performances of power in the local context he is remembered as styling himself 
upon the D.C Cosmo Haskard, and this was reflected in the way he governed his people; in using 
the limited resources he had available to him he used his personality effectively, in other words, 
“he ran Hewe like a British person”.128 Sir Robert Coryndon, Governor of the Ugandan 
Protectorate in the 1920s, is quoted by Kirk-Greene to illustrate that such behaviour by native 
authorities ought to be encouraged:  
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“It is recognized that a valuable principle of Native Administration is that the desires and the 
measures of the Government shall be carried through as much as possible by the force of personal 
prestige which should be the distinguishing characteristic of native officials … that, in fact, the 





Native Authorities in Nyasaland were defined indiscriminately in the majority of the late 
colonial legislation as somewhat out-dated bodies that needed to be welded to new progressive 
elements forthwith: “chieftainship left to itself will too often rot”, wrote Hudson in 1950, “the 
canker spreading to all in contact with it”.130 The variation in influence and effectiveness of the 
system was reflected in the allocation of native authority salaries which was increasingly 
dependent not only on population and size of territory but also “on imponderables, such a 
chief’s eminence with his tribe, his relationship to neighbouring authorities, etc...” 131 Yet the 
“success” and “failure” of native authority chiefs in this late colonial period was not a simple 
equation; as Power highlights:  
 
“Even though migrant autonomy might pose a challenge to chiefly authority and prestige, migrants 
could also assist chiefs in asserting political claims. Similarly, African cash croppers demanded 
security of tenure and ‘modern’ inheritance laws to safeguard their material wealth, while 
defending ‘traditional’ corporate “family values” when this suited them. Chiefs wanted their people 
to prosper so that they could collect taxes and other levies, but they also wanted to ensure that 
emergent accumulators did not undermine their own authority or efforts at accumulation. So chiefs 
and commoners had feet in both “old” and “new” worlds. They were all part of the new colonial 
economy, and this had implications for the way colonial politics would play out”.132 
 
Whilst the colonial framework empowered Timothy Chawinga in various ways the 
process was a subtle and contextualized one and there were limits to this state-endorsed 
authority. This chapter has attempted to unsettle some of the assumptions that exist concerning 
the central role of the state in producing local authority. Gaining power through other means – 
be they narrative, productive or symbolic – shifted the frameworks in which authority was 
produced in colonial Hewe. To reiterate Apter, power can change “the rules of the game – the 
depth and span of the royal lineage, the prerogatives of high office, the ranking of chiefs, the 
influence of Big Men – and can do so because authority is not simply given or imposed, but it is 
constructed, negotiated, and reconstructed by actors, myths and rituals that can uphold the 
status quo, but they can also be invoked and performed to oppose it”.133 
Timothy manoeuvred himself skilfully within a landscape of overlapping identities and 
local opportunity but was fortunate also to have established himself at a time (1943-53) when it 
was perhaps easier for him to move between his role image and his other registers of power. If 
the sphere of native authority politics was less about emphasizing and wielding customary 
rights and obligations per se, but rather more about negotiating access to people and resources 
in whichever way one could then this was a time when certain advantages could be gained in 
this regard. From 1953 as the political situation in Nyasaland became increasingly tense, and 
the stakes for wielding authority at every level was higher, the government was becoming ever 
vigilant, replacing what they thought of as rebellious anti-federation chiefs with native authority 
councils. Furthermore native authority structures became the target of Congress attacks rather 
than the places they had been where support for the nationalists could be garnered. Recasting 
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the debate about chiefly authority in terms of economic accumulation helps to shift the lens 
away from the usual political collaborator and resister discussion of this time and emphasises 
that native authorities continued to use both the “old” and “new” worlds to establish and 
develop their authority. 
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Fig. 1: Above, Timothy Chawinga at a formal dinner whilst attending the Festival in Britain in 1951 as a 
representative of Nyasaland. Photo from the private collection of Mary Chawinga 
Fig. 2: Below, Timothy Chawinga delivering a welcoming speech to the Queen Mother on behalf of the chiefs 







Fig. 3: Above, Timothy Chawinga's house; building began on it in 1951. Taken by author in 2009. 
 
Fig. 4: Below, Katowo Trading Centre, in 2009. The blue building on the left is the maternity  
ward built by Timothy Chawinga. Taken by author. 
 




Fig. 5: Above, Themba Katumbi’s office in Katowo, built in 1943 by Timothy Chawinga.  
Taken by author in 2009 
 
Fig. 6: Below, the visit of the Queen Mother to Mzuzu, 24 May 1960. Timothy Chawinga can be seen third 








Fig. 7: Above, a view of Hewe from the foothills of Mwanda Mountain near Chisimuka. The Hewe River 
can be seen as a winding strip of light green through the centre of the photograph. Picture taken by the 
author in 2009. 
Fig. 8. Below, the border post near Chikunguweya, where the Malawi Young Pioneer base was built in 
1967. Picture taken by author in 2009. 
 




Figs. 9 & 10: Above, left Abraham Munthali, right Elias Jato Kawonga. Picture taken by author in 2009. 







Fig. 13: Above, memorial to Vinkakanimba in Muyombe, an annual celebration was started there 
in 1964 following Timothy Chawinga’s inauguration of the Mulindafwa Ceremony. Picture taken 
by author in 2009. 
Fig. 14: Below, Mulindafwa Day, the present Chief Katumbi, Kelvin Chawinga, can be seen on the 
right in the white robe, on the left sits Chief Kyungu of Karonga. The box contains the 
“Mulindafwa Stone” which is held up for all to see. Picture taken by author in 2009. 
 
 




Fig 15: Above, SGVH Chilikunthazi and some members of his village. Picture taken by author in 
2009  
Fig 16: Below, a group of women from Wachipa Village in Hewe; they gathered so that we could 
record some of the songs they remember singing during the time of Timothy Chawinga’s 







Fig. 17: Above, view of Mwanda Mountain, the ritual place of the rainmaker Mlomboji;  
seen from the road from Bwanyonga to Katowo. Picture taken by author in October 2008. 
 
 






Eating the land:  
Agricultural resources and the accumulation of power 
 
 
“Chief Katumbi, whose small area and population in the extreme north of the Mzimba District is 
worthy of reference in that he is a young man who catches the eye of successive District 
Commissioners by his progressive ideas, and a willingness to co-operate in measures designed by 
local Government Officers for soil conservation and improvement in peasant agricultural practices, 
and indeed in all matters of local government. In June he received a well merited award of the 





This chapter continues to track the relationship which was previously suggested between the 
exploitation of agricultural resources and the accumulation of chiefly authority. As chapter 
three made clear the huge investment in agriculture that came with the so-called “Second 
Colonial Occupation” increased the material base from which chiefs, and other African elites, 
could potentially draw authority. Native Authorities were positioned as the perfect people to 
enforce the new developmental agenda of the colonial state, with its emphasis on conservation 
and increased agricultural production. In fact agricultural policies and forums for the discussion 
of agrarian change formed the main agenda of interaction between the government and chiefs, 
as well as between the chiefs and their people from the 1930s onwards. These reforms and 
interactions, this chapter will argue, enabled Timothy Chawinga new ways of extracting and 
increasing his power in the local context.  
Up until the 1930s the control over the productivity of individual gardens, techniques, 
crops to plant and where to plant them was something that the Katumbi Royal chiefs had never 
considered as a part of their responsibility. By the time Timothy Chawinga became Themba in 
1942 the politics of colonial engagement put local leaders into a position as the enforcers of new 
“agricultural rules” presiding over activities where they had not been required to dominate or 
influence before. For some chiefs having to be the enforcer of these rules made them quite 
unpopular amongst their people, for whom the activities seemed harsh and unfair. For others, 
however, they provided new opportunities to control and exploit their environment and assert 
territoriality in an era where the value of land was beginning to steadily increase.  
Much of the existing literature emphasises the decreasing possibilities for chiefs in this 
post-war setting. Some suggest that because this state intervention presented a major challenge 
to “peasant autonomy not just in the realm of cash crop production but also in food security”2 
the popularity of the African nationalists rather than the traditional leaders was bolstered. “By 
addressing these grievances” and linking them to their own political agendas, such as the fight 
against Federation, these nationalists were able to gain popularity amongst the grassroots.3 
Mamdani concludes that this period was one in which nationalist movements were able to turn 
the people against “the uncustomary powers of Native Authority chiefs” and as a result the 
policy of indirect rule across British Africa was finally “exhausted” by this time.4 However, such 
a perspective pays little attention to other changes which the increased focus upon agricultural 
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production wrought; the access which people had to resources – technical and material - and 
the changes which this effected within communities also had the potential to benefit local 
authorities in useful ways.  
Timothy Chawinga’s use of agricultural setting to extract a significant amount of power 
is impressive but only possible, as the previous chapter argued, at this particular period in 
colonial history. However, as well as the timing of his chieftaincy this chapter will argue that its 
geographic location and relatively small territorial size mattered a great deal too. Capturing new 
economic opportunities was of crucial importance to the survival of chiefs’ legitimate authority 
at this time but this figured in a matrix of many other factors which contributed to their 
strength as leaders; each varied in significance and, as this chapter will argue, often depended 
upon where these chiefs were located. 
The conditions faced by Native Authorities in the northern region of colonial Nyasaland 
for example were quite different to those of their southern counterparts who managed quite 
different patterns of residence, land scarcity, denser populations and a much larger European 
settler population. In the southern and central regions of the country, more chiefs presided over 
highly sought after land, had to negotiate the terms of thangata,5 and as a result dealt more 
often with a disgruntled and disaffected population. The relationship that people had with their 
chiefs in the northern region had been to a much lesser extent mediated by the imposition of 
colonial agricultural schemes and repressive administrative measures, but that is not to say that 
differences between the native authority territories within the northern region did not exist. 
Huge disparities in character were in evidence, even between neighbouring chieftaincies. 
One of the reasons for Chawinga’s success, this thesis argues, is that Katumbi’s native 
authority was a very cohesive and concentrated political unit, especially when it is compared 
with his neighbour Chikulamayembe’s sprawling and diversely populated land which was 
almost three times as large; this meant Chawinga was able to practice a more controlled form of 
territoriality, something that Cosmo Haskard duly noted when he travelled around the district 
in his capacity as D.C. He commented that with Chikulamayembe living up on the Nkamanga 
Plain near Rumphi whilst he might have presided over a larger area he was so far from the 
lakeside villages of his subordinate chiefs Mwamlowe and Chapinduka, that in these places “his 
authority […] was I think one might say almost nominal”.6 Chawinga’s area contained some 
difficult to reach places, but quite a different picture of command and control was presented 
there. The chief’s authority reached the farthest corners of his territory and the differences in 
the influence he had over his people was regularly observed by both Haskard and his assistant.  
 In addition to using the size of the territory to his advantage, a chief could maintain 
much more autonomy if his native authority was not valuable to the state in terms of 
production, or was not a threatening place in terms of political organisation. In the areas where 
more government attention was paid, either on account of the very obvious political elements 
they harboured, or due to their economic potential, native authority chiefs had less opportunity 
to pursue their personal ambitions.  That is not to say they did not try; in Karonga rural elites 
had been enriching themselves through large scale rice schemes and successful Master Farming 
activities, and the development of a vigorous network of co-operatives in the region gave 
further opportunities for accumulation and politicisation. This meant that when the government 
tried to put marketing restrictions on them, increase taxation, or implement agricultural rules 
which these people thought to be detrimental to them they were well positioned and well 
disposed to protest against them; by the 1950s the northern lakeshore had become a hot bed of 
activism and as such was much more visible to the state and duly received more attention.7  
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In contrast with chiefs and nationalist leaders in Karonga, the leadership in Hewe was 
good at flying under the radar. Hewe was not only physically distant from state controlled 
markets and the main government Boma, it was also able to take advantage of the strong cross 
border regional connections over in Northern Rhodesia; this made the area more politically and 
economically independent. The research undertaken in Hewe has borne out Boone’s thesis, 
drawn from contemporary examples across West Africa, that a peripheral area would often be 
less intensely governed on account of the limited threat and the limited value which it offered 
the state;8 places like this were often just left to their “own devices, granted extensive 
autonomy, or simply neglected and not incorporated into the national space”.9 It is the argument 
of this chapter that Timothy Chawinga was able to capture more opportunities without raising 
the suspicions of either the local population or the state, which assumed a neither engage nor 
impose position in relation to Hewe. This chapter will continue by exploring how the colonial 
policies of the time, together with the limited incorporation into the state of Hewe’s economy, 
enabled Chawinga to fashion a territory which he could exploit for his own benefit.  
 
 
Part one. The opportunities of the “Second Colonial Occupation”  
 
The Development Plan of 1945 and changes in the value of land 
The post-war policies of the colonial office brought a new agenda to Nyasaland in the shape of 
the Development Plan of 1945. This plan outlined a broad ranging set of reforms which would 
see chiefs come to mediate agricultural production in a more significant way than ever before. 
The changes that it heralded restructured the way in which land was managed and began to 
alter the meaning of ownership and access to this increasingly important resource.  
 Prior to 1945 there was no sense that struggles over land formed any significant part of 
day-to-day life in the Mzimba District, or indeed in much of the Northern Province. No 
systematic collection of information about land rights and tenure had ever been undertaken in 
this part of the Protectorate, a fact which Thatcher, the district commissioner of Mzimba who 
was charged with surveying the land in his district, interpreted as meaning the “present absence 
of any problems due to land shortage”.10 Following the results of this 1945 survey into “Native 
Land Rights and Tenure” Thatcher concluded that the general principles upon which land was 
assigned and held “hardly vary throughout the Ngoni-Tumbuka area of N.A. M’mbelwa and the 
Henga-Tumbuka areas of Native Authorities Chikulamaembe and Katumbi”.11  
 The chiefs throughout these areas were presumed to be vested with the rights to control 
land, though in practice this was almost always delegated to the village headmen except in cases 
where large numbers of new migrants sought land on which to settle. According to the survey 
membership of a village carried with it “the right to cultivate a portion of the village lands”, and 
having once been allocated it became “vested in the individual and his family in perpetuity”.12 
Even if the individual did not cultivate the plot of land he could maintain rights over it 
indefinitely unless the chief decided to evict him, examples of such eviction however were 
“almost unknown”.13 Land was considered a good which could be freely exchanged but not sold, 
and whilst a man was entitled to hand his land to someone known to the community, he could 
not do the same with a stranger without consulting the chief first. Whilst the results of the 
survey indicated that there were structures which managed land transactions, in practical terms 
they represented terms which were rarely consulted. In these areas where land was plentiful a 
somewhat relaxed approach to rights and tenure operated; despite having been given the 
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opportunity to do so, up until 1945 “no rules, orders, circulars or other instructions [had] been 
issued by any of the Native Authorities of this district concerning land or rights in land”.14 
 There were some indications that things might be a little more complicated than they 
looked. Investigating the lake-shore villages in Mzimba, where some land disputes had reared 
up in the early 1940s, Thatcher flagged up an eminently important dynamic which would 
become more problematic across the Henga-Tumbuka and Hewe areas of Mzimba as time went 
by; “the original settler families, of which the existing territorial chiefs are not necessarily 
members, have always been regarded as “owners” of the particular areas over which they 
originally acquired the rights”.15 Whilst it was hoped that the establishment of Native 
Authorities with their ability to issue official orders regarding “Native Trust Land” would 
discourage such interpretations of ownership, it was obvious that these “original” rights still 
existed in people’s memories, especially in regard to rights over trees.  
It is difficult, however, to know whether or not the tension between different historical 
authorities was widespread at that stage as few investigations had been made. The 
administration was keen to find out how prevalent these claims were but they were also 
reluctant to spend too much time digging about for evidence of it for fear of reviving forgotten 
disputes. What can be assumed is that because of the abundance of cultivable land no desire to 
contest these claims existed, and therefore the narratives of original ownership remained 
largely invisible and unspoken, certainly as far as the administration was concerned. Most 
conflicts that did arise could be easily resolved at this time by the giving of gifts – usually beer or 
a fowl – to the “owner” as a way of smoothing the way.16 However, claims to autochthony rarely 
die out over time; they remain embedded in the narratives of clans and chieftaincies, and get 
revived in times of austerity.  
 The area under Chief Katumbi’s jurisdiction followed almost identical patterns to its 
neighbouring native authorities in terms of land ownership and use. The longest claims to 
autochthony existed in the clan histories of Khunga (represented by the leadership of Councillor 
Zolokere) and Kachalie (through Headman Khutamaji);17 however, as Thatcher notes in the 
survey, with “no land hunger in this area [...] the question of what happens when all the 
cultivable land in a village is occupied is not applicable”18 and the extent to which orders or 
rules governed land rights was negligible. Each case was simply assessed “in accordance with 
the general trend of opinion”.19  
Times were changing though; there may still have been plenty of land but from 1945 
native authorities were becoming increasingly involved in the management of productive 
activities on it. Firstly colonial land reform policies designed to increase the value of land in 
order to improve productivity increasingly linked authority over land to chiefs as a way of 
controlling this market; so “while social relations continued to be important, who these were 
with underwent change”.20 As Carswell has noted, whilst in some ways this shift “from a system 
whereby well-connected individuals could form relationships with in-migrants, act as their 
hosts, and benefit from their labour, to a system whereby colonial appointees – by virtue of their 
position could allocate land” was not as disrupting as it sounded – the well-connected 
individuals and the colonial appointees were often the same group of people – however, it set in 
motion a “formalisation of authority” over land which would have future implications.21 
Secondly, this was a time in which chiefs were able to further extend their control over land 
through various colonial conservation policies.  
The culmination of this move to further enable native authorities in these matters in 
Nyasaland came in 1947 when the Natural Resources Ordinance was introduced. This 
legislation was designed to “force people to look after and cultivate their land properly” at a 
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time when food production and soil conservation occupied the attention of local 
administrations and important decisions to make “revolutionary changes in peasant cultivation 
practices” were being made.22 The changes which this would provoke were pre-empted by the 
administration and the increasing economic value of this good in these most unprepared of 
places was of pressing concern: “The economic value of land is barely appreciated” the survey 
concluded about Katumbi’s area, “and the system at present in being would require 
considerable modification to cope with the problems posed by an enhanced land value 
produced by efficient methods of cultivation”.23 The process of territorialisation which had been 
underway during the previous sixty years of European influence was entering a new phase; 
territorial spaces were becoming economically valuable. 
 
Re-evaluating the ‘Dead North’ 
Geoffrey Colby’s ambitious post-war investment in production meant that substantial 
agricultural projects, experiments and schemes were devised and implemented throughout the 
Protectorate. The Northern Province had suffered from a lack of attention and a long-standing 
battle to rid itself of its reputation as the “Dead North”;24 when Colby arrived in Nyasaland in 
1946 the Province hosted “only one single European planter, in the Karonga District, no thriving 
industries, and [...] no permanent departmental officers, except for a European Agricultural 
Officer in the Karonga District. Communications are poor, and only now are they beginning to 
improve”.25 Despite being the biggest district in the Protectorate Mzimba only welcomed its first 
agricultural officer in 1945 and the plans for further agricultural assistants and soil rangers for 
the Northern Province had still failed to materialise by the end of the decade. The northern 
districts suffered additional problems on account of the large numbers of able-bodied men 
migrating “to other countries for employment, leaving the village denuded of the very people 
required to take such an important part” in these development activities.26 Even with a better 
retention of this labour the concern was still there that “apart from the arterial North Road 
running from Mzimba through Njakwa to Fort Hill, nothing very satisfactory has so far been 
done in opening up the hinterlands”,27 and as such opportunities for wealth accumulation 
remained limited and unpromising.  
Once Colby arrived things did begin to change; however, for reasons that will be 
expanded upon in the following section, investment in the north remained limited to certain 
areas and was delivered in extremely uneven ways. This unevenness can be explained partly by 
the diversity of ecological zones that can be found within the northern region. Following a 
detailed agricultural survey undertaken by Hornby in 1938 which formed the basis of Colby’s 
plans, each of these areas was marked out for their economic potential and treated accordingly. 
For example, in North Mzimba, the zone within which the Hewe Valley is found, five distinct 
areas were highlighted in Hornby’s survey: the Upper Henga Valley; the Lower Henga Valley; 
the Nkamanga Plain; the Hewe Valley; and the Upper Rukuru Valley – each roughly conforming 
to a different chiefly territory as well as an ecological one. The Upper Henga was described as an 
extremely fertile area, native coffee had already been doing well here by the time that Colby’s 
policy to invest in local industry came about. This part of the Henga Valley provided the 
Livingstonia Mission with most of its food requirements and had done for many years. 
According to Hornby owing to the “certain amount of permanency in agriculture” which existed 
here, new industries based on Tung and coffee had great potential to thrive. The Lower Henga 
Valley, like the Nkamanga Plain, had a good climate for maize cultivation. Both areas were also 
considered to have plenty of potential for the development of beans and groundnuts as cash 
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crops, as long as “the native can be offered sufficient inducement to cause him to plant up bigger 
acreages”.28  
To the north of Mzimba there lay North Nyasa District - present day Karonga and Chitipa 
Districts - here a wide variety of native food crops flourished in this fertile region. The Co-
operative Department, set up in 1951 under the provincial direction of Bingham, was 
particularly active in these areas. In Karonga District three major co-operative organisations 
developed: the Kilapula Rice Growers Co-operative Union (KRGCU), the Misuku Coffee Growers 
Co-operative Union (MCGCU) and the Bulambya Ghee Producers Co-operative Union (BGPCU) 
“all of which played significant roles in the politicisation of their areas.29 Chief Kilapula, in 
whose area the rice growing co-operatives were thriving, became a particularly important 
figure. Not long after the rice growers union had been established in 1953 a small town grew up 
around the headquarters where electricity quickly became available. Chief Kilapula, or Joseph 
Mwanjasi as he was also known, benefitted significantly from the prestige which this new 
development provided him, especially as no other town in the region had any access to 
electricity. It was prestigious enough to be chief of such a ‘modern’ area but Mwanjasi had 
positioned himself well by becoming chairman of the Rice Co-operative Union; had he not done 
this he might have struggled to maintain his status while other rural elites began to accumulate 
wealth and power in this setting. By expanding his role into straightforward business activities 
he was able to augment his reputation as a successful man “who commanded much respect from 
his people, and who was one of the most progressive African rulers in the district”.30 
So there were some obvious opportunities for people particularly in the Henga Valley 
and at the Lakeshore where cotton and rice projects injected significant investment. This 
attention had the effect of increasing the wealth of local communities and creating rural elites 
that were determined to fight to retain their new position in society. In other areas, where the 
geographical landscape enabled a different kind of accumulation, the local economy had another 
dynamic. The mountainous Misuku uplands in the farthest northern reaches of the province 
offered ideal coffee producing terrain, the topography of which provided great competitive 
advantage for the local population given that “there were plots of only 50 acres or less suitable 
for coffee, scattered among the hills” and therefore was almost entirely unappealing to 
European settlers for whom establishing even a moderately sized estate was impossible here.31 
On account of this, groups of African commercial farmers emerged in these areas and as early as 
“the mid-1920s there was as large a group of potential African estate owners as Europeans”.32 
The relationship of these farmers to the chieftainship of Mwenemisuku is as yet unexplored in 
great detail but it is clear that, unlike Mwanjasi who had manoeuvred himself into a prestigious 
position in the rice industry, Mwenemisuku was unable to do the same in relation to the coffee 
industry which was being built up around him, and as such he was possibly less able to check 
and compete with the accumulation of these coffee estates. Moreover the proximity of these 
estate farmers to the Tanganyika border added further specificities such as the much lower 
labour costs which they benefitted from on account of the presence of Tanganyikan migrants in 
the area who moved there to avoid higher taxes and poorer soils.  
Boone summarises such differences in her own work, giving them a political dimension. 
Her arguments can help make sense of the scope which different elites had to exploit their 
environment, and show that this had much to do with their relationship to the state. She argues 
that rural elites who do not appropriate their own share of the rural surplus directly – relying 
instead on state intermediation – are more likely to be interested in aligning with new regimes. 
Those who are able to appropriate their own share of rural surplus directly could position 
themselves as competitors to new regimes, in a fight over division of the rural surplus. In 
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Nyasaland, in areas where there were significant profitable cash-cropping opportunities, for 
example with the co-operative movement and Master Farmer Scheme, chiefs could manoeuvre 
themselves into a good position to exploit these new opportunities, using their traditional 
identities to mobilize land and labour for this end; elsewhere they tapped agricultural surpluses 
by investing in trading and transport. To remain successful elite, and to maintain authority, 
leaders had to exploit the material opportunities the environment in which they ruled gave 
them.  
As has been laid out clearly in the introduction to this thesis, the environment is a 
critical arena through which people are able to manipulate, dominate, express decisions, 
empower and undermine.33 But chiefs did not own and manage such resources indiscriminately. 
Some were monitored closely, or competed over, by the state and/or by more influential 
commoners. Extraction of wealth from the environment was mediated through an areas value to 
the state or on account of the presence of a particular resource within that area, and was 
dependent on local power relations. As Jacobs pertinently highlights: “relations with fellow 
humans shape the choices people make about how to use the environment, and everyone does 
not have the same freedom of choice”.34  
Border areas could, for example, prove both advantageous and disadvantageous 
according to the wider context in which this border economy existed. For those living in the 
North Nyasa District, as Hornby’s survey pointed out, a large amount of the produce farmed 
there had been ‘lost’ to Tanganyika “where a ready sale at attractive prices for ungraded 
products exists”. Properly supervised it was believed that rice, loams, groundnuts and maize 
production could be significantly expanded, especially in the Karonga-Songwe Plain, but the 
uncontrolled marketing of these products, which in most cases was arranged by Indian traders 
in Tanganyika appeared “to exploit the North Nyasa produce growers to the full”.35 Yet for 
Timothy Chawinga the position which Hewe had on the border with Northern Rhodesia was 
hugely significant; the chief took advantage of this in order to – as Boone would have it – 
appropriate his share of the rural surplus directly, reinforcing his already peripheral economic 
position and ensuring that both he and his people were less reliant on the state.  
 The differences between those chiefs who were reliant upon the state structures and 
those who were less can be observed to some extent in the reactions of chiefs to Federation 
with the Rhodesias in 1953. When the non-cooperation campaigns began it was in the areas 
where the state was more involved, in the rigid enforcement of conservation rules for example, 
where protest was exacerbated. It was to these more visible areas that the historian’s eye has 
been drawn and it has been easier to apply the resister/collaborator distinctions to the ruling 
chiefs who had to manage these areas. Chiefs Gomani, Mwase and Tengani are now more or less 
famed for their rejection or, in the case of Tengani in the Lower Shire Valley, wholehearted 
support of government schemes.36 Chiefs in less incorporated areas perhaps had less pressure 
to act one way or the other.  
 
Hewe: Fertile but faraway 
As the previous section has highlighted, the areas which had more profitable opportunities were 
far more likely to have close attention paid to them; conservation rules and orders were more 
forcefully applied and farmers’ behaviour was more keenly observed and monitored in such 
places where there was more for the government to lose if things went wrong. In the Misuku 
Hills and Henga Valley, where hopes had been set on coffee production, assessments were 
continually being made about how and why the world demand and high prices for the 
commodity was failing to have an impact on farmers’ choices;37 the expectations of these local 
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economies were generally much higher.38 There was a much stronger enforcement of anti-
erosion measures such as contour ridging on account of the high visibility of coffee plantations, 
which was quite different to lakeshore production which didn’t require as strict conservation 
measures owing to the very different type of agriculture practiced there.39 Not only were these 
places more visible in terms of their production methods, they relied more heavily on the state 
in terms of transport and marketing.  
Areas which relied on less profitable, and less state-managed, crops – maize, beans, 
cassava, millet – for their wealth were more often able to maintain a good position in the local 
regional economy and were less reliant upon state marketing and assistance for maintenance of 
accumulation, especially if like Hewe their connection to communities and markets external to 
the Nyasaland protectorate, for example those just across the border in the Northern Rhodesian 
communities of Muyombe and Sitwe where ties were cultural and social as well as economic, 
offered the prospect of different sources of wealth and accumulation. Even the new permanent 
all weather road, which was cleared through Rumphi and into Northern Rhodesia onward to 
Tanganyika in 1933, could be seen to have assisted Hewe in retaining this strong regional and 
cross-border economic presence, new bus routes were even planned to connect the areas;40 
contrary to much of the literature on the impact of road and transport infrastructure on remote 
areas, the connections that the road made regionally were much more significant than any 
connection it was supposed to have made to the national economy. In one Northern Province 
annual report the benefits for “natives” travelling to Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika “where 
goods could be easily obtained” and purchased was plain to see; “towards the end of the year” 
the 1946 report concludes, this activity had “developed into a remunerative business and 
purchasers on their return would hawk goods from village to village selling at fantastically high 
prices”.41 Carswell’s study of a peripheral economy in Uganda shows that whilst the importance 
of such thriving regional trade in food became particularly visible during times where food 
shortage threatened surrounding areas, “at no time did they see this trade as something to be 
‘harnessed’ for ‘agricultural development’”;42 here, perhaps, they missed a trick. These 
administrations failed to understand the local systems of agricultural exchange since their main 
focus had been on developing areas for cash cropping.43  
Save for the more universally applied natural resources rules and orders, very few state 
‘interventions’ could be said to have taken place in Hewe,44 and expectations of the area were 
far from grand. Although a variety of crops were considered to grow successfully there, beans 
and groundnuts in particular, the “long carry over the hills before even the Nkamanga Plain is 
reached” was a serious hindrance to the development of any significant scheme in the Valley.45 
Ecologically Hewe had much in common with the Nkamanga and South Rukuru Plains and the 
Henga Hill areas – places which participated variously in coffee schemes, large scale maize 
production and cotton experimentation – but except on the very smallest scale it was an area 
passed over by the colonial state. Hornby considered that the Hewe Valley certainly had some 
extremely fertile pockets of land but they were simply not substantial enough to define it as a 
“middle-zone of agricultural potential”,46 a status which would have merited attention. 
Furthermore, the poor communications, lack of good road and price of transporting crops from 
there made it an even less attractive prospect to invest in. 
Experimentations with various crops did begin there; cotton, coffee, and maize to be 
grown for the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) which had its headquarters at Mzuzu,47 
but even though there was some degree of success (the maize from Mwachibanda was sold in 
large quantities to the CDC for a year or two),48 the distance from the lakeshore and viable 
markets meant that such initiatives were generally abandoned before they really got going. This 
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also made it much harder for the Master Farmer Scheme to have a significant take up in Hewe; 
only a couple of farmers profited from this initiative in Hewe.49 The cultivation of Turkish 
tobacco raised some interest in the Valley by the end of the 1950s, but with it being such a 
political crop growers experienced difficulties; labelled “federal” on account of the provenance 
of the tobacco seed, their gardens were increasingly attacked by Congress sympathisers.50 
Understandably, tobacco did not become established as a cash crop in this area until the 
independence period dawned. In contrast to Karonga the co-operative department would 
supervise little more in Hewe than a couple of small co-operative stores and a maize mill. There 
certainly wasn’t the same level of politicisation amongst the ordinary farmers through co-
operatives as there was in Old Karonga district throughout the 1950s51 boycotting of markets 
rarely happened under Timothy’s chieftainship and only during the State of Emergency in 1959 
was any serious disruption experienced in the Valley. 
The implications of Colby’s reforms in the Northern Province made some definitive 
changes; but not all of these changes can be understood in terms of successes with agricultural 
projects and levels of protest. The highly diverse landscapes and geographies of authority saw 
to it that this period of reform was received and dealt with in a whole variety of ways, 
furthermore the varied delivery of conservation rules and schemes are important to analyse 
since they were not simply delivered in a vacuum. It is not always clear, for example, why 
certain pieces of legislation worked in one place and not the other. Take the forestry rules in 
Mwenewenya of 1934; in the section relating to the control of hill slope cultivation it was 
written “no person shall open a garden on the slope of a steep hill without the permission of his 
chief and village headman”, it was a rule which was doomed to failure as requiring the chiefs 
permission to open a new garden was actually against native custom. No one would ask the 
headman which piece of land he should farm. Any attempts to manage this cultivation through 
legislation alone would have proved unsuccessful. Many factors influenced how they were 
received. Carswell’s detailed analysis of the methods of implementation serves as an example 
that we need to look at policies “in environmental, agricultural and technical terms”, seriously 
considering the nature of, and methods used to introduce, these measures plus the effects of 
such arrangements “on existing social and political relations”.52 She has suggested, for example, 
that in Kigezi the anti-erosion measures were not too dissimilar to the indigenous systems of 
cultivation; that the amount and type of labour required were not too disruptive; and the good 
relationship that local district officials had with the communities in this part of Uganda enabled 
a smoother application of policy. 
This latter element was certainly a factor in the rolling out of policy in Hewe. Chawinga 
took advantage of the less formal colonial administration in the Northern Province and was able 
to benefit in less direct ways from the shift in policy which Colby brought in. Using the new 
forums brought in by the Development Plan to his advantage, he quickly realised that by 
working closely with colonial officials in the north and by convincing them of his work ethic 
then he could skim off other benefits. His successful performance would bring rewards and 
wider recognition; all of which fed back into his local authority. 
 
Chief Katumbi and the Natural Resources Board 
In his comprehensive survey of environmental policy in colonial Malawi, Mulwafu highlights 
that prior to 1946 nothing comprehensive existed which dealt with the conservation of natural 
resources in the Protectorate.53 When the Natural Resources Board was set up in order to 
address this situation in 1946 it aspired to do much but was limited by “its small size and 
budget”,54 and “compromised in its capacity to implement its rules and regulations “by 
154 | e a t i n g  t h e  l a n d  
 
 
prevailing conditions and African resistance”.55 Mulwafu explains that this led to situation in 
which most of the NRB’s directives were delivered through propaganda rather than with direct 
contact between state agents and the targets of these shifting polices, the peasants. In order to 
get their message across the Board was forced to turn to Native Authorities and honorary 
Conservation Officers to deliver it.56 
Remembering this post-war period, reflections from retired colonial officials confirm 
that in the northern regions “staff of all departments was thin on the ground and district officers 
did a lot of jobs for departments in the rural areas”.57 Useful relationships therefore quickly 
developed between the officers and local authorities which were beneficial for both parties. 
Observing these relationships rather than focusing on colonial policy, which can have the effect 
of over-valuing “the directive power of “the state””,58 brings to light how the special connection 
between the African people and the colonial agents in the Northern Province brought 
opportunities for both parties.  
The officials genuinely enjoyed being in the Northern Province in particular where a 
“tremendous” team spirit is said to have existed. The closeness in their working lives, between 
the Europeans and their African colleagues, was clearly in evidence in Rumphi and Karonga, and 
is nostalgically celebrated.59 Unlike other parts of the Protectorate, the province is described as 
having been maintained as “really a purely African area”.60 Even well into the 1950s when a new 
district was created in the province staff members remained thin on the ground. When, after 
years of speculation and planning, the new district of Rumphi was created in 1952 to serve the 
administration of the native authorities Katumbi and Chikulamayembe, only three Europeans 
were in situ by the end of the decade: the District Commissioner, a Co-operative Society officer, 
and a Public Works Department (PWD) works supervisor.61 Plans to increase the number of 
staff were played down by Haskard who remembers of the time that such an idea was 
“nonsense in a little place like Rumpi”.62 In light of this, the first two D.C’s of Rumphi admitted 
that they “relished the isolation” and “position of unchallenged authority” that the position gave 
them,63 whilst the Africans, if they knew how to earn the respect of these administrators, 
benefitted from the personal relationships which could be built in the context of this isolation. 
In fact respect appeared to be the currency on which the economy of colonial administration 
was built in these parts. Government was “by consent” in the Northern Province Haskard would 
later joke, “how else could a handful of Europeans run the show?”64 Noel Harvey knew that what 
was important was not the number of people in the offices but that “Africans respected our 
standards and our decisions”;65 until the latter part of the 1950s the closeness with which they 
all worked meant that respect for one another was easily established. 
Hewe might not have been an area to invest in big projects but Chawinga grasped the 
fact that good relationships with officials could bring his area additional development 
opportunities for bridges, wells, improved roads, and school classrooms. The Native Welfare 
Development Fund (NWDF) was one way in which some of the development budget filtered 
down into the rural areas. The Fund’s primary objective was to finance agricultural 
development projects, especially around conservation and the restoration of the facility of the 
soil, but also to facilitate parallel schemes of social and economic development; these included 
the restoration of old roads, the building of permanent bridges, and construction of water 
holes.66 Such spending was not applied everywhere in the Province though, the limited funds 
and staff did not allow for this, so the small investment initiatives that the NWDF supported 
were most often found in those areas where good relationships with efficient chiefs, who kept 
villages clean and well ordered, existed. Noel Harvey’s reminiscences from his time as A.D.C. 
Karonga (1954-59) make this point very well:   
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“You could quickly gauge the flavour of a village by the condition of the houses and gardens. The 
size of the house measured the prosperity of the owner, but keeping its walls and thatch in good 
condition […] terracing and ridging the gardens and rotating the crops, - all this cost nothing. But 
these were the differences between the run-down villages and those which conserved their topsoil 
against erosion and took pride in their house and the village school. It was in the good villages that 
you invested your tiny development funds – a water pump, a fish farm once they had damned the 
stream, perhaps a health clinic or a road to join it with the main road”.67  
 
It was generally thought that by 1949 some major alterations were needed to make the 
conservation policies, and specifically the work of the Natural Resources Board, more effective. 
The decision to decentralise the NRB by creating Provincial and District bodies was taken with 
the idea that these new locally oriented boards would “come up with more effective 
conservation measures by virtue of the specific and intimate knowledge supposedly possessed 
by their members in their areas of influence”.68 For the first time prominent Africans were to be 
included as members.  
Whilst Mulwafu provides the example of the Domasi District Natural Resources Board as 
one of the few examples of provincial and district Natural Resources Boards that worked 
effectively,69 Cosmo Haskard remembers that when he worked as the first District 
Commissioner in Rumphi, it was the District Natural Resources Board which proved to be one of 
the most effective organs of change in the area. By his own admission, this he puts down to the 
fact that it was almost entirely run by Africans. The members of the Rumphi District Natural 
Resources Board were all African apart from the European Agricultural Assistant and the D.C., 
and it was “much more useful” than most of the official district and provincial council meetings 
in which nothing important could be talked about with the African members.  
In a small district like Rumphi where membership of these councils was mixed 
European and African, and at a time when the province was just beginning to feel the effects of 
Federation, the difficulty of discussing certain aspects of government policies openly with 
Africans was creeping in, “to the extent that one was a bit inhibited” and the formal meeting of 
the district team was, in the opinion of Haskard “a bit of a sham”.70 The Natural Resources 
Board, on the contrary, dealt with extremely practical issues and was driven almost entirely by 
Africans; it was much less political and “a lot was achieved through it”.71  This Board became an 
important platform for the performance of Timothy Chawinga’s chieftainship. It had been set up 
to better enforce the rules and orders delivered under the Natural Resources Ordinance (1947), 
but had a defining impact on Timothy’s ability to control the environmental and agrarian 
landscapes within his area, and extract from them in a number of ways.72 
Native Authorities in the Northern Province played a significant part in legislating 
change through the Natural Resources Board as it offered them more power to produce their 
own conservation rules and orders. This leverage was given partly on account of the limited 
number of agricultural officers in the north,73 but it had also to do with the vastness and 
variability of the region in terms of ecological conditions.74 The original plan had been that 
officials would consult Native Authorities about the conditions that existed in their areas and for 
an initial short-term period chiefs were to be given the right to make place specific rules and 
orders; it was an arrangement which was never intended to continue beyond the time when a 
broader set of Natural Resources Rules could be defined. However, due to the extremely diverse 
set of ecological challenges which existed in the North, and the fact that the Agricultural 
Department had been unable to survey the entire Province and assess the possible variations 
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needed, there was a substantial delay in their application. The initial Native Authority Orders, 
which were originally designed as only a stop-gap piece of legislation, came under increasing 
pressure in 1951 as the debate over the Natural Resource Rules heightened. The archive 
records that the delay “seriously retarded progress in the Northern Province as the Natural 
Resources Board has in consequence been forced to rely upon Native Authority Orders which 
are not being strictly enforced due to the erratic and half-hearted support of most of the Native 
Authorities concerned”.75  
Most Native Authority Chiefs were uncooperative and reluctant to enforce their Orders 
which they had been required by the Board to introduce, revealing that their assistance during 
the previous year had been a pretence and mainly down to the “prodding and persistence” of 
available Government officers.76 It was noted that “Village Headmen have made no efforts to 
trace and prosecute offenders, and in some cases an aged and infirm individual or local 
simpleton is produced knowing that such individuals will not be severely punished; the only 
answer to this problem is collective punishment”, was the conclusion of the Provincial 
Commissioner about the situation.77 The Native Authority Orders after all had only been 
intended as a temporary measure and, with these examples demonstrating their lack of 
cooperation, it was considered inadvisable to rely upon them; once this was realised there grew 
a rather “urgent necessity for the [Natural Resources] Board to have powers to enforce its own 
Orders and Rules”; as Acting P.C. Hodgson wrote to the Chief Secretary in 1951, “The Board has 
for the past twenty seven months been relying to a large extent on bluff, and the bluff has now 
been called”.78  
It was thought that the only hope in succeeding to effect the great changes in techniques 
of production so desperately sought after and outlined in the government’s plans would require 
the powers granted to the newly formed Natural Resources Board to be applied most strictly.79 
The reliance on this Board to bring about change in the north would work in the favour of 
Timothy Chawinga, who was able to use the Native Authority Orders effectively to construct a 
reliable system of prosecution and control. The current literature tends to concentrate on the 
rather more negative implications of the conservation policies which were enforced throughout 
British Africa at this time, how it led to disquiet and discontent and how in many places it was a 
tool for the African nationalist movements to garner grassroots support. In fact, the changes 
which came about with these new frameworks of control also provided a new space within 
them for local actors to gain new footholds within the rural economy, using the agricultural 
resources as a new material basis for their authority.  
In the remote rural context of Hewe, access to new resources and new platforms to 
augment his individual power was important for Timothy Chawinga. He may have already had a 
personality to inspire a certain level of compliance in his people but under the Natural 
Resources Ordinance local boards were formed which could “issue instructions to any land-
owner as to what to grow and how to maintain his land…when an order is to be issued to ant 
(sic) African landowner, the order will come from the Provincial Commissioner thro’ the District 
Commissioner, through the Native Authority to the African”.80 Chiefs were seen as the perfect 
facilitators of local agrarian change. From the perspective of the colonial state several 
assumptions about ‘chiefs’ and their relationship with the environment register as being 
particularly relevant in the current discussion: that chiefs were the ‘natural’ managers of local 
natural resources; and that this relationship, which chiefs had with ‘their land’, put them in the 
best position to be the arbiters of agricultural justice which colonial administrators.  
In his book Conservation Song Mulwafu is keen to demonstrate the important reality that 
the colonial state did not deliver a uniform policy around natural resource conservation, and 
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furthermore that colonial officials differed in their ideas on how such policy should be delivered. 
This lack of “united voice or homogenous approach” he argues “provided peasants with an 
opportunity to evade the effects of coercive state intervention programmes”.81 Observing how 
Timothy Chawinga used the NRB and the gaps which the government had engendered between 
policy and practice, it is possible to argue that chiefs had the opportunity to benefit in their own 
way from these decentralised decision making arenas. The “weaknesses in the system” which 
Mulwafu’s peasants exploited were turned on their head by Chawinga who used them to achieve 
quite different ends. 
It is not unlikely that Chawinga’s vocal participation on the Natural Resources Board and 
his successful implementation of so many of the Board’s edicts in the local setting were 
important in raising his profile with the Government. In 1951 he was selected to represent the 
chiefs of Nyasaland at the Festival of Britain,82 something which could have only happened on 
account of his effectiveness and visibility as a chief. This was no mean feat. For Katumbi, a chief 
of this rather unpromising area, to be chosen as one of only three representatives of Nyasaland 
at this international event was clearly impressive and something which he evidently took in his 
stride. The Festival of Britain was an exhibition designed to inject development impetus into 
post-war Britain; there is every possibility that his exposure to the big modernisation plans of 
the British Government which were on show at the event, and the visits he made to farms and 
industry whilst in the country had an enormous influence upon Chawinga’s own way of thinking 
about and implementing development in his own context. As the first Katumbi chief to “go 
outside” of the continent and experience life in Europe, his own prestige in the local area 
increased dramatically. 
 
Safeguarding everyone’s interests 
However, Chawinga did not need to go overseas to gain the experience of “advanced 
technologies, and new forms of authoritative knowledge".83 As a part of the investments in 
production and conservation, demonstration and seed farms had been set up across the 
Protectorate as a way of imparting knowledge to chiefs and leading members of their 
communities. These were not only “suitable places for African farmers to meet and be shown 
improved methods of growing crops”84 they were also places where they could learn new 
expertise and practical skills; knowledge which could be translated into a new source of 
authority.85  
Chawinga took advantage of various paths to knowledge transfer that were put in his 
path; he made sure that in the local setting it was he who was the one owning the ‘innovations’ 
and technologies which were passed on to him through the colonial ‘experts’. Few people 
remember the agricultural demonstration plots or cassava gardens as being a government 
initiative, “Kamangilira did this”, the resounding reply as discussions about past agricultural 
experiments were in progress. His success translating these innovations to his people and their 
take up of the new techniques can be seen to have earned him additional respect from Haskard 
who thought that for there to be effective government, chiefs needed to demonstrate real 
authority amongst their people. In his 1952 desk diary he writes that there was a great amount 
of conservation and agricultural activity in the province and that the “most successful 
agricultural show was held at Katowo, the headquarters of Chief Katumbi”.86 The shows that 
were put on in Hewe instilled a sense of pride in Katumbi’s people. The Valley’s reputation for 
growing maize and beans, in particular, remains in people’s minds across the wider region even 
today. In this context of limited funds, isolation from Zomba headquarters, and the importance 
of personal relations, Chawinga thrived.  
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With its consistently high yields of staple crops such as maize and beans, the Valley was 
a regular safety net for the food security of the wider region. Throughout the period 1945-1956 
it is notable that the shortages experienced in the northern part of M’mbelwa’s Mzimba District 
and “sometimes even the requirements of the lakeshore communities of Chikulamayembe” were 
regularly covered by maize purchased from the areas of Hewe, Nkamanga and Henga.87 Hewe 
played an extremely important role in the local and regional economy on account of the 
exceptionally high transport costs for imported maize from south and central provinces and this 
did give the people some power in the regional economy to manipulate prices and marketing 
rules. However, reliance on the distribution and sale of these crops - which had limited market 
value - ensured that very little economic differentiation occurred amongst the farmers of Hewe. 
With no cotton, coffee or tobacco industries of note to participate in there wasn’t the same 
opportunities for farmers with money to invest in their land in a significant way. This was quite 
unlike in Henga Valley where big differences were notable between emerging cotton farmers 
and traditional millet cultivators,88 and in the lakeshore areas or Misuku, where there existed 
more profitable opportunities for those with capital to invest. Those returning from South 
Africa or Rhodesia to Hewe tended to be limited in their entrepreneurial activities to small 
trading interests and cash cropping of the less valuable cash crops on a greater scale using, 
perhaps, hired labour. 
Agriculture in Hewe revolved largely around individuals and small groups of farmers 
subsisting, surviving and trying to make any small profit they could which would be spent on 
household items, clothing, sugar, salt and soap. To pay taxes or fines there was a small amount 
of work available through the Public Works Department (PWD) which organised road clearing 
and bridge building in the area, but this was seasonal and not available to all.89 To make 
‘serious’ money the only option for the people of Hewe was to enter the labour migration 
market; and from the early 1930s this was an option that most men took up, whether it was for 
the reasons of accumulating money for marriage, to start a small business, or to invest in their 
land. Of course the reasons for participating in these processes were as varied as the types of 
labour contract and destination that were on offer. The decisions which men took – as it was 
almost entirely a male pursuit in this area – were based in familial and community obligations, 
as well as the different ambitions and aspirations of the migrants themselves. 
It is beyond the scope of the chapter to discuss at great length the varied experiences of 
farmers in relation to the post-war changes which were taking place; they are perspectives 
which need to be considered at much greater length if the impact and unevenness of colonial 
policy is to be properly understood. After all it was not only the rural elite who had to adapt 
their behaviour in order to safeguard their access to resources at this time. Berry has noted how 
in Ghana, under similar circumstances, farmers began investing in many forms of patronage in 
order to maintain their position. Investing in the community through marriage payments, 
funeral ceremonies and loans, these choices “served to reinforce or advance people’s standing in 
social networks, or helped strengthen their claims to productive resources which were under 
threat at this time. People were investing in the means of access to productive resources, 
including social identities or forms of status, as well as in the means of production per se”.90 
It is necessary to make a comment on the discussion put forward by Chanock amongst 
others that customary law enabled traditional authorities to grow in stature and importance in 
areas where labour migration was high, specifically because they took on the role of 
safeguarding the domestic interests of the men who had left to look for work elsewhere. What is 
clear is that the arena of customary law emerged as an important space of negotiation in a rural 
context where migrant labour and the new demands of market agriculture placed strains upon 
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relationships, and in a setting where control over labour, wealth and land were hotly 
contested.91 Chanock has described court cases during this period as “new conflicts caused by 
new demands being made of old relationships”;92 migrant husbands looked to them, it is argued, 
to maintain their land rights, have their “adulterous” wives punished, and bridewealth returned 
to them. Empirical examples drawn from across the continent which look at the relationship 
between women and customary law do not concur, however, that this institution always 
worked in favour of the male elders. 
Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Schmidt in colonial Zimbabwe and Judith Byfield in 
Nigeria, Spear marks limitations on Chanock’s way of looking at customary law and thus 
challenges the straightforward view that chiefs’ authority increased in this context. Women 
invoked customary law themselves “to force elders and colonial authorities to exercise their 
responsibilities to protect women’s rights”; in some cases they were “able to exploit the gap 
between law and practice to evade the new laws altogether”.93 There is little doubt that women 
were generally subjected to more rigid controls in the colonial period, but as Schmidt 
demonstrates they were also sometimes able to use the “conflicting interests” within the African 
and European “male alliance” to their advantage.94  
The 1952 Moffat Report on Native Courts can give us some sense of why the records 
from Hewe Court were limited. Since colonial staff had been put under pressure to perform 
many duties, including agricultural development activities, the Report notes that “half the 
present administrative officers in Nyasaland have never seen a native court in session”.95 For 
whatever reason that these records do not exist it leaves a gap in knowledge in terms of the type 
of conflict and shape of demand which were making their way into the Native Court in Hewe 
during Chawinga’s reign. It would have been especially interesting to see the prevalence of cases 
during his chieftainship in which women and young men contested control from elders, and the 
ways in which the court and councillors dealt with them.  
One intriguing suggestion in the Moffat Report is made that on the whole “court 
members are said to be rather severe on young educated men and men who have been away at 
work for some time”.96 This intergenerational tension between the young men and the village 
elders was an ever increasing dynamic, and the management of these relationships might well 
have brought an opportunity, as it had done in the intervention in domestic disputes between 
husband and wife, of increasing a chief’s authority. We can only speculate as to how Chawinga 
would have managed these inevitable domestic conflicts in terms of customary law; however 
what is known through oral accounts and other archival sources is that one of the strengths of 
his leadership was his ability to address the concerns of women in his area. He understood and 
responded to their economic vulnerabilities and social anxieties. The context of a labour 
migration economy in Hewe probably did increase Chawinga’s opportunity to increase his 
authority, but not through safeguarding the interests of the men in Hewe. It was rather by 
courting the support of women that he grew in stature.  
 
Women and labour: The management of local landscapes 
These were times of great change, even before the State of Emergency in 1959. Investments in 
agricultural production and the introduction of “efficient methods of cultivation” were putting 
significant new pressures upon social and economic systems in the villages, and as a result also 
upon the structures of traditional authority. Emphasis upon commercial activity was leading to 
new demands on labour and putting an increasing value on land;97 both of which encouraged 
Africans to renegotiate their position in society “in order to gain access to additional productive 
resources”.98 Social transformation was both predicted and desired by the colonial office, but it 
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warned of this transformation bringing difficulties and disruptions at first.99 In the northern and 
lakeshore districts, where from the early 1930s the economy relied to a great extent upon their 
populations migrating outside of the country, local agrarian institutions would also be affected 
by a ‘shortage’ of able-bodied men. This shortage would affect the shape of domestic spaces and 
agrarian practices and it would change the role and responsibilities of men, women and 
children, as established methods of social control were challenged. This was a great concern of 
the Nyasaland African Congress whose first President Levi Mumba stressed at one of the first 
meetings of the African Provincial Council meeting in 1944 some of the challenges that these 
ordinary farmers were facing. With the high prevalence of labour migration in the Northern 
Province a determining factor in his analysis, he urged the government to spend time thinking 
about the effects of this search for money outside on peoples’ attitude:  
 
“…while they are away they are developing a change in outlook which, if not guided, may create 
social difficulties when they return home. In village life they are accustomed to look with respect to 
the chief, village headman or clan head in all their actions; elsewhere they live as individuals 
responsible to themselves and therefore act without considering the effect of their actions on the 
others”.100 
 
In the Hewe Valley, where a large number of men left their homes to join the multitude 
of other Northern Nyasalanders, few remember this time as being particularly difficult. Men 
generally admit that women got on just fine without them, and their wives agreed. “There was 
no change in agriculture when I went away. My wife continued farming very well” admitted 
Godwin Chawinga. Nyamnyirenda, his wife, said that the only thing that had been important 
when the men left was that she was given “land and hoes for farming” to ensure she could 
continue with all the activities that needed to be done.101 Women in Hewe might have 
complained to one another of their men’s absence whilst they pounded their maize,102 but as 
long as their husbands provided for them they don’t remember the time as being particularly 
difficult. Some even reminisced happily about the new experiences which this time brought 
them of building grain-stores and repairing tools, which were traditionally male occupations.103 
The more successful migrants were able to send money home so that their wives could employ 
casual labour, or even have a permanent farm hand live with them. It was easy, they said, to get 
people who would work for old clothes or shoes.104  
The fact that Hewe was an area not of cash cropping but domestic food production 
meant that women did the majority of the agricultural work anyway. In such a context, “where 
labour requirements for the production of foodstuffs were low, the absence of even 60 per cent 
of able-bodied young men was not an economic catastrophe”.105 Nevertheless, in these areas the 
Natural Resources Board (NRB), with its rules and regulations, still presented an ominous 
threat to women, who would always represent the majority of attendants at any meeting about 
agricultural policy in the northern province; something noted by the Provincial Commissioner 
of Mzimba in 1948.106 McCracken even poses the not unlikely notion that the NRB could have 
been more threatening to this group of people in the north than the idea of federation.107 As 
such, even whilst people appeared to farm with little change during these years, the role of 
Timothy Chawinga in ensuring that communal labour and co-operation amongst farmers was 
undertaken,108 and that women in particular were looked after at this time, must have played a 
huge role in the general sense of continuity and lack of disgruntlement. 
Whilst on a tour of the district in 1950 just after the country had been ravaged by one of 
the worst famines for decades, the agricultural assistant Geoff Craske wrote that “during the last 
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four days I have particularly noticed that, in comparison with other areas, the people of N.A. 
Katumbi are much better informed of current events, rules and orders, etc…”; it was the chief 
himself who was praised for this “and credit is due to him for the fact that in every village very 
complete arrangements were made to receive myself and my carriers. Neat grass enclosures […] 
had been built, and supplies of food were available everywhere”.109 At times of crisis Chawinga 
was quick to respond in order to secure the livelihoods of his people, whilst others across the 
region died of hunger. During times of heavy migration his attention turned towards the women 
in his area, to whom he provided opportunities for them to access communal and paid labour 
and offered social protection for their families:  
 
“Early in the year, when it was seen that maize crops would suffer from shortage of rain, Chief 
Katumbi called out his people to construct a dam and a long water channel to irrigate the drier 
parts of the Vwaza marsh. This effort was sufficiently successful to enable not only the saving of 
appreciable maize crops, but also enabled a second maize crop to be planted as soon as the first 
crop was reaped. The result was that a second crop was reaped before the onset of the rains late in 
the year, enabling yet a third crop to be planted before the year ended. Through this effort, the area 
of Chief Katumbi has had a surplus of maize for sale, which at the price of 1d per 1lb has brought a 
lot of money to the women of the area and to the chief himself. Moreover, it has enabled a lot of 
hungry people from other areas to find food”110. 
 
Timothy constructed himself as a husband to all the women; few have a bad word to say about 
him and most remember the chief mainly for the great provision he organised. Not only did he 
arrange group pest drives and communal labour parties, vital activities for women farming their 
land alone, he increased the opportunities for feasting, celebrating and singing whenever he 
could. It is said that absent men and those failing to take responsibility for their farms or their 
families were actively pursued and punished by Timothy. 
  
Provision and protection  
Rumphi District’s reputation as “the traditional maize granary of the province”111 was in no 
small part down to the fertility of Hewe. In 1946, there were serious shortages of maize across 
Rumphi and the northern parts of Mzimba District. Whilst chiefs Chikulamayembe and 
M’mbelwa had to petition the government for subsidized grain as famine relief, the people 
within Katumbi’s area were satisfied. Certain areas within Hewe were particularly productive 
and regular government Ulendo’s identified that Mwachibanda, in the northern most part of 
Katumbi’s area, was extremely fertile; “[It is] remarkable”, wrote the Agricultural Officer for 
Northern Province in 1950, “that there is a surplus for sale from so small an area”;112 and this at 
a time when famine was taking its toll on the Nyasaland population across the country. 
Famine has not only to do with subsistence, but with the poor management of food 
supply. In order to establish a more useful picture of this food supply one has to examine 
“pricing policy, political manipulation of markets, government intervention” and embed the 
analysis of these variables in local factors of economic differentiation and social relations.113 
That the strains of the 1949-50 famine were not so obviously felt in Hewe was also likely down 
to the fact that the exchange of the crop that was available was well managed. During a later 
time of crisis Chawinga’s foresight was praised by Haskard: “Chief Katumbi, fearing a local 
shortage later in the year, has advised his people not to sell maize at the markets. Under the 
circumstances this is likely to prove a wise move”.114 Prices were set by the Agricultural 
Production and Marketing Board in an effort to manage food security and make profits, but in a 
peripheral borderland area like Hewe it remained relatively easy for maize to be circulated 
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locally, across the border, and at different times to when the Board operated. “People in Rumpi 
district have not sold their maize to the Board because they can obtain higher prices from 
African traders”,115 a report in September 1958 commented; it was this flexibility which 
Chawinga made sure his people took advantage of.  
As the previous chapter explored, the time at which these comments were being made 
was an uncertain one for the future of Native Authorities. Most were believed to have little real 
power and the job of developing the countryside in the context of the post-war economy was 
increasingly considered as a task beyond them. Chawinga, however, appeared to remain 
remarkably in control. Always to be seen leading by example, Chawinga was marked out as “an 
effective and progressive chief”.116 Though his area was small he was one of the few chiefs in the 
Mzimba District willing to redress deficiency in main crops by capitalising on the Hewe River to 
increase dry season cultivation in moist valley soils. Furthermore, his organisation of communal 
measures for dealing with baboon and wild pigs ensured that Hewe was rarely food insecure:  
 
“Despite constant encouragement and no little compulsion, backed by the supply of about 100 tons 
of cassava and sweet potato cuttings and by bean seed for planting in Mzimba District, the response 
from chiefs and people was disappointing, with the notable exceptions of Native Katumbi’s area and 
most of the Karonga district”.117  
 
He used the official conservation rules and orders to compel his people to participate in 
the development of the area, and the protection of their gardens and crops, but he never made 
anyone do anything that he was not prepared to do himself and he regularly headed up the pest 
drives and worked hard preparing and weeding his own garden. No one was in any confusion as 
to who was to be the one ultimately responsible for his people in a crisis. 
Whilst on tour in March 1951, Haskard visited an area on the very edges of Katumbi’s 
territory – from Kalindamawe to Mykoloti – where he found much evidence that the people 
respected the leadership; the chief “is much respected and has real authority! All villagers and 
drum welcome at most”,118 Haskard wrote in his diary. In a comparison with work done in the 
gardens of Kalindamawe and those just across the border in the village of Mykoloti, under the 
adjacent sub-Native Authority of Mpherembe (who fell under the Native Authority M’mbelwa), 
Haskard noted that the “ridges and bunds were all done in Kalindamawe and not a single one in 
Mykoloti, where there is continued ‘njala’ (hunger) and none at Kalindamawe. Themba Katumbi 
makes latter plant in November and work hard in gardens, planting big ones. The type of soil 
and land is identical”.119  
The compliance which Chawinga achieved from his people in agricultural activities can 
also be compared with Chikulamayembe’s performance in similar matters.120 Why when both 
chiefs had the same access to the committees, boards and training which proliferated in the 
post-war period did one emerge more powerful in the context than the other? There is clear 
evidence which demonstrates Chawinga’s greater ability to command labour. At a time when 
people were hardly working for “just” beer anymore but were increasingly seeking “real wages”, 
he was still able not only to arrange volunteers to cut trees and prepare the land for an airstrip 
at Chiteshe, but to build Government buildings and school classrooms within his area: 
 
“An excellent brick school building comprising three class rooms and an office was erected at 
Katowo School at a cost of only £25 thanks to the energy and enthusiasm of Themba Katumbi, who 
encouraged his people to undertake much voluntary work for the public good. Only artisans were 
paid, all unskilled labour being given free”.121  
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These efforts stood in stark contrast to Chikulamayembe who had very little success in 
recruiting voluntary labour to build even a teachers house in his area, which in the end cost the 
government £45 to erect. The fact that Katumbi had no subordinate chiefs in his area perhaps 
enabled greater progress to be made as it was down to the “petty jealousies” in 
Chikulamayembe’s area, between himself, the councillors and elders, which had been at the root 
of the problem in Nkamanga. They would, the D.C. concluded, “constantly frustrate progress in 
this as in many other directions”.122 Chikulamayembe might have had a much greater area to 
exploit – it was at least three times the size of Hewe – but the area contained several sub-Native 
Authorities who were able to wield their own localised authority. Hewe formed a relatively 
concentrated political unit, and Chief Katumbi could practice a more controlled form of 
territoriality there than Chikulamayembe ever could over the Nkamanga, Henga and lakeshore 
areas.123 Personality also had something to do with it, as the previous chapter indicated, 
Chawinga’s interactions with his people and the officers who supervised the implementation of 
conservation measures were much more pacifying than John Hardy Gondwe, the 
Chikulamayembe of the time,124 and he was keen to make sure his people did not appear too 
visibly political.  
Whilst the Government concluded that the radical changes in peasant cultivation 
practices, which were essential to the success of food production and soil conservation policies, 
demanded that more able bodied men “stay at home”, Timothy’s focus was fixed upon the 
efficient organisation of the labour that he did have available. When boycotts of markets and 
natural resource rules were causing havoc in other parts of the country, and were having an 
impact even within the same district, no effects were reported in Hewe. In the month of July 
1948, when maize markets were opened in Mzimba for producers to sell their surplus supplies, 
a boycott had been arranged by the producers of the district who were refusing to sell at the 
price set and were demanding a higher amount than had been approved for their maize. The 
boycott “engineered by men who were not themselves the producers with maize to sell, but 
local agitators”125 took place throughout Chikulamayembe’s territory yet no such calls for 
disobedience were heeded in Hewe. The D.C was quick to identify Chawinga as the reason for 
this. He wrote of the district wide disruptions in his annual report but pointed out that “in 
fairness to Chief Katumbi there was no boycotting in his area and the markets there worked 
smoothly and harmoniously”.126 
 
Federation and political discontent: a change in atmosphere 
These odd disruptions in the context of the politics of the 1940s were quite different in 
character, however, from the proliferating conflicts of the 1950s. The tide of dissent which came 
thick and fast after the introduction of Federation in 1953 would not be so easily contained. As 
the previous chapter highlighted this political change really shook up the negotiated status quo 
and seemed to force chiefs in particular to side definitively with either the nationalists or the 
government.  
 As soon as discussion about Federation began to take place Africans equated it with a 
betrayal of the trusteeship role that the British government had taken on when they had made 
Nyasaland a Protectorate. The nationalists complained that they were putting the interests of 
European settlers above the African population, and by doing so were threatening their hopes 
for self-determination and Independence.127 For many chiefs this presented a tricky prospect, 
and they all negotiated their reactions to these plans, and the nationalist campaign off the back 
of them, in their own way. On the whole, however, since chiefs overwhelmingly feared that 
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Federation would lead to a diminishing of their control over their land very few of them came 
out in favour of the plans.128  
 What ought to be noted, however, is that the impact which the threat of Federation 
created resonated differently throughout the Protectorate. Since in the southern highlands 
colonial policies had already left much of the population with diminished access to land and 
Africans had had to provide unpaid labour - or thangata – as a way of paying their taxes, it was 
greatly feared that Federation would exacerbate these hardships. It is understandable then that 
in places where the population were facing limited livelihood choices the protests against 
Federation were the most protracted and violent. In the north, the relationship between the 
majority of Africans and the land on which they cultivated their crops was not mediated by 
European interests in quite the same way as it was in the southern parts of the country. Here 
the social problems which the labour migration economy wrought were more likely to have 
formed the basis for discontent against the plans for Federation than a direct concern about 
access to land.  
What was universal, however, was the way in which the proposal for Federation “came 
to dominate and symbolise the larger anti-colonial struggle in the post-war period”, so much so 
that the wide variety of grievances felt throughout the country – especially the implementation 
of conservation policies - “were conflated into the anti-Federation campaign”.129 Once 
Federation arrived and when by 1956 the Natural Resources Ordinance was amended to make 
it easier to prosecute people for agricultural offences, the population at large became even more 
susceptible to the propaganda of the Nyasaland African Congress.130 Congress had played upon 
local people’s fears that having a political federation with the racist regime of Southern 
Rhodesia would put a firm end to their ability to work freely on their own land; over this, the 
farmers of Hewe also expressed apprehension.131 The few with the enthusiasm and intellect to 
encourage others to protest against the colonial activities had to rather appeal to future 
insecurities – because serious grievances in Hewe were quite limited. The message propagated 
was that if Federal rule was allowed to continue the state would “make Hewe to be a big farm 
(with) no settlement, just commercial farming”. 132  
The administration knew that these amendments would bring a change of atmosphere 
and they were “not carried out without some heart searching with regard to the possible effects 
that the new system might have on the district”;133 there can be little doubt that they fed into the 
general discontent which resulted in the State of Emergency in 1959. It was not only the local 
people’s lives that were affected; the colonial district officials who themselves had always held 
serious reservations about the usefulness of Federation, and sympathised to some extent with 
the people’s fears of the Rhodesian influence, remember this time as being very different to the 
earlier years of administration in the north. Reminiscing with a former colleague about this era 
Haskard agreed that “in our Rumpi days [the early 1950s] there was little opposition [to soil 
conservation]. The emphasis was on the positive side of agriculture – coffee growing with the 
necessary terracing, diversification of crops, agricultural shows […] Opposition to agricultural 
rules came with Federation and was a potent tool in the hands of the MCP”.134 Things, he said, 
changed enormously for everyone after 1957, the “time that the Government must have decided 
to put pressure on the Native Authorities to enforce the rules”. This was something that Haskard 
had concluded was “a policy with scant hope for success”.135  
The reaction of peasants in Hewe, as elsewhere, to Federation and to conservation 
measures such as contour bunding – the most hated of all the policies on account of the hard 
physical labour involved in preparing these anti-erosion channels – were based not in deep 
ideological sentiments about freedom and human rights (though some amongst them did 
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develop political views to this end). It was the threat that these policies caused to them in terms 
of accessing productive resources and limiting their labouring capacity that actually moved 
them to action. The reactions to these measures therefore varied greatly throughout the country 
on account of the differences in local political economy and the varied impact that they had 
upon people’s day-to-day activities. Contour bunding was a practice that the Nyasaland African 
Congress leapt upon as a way of encouraging a targeted rebellion against the colonial state. It 
was forced upon people in hot dry season when ground was hard and in areas where there was 
a serious lack of useful labour anyway.  
Grace Carswell’s approach to understanding the varied responses of peasants to 
conservation measures in western Uganda is a helpful way of thinking about how Chawinga 
might have been able to persuade his people to conform to these measures. It is her suggestion 
that the manner in which the measures were enforced and the personalities that administered 
them had a lot to do with how they were received by the general population, and in turn how 
they were reacted to; as a result each place displayed a different dynamic in relation to the 
policies:  
  
“In contrast to other areas, local level officials [in Kigezi] became concerned about threats to soil 
fertility, and formulated local-level policies to deal with the problems as they saw them. [...] a 
greater amount of attention was given to education, propaganda and the provision of incentives 
and the reasons behind the implementation was explained well [...] by working directly through 
chiefs and giving them power to judge and punish the administration was successful in getting the 
schemes carried out”.136  
 
Further reasons for why conservation measures might have been easier to implement in 
some areas and not others were a lack of fear of losing their land to Europeans, a limited 
nationalist presence, and the type of crops and labour being used in each local setting. Women 
were the ones who generally undertook the “conservation task” of digging bunds in Hewe and 
other such areas of high labour migration. Chawinga maintained a good relationship with the 
women of his area and by the time the introduction of some of the more severe and disrupting 
measures were introduced he appeared to have secured their loyalty for the most part. 
Furthermore, as good as he was in presenting the successful agricultural measures as his own 
ideas, Chawinga seemed rather adept in distancing himself from the ones that were widely 
disliked; when it came to bunding no one blamed Chawinga for forcing them to undertake these 
tasks. Unfortunately there are no archival sources which demonstrate how successful or harsh 
Chawinga was in prosecuting his people over natural resource rule infringements, but there is 
also no evidence that he emerged from the period with a reputation for simply bowing to the 
word of the colonial administrators either, as others around him did. 
Perhaps it was the relative economic autonomy which a border-zone area such as Hewe 
seemed to have which afforded Chawinga and his people greater opportunity to avoid state 
control. As was mentioned at the start of this chapter, the agricultural emphasis in the areas on 
either side of the Hewe/Muyombe border was on the rather less profitable and much less 
keenly observed food crops of maize and beans, therefore there was a much more flexible and 
open local exchange in these commodities. The populations in these border zones had a much 
greater control over the buying and selling of maize (especially in these pre-fertiliser days) than 
they would have over tobacco or cotton. The villages of Muyombe, Kanyerere, and Sitwe were 
also isolated from the Northern Rhodesian colonial state to which they “owed” allegiance, and 
had a much stronger connection with the western regions of Nyasaland than their Northern 
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Rhodesian hinterlands. In these less regulated areas alternative markets, additional sources of 
wealth and social connections all provided people with the opportunity to opt in and out state 
provision and protection.  
It was impracticable to prevent these movements given the closeness which existed 
between these people and the ease with which they could travel across the border. Seeing how 
the communities interact in contemporary times, particularly with the trade in millet and cattle, 
it is not hard to imagine the importance and strength of connection which existed during the 
colonial period. Long distance road transportation to connect the north to other parts of the 
Protectorate did not sufficiently develop before the end of colonial rule. However, for some local 
traders this proved most beneficial. The 1946 annual report for the Northern Province pointed 
out that “many natives travelled to N. Rhodesia and Tanganyika where goods could be easily 
obtained and made their purchases there. Towards the end of the year this developed into a 
remunerative business and purchasers on their return would hawk goods from village to village 
selling at fantastically high prices”.137 This was a difficult trade for the government to control, let 
alone try to manage; the border area was “so open at this point and means of evasion so 
numerous by a net work of paths leading across the border that effective control against 
Africans would be impracticable”.138 
The Great North Road, which had been cleared in 1933 with the express aim of opening 
these hinterlands up for more profitable trade by connecting them better to national markets, 
had, in fact, a much more significant effect on strengthening ties within the regional economy. 
Passing through Hewe before proceeding across the border into these areas of Northern 
Rhodesia and then back into Nyasaland again, the road made driving cattle and carrying goods 
much easier for local people. This was a road that remained difficult for motorised 
transportation but now provided an easier route for walking and moving livestock. Whilst more 
thorough research needs to be conducted into the impact of these connections in terms of 
economic and political autonomy, there is little doubt that this road served to further 
strengthen the bonds within this border-zone. Commodities, people, families, and disease all 
flowed to and fro across these areas; the fact that smallpox spread rapidly through these areas 
at one stage can be a useful marker of its interconnectedness.139 The road, therefore, came to be 
much more useful in linking periphery to periphery than core to periphery, something that 
became particularly pertinent once Banda re-diverted the road so it would not pass through 
Hewe and Northern Rhodesian villages in the 1970s. 
 It wasn’t only people and their goods that roamed freely to and fro across this border-
zone area; this was a place with a reputation for plentiful game populations, something which 
had often been seen as a huge disadvantage to the people who lived there on account of their 
predation of crops and people. The next section will consider how Chawinga also used this to his 
benefit. In a period of time when having the means to access productive resources was an 
increasingly important source of authority, he exploited of game laws and pest control superbly 
to this end.  
 
 
Part two. Techniques for territoriality 
 
Controlling labour, chasing pests, and hunting game 
A farmer cursing the presence of pests and game in their gardens was no uncommon thing in 
Hewe during the colonial period. Reports of the havoc that rogue animals were causing in the 
area were rife: 
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“The people in Chief Katumbi’s area, to the north of the Mzimba district in the neighbourhood of the 
Vwaza Marsh, are exposed to marauding animals more than elsewhere in the province. The area of 
this chief adjoins that of Northern Rhodesia where organised game control operations are carried 
out all the year round, and there is a lot of coming and going across the border of elephant and 
buffalo. In addition to the damage they do to gardens, these particular beasts are feared by the 
peasants, and there have been reports of unprovoked attacks by both elephant and buffalo”.140  
 
What was a huge inconvenience for farmers Chawinga turned into an advantage; successful pest 
control came to stand as a corner stone of his leadership and formed a symbolically important 
part of his chiefly identity. “Marauding animals” were considered to be a problem in many of the 
outlying districts of the country. Endless complaints from farmers, and chiefs, about the 
destruction of gardens and threats to human life, found their way to the local government 
agents or were presented in provincial council meetings, particularly in the Northern Province. 
Some areas experienced such serious depredation of crops that their food security was thought 
to have been seriously compromised; “life is barely supportable by reason of ravages of wild 
animals of every description”, wrote the D.C. North Nyasa in 1944 about the lakeshore region of 
his district.141 It was similarly concluded by the D.C. Mzimba that “nothing but large scale 
destruction of these beasts can save the major losses suffered to crops”.142  
Up until 1948 it had been the responsibility of each Native Authority to supervise crop 
guards in their areas to deal with these threats. They could complain, on behalf of their people, 
that game and vermin, particularly baboons and pigs, were causing irreparable damage in the 
food gardens, and would be granted a certain amount of shot gun ammunition for the “purpose 
of protection of the growing crops”.143 However success was predicated on the chiefs’ ability to 
organise, and villagers’ willingness to participate in, communal pest drives; in an area where 
demands on peoples labour in the village were already high on account of the migration of many 
of the young men, this extra activity, particularly amongst the main agricultural labourers 
women, was not popular. “Much of the manual effort required to prepare enough garden land 
for food is left to the women”, it was reported in a 1948 annual report, that “there is doubt 
whether it is physically possible for enough ground to be prepared by the women with 
inadequate assistance at their disposal”.144 
  At the beginning of 1948 a European Cultivation Protector was appointed to the 
Northern Province, making his headquarters in Mzimba. With this came a new initiative 
whereby old hunters recruited by native authorities would be replaced by new hunters 
appointed locally but under the direction of the European staff and funded by the NWDF which 
would make available money to purchase rifles and pay hunters a better rate.145 This move was 
prompted by a sense that crop protection under the native authorities supervision had not 
proved to be very successful.146 For the most part chiefs seemed content to relinquish their 
responsibility for such matters; it became easier for them to redirect the disgruntled attitudes of 
their people and more directly hold the government to account for not protecting their gardens, 
for failing to provide them with the appropriate amount of game rangers with rifles, or indeed 
ammunition for their own shot guns. It also made them much more reluctant to collaborate with 
these government officers in inducing villagers to take part in pig and baboon drives.147  
By the late 1940s the effectiveness of the pest control teams had decreased considerably 
on account of “the general lethargy of the villagers who show little or no enthusiasm in joining 
in game drives or even in assisting with the feeding of the hunters when they are concentrating 
their efforts on baboon and wild pig rather than game meat, in the rural areas”.148 In fact, in the 
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areas where depredations of game were most severe, villagers actively began complaining about 
the work of the Game, Fish and Tsetse control hunters who, they had been promised, would be 
more active in diminishing these threats but were in fact poorly supervised from the outset with 
the European game control officer barely in situ throughout the first year of this apparent 
government take-over.149 With a government happy to invest only very little in these serious 
local concerns, particularly in the north, and with most chiefs happy to rid themselves of one 
more responsibility which they saw as having little benefit to them, this area of village life lay 
quite neglected. Regardless of whether or not these aspects of control fell under his “official” set 
of responsibilities, Chawinga considered pest control absolutely integral to the success of his 
area, and the welfare of his people; contrary to the Government line of the issue, he not only 
retained the responsibility for game control in his area but managed to increase his jurisdiction 
slowly over the next ten years.  
Chawinga considered that there was much value in attending to his peoples’ concerns 
about pests and game. He used the 1949 Natural Resources Ordinance to his advantage to 
legislate locally and effectively organise the labour in his area with an order making it 
“compulsory for all able-bodied men to turn out for baboon and wild pig hunts when called 
upon to do so”. He impressed agricultural and district officers again with his administration of 
these pressing tasks which had been made especially difficult as, like in many parts of the 
Mzimba and Chinteche Districts, there was a very short supply of healthy adult males in the 
villages;150 “the results of these communal hunts are reported to be most encouraging, and Chief 
Katumbi intends to continue them in 1950” the DC recorded in his 1949 Annual Report.151 
Furthermore, to his credit, in the local narratives of his chieftainship, these initiatives are like 
the experimentation plots and cassava gardens, very much remembered to have been of his own 
making; “There has never been such a good chief”, said Jomboli Nyirenda, “he really helped his 
people; when there were pests he would organise everyone to chase; he started Cassava garden 
demonstration plots to encourage its planting; when there was no water he made everyone dig 
a well […] He paid my school fees one year”.152 
 
Hunting lions and elephants 
Pest control demonstrated Chawinga’s command over local labour and augmented his authority 
in the eyes of the government and with the local population as a protector of their livelihoods. 
However, it was with his hunting of larger game animals that he really attained great prestige, 
both materially and symbolically. The desire to control these wild elements of the landscape 
was state sanctioned but it was also embedded in local narratives; hunting was a fundamental 
expression of leadership, and prowess in the skills it required was an eminently good portent 
for the community. With the Balowoka chieftaincies suffering from limited spiritual legitimacy 
and traditional authority in the land, the Katumbi leadership benefitted greatly from Timothy 
Chawinga’s passion for and excellence in hunting especially as the historical narratives of the 
chieftainship oriented around the foundational role that hunting had played in the 
establishment of the Katumbi royal clan. 
The migration story read out at the annual Mulindafwa ceremony tells the tale of how 
Katumbi’s grandfather came looking for elephants from across the lake; Mulindafwa’s legacy is 
reflected in the surname of all the clans in line to inherit the title Themba Katumbi, Chawinga – 
derived from the Chitumbuka noun Cabinga (hunter), from the verb Kubinga, to hunt. Timothy 
Chawinga was certain to have pleased his ancestors with his hunting exploits, whilst also 
feeding into people’s imaginations the image of how a ‘real’ chief should act; strongly connecting 
to the past in order to establish his moral authority and historical legitimacy through these acts. 
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Importantly, his ability to control his environment, protect his people’s cultivated land, “tame” 
wild nature and neutralise the danger which it posed meant that he was able to retain some 
autonomy in an atmosphere of tightening colonial control. This was shored up by the close 
association which the Katumbi chieftainship had developed with the rainmaker Mlomboji 
whose control of the untamed aspects of nature was long established in the landscape and in 
people’s imaginations. 
From Roman emperors to Persian, Assyrian and Egyptian rulers, all have depicted 
themselves and been depicted as “brave protectors of their people against the ferocious animals 
that beset them”;153 the image of the hunter has always brought with it strong associations of 
having great authority in the land. Unsurprisingly his performance as hunter is the major motif 
drawn upon when people talk about the power and success of Timothy Chawinga; “[He] was a 
hunter, but he didn’t go to the bush, he would catch the lions in people’s gardens. Once a man 
was killed by a lion and he went to kill it”, remembers Peter Chawinga. When asked what 
Timothy achieved during his chieftaincy the most common response revolved around this 
particular element of his behaviour: “He was a man. Lions were finishing people here in Hewe 
but he killed them. He made traps for rats […] He killed lions, elephants, and reduced the 
number of rats. I forgot about anything else he did”.154 Such reports of his bravery can also be 
confirmed by reports found in the colonial archive: 
 
“A large man-eating lion, well advanced in years, recently broke into a house in Kalindamawe 
village in Chief Katumbi’s area, and attacked and killed two women who were sleeping inside. The 
Chief was hastily called, and found the lion some distance away devouring one of the women. Angry 
at being disturbed, the lion charged at the people who were following the Chief but in doing so was 
shot dead from a distance of about 7 yards by the Chief, who was concealed behind a tree [...] This is 
the second time that Chief Katumbi has shot a lion in defence of human life”.155 
 
His son Norman recalls that it was on account of this incident, when the game scout didn’t 
appear and Timothy heroically arrived to kill the lion instead, that caused him to be given his 
praise name; “They started calling him Kamangilira after he killed this lion at Mowa. [It means] 
whatever he says he will do, he will do it”.156 
By capitalising on the vast presence of game in his area and through his heroic hunting 
activities he took advantage of the colonial construction that the Valley was a ‘dangerous 
wilderness’, in need of control. Furthermore his assured performances ensured that colonial 
government machinery was kept at a distance; when the administration could rely on an 
effective native leader to do their job for them then it would. Mackenzie summarises the power 
of such performances as these in sustaining a leaders’ authority by reminding his readers that 
“separating productive human settlement from areas demarcated for the use of animals and the 
pursuit of the hunt” was an ancient art of leadership. Through “this technique a ruling elite 
could draw its revenue and human following from the one while exhibiting its prestige, securing 
its recreation and symbolically establishing its authority over the natural world in the other”.157 
Through his participation on the Natural Resources Board he made sure that the Vwaza 
Marsh area in the south of his territory, renowned for the vast presence of game which it 
supported, was much more closely monitored. A growing focus on game as a sport and tourist 
attraction had built pressure for the introduction of the Game Ordinance of 1953; it was this 
piece of legislation that enabled Timothy to gain an even greater control over the resources in 
the Hewe Valley. The remoteness of the place and its pressing crop predation problem, 
combined with the shortages of game department staff, saw the chief assuming the position of 
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Honorary Game Warden in his area; in this he attained a level of responsibility for game within 
his territory that no other native authority in the Protectorate could match and secured a 
channel for accessing both material wealth and traditional symbolism. These activities helped 
diversify his sources of authority, something which became increasingly necessary as 
decolonization loomed large on the horizon.  
His suggestions to close the area in which the Marsh lies are recorded in the 1955 
Annual Report of the Northern Province Natural Resources Board, on which he sat as a non-
official member. By June 1956 the Director of Game, Fish and Tsetse Control, H.J.H. Borly, after 
several discussions on the matter, decided that it should be given a trial, and on the 25th of July 
1956, under section 6 of the Game Ordinance 1953, the Vwaza Marsh was officially declared a 
controlled area: 
 
“The proposal to place Vwaza Marsh area, suggested by me in 1954, has recently been very 
forcefully raised by Chief Katumbi under whose jurisdiction it lies. He points out that the area has 
been very much shot over by Europeans from the Copper Belt over the last few years and that game 
in it is, for the moment, much depleted. Once again however, the area is not thickly populated and he 
considers that given an element of protection over the next two years or so the game will recover 
and that with careful control of shooting after recovery it should provide good sport for many years. 
I agree with his contentions in principle though I have some doubts whether the law could be well 
enforced here, as I have no officer in the Northern Province to look after it. Chief Katumbi himself, 
however, is a forceful and efficient Chief and is also an Honorary Game Warden so that he has 
enforcement power not normally enjoyed by a Chief. Both he and the Northern Province 
Administration are confident that the law can be adequately enforced. I certainly think it is worth a 
trial”.158  
 
He held the image of a chief embedded in traditional relations and responsibilities to his 
people, but he had a very contemporary grasp of his position. His negotiation of the controlled 
shooting area was demonstrative of this; with his authority over Hewe under an increasing 
amount of pressure as non-chiefly elements increased their participation in local decision 
making processes, he was able to use the Game Ordinance to put himself in a great position to 
exploit the plentiful presence of game that his area was blessed with.159 When discussions arose 
in 1957 about the possibility of a share of the revenue from Game Licenses going to local 
authorities it became clear that this controlled area represented rather more than 
conservational sentiment for Katumbi, the evidence of his entrepreneurial enterprise was 
revealed.160 The subject of the revenue from licenses cropped up in Provincial Council meetings 
from 1956, where wrangles can be seen between the Game/Natural Resources Departments, 
who appear to be highly appreciative of Katumbi’s role in the management of his area, and the 
Provincial Administration who, whilst clearly impressed with the actions of Chawinga in these 
areas under his supervision are equally aware of his manipulation of such activities for his own 
means. The case appeared closed as the Government answer to the renewed campaigning for 
giving shares of licences to local authorities came back. Whilst the “interest shown by the Chiefs 
was appreciated [...] Government was no longer in favour of the principle of giving shares of 
licences to local Authorities which was financially complicated”, preferring rather that these 
local bodies be financed from locally levied rates and from block grants from Government funds 
when a case for them was made.161 
The issue of distributing suitable rewards for the services carried out, however, would 
re-enter public debate in 1961, just four years before Independence. Borly, still the Director of 
the Game, Fish and Tsetse Control Department, was evidently delighted with what he upheld as 
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Chawinga’s almost single-handed efforts in re-populating the Vwaza Marsh area. He credited the 
chief with bringing the number of animals in the controlled area up to a level where “it may be 
justifiable to award one or two hunting permits during this coming dry season”.162 His efforts in 
“making certain that his own people neither hunt themselves nor assist visitors from outside to 
do so” should be rewarded he argued. “My officer in the north has given what support he could 
but owing to staff shortages this has been more moral than physical and without Chief 
Katumbi’s efforts some hunting would undoubtedly have gone on”.163 Of course much hunting 
did still go on, contrary to Borly’s suggestion; from the local accounts of this time it is Katumbi 
himself who is the major benefactor of this controlled zone, hunting irreproachably within its 
boundaries:  
 
“When this Ordinance was drafted I pointed out that the success of these Controlled Areas must 
depend a great deal on the active support of local chiefs and that it seemed to me quite equitable 
that their Treasuries should have a share of the revenue from them, as they do in the case of land 
rents [...] This suggestion was rejected at the time but it was intimated that in the event of any 
individual Chief actually taking a positive part in helping to control unauthorised shooting the 
matter could be raised again. Accordingly I now raise it and strongly recommend that consideration 
be given to providing for the local treasury to receive a share of fees for permits in the Vwaza Marsh 
Controlled Area. I should suggest a fifty percent share. The actual addition to local Treasury funds – 
or loss to Government – will, of course, be very small but the principle of paying it seems 
important”.164 
 
Perhaps this somewhat naive understanding of who was taking advantage of who 
reflects the comparatively little interaction that this Game Department had had with local 
authorities in remote areas such as Hewe. Graham-Jolly, the Acting Provincial Commissioner at 
this time, was more aware of Chawinga’s exploitation of his area than anyone else, and was no 
doubt influenced in this opinion by his predecessor Haskard’s notes, the long standing 
Provincial Commissioner by this stage who was on leave when this discussion took place; 
Haskard’s experience of administering Katumbi’s area as D.C Rumphi and P.C Northern Province 
had given him an insight into the local context. Graham-Jolly points out that Timothy ought not 
to get a salary increase to reflect his responsibility as this in fact already represented a rather 
lucrative position for him, given that he could make rather a substantial annual income from 
ivory sales alone:  
 
“I am not in favour of any adjustment being made to Chief Katumbi’s salary to reflect his endeavours 
in the ordered preservation of game. If Chief Katumbi deserves some special recognition for his 
game preservation activities I suggest it should take the form of an award such as the B.E.M. or the 
Queen’s Medal for Chiefs in silver gilt. To pay him an increased salary as a direct return for his game 
service might well establish a precedent. Chiefs and Headmen in other protected areas might 
demand similar treatment. In any case I am convinced that Chief Katumbi’s efforts have been 
directed at improving his own position, and the sale of ivory can bring him in as much as £200 in 
one year. I am, however, fully prepared to support an increase in the Chief’s salary to reflect his 
general efficiency; tax collection in his area has been good”.165 
 
The money from ivory sales alone enabled Kamangilira to build an impressive house complete 
with iron sheets from Mbeya in Tanganyika, purchase two land rovers, establish a small store, 
construct a maize mill for community use, as well as personally pay for many local children to 
attend secondary school at Livingstonia.166 “Hunting is how he became rich. […] He would go to 
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Vwaza to kill elephants and share the meat […] He would drive elephant from Chisimuka to 
Zolokere [and] even other hunters would kill elephants and bring ivory to him and he would sell 
it. Hunting helped him much; he did this before Vwaza became a game reserve. He was very rich 
from ivory”.167 Aside from the obviously material things which Chawinga was able to build and 
establish with the revenue from ivory, the extra income was increasingly important for 
establishing an independent source of income at a time when there was a growing presence of 
‘new men’ who could potentially threaten his authority, something which will be explored 
further in chapter five.  
 
A local alliance: Themba Kamangilira and Village Headman Khutamaji 
As much as Timothy relied on government initiatives, he also leant on tactical relationships with 
specific people within the Valley to ensure that he could maximise his advantage. His close 
relationship with Khutamaji Kachalie, a village headman in the swampy southern most part of 
the valley, where game was plentiful, demonstrates this most succinctly. Khutamaji in fact had 
jurisdiction over the area immediately bordering the controlled shooting area. From early on in 
his chieftainship Timothy courted his friendship, seeking to gain the advantage in his hunting 
activities by asking him to inform the chief about the movement of game, relying on him to 
police poaching activity and, as some local residents testified, occasionally even staying at his 
house overnight so that he could set off easily on early morning game hunts168  
Even though the dense rainy-season bush and swollen water channels of the Vwaza 
Marsh gives way to a much more negotiable landscape in the dry season when big game hunting 
was undertaken, it still took a certain local knowledge to monitor and navigate the changing 
landscape. Whilst Timothy was a good tracker and an experienced hunter the presence of 
skilled surveyors of the landscape from Khutamaji’s villages were invaluable both before and 
during his hunts. The first game report pertaining to the newly demarcated controlled area, 
which he delivers to the District Commissioner in 1957, hints at the close tactical relationships 
which he was establishing: “I told the Village Headmen who live in the Vwaza, to report to me, 
what kind of game they see, the keenest Village Headman on this report has been V.H. 
Khutamaji”.169 After detailing in his letter all the types of game found in the area, including large 
herds of zebra for first time in four years, he continued with his high praise of Khutamaji, who 
he described in his report as “very much interested in game animals, and he likes these rules, 
and order better than any body in this area. And I very much appreciate with him (sic)”.170 It is 
possible that this high praise was aimed at securing Khutamaji some financial reward, a nice 
return on his assistance in making the Themba a rich man. Whatever the purpose of this 
acknowledgement it can be said with some assertion that handing out praise to subordinates in 
this way was not something Timothy was in the practice of doing.  
This strong relationship with Khutamaji was maintained throughout the rest of his 
chieftainship. When in 1966 the native authority area of Katumbi was divided so that a sub-
traditional authority area could be carved out, with Councillor Zolokere171 assuming 
responsibility for the headmen, land, tax collection and management of resources in the 
southern part of the Valley, Chawinga insisted upon retaining authority for Khutamaji ensuring 
that the Vwaza Marsh was directly still under his authority. Practically and geographically it was 
patently ridiculous that Khutamaji did not report directly to Zolokere who was based very close 
to his village; he was now so much further away from ‘his’ chief than anyone else in the area, but 
the decision enabled Timothy to maintain controlling the areas rich in game, through Khutamaji 
his hunting activities continued unabated.172 It was only after Independence once the controlled 
area became an official National Park that Chawinga was forced to reorient himself within the 
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new spaces being constructed within his territory by the Malawi Congress Party; this is 
something that chapter six will address at length.   
 
“He was kind to people, but he was self-centred”: the limits to dictatorship 
His command over the landscape did not go completely unchecked however during the colonial 
period either. Increasingly, and particularly so once a new political landscape began emerging 
after the State of Emergency, people became bold enough to complain that Timothy’s exclusive 
rights over hunting and pest control, and in particular his monopoly over fire power in the area, 
was detrimental to their livelihoods. In the far south west edges of Katumbi’s territory, not too 
far from Khutamaji’s village, in an area where game was plentiful and destructive, people grew 
annoyed that they were neither permitted nor equipped to control garden pests themselves. 
The people from Mowa complained to the Agricultural Assistant Geoff Craske in 1962 that they 
were having trouble in effectively scaring animals away from their gardens; “they complained 
bitterly of elephants, bushbucks and pigs eating up their crops. It is true that no one in this 
village owns a gun. The Village Headman told me that Themba Katumbi would not allow anyone 
with a gun in that area because he did not wish to see anyone shooting in the whole of Hewe 
even for the sake of scaring the animals that were eating crops except himself. The people have 
looked on their chief as a selfish chief”.173 The same was true in the northern parts of his 
territory, around Mwanda where game also moved very freely. Joseph Munthali remembers that 
he wanted to control everyone, “he was jealous such that he did not want someone to be better 
off than himself. For example, opportunities to kill game only himself. He was too much of 
himself. He was kind to people but he was self-centred”.174 Whilst some, like Master Farmer 
Foresize Nyirenda and Donald Mwangonde, tried to get around Chawinga’s monopolisation of 
shotgun ownership by applying to the government directly for a license; the channels to get one 
could hardly circumnavigate his watchful eye. Mwangonde’s license money, for example, got lost 
sometime after he left it at the chiefs’ office to be sent to the D.C.175 It was evidently not easy to 
wrestle any sort of autonomy from Chawinga’s almost dictatorial grip on the territory. 
 In response to a question about the “important things” that Timothy Chawinga had done 
during his chieftaincy, Roosevelt Mwangonde believed that he was successful because “he made 
Vwaza to be the Game Reserve, he influenced so that we could have an airport, he made people 
to dig ridges so that pigs could not enter in the garden [...] He was staying with the people very 
well and he was even encouraging people to grow many crops so that they could have surplus. 
He was also monitoring gardens and people who were lazy were being threatened that their 
land would be taken away from them, that is why people loved Kamangilira”.176 In Chitumbuka 
the word used to express these feelings kutemwa indeed means ‘to love’. However, Timothy 
Chawinga was not an endearing leader; this ‘love’ of their chief was no doubt more of a reverent 
love, akin to the ways in which people ‘love’ political leaders of whom they are in fact afraid. In 
the context of ‘Big Man’ theories which were outlined in the introduction, Chawinga developed 
many of the characteristics. There was no shortage of adulation for him but like so many other 
dictatorial leaders it was the fear he evoked in people which had a lot to do with this.177  
Efram Chawinga recalled, “[he] was a clever chief and he didn’t like stubborn people [...] 
He was a person who liked development, he didn’t like lazy people in his community”.178 
Chipofya Nundwe highlighted that he was not the only person that the villagers were 
accountable to, since there were headmen who presided over different parts of the territory; 
however “in those days […] they would all be called to the chief’s headquarters at Katowo and 
when they had finished all the weeding and bunding they would then go and clear roads at 
Mowa. So there was punishment if people under VH Chipofya did not complete their work, they 
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would have to give the Themba a goat. Everybody was ready for that”.179 Others remember 
muddying their legs up to their knees if they wished to move around to do anything beside their 
garden duties in the mornings during the season of cultivation.180 On encountering someone 
whom he suspected had not first been to the garden, before they embarked to do anything else 
in the day, Timothy Chawinga was said to have severely reprimand the person in question, and 
would often meet out a heavy fine.181 By dirtying themselves as though they had been hard at 
work in their gardens people invented new ways of circumventing his restrictions; that they 
bothered to do this, however, is another indicator of Timothy’s authority.182 
 Chawinga was not ignorant of this tension. To maintain a level of loyalty among his 
people he would have to act in the manner that all Big Men were accustomed: the redistribution 
of his wealth was important. As much as he is remembered for his stern warnings and 
monopolisation of guns, he is praised for having paid children’s school fees, building a 
community maize mill, organising social and sporting events at the community hall which he 
also helped construct, and making sure that in hard times there were opportunities to celebrate 
and have a good time. The most memorable of these celebrations was the Mulindafwa ceremony 
which was held during September every year. Perhaps it is no coincidence that September was 
one of the dreaded ‘suicide months’ just before the rainy season when food supplies were very 
low and times were always tough. The Mulindafwa ceremony would customarily conclude with 
a huge celebration, the entire community feasting upon an elephant which Timothy was given 
permission to hunt and kill especially for the event. This provision, coming at the end of the dry 
season, lives on vividly in people’s memories, especially the women. When the celebration was 
first enacted in 1954 the impact of labour migration was at its height and the population still 
had to think about preparing their gardens and digging conservation bunds in expectation of the 
rainy season which began in November. The celebration was a timely boost for a seasonally 




Having strong territorial control over a place, its resources and its people can put one in a good 
bargaining position in relation to organisations or individuals who wish to have some influence 
within an area. It is the assertion of this thesis that the period 1943 to 1953, when neither the 
state nor the emerging African nationalists were particularly concerned to engage with the 
leadership or economy of Hewe, Timothy Chawinga was able to gain a significant moral and 
economic grip upon his territory. This was significant enough that by the time chiefs were being 
drawn more prominently into the politics of the time after Federation, he was in a position 
where he could exploit his guardianship over Hewe to his advantage. Both nationalists and 
colonial officials could not dismiss his control over this political space and as such Chawinga 
could not be ignored; he was someone with whom they needed to bargain rather than present 
an ultimatum.  
As the next chapter will show more empirically the priority for the colonial government 
was to maintain sovereignty over its borders, rather than achieve an ultimate control over every 
person and every resource and Chawinga enabled this to happen. He did what all progressive 
and efficient indirect rule chiefs were supposed to do: ensure that the projection of colonial 
state power reached the furthest corners of its territory with the least possible cost to the 
regime. However, as the thesis has been arguing thus far, this did not mean that he was reliant 
upon state given authority, he had progressed beyond that. His sources of authority were 
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manifold, and they had to be in order for him to survive the changes that were afoot. The 
relationship he had developed with his people ensured that he could not be ignored by 
nationalists either. For them to influence the political space, they needed to gain access to it 
through him. The autonomy he developed in this regard put him in a unique position after 
Federation took place.  
The opening of this chapter began with a discussion about how prior to the 1940s land 
had not been an issue worth talking about in the northern part of the Protectorate. In Hewe no 
rules or orders were made about tenure and very few conflicts over land were noted by any of 
the previous district commissioners. By the late 1950s much had changed. The territorial spaces 
that had been constructed and/or reinforced by the policy of indirect rule were becoming 
exploitable economically and agricultural sources of wealth (as a material basis of authority) 
were becoming a great deal more important to traditional ruling elites in the countryside.183 
However, the extent to which people had access to land, labour and agricultural surplus within 
these territories depended on their “economic autonomy (or dependency) vis-à-vis the state”.184 
Chawinga effectively used the resources available in a space which the state did not wish to 
compete with him over. His freedom to extract wealth, control labour and exert strong 
territorial claim over Hewe, as well as its borderland position and regional relationships, are the 
most important reasons why his area was agriculturally productive and furthermore how he 
was able to become so regionally powerful. By 1957 he had successfully translated this into a 
territorial victory over Chikulamayembe when in January the dispute over the ownership of the 
villages of Chelanya and Kapemba was settled in his favour.185  
As Mandala highlights in his PhD thesis about the Mang’anja chieftaincy in the Lower 
Tchiri Valley, colonial intervention into peasant economies “remained restrained to the market”, 
and since the “dynamics of the economy were rooted in the pre-capitalist social relations and 
the underlying ecosystem”186 in certain instances where the market did not shift these dynamics 
too much, these underlying relations provided alternative channels of exploitation. The 
meaning, use and value of land were in a constant state of transformation however and as the 
late 1950s brought about a more significant move towards commodification, with a shift 
towards progressive farmers and commercial plots, the market made more of an impact on 
these local relations. As the commodification of land shifted people’s relationship to it, as 
alternative authorities emerged to claim autochthony, as increasing pressure upon it forced new 
divisions and, eventually, as the new African government redefined how it would project state 
power, Chawinga’s unrivalled territorial control would be challenged. 
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Playing the long game:  






Timothy Chawinga knew when to stay silent. The tumultuous period of shifting allegiances, 
resignations and boycotts by native authorities which took place immediately before the 
Nyasaland Government was finally subjected to federation with Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia proved to be one such time; as the political intelligence report for May 1953 simply 
put it, the usually outspoken chief chose quite uncharacteristically to remain “on the fence”.1 
Chawinga had always been opposed to federation, and he made no attempt to hide this fact, 
however his taking a stance on this particular issue did not mean in any sense that he aligned 
himself with the Nyasaland African Congress or that he approved of their tactics. Chiefs like 
Mwase and M’mbelwa who took firm stands to ally with Congress by dramatically resigning 
their official positions or publicly leading non-cooperation campaigns would later retract their 
resignations and back out of boycotts, worried about the consequences these activities would 
have on their authority. Their vacillation on these matters sent confusing messages to both the 
Government and their people, and it made them prime targets for Congress manipulation on 
account of their seemingly weak-willed behaviour. Chawinga practiced moderation in dealing 
with these highly political matters; his only demonstrations of commitment up until 1960 were 
directed towards the needs of the people of Hewe; a useful tactic in times when the future 
direction of the nationalist movement was extremely unclear. This chapter will argue that 
Chawinga was able to ride the wave of political discontent and constitutional change on account 
of his continued public neutrality throughout the 1950s.  
Taking a neutral stance was not a guaranteed ticket to a chief’s survival though; it did 
not work so well as a tactic in places where traditional authority was already being put under 
considerable pressure from other sources, and fence sitting would see them only lose more 
ground. As previous chapters have shown, reforms to native administration were putting chiefs’ 
institutionalized powers under threat. This threat was more keenly felt in areas where the 
experience of labour out-migration had prompted some people to resist traditional authority. 
Similar tensions were felt in Karonga where the co-operative movement, which had been 
extremely successful in establishing profitable schemes, enabled local elites to begin to rival the 
chiefs in terms of economic wealth. In such places leaders were forced to watch their backs. 
Across the border from Hewe in Chief Muyombe’s territory in Northern Rhodesia, the threat to 
the established order came from younger factions within the chieftaincy itself who saw the 
advantage of allying themselves with nationalist elements to oust the old guard. The pressures 
on chiefs and the threats which formed in the local context as well as on account of the national 
structural reforms varied greatly throughout the Protectorate. Whilst most of them were able to 
hold the ground throughout the uneven disorder of the 1950s, these often long-standing 
tensions between the chiefs and their people came to the fore during the State of Emergency 
which was declared in March 1959, and would last until the middle of June the following year; it 
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proved a perfect opportunity for unpopular chiefs to be removed and new faces to take their 
place. 
In Hewe, despite increasing Congress pressure Chawinga continued to attend district 
and provincial meetings and refused to boycott official events. Meanwhile he spent this time 
also bolstering his traditional role, careful not to neglect the responsibility he had towards his 
people. There were economic and political threats of some importance but they were not yet 
organised or strong enough in the local setting to overwhelm his position; he had room to sit 
tight, and maintain a nonaligned status. Harvests were good, shortages were few, and as the 
officials noted: when this was the case the breaks were generally put on political activity.2  In 
fact, rather than causing his chieftaincy to crumble the opening days of the State of Emergency 
provided the dramatic stage which Chawinga needed to bravely reassert his commitment to the 
people of Hewe, some of whom were starting to grumble about his dictatorial style.  
When Chawinga did make a political stand, he did so once Hastings Banda had returned 
to Nyasaland to take over the leadership of Congress from the hesitant T.D.T Banda. Bearing an 
allegiance to Hastings Banda as an individual – who he had first met in London in 1951 when 
the chief attended the Festival of Britain and where Banda was practicing as a GP3 – rather than 
to the idea of the NAC per se, proved useful for Chawinga. When Banda returned to Nyasaland in 
July 1958, Hewe was one of the first places he went to hold a rally4 and he selected the chief to 
join him in Ghana at the All Africa Peoples Conference in December 1958, and then in London as 
his chiefly representative during the federal review process in 1960. Interestingly this decision 
to associate more overtly with the nationalists once Banda returned did not appear to concern 
the local administration too much. They seemed rather nonchalant about Chawinga’s political 
dealings, probably realising that the ability he had to keep his people in check was too precious 
an asset to endanger in an atmosphere of great tension across the Northern Province.  
Bearing in mind that chapter three has already analysed the structural threats to 
chieftaincy, this chapter will concentrate on how Chawinga managed to contain the challenges 
to his leadership whilst chiefs around him struggled to do the same during this eventful period 
of time (1952-1960); and how he negotiated his way through the myriad political alliances 
which each promised to protect the future of native authorities in different ways. Two key 
diplomatic moments sandwich this period, the discussions around federation in 1952-1953 and 
the arrangements for the 1960 federal review process; in these historical moments many chiefs 
entered into politics publicly for the first time, officially articulating their loyalties in 
correspondence, as part of delegations, and in resignations tendered. What becomes clear, 
however, is that it was not chiefs’ interactions with national level politics that would see their 
future secured, more often than not what happened between chiefs and the local party faithful 
at these times was far more crucial in determining how their relationship with the future 
Malawi Congress Party would be shaped. The situation of local politics in Hewe was no 
exception; it is through this lens of analysis that the shifting fortunes of chiefs such as Chawinga 
ought to be examined, rather than through the endless changes which took place from 1952 to 
1960 at the national level of both the party and the government. 
 
 
Part one. Chiefs can no longer be kept out of politics 
 
Fractured alliances and shifting agendas 
In May 1953 the position which people in the Northern Province took in regard to the 
Nyasaland African Congress could best be described as “fluid”; a position which reflected the 
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organisation’s own turmoil. A varying degree of opposition to the non-cooperation tactics that 
elements of Congress had been urging people to participate in as a protest against the dreaded 
Federation was noted, with most agreeing that the suggestion of a boycott of the Queen’s 
Coronation celebrations in June was in particularly “bad taste”.5 The previous six months had 
been times of great uncertainty for native authorities, many of whom had tried to avoid taking 
sides by doing what Chawinga did, attempt to act purely as a figurehead for their people, trying 
to voice only their people’s opinion. This did not stop members of Congress from trying to turn 
chiefs towards their agenda and they worked on identifying the ones that were more easily 
persuaded to follow than others. John Hardy Gondwe, Themba Chikulamayembe, was 
approached as one such susceptible character. In April 1953 he had assured the Provincial 
Commissioner that he would warn all his people not to have anything to do with Congress, but 
by June he showed the first signs of rebellion. He is reported to have turned up four hours late 
to his own meeting and to have insisted that the District Development Committee and Education 
Committee were to be boycotted, as well as the Coronation celebrations and Provincial Council.6 
Further north, Chief Kyungu in Karonga was reported to have “slipped into the hands of local 
Congress members”, and M’mbelwa to the south was already working at a senior level within 
the organisation, with his “main motive” appearing to be “self-aggrandisement based on self-
government”.7   
 There is little evidence to show that local members of Congress set their sights directly 
on Timothy as a prospective ally in this their earliest non-cooperation campaign. The only 
source which shows that Chawinga rejected outright a call to boycott official meetings is his 
response to Chikulamayembe’s letter which was an instruction to him to follow in his example; 
to this “Katumbi tore up the letter and said he would use his own judgement. Later, Katumbi and 
his councillor the Rev. Amin Msowoya attended the meetings”.8 In the context of the bitter 
rivalry between the two chiefs this declaration of independence says rather more about local 
tensions than broader political affiliations.  
However, paying heed to local politics and being influenced by the local agricultural and 
economic situation likely formed a large part of all chiefs decisions in this regard, a dynamic that 
can be illustrated by the desperate vacillation which many of them displayed when it came to 
actually seeing through what their grand public statements suggested they would. When the 
resignation of eight chiefs was reported in the British press on the 12th of June 1953, it seemed 
as though Congress’ plans to capture the chiefs was working. However, the decision to pursue 
non-cooperation tactics made by Chief Mwase and “his followers” – which included preventing 
their people from being recruited as labourers to South Africa and distancing themselves from 
any decisions taken by the Legislative Council9 - belied the more complex matrix of options and 
restraints which chiefs faced.  The fact that two of these rebellious chiefs retracted their 
resignations just days later and that at the same time an official chiefs’ council passed 
determined resolutions to continue working with the Government and not to heed Mwase and 
Congress show that a range of choices, each with their own benefits, presented themselves to 
native authorities at this time. 
 After what seemed to have been a successful couple of months of recruitment the 
interest in Congress from earlier in the year dropped off significantly when good food harvests 
and a bumper crop of tobacco and cotton dissipated the building tension in April and May 1953. 
Decisions were also affected by the changing diplomatic situation; when the Secretary of State 
for Colonies visited, for example, and gave fresh assurance that federation wouldn’t mean the 
loss of land for Africans the mood was also considerably lightened. It should be remembered 
that the general atmosphere in the country at this time, even just prior to federation, was not 
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one where angry anti-Government feeling dominated. As one senior official noted after having 
been away for some time, the “friendly attitude” of Africans towards him surprised him on his 
return to Nyasaland in June, especially having heard that things were taking a turn for the 
worst.10  
For some Africans the question of federation itself had not even been settled, this was 
especially the case in the north where there was plentiful land and the impact of the Natural 
Resource Ordinance policies had not been so keenly felt. The African civil servants in Karonga 
might have been very resistant to the idea of federation but their influence was limited. It was 
reported that in “the rural areas of Karonga the majority of Africans have no definite opinion 
about federation, many have no knowledge of it, and others frankly confess that they are not 
interested; several were surprised to learn that federation was not yet an accomplished fact”.11 
There is even evidence in the colonial files that there were some farmers in Nkhata Bay and 
Mzimba who actively desired federation; their correspondence expressed the opinion that it 
would bring better schools, hospital, transport, food and more money12 and that those chiefs 
and Congress members who did not want it were protesting on account of their concern for 
their own positions rather than the welfare of their people13. Whether these examples 
demonstrate anything more than government propaganda is difficult to know. What is sure is 
that this was a time when fragile alliances existed within the nationalist organisation, and 
between Congress and chiefs. Only a very few number of chiefs could be decisively pinned down 
as being either firm collaborators, or ardent resisters. The emergence of several other 
organisations professing to speak for “the people” or better represent native authorities is 
illustrative of this fragile landscape of shifting allegiances.  
 
“Unconstitutional bodies”: the Nyasaland African Convention and Supreme Council  
Chief Mwase, one of the most high profile of native authority chiefs, was behind several new 
“unconstitutional” organisations. It is useful to examine his shifting public inconsistency before 
comparing how Chawinga himself responded to these dramatic events which were reshaping 
the landscape of politics in Nyasaland. Having worked enthusiastically as a key member within 
the Nyasaland African Congress throughout the late 1940s, attending the Victoria Falls 
Conference to discuss federation in 1951 alongside NAC representatives and campaigning with 
them to make sure few people were persuaded by the plans to federate, by 1952 Mwase was 
organising the chiefs separately from the NAC and Protectorate Council; with sometimes 
confusing consequences.  
His first rather contradictory display of behaviour was made in a speech against 
Congress in 1952. In a letter to the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province he openly 
derided the organisation for their taking freedom of speech away from the people of Nyasaland. 
He was unhappy about their “recruitment” tactics which included intimidation designed to 
frighten chiefs into membership and he told the P.C. that the “chiefs and native authorities are 
ill-advised; that the organisation will soon take over the Government and that the chiefs and 
native authorities are to be highly respected that they are now”.14 Despite this rather 
conciliatory letter towards the government just two days later he also resigned from his official 
position as native authority; it appeared that he was neither pro-Congress nor pro-government. 
In the context of a NAC riven with internal conflicts he decided to move to higher ground. He 
imagined that he might be able to do this by leading chiefs in protesting against federation in 
their own way, with their own agenda. 
 The first opposition party he started “for the good of my country man and woman” was 
the Nyasaland African Convention.15 Leading a number of other members of the African 
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Protectorate Council to also abandon their official positions, he stated that he had begun 
forming the organisation because the “time has come for chiefs in Nyasaland to take their own 
line with regard to federation”, and to no longer “follow blindly the lead of Congress”.16 Despite 
Mwase’s firm and persuasive statements, just two months later the impetus of this break-away 
was lost. Lost in its desire to distance itself from Congress – if this was indeed a serious 
motivation from the start and not a diversion tactic – and lost in its own “independent” 
campaign against federation.  
The chiefs’ conference which Mwase had organised to be held on the 15th and 16th of 
November 1952 in Lilongwe, was said by him to have been a chiefs-only event, but for observers 
it was clearly “inspired and directed” by Congress and was full of its representatives who were 
set on influencing the course of events. At this event a National Chiefs Union was formed, with 
Mwase as president, and one of its first activities was to organise another delegation to the UK 
in order to present to the Queen a petition against federation signed by 83 chiefs. Early in the 
following year the Chiefs Union joined with the NAC and the Protectorate Council to form a joint 
committee which they named the Supreme Council of Action; in this they advocated Congress 
inspired non-cooperation tactics.17 Despite his vocal severing of Congress ties Mwase was 
evidently still working closely with at least some of its more radical leadership. On the basis of 
his behaviour as it is reported in colonial records it is difficult to pin down where his true 
allegiance lay; and this was something that the administration would find increasingly irritating.  
Chiefs who had no pressing political agendas of their own to pursue had an easier time 
of it during the months of April and May 1953 when harvests were good and bumper crops of 
tobacco and cotton were guaranteed to sell well at market18; in such a context political agitation 
was down to a minimum and chiefs could concentrate on their usual administrative duties. 
Perhaps it was this lack of impetus among chiefs that led Mwase to become involved with the 
Supreme Council. It consisted of Chiefs Mwase, M’mbelwa, Gomani and seven other native 
authority chiefs, plus eight representatives of Congress including Willard Gomani, the very 
active son of Chief Gomani, and J.R.N. Chinyama, the then current President of the NAC.19 This 
organisation was essentially the crucible for the campaigns of civil disobedience which became 
the characteristic tactic of Congress throughout the 1950s.  In May 1953 The Supreme Council 
took the decision to issue orders, which they pinned on trees and buildings, to boycott 
Government meetings and practice non-participation in all official activities, this controversially 
included the Queen of England’s coronation celebrations. These orders were accompanied by 
what the Government described as “widespread” intimidation: this consisted of threats that 
people who did not participate would have their throats cut, their houses burnt, or witchcraft 
would be used against them. This the Government found difficult to counter, having few 
channels to spread their own information among the people.20  
Whilst Mwase led the calls to boycott and perform acts of civil disobedience it was in 
fact Chief Gomani – encouraged by his son Willard and their close association with the radical 
minister the Reverend Michael Scott – who became the most famous of all chiefs who 
participated in these protests. The Natural Resource Ordinance had had a big impact in Ncheu, 
in which Chief Gomani’s chieftaincy was to be found; his was a ready audience who perhaps had 
not felt the benefit of the good harvests which other areas were experiencing at that time. 
Working closely with B.W. Matthews Phiri, another member of Congress who was involved with 
the Supreme Council, and pushed by his son Willard he warned his D.C that should federation 
come he would personally protest against it by handing back his tax and license books and 
refusing to undertake his duties. A fierce non-cooperation campaign was fought in Ncheu and 
Gomani was the first chief to be deposed on account of it.21 Unrest also took place elsewhere in 
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the south: in Thyolo, Mulanje, Port Herald, Chikwawa and the Lower Shire; blame was put on 
the instability of native administration in these areas and on the tensions which the forced 
labour tenancy system of Thangata had fermented.22 It also forced new fractures between those 
who believed that violence was needed to overcome federation and those who could not justify 
the death of Africans in order to attain secession.  
The decision of people to follow either their chiefs and/or Congress’ lead was not really 
an ideological one for most of the population or indeed for their customary leaders; this remains 
another aspect of this time. Some people were rather suspicious of their chiefs’ motives for 
wanting independence, and made the suggestion that their chiefs were only fighting for freedom 
from the colonial regime so as to secure their own future and that they would not think twice 
about acting against the interests of their people once this was attained. They were convinced 
that once an African government gave them the space to fill the positions of their entourage 
with whomsoever they wanted they would immediately select only friends and relatives for the 
jobs. For this reason freedom from the colonial administration was, for these people, simply not 
worth fighting for; they were a much tougher crowd for the nationalists to appeal to.23  
 Mwase’s resignation in June, along with seven of his compatriots24 was retracted soon 
afterward it was submitted. His decision to do so was understood by the administration to be 
the actions of “a worried man” who was “trying desperately to keep a foot in the Government 
camp”.25 The message he was sending out to the population, to other chiefs, and to the 
government was decidedly unclear; behaviour which suggests how difficult it was to be firmly in 
either one camp or the other:  
 
“He campaigned to boycott the celebrations, yet at the last moment he produced an address of 
loyalty on behalf of the Africans in his area, and also sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, 
asserting his loyalty to the Queen. On the 19th of June however he took a prominent part in an 
attempt to prevent Africans from seeing a coronation film”.26  
 
Other active members of the Supreme Council also began to get jittery. Strangely Chief 
M’mbelwa became more co-operative with the Government than he had been for some time, 
organising a very successful early tax drive in his area in June. The government’s interpretation 
was that he had done this so as to avoid the embarrassment if Congress later pressed for non-
collection of tax as a form of non-cooperation.27 The difficult position of these chiefs was 
certainly appreciated by the administration but they did not believe that there was any excuse 
for disloyal behaviour or for “the formation of a quite unconstitutional body such as the 
Supreme Council and, through this, association with Congress in its call to, and campaign of, civil 
disobedience”.28 The government had come to the end of its tether with Mwase in particular 
who they charged in no small measure with “the bloodshed, waste of money, and damage to 
race relations”29 which the non-cooperation measures brought about: 
 
“He must now realise, and accept, that he will have to stand on one side of the road or the other, and 
that if he is officially to resume his office he must finally abandon his past policy of vacillation and in 
sincerity, for Government cannot tolerate it in a Native Authority”.30   
 
So too had another group of chiefs come to the end of their appreciation of him. At a meeting of 
15 senior chiefs and Native Authorities in the Southern Province, delegates passed firm 
resolutions not to break any laws made by the Government, and a group of chiefs from 
Chikwana and Port Herald sent a message to the Provincial Commissioner, “we will not allow 
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Mwase or Congress to give us orders”.31 One thousand people gathered at N.A. Chikowi’s 
headquarters for an anti-Supreme Council meeting on 24th June, including Chiefs Katunga (of 
Chikwawa), Ntondeza (of Thyolo), Chitera (of Blantyre), Chimombo (of Thyolo), Kuntembwe (of 
Chikwawa) and Ngabu (of Chikwawa); most of whom would be later punished by their people 
for “these acts of treachery”.32  
On the 10th of October, amid these tensions, Mwase decided to withdraw his third 
resignation; this was just another confirmation in the eyes of the administration that he was 
both “a master of duplicity” and a chief who was easily led.33 This was not the last that would be 
heard of Mwase; he went on to play an extremely important role advising the young leadership 
of the more radical Congress and he saw out the Emergency emerging as more heroic than 
spineless, however it is difficult to get a sense of what might have happened to him in Banda’s 
Malawi as he died soon after the Emergency in 1962.  
 
Keep on consulting and we’ll go on co-operating! 
Although he was known to have been a good friend of Chief Mwase, Timothy Chawinga kept a 
low profile throughout the tumultuous period just prior to federation. His name did not come up 
as either someone who was obviously loyal to the Government or as someone who signed up to 
the activities of the Supreme Council. He did make his views on federation very explicit 
however. At the end of 1952 a special meeting of the African Protectorate Council was held. 
Chaired by Fox-Strangways the Secretary for African Affairs, it had been called in order to 
choose and brief representatives to attend the London conference to discuss federation in 
January 1953. Attending as one of seven delegates from the north Chawinga made his opinion 
on this matter clear: 
 
“If we agree to the suggestion that we send delegates to England it will mean that we are not 
representing the wishes of our people [who are opposed to Federation] […] we have reached the 
stage when we feel that there is nothing good in the federation scheme, […] I feel that had there 
been anything in it to benefit Africans, and had we continued to oppose it as in fact we have done, 
the scheme would have been dropped long ago simply because we did not want it”.34   
 
This is, however, one of the very few public statements from Chawinga. Like most members of 
the African Protectorate Council he was opposed to the federation in principle and in detail and 
did not wish to participate in any forum that would be discussing the matter in any seriousness 
due to the disappointments which had occurred when chiefs had attempted to have their voices 
heard on previous occasions.35 Several witnesses confirmed that he did not hold back from 
expressing his political position amongst his friends, teachers and colleagues in Hewe,36 but he 
would never be drawn into a public debate about it. His name is notably absent in all of the 
political intelligence reports during this time and seems not to appear on lists where chiefs 
political affiliations were known. He continued to work through the “proper channels”, which he 
knew still gave him the best opportunity of getting the things done he wanted to get done in 
Hewe, and in giving him chances to have his voice heard the loudest and most effectively. The 
1950s were, overwhelmingly, years where he committed himself to his administrative role as 
native authority and the period of federation was arguably when he was at the height of his 
powers.37 As the previous chapter showed he excelled in organising agricultural activities 
during the federation period, and he wasn’t in any hurry to jeopardize the socially and 
economically important position that he had attained as an honorary game warden. The 1955 
Annual report on Native Administration summed up his achievements as follows: 




“In Rumpi District, Chief Katumbi completed another year of efficient administration in his area. In 
June he attended the ceremonial parade in Zomba on the occasion of the Queen’s birthday, in order 
to receive from His Excellency the Queen’s Medal for Chiefs in silver gilt, which had been awarded to 
him the previous year. Chief Katumbi was appointed a member of the Provincial Natural Resources 
Board and was largely responsible for the proposal that the Vwaza Marsh area should become a 
controlled shooting area. In May, [he was] also responsible for starting a welfare hall building in 
Katowo”.38  
 
In this same year his achievements were even reported in the vernacular newspaper Msimbi; an 
enthusiastic write-up sent in by the clerk at the Hewe post office, Chakhalira Chilembo about the 
plentiful harvest in Hewe was deemed a sufficiently important success story to be published.39 
Perhaps being able to maintain a reputation as an efficient and cooperative chief at this time 
when Congress was thought to have been harassing and intimidating the whole of the 
countryside was easier than might have previously been thought. The combination of 
Chawinga’s territorial success which had brought him some independence, as the previous 
chapter explained, and the internal crises which beset the nationalist camp, ensured that the 
Nyasaland African Congress was not an overwhelming force in Hewe.   
The early 1950s were notoriously difficult years for the NAC. The organisation was at a 
“particularly low ebb”, its leadership “lacked unity and seemed to have lost its sense of purpose 
and direction” especially since the financial scandals and rumours of embezzlement which 
rocked the executive in the late 1940s created division and distrust.40 With no strong leadership 
the campaigns against federation ran along factional lines and chiefs could strategically choose 
to shift their allegiances as the balance of power altered between the various main stakeholders. 
In this milieu there was opportunity for chiefs to take a lead of their own, as the example of 
Mwase showed. With no resolution on how to tackle the future of constitutional reform – which 
resolutions were enough for the African people and what were acceptable lengths to go to in 
order to get them – the “nationalist struggle” evidently had assumed a variegated and regionally 
specifically character. This character would continue even after the party was reinvigorated by 
the raft of young men who had been educated outside of Nyasaland. Chipembere, Chiume and 
Chisiza indeed brought a different perspective and a more radical strategy. By the mid-1950s 
Congress was more organised and determined not to make compromises. In 1957 under the 
leadership of T.D.T Banda the more moderate positions were no longer tolerated. Achieving 
anything less than secession and independence was not even contemplated, and Congress 
undertook this campaign by applying pressure on the government to increase the number of 
Africans in both the legislature and executive. This was considered by the leadership to be 
crucial and they worked hard for this change at the national level as they feared if this was not 
achieved in advance of the Federal Review conference which was to be held in London in July 
1960 then an unrepresentative body of men would be left to decide the future of the people of 
Nyasaland.  
However, whilst the organisation had clearly become a lot more focused since 1953, 
especially in terms of maintaining a strong leader at their helm – this began by getting rid of 
Chinyama in 1953, then Sangala in 1956, and then eventually T.D.T Banda in 1958 to make way 
for the return of Dr Banda41 – “on the ground” the local branches generally remained weak, 
except in places where tensions created by colonial and federal policy did exist (this is borne out 
by the extreme reactions that people had towards their chiefs in Southern Province where land 
was scarcer and agricultural measures since 1949 had taken their toll)42 or in places where the 
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more powerful Congress leaders had a specific attachment. As Kalinga points out, “even when 
Chiume, Bwanausi and others began to organize congress at grass roots level they did so at 
regular intervals but only in specific areas, usually in or near their homes or places of work”.43 
Often the first chair-people of Congress branches in the local setting were the less radical clerks 
and ministers who had graduated from Livingstonia, most of whom were committed to working 
through the traditional forums (in Hewe the Reverend Levi Kaleya was the first branch 
chairperson). In such a situation plenty of chiefs continued to go on working through official 
forums as they had always done, with little retribution; branch meetings were more often places 
of sedate discussion about politics than radical interpretations of nationalism. Along with the 
chiefs they generally found their own less overt ways of resisting the excesses of colonial rule.  
 Chawinga’s attitude was rather: if you keep consulting us chiefs about the matters of 
local and national importance, then we will keep co-operating with you whoever you are. He 
knew the benefit of working through official forums, especially because decisions made in small 
local arenas had the potential to affect change if they continued to be fed into higher levels of 
policy making. Working within the system did not mean that he did not vocally challenge how 
he thought it ought to be run, as the minutes of a meeting of the African Protectorate Council in 
1952 reveal. At this meeting he was adamant that any legislation which affected African 
interests and was to be discussed at the Legislative Council should first be submitted to these 
local forums; if the Government introduces a law without consulting us, he warned, it “will affect 
the cooperation of the people”.44 This was surely a way of safeguarding his own position as a 
contributor to the law making processes as much as it was a symbolic stance on behalf of his 
people. As major changes took place in the local government system he lamented the effects that 
this would have. When from 1956 Provincial Council resolutions were no longer passed through 
the African Protectorate Council he flagged up his concern. This process ought to be restored he 
said because “when Provincial Councils had something to suggest to Government it would carry 
more weight if it was forwarded through Protectorate Council, as it would show that the four 
councils were unanimous in their views”; it was his worry that if only the Northern Province 
African Provincial Council asked for something from Government, “the request would not be 
treated as well as if it had been submitted by all the Provincial Councils through the 
Protectorate Council”.45 For understandable reasons Chawinga wanted chiefs to have control 
over as many of the decision making processes as possible46 and when there were moves to 
curb this participation he was very vocal about it.  
The local government milieu has been largely ignored as a place where sympathies were 
won and lost, but this was an important battleground especially as the changes in legislation 
opened up the system of native administration to political elements. Working through 
government channels to gain an advantage through grassroots support was a tactic not only 
pursued by Chawinga; Congress leadership also drew its influence and authority from these 
arenas. The Local Government (District Council) Ordinance was passed in 1954; granting them 
the right to sit on the councils as ex-officio members it was designed to bolster the role of chiefs 
who whilst they lost the power to make rules, retained responsibility for law and order, tax 
collection and land distribution. Reforms to local government also enabled activists to gain a 
foothold in the local administration,47 especially after a revision in the constitution of 
protectorate and provincial councils which increased the quota for African members saw 
Congress win all five of the new seats available.48 
Whilst these shifts in local political representation had the potential to undermine 
native authorities, Chawinga continued to keep a firm grip on his administration. In 1955 and 
1956, for example, he successfully held, on his own initiative, courses for his village headmen “at 
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which he lectured them about various aspects of Government activities and explained the 
categories into which village headmen had recently been graded”.49 The question is: how did he 
manage to maintain this stance without jeopardizing his authority with his people as happened 
with many other chiefs? This thesis continues by arguing that in the period leading up to the 
Emergency Chawinga maintained both credibility and control on account of three main factors: 
the nature of his relationship with state officials and Hewe’s place in the colonial economy; 
Chawinga’s maintenance and strengthening of tradition in the local setting; and on account of 
the limited economic threats to his authority. During the period of the Emergency itself the way 
in which he was able to successfully fulfill the expectations of both his people – customarily – 
and the state – by helping maintain its sovereignty – was crucial to his survival.   
 
 
Part two. Maintaining credibility and control in crisis 
 
Before the Emergency: maintaining good relationships and adhering to “custom” 
As the previous chapter has explored, the content and technique of colonial policies were 
experienced differently on account of the personalities of those involved – African and European 
– the economic context into which they were brought, and the influence of the local political 
milieu. “Pockets of militarization”50 might have presented the state, and the scholar, with a 
particular narrative of decolonization, but this was by no means the common experience. The 
population’s reaction to chiefs’ behaviour was based in many different factors; whether or not 
they were collaborators with the colonial state was generally quite far down the list. As such 
keeping on the right side of the administration during the years of decolonization did not 
necessarily condemn native authorities to deposition later on. As more empirical cases of chiefs 
are drawn up it will surely become clear that their future security could not at all be predicted 
simply on their choice of whether to follow Congress or follow the Government but rather in 
relation to the relationships they cultivated and maintained in the local setting. 
Another of Chawinga’s strengths was that he excelled in using tradition and custom to 
his advantage. The alienation which traditional councillors felt in Chikulamayembe’s area was 
visceral and damaging; by choosing to consult the Reverend Edward Manda over and above the 
elders he alienated a potentially powerful body of people .51 Chawinga, having been advised by 
another Livingstonia trained minister, the Rev. Isaac Khunga, was warned that he should 
develop a very diplomatic and inclusive stance when it came to dealing with the elders in his 
own chieftaincy. Although Khunga died at the end of 1952 his legacy to Chawinga was an 
important one: he knew the history of the chieftaincy extremely well and he impartially guided 
the chief through the Chawinga family politics and potentially damaging clan rivalries.52 The 
longest serving headman Chembe Mfune, who was also a contemporary of Chawinga’s, 
remembered: 
 
“Kamangilira followed the chiefly line and paid great attention to tradition. When people would 
choose a chief, before he was crowned by the Themba his credentials would be checked by 
Kamangilira to make sure he was of chiefly line and he would be crowned only after this had been 
‘proved’. Amongst his own family whenever there was a quarrel he would act the same as with 
everyone; he played no favouritism amongst the clans”.53  
 
Within the royal family itself another key figure who played a large role in guiding Timothy 
through the minefield of succession and chiefly disputes was the Village Headman Thanila. 
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People in Hewe remember that he was passed over as a candidate for the Katumbi chieftaincy 
himself only on account of his limited education which was deemed by the 1930s a prerequisite 
to rule. This did not appear to sour his relationship with Timothy, however, with whom he 
worked closely as an adviser. He was seen to be such a stabilizing factor in the area that he was 
chosen on a number of occasions to act as chief Katumbi for interim periods; for the first time 
just before Timothy’s crowning and then again after the sudden death of a couple of chiefs in 
more recent times.  
What was of some additional help to Chawinga, in contrast to the situation Chiefs 
Muyombe, Chikulamayembe and Kyungu found themselves in, was the fact that there were 
many fewer headmen and councillors for Katumbi to manage54 and at least up until 
independence he did a good job of keeping everyone of them on-side.55 His relative youth and 
flexibility also meant that he did not fall prey to more radical or more conservative elements 
unlike some of his contemporary native authorities who were more easily co-opted on account 
of their infirmities or lack of education.56 There may have been the odd disgruntled individual 
here and there but no significant party organisation to rival the leadership of Timothy emerged 
at this time in Hewe, neither did he allow the necessary space to open for new politicized 
elements to infiltrate the chiefly organization and co-opt disenfranchised traditional elements 
into their movements, at least not until the late 1960s when these tensions, backed by stronger 
central party support and resources – as well as the Malawi Young Pioneers – eventually gave 
Timothy some cause for concern. 
 Internal tensions within chieftaincies created dangerous spaces in which people with 
radical agendas could enter. Although the national political context was a little different, the 
ways in which emerging party political elements thread themselves into the Muyombe 
Chieftainship across the border in Northern Rhodesia – a chieftaincy which had shared much in 
terms of historical experience with the Katumbi chieftaincy57 - demonstrates how well Timothy 
Chawinga held together the different agendas of his people in Hewe. In the kingdom of Uyombe, 
“where there was widespread dissatisfaction with the chief’s policies”,58 the young nationalist 
leaders were able to exploit it and set up in opposition to Chief Muyombe. They chose not to 
oppose the chief directly but rather induced his disaffected personal advisors and traditional 
councillors – key members of the ruling stratum – to join them, co-opting them into these 
emerging local party structures; as Bond highlights in his detailed ethnography, “the support of 
these powerful senior men was thought to be necessary to give the movement legitimacy”.59 
Essentially the local branch of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) found itself in a 
position to crystallize the long-standing opposition against the chief and provided “a channel 
through which popular discontent could be expressed”,60 a discontent which would lead to the 
creation of a new post of Deputy Chief (taken up by Edwall Muwowo) a position which the party 
leaders infiltrated and thus became “important figures in the political life of the chiefdom”,61, 
participating in the structures of traditional legitimacy. Such tactics were not uncommon across 
the continent during decolonization. In Ghana, Rathbone notes that in a good number of cases 
“rural Party branches were actually founded by members of embittered, losing factions (of the 
chiefly clan). Local grievances could now be re-written as elements of a national campaign. 
Aggrieved factions now used the relatively sophisticated resources of local Party branches to 
harass their opponents […] In case after case it seems that the formation of rural branches of the 
CPP (the Congress People’s Party) almost always coincided with a long-standing rural struggle 
for chieftaincy”.62 
 Disenfranchised elements of chiefly clans might have benefitted from nationalist 
support but they also did not want to lose out on achieving the crucially important local 
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relevance. When the new Deputy Chief Edwall Muwowo introduced the Vinkakanimba 
ceremony in 1965, it was done so in order to shore up the chieftaincy’s position in a landscape 
of political and social uncertainty. Bond noted that the introduction of this celebration of the 
arrival of the first royal chief by Muwowo had what he could see were several aims which 
besides from an attempt to gain popularity, meant he could “emphasize the position of the royal 
clan as the rightful rulers vis-à-vis the new politicians […] Within the framework of the royal 
clan it would reinforce the claims of the descendants of Vinkakanimba, and it would bring the 
residents of the chiefdom to the capital, emphasizing it as the political and, for many, the 
religious center of the chiefdom”.63 Interestingly this chiefly celebration was known to have 
been directly inspired by Chawinga’s Mulindafwa ceremony which had been first introduced 
some eleven years earlier in 1954.64  
Chawinga’s constructed “timeless ceremonial tradition”65 was designed to publicly 
circulate the narrative of his chieftaincy’s historical legitimacy, as well as its continued 
relevance, and people were invited to attend from neighbouring chieftaincies as well as officials 
from the government so that its message could resonate beyond the territory itself. Behind the 
story and the symbol there were a collaboration of chiefs, advisors and councillors who had 
been re-writing history in order to shape collective memory as a tool to define their place in the 
polity.66 The focal point of the celebration and the central symbol of royal sovereignty was the 
“Mulindafwa Stone”; a symbol immediately picked up on by the Nyasaland Times in which an 
article was published on the 12th November 1957 which presented the comparison of this stone 
with that of the Stone of Destiny (or Stone of Scone),67 used since 1057 at the inauguration of all 
Scottish monarchs and then from 1296, after being captured by Edward I of England, by all 
English monarchs.68 The article went on to describe the provenance of the symbol and how its 
history was performed at the ceremony; “The legend is that when the chief climbed to the top of 
Themba Hill to survey his new domain he sat on the stone. It was carried in procession through 
the main street at the present chief’s headquarters during the celebration and was loudly 
acclaimed when Chief Katumbi held it high for all to see”.69 Staying in control of his future saw 
Chawinga insisting upon continual reference to the past, and to the importance of tradition as a 
legitimizing dynamic in his local authority.70  
 The final important aspect which limited the damage to his authority during the lead up 
to the Emergency was that the local economy in Hewe had not provided much opportunity for 
the accumulation of substantial wealth; a crucial prerequisite for any potential challenger to 
Chawinga. Whilst it is certainly true that through various labour migration strategies the 
number of people who ran small businesses in Hewe did steadily increase in number 
throughout the 1950s (see tables 1 and 2), in contrast to places in Karonga, for example, where 
significant gains were being made by individuals involved in domestic cash cropping, 
individuals in Hewe were however quite unable to economically threaten their chief. The idea 
that the colonial economy “altered productive activity”71 in the countryside and thus also 
affected “the basis” of customary rule is much lauded but cannot be argued as being a universal 
dynamic (of wealth displacing or transforming customary authority); it is certainly not the case 
in the Hewe Valley. Furthermore the notion that it also “violated the logic of indirect rule by 
displacing people from their village economies into the paid labor force […] withdrawing 
villagers from the moral and physical authority of the customary order” and creating 
“masterless men”,72 is also perhaps overstated in the literature. Certainly in the case of Hewe, 
where there is not enough evidence to show that this was the case, this general increase in 
wealth and other dynamics associated with labour migration seemed to have little significant 
effect on the production of Chawinga’s authority.  
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Timothy’s image was more in danger of being dented by particular individuals’ rather 
than from a society wide increase in wealth. One character Abraham “Supply” Munthali, whose 
activities will be discussed at greater length in the final section of this chapter, was able to 
accumulate substantial profits from his carpentry business and must have been an annoyance to 
Chawinga because he was able to demonstrate patterns of patronage, consumption and 
respectability that sometimes went beyond the chief himself. Given that the performance of 
prestige was vital for his big man status he monitored such threats carefully. In the event, 
Munthali had no political ambition or desire to usurp authority from the chief; he did not 
conform to the patterns of businessmen who were becoming involved in politics elsewhere in 
the region so was unlikely to have used the Emergency to his advantage. 
 
What did the chiefs do next? Maintaining “order” during the Emergency  
Dr Banda returned to Nyasaland in July 1958 to lead the NAC through a long process of 
diplomatic negotiations with the Governor Robert Armitage and the Secretary of State for 
Colonies Lennox-Boyd about constitutional change.73 With nothing resolved after six months the 
pressure on Banda to deliver something positive to an expectant and agitated population 
awaiting some change grew. The radical leaders who had called Banda back but had vowed to 
throw him out should he divert from the strategy of the party grew concerned that he would 
start to make compromises on their behalf. Furthermore because he rarely divulged any detail 
about these meetings to the population, who were hanging on Congress promises, they too 
began to worry that he would leave them in a more difficult situation than before. This was 
certainly the concern of many chiefs who expressed their fears that their own future 
constitutional role would not be secured by Banda. The atmosphere in the country began to take 
a turn for the worse and Armitage warned Lennox-Boyd in October 1958 that something would 
happen in the country in or before 1960.74  
In the meantime, these fears about Banda’s potential to compromise on constitutional 
reform were also being picked up on by Youens, the Chief Secretary, and interpreted as a 
vulnerable point worth pressing.75 In the event Banda was willing to shift his position on having 
a majority in the executive council but in January 1959 he told Youens that he was determined 
to attain a majority in the legislature, a resolve which may have been strengthened by his 
attendance at the All African People’s Conference which was held in Accra in December 1958 
and at which the necessity of using violence against the colonial state was discussed; from this 
time onwards Youens was convinced that Banda in fact wanted to go to jail. In Nyasaland non-
cooperation reached new heights at the end of 1958 and agricultural orders were widely 
disobeyed; in order to control the imminent threat to order whilst Banda was away in Ghana 
new measures were brought in to deal more harshly with the protestors.76 Banda came back to 
his country buoyed up by pan-Africanist rhetoric and told his people that they should be ready 
to be imprisoned, as he was, for the sake of freedom.77 Whilst Chipembere made threatening 
speeches warning people that if they sided with Europeans in the times of crises then they 
would feel the wrath of Congress Banda kept up the public appearance that he was not in favour 
of violence. The lack of resolution to the constitutional amendments eventually led to an 
ungovernable situation where a State of Emergency became inevitable.  
The political fallout from the Emergency was felt at many levels but especially among 
the chiefs whose response to the crisis had serious implications for their legitimacy, as well as in 
relation to the moral authority both Banda and the party gained on account of their high profile 
participation in the struggle. Banda began his conversion into the father of the nation whilst he 
was incarcerated in Gweru prison in Southern Rhodesia, and the support for the party from 
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amongst the grass roots grew exponentially after the Emergency. The Malawi Congress Party 
was born out of the ashes of the banned and divided Nyasaland African Congress at the end of 
1959, whilst the Emergency regulations were still in place. With the help of its active youth 
league, the support of women and much better organisation at the provincial and district levels, 
the number of local branches grew from 52 in December 1959, to 77 one month later, reaching 
an incredible 223 by February 1960 only three months after its inception78 and something like a 
quarter of million members.79 In the light of these changes the outcomes of the conference to 
discuss the federal constitution, held in London in July 1960, were destined to swing much more 
in favour of the Africans, at least as far as the Nyasaland delegation was concerned. Before the 
discussion turns to look a little at the make-up of the delegations who attended the conference, 
and how chiefs became politically involved in this debate, it is necessary to make some 
suggestions as to why certain chiefs maintained credibility with their people during the 
Emergency, and why others did not. 
First it is useful to start such a discussion by emphasizing that the government had 
resolved to deal with native authorities in the Northern Province differently to those in the 
south and central regions where pro-Congress chiefs could be much more easily deposed. 
Youens made it clear that action against native authorities in the north ought to be undertaken 
with extreme caution as here “all chiefs are anti-federation and it would be dangerous to adopt 
any preventative measures against them”;80 memories of the aftermath of Gomani’s arrest in 
1953 played on the government’s mind and it was assumed that the arrest of any out-spoken 
chiefs would end in disaster.81 Chiefs might have all been anti-federation but what has emerged 
from the few studies that have been done on specific native authorities in the Northern Province 
is that in the eyes of their people this was less relevant than the way in which they acted during 
the chaotic and unsettling time of the State of Emergency. Both Kachapila-Mwazizwa and 
Kalinga have argued that chiefs in Nkhata Bay and Karonga respectively suffered a loss of 
popular support after the Emergency because they failed to live up to the “customary 
responsibilities” that their people had for them at this time.82 It was at this time, when the 
nominal support of the state failed them, that bubbling crises of local legitimacy came to a head.  
Peter Mwakasungula, Chief Kyungu in Old Karonga District, had always worked well 
“within the system as the main spokesman of the people of the northern portion of the Karonga 
lakeshore”83 defending his people against certain excesses of colonial rule, however the manner 
in which he attempted to solve the problematic situation during the Emergency did not resonate 
well with Ngonde custom and tradition. The expectations the local people had of their leader 
was to be “their defender and promoter of harmony in the body politic […] The key issue was 
that during the crisis many of his people no longer perceived him as their champion; in their 
view, he had encouraged discord, and had failed to lead them at that crucial time”.84 In Hewe, on 
the contrary, it is remembered that “Kamangilira […] rescued us from [the Colonial 
government]” during the Emergency. He had explained to his people that they should not fear 
the whites because “if they did anything we would get rid of them”.85 In Old Karonga local 
political leaders were quick to pick up on the increasingly conservative acts of Kyungu and 
emphasised his opposition to decolonization. In doing this they caused major splits in the 
aristocracy and amongst the headmen.86 In Hewe there was no significantly well organized 
younger political elite ready to take advantage of the dilemma which the logic of indirect rule 
created for their chief at this time, furthermore the disenfranchisement amongst the old elite – a 
key element bolstering authority amongst Balowoka chieftainships like Katumbi – which had 
been a necessary factor in building the legitimacy of new political cadres in the countryside had 
not taken place in Hewe as it had done in other areas. 
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 In this context, the popular memories of Chawinga’s behaviour during the State of 
Emergency in Hewe, the heroic scene that was recounted at the very introduction of the thesis, 
indicate that at this crucial moment he responded to the core of his people’s needs. People in 
Hewe accepted the contradictory behaviour which Timothy displayed; with no one to point out 
his weakness he was able to hold these tensions, and this seeming paradox, from undermining 
him. He did this a great deal more successfully than some of his compatriots. “He was partly for 
the people, partly for the government” said Lyton Karua of Chawinga’s actions at this time.87  
Samson Mumba confirmed this contradiction he was able to maintain: “Kamangilira was 
working with the government but when he came back to his people he was telling them to do 
bad things to the government”.88 The Government officials on the other hand also had had 
enough experience of his local authority to believe Timothy when he was able to promise that 
his area would be returned to calm, so much so that they released him from custody not long 
after his arrest during the Emergency; when the priority of the colonial officials – who 
themselves had always had some concerns about the benefits for Nyasaland of federation89 - 
was not so much the prevention of secession, but rather the maintenance of order, and the 
desire to maintain the monopoly over violence within their boundaries. In this regard, Chawinga 
was the perfect man for the job. The benefits of his maintenance of territorial control extended 
to the colonial state as he had persuaded his own people not to go with guns to the Boma at 
Rumphi.90 He was a useful chief as far as the colonial administration was concerned yet in the 
local setting he was also a defiant chief with his people’s interests at heart.  
The rather flamboyant sacrificial image that the ‘line in the sand’ rumours from the State 
of Emergency continually reiterate goes beyond the notion that this was a chief doing his duty in 
the face of grave danger though.91 It serves as an extremely effective piece of public relations. 
The rumour presents a definable moment which is easily narrated as proof of leadership 
qualities; it resonates with other stories of individual heroic defiance in the history of resistance 
spoken and written throughout the world, not least the representations of Banda’s own acts of 
valor undertaken for the sake of the Nyasaland people. Chawinga gained much from this 
moment, it was an opportunity to improve his image and regain some much required humility 
in the face of a growing number of accusations of selfishness. This narrative has had a powerful 
effect, and the represented actions of this chief have been oft-recounted throughout the Valley 
as a confirmation not only of this chief’s bravery but also his legitimacy.92  
Practically things did start to change for Chawinga after the Emergency however. For a 
while he was able to maintain the territorial behaviour which had been enabled by the colonial 
state as well as by using the techniques for local legitimacy described above; in these ways he 
kept a lid on discontent, something which his association with Banda helped to contribute 
towards. However, once colonial state sovereignty was weakened after the 1961 elections, at 
which the MCP won a landslide victory, new threats emerged, some of which he was able to 
successfully counter and others which would begin to test his leadership skills more 
fundamentally. His strong personality politics, which thrived in the setting of indirect rule, 
eventually fell out of favour with the local branch leadership of the MCP who began to contest 
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Part three. After the Emergency, new landscapes of discontent  
 
One of Banda’s chiefs 
As chiefs in the surrounding areas appeared to be losing everything on account of their co-
operation with Government, Chawinga seemed more determined to be seen to implement their 
plans. After the Emergency had been declared Chief Mwenewenya was sent for by the District 
Commissioner of Karonga. He arrived at the D.C’s camp who reported that “his clothes were 
dirty, his face unshaven and he had been drinking. He took no heart from our visit since he knew 
we would leave at once and if he identified himself with us he would be condemned by the 
politicians (…) I wanted him to be encouraged by my visit, by showing our flag. But he knew that 
the old authority – ours and his – was gone”.93 At the other end of the country in the Lower Shire 
Chief Tengani was undergoing his own crisis in authority; labelled by Congress as “the 
quintessential collaborationist chief”, his court was eventually boycotted by his people in 1962, 
“and he was left with no option but to resign”.94 In the midst of this “political strain” and partial 
boycotting, Timothy Chawinga was still receiving praise, for example on account of his excellent 
chairmanship of the education committee which he kept running smoothly, reaching “sound 
decisions” in 1960.95 Such behaviour seems to suggest that Chawinga was more aligned to the 
conciliatory attitude of the African members of the Legislative Council than the new radical 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and its new Secretary General Aleke Banda who had assumed the 
role following the imprisonment of much of the leadership.  
As the majority of Africans prepared to boycott the Monckton Commission in January 
1960,96 Chinyama, a former President of the NAC who had himself condemned the non-
cooperation riots in 1953 and since 1956 taken up an official position in the Legislative Council, 
and T.D.T. Banda who after also having been ousted from the leadership of the NAC formed the 
short-lived Congress Liberation Party (CLP), rather urged them not to, saying that it would be a 
mistake for people to decide not to give evidence. The rallying cry from the newly formed MCP 
was that the Commission’s terms of reference were simply not wide enough to accommodate 
the possibility of secession from federation, and furthermore that the continued incarceration of 
Dr. Hastings Banda following the Emergency put him at a great disadvantage for properly 
preparing their case for the constitutional review process. 
The MCP believed that whilst the State of Emergency was still in place it was “impossible 
for Africans to consult freely and to know how rank and file thinks”;97 it therefore believed the 
process should not be supported. Wanting nothing less than self-government it had been their 
strategy to intimidate witnesses to prevent them giving evidence to the Commission as part of 
their campaign. They were successful in persuading first the politically inclined, and 
consequently the bulk of the population to stay away from the Monckton Commission. Chiefs 
boycotted the consultations en masse either on account of their principled unwillingness to be 
associated with the colonial government or for the more fearful reaction engendered in 
response to the intimidation tactics. When questioned by the government about their 
persuasion towards the commission chiefs like Chikulamayembe feigned ignorance.98 However, 
whilst Timothy Chawinga was described as being not “at all anxious to attend” the consultations 
the District Commissioner did manage to persuade him to discuss meeting some of Glyn-Jones’ 
approved list of Monckton Commissioners99 along with some of his councillors. His 
preparedness to hold a meeting with his village headmen was noted by the DC in his ulendo 
diary entry for 4th March 1960, where he concluded that “the issue is still an open one for 
them”.100 
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Chiefs became masters of negotiation during this tumultuous period; most rejected both 
the clearly pro-colonial stance of Tengani, but few took up the protesting zeal of Gomani, 
involving themselves instead, as the examples of Chikulamayembe and Katumbi show, “in a 
delicate set of manoeuvers through which they attempted to avoid risking the displeasure of the 
government while […] retaining the support of their subjects”.101 Since many Nyasaland officials 
had their doubts about the fairness of the conditions under which the Monckton Commission 
took place, most could forgive chiefs’ decisions not to take part in the process, but the 
reappearance of banned agricultural practices and the targeting of farmers taking part in the 
Master Farmer scheme or in growing tobacco could not be ignored.102 Whilst reports show that 
Chawinga continued to perform his duties with “considerable energy in his area”, and he 
“welcomed most government activities”, finding the “time and opportunity” said the D.C. to give 
“active support to the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments” as well as “the affairs of the 
District Council and its committees”,103 a concomitant general decrease in co-operation from 
farmers across the northern region was emphasised. An “extensive opening of visoso gardens” 
and increase in slash and burn cultivation was reported in Rumphi during 1961,104 as well as a 
huge increase in tax defaulters,105 an indication that people no longer felt threatened by the 
ramifications of undertaking these outlawed practices.  
For a short time after the Emergency, when a freer political atmosphere meant rules and 
orders were much less strictly enforced in the courts, there was more room to demonstrate 
dissatisfaction with native authorities.106 Chawinga did not escape this time unscathed, in Hewe 
he too became the target of criticism. Yet, the accusations leveled at Timothy were oriented 
around more local matters; his possible involvement in corrupt activities, in particular an 
alleged embezzlement of funds which had been supposedly contributed to the Native Treasury 
for the clearing of the airfield at Chiteshe,107 and his manoeuvering to exploit the game in the 
Valley whilst denying others the opportunity to manage pest control by owning firearms.108 He 
jealously guarded his position and was keen for no one to excel above him in economic or social 
standing, “he only gave chances to himself to kill game and he wanted to possess everything”.109 
His pursuit of objectives with a single-mind might have given rise to his famous praise name but 
it did not make him popular with everyone; something that emerged for the first time at this 
juncture. 
Some tried their luck in bringing him down after the Emergency. During an ulendo to 
Hewe in February 1960 the D.C. was met by a villager Benedicto Lonje who openly criticised 
Timothy with no holds barred, bizarrely attacking him over matters that the government had 
already concluded that he was extremely competent in. His “enthusiasm for agriculture is very 
limited” Lonje complained, he called him “backward” and bitterly accused him of holding back 
others. He railed against the fact that Hewe was now a place “where the chief is more than his 
people, and must be treated accordingly”,110 something that was no doubt much nearer the 
mark. Others complained that he didn’t grant them their gun licenses, or that he was 
monopolising the businesses operating at the trading centre, whilst increasingly his judicial 
decisions were contested by Hewe people who took their cases to the D.C.111  
These points of contention became much more present in the discussion of his 
leadership from this time onwards; a notable change from an earlier colonial period where his 
chieftainship received little internal criticism, at least as far as can be gathered from the colonial 
records. In the case of Chawinga, the challenges were neither concerned about his cooperation 
with Congress, nor were they sufficient to affect his local standing at this time, especially since 
his association with Banda brought him timely relief from these decidedly gentle pressures. 
From the point of view of the administration his close co-operation with the MCP did not go 
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unnoticed but, perhaps surprisingly, it is presented by them as neither contradictory nor 
worrying. His local campaigning was largely ignored by the D.C, one example of which occurred 
after his ulendo to Mwachibanda at which point he writes that he left Chawinga to “hold a 
political meeting in a church [...] I only hope I didn’t turn a blind eye too obviously”.112 The tone 
describing his political activities becomes almost congratulatory: on top of all his official work 
he also managed to “visit England twice as a member of Dr. Banda’s political team”.113 His 
contribution to the sovereignty of the state’s monopoly of force surely has to have been one of 
the main reasons for his continued popularity with the administration. 
He may have been a hesitant contributor to the discussions about Nyasaland’s future as 
far as the Monckton Commission was concerned, but when he was chosen by Banda to join him 
in London as an MCP representative Chawinga could not have been a more willing participant in 
the process around constitutional reform. It is difficult to know how the relationship between 
Banda and Chawinga developed in-between 1958 and 1960 but clearly the new leader thought a 
great deal of the chief. The decision to take chiefs to participate in the Federal Constitutional 
Review came after long months of native authorities who were concerned that their future 
position would be in “jeopardy unless they have opportunity to make representations to [the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies]”.114 It was a confronting process; chiefs still maintained such 
a wide variety of positions that the choice of which ones would attend necessarily lifted the lid 
on the box that tried to “keep chiefs out of politics”115 and directly pit them against one another 
as official and party representatives. At first it was hoped that putting together an official 
delegation was the solution which would avoid the chiefs having to obviously take sides. In 
doing this chiefs acting as advisers or members of party delegations of the United Federal Party 
(UFP), the Malawi Congress Party and the Congress Liberation Party would be excluded. Chiefs 
should speak their opinion, agreed the Secretary of State for Colonies but they should do so “in 
their own right as chiefs, rather than in the capacity of advisers to myself, yourself, or anyone 
else”.116 In the event, the creation of an “official” delegation only brought the divisions more 
starkly to a head. Each party argued that their interests could never be adequately represented 
in such a group and decided that they would each take their “own” chiefs as advisers, something 
which prompted the Government to have to do the same. The Secretary of State was desperately 
keen, however, for everything to be done to avoid them appearing as “government” chiefs, as 
opposed to “Malawi” or “U.F.P” chiefs.117 However it grew increasingly impossible to maintain 
the façade that chiefs were apolitical, especially as they themselves wished to be involved in the 
conference. In this situation they could not safely be denied their role in the discussions;118 once 
they started laying their cards on the table it could be quickly seen that they could not be neatly 
slotted into having either pro- or anti- government positions.    
 The concern then of those in the leadership of the MCP, namely Orton Chirwa, was that 
any official delegation might nominally represent the interests of each party but it would not do 
so in a way which reflected reality; it would be too weighted in favour of the UFP he said and 
given that “we represent the great majority of the population, we are entitled to the largest 
delegation”.119 After meeting Banda privately in London before the conference the Secretary of 
State did eventually manage to persuade him to add an MCP chief on to the official delegation, 
but whilst it was expected that he would add it from one of the nominated three chiefs which 
the party was bringing as their advisers,120 as the others had done, a new member of the team 
was selected; “on the directions of Dr. Banda, the party has nominated Chief Katumbi of Rumpi 
as representative for official chiefs delegation”.121 They could do nothing to change his mind on 
this matter and Chawinga arrived in London, at Government expense, on the 22nd July ready to 
take part in the conference as one of Banda’s chiefs.122 The selection of Chawinga to undertake 
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this task is telling not only of his ability to effectively represent party views but also on his 
diplomatic skill, which was a great asset when having to work alongside other chiefs with 
differing views, as would be the case with the official delegation.  
The personal backing of Chawinga by Banda in this instance guaranteed that his 
immediate future was secure however in the end it would be in the context of local politics not 
national acclaim, where his authority would eventually be put in jeopardy. The events around 
the State of Emergency had created a platform not only for him but for other nationalist heroes 
to emerge, even if on the very smallest of scales. The local branches of the Malawi Congress 
Party bristled with ambition, and the politically minded members of the Hewe branch were no 
exception. People like Jim Ngwira and Jato Kawonga, who had been extremely active in 
galvanizing the people in their area before the Emergency and who were eventually arrested 
themselves on the 3rd of March, became notable if diplomatic critics of Chawinga’s approach.  
 
Political people in Hewe    
Jim Ngwira posed no substantial threat to Chawinga’s chiefly authority in the closing years of 
colonialism but he would eventually become the biggest thorn in the chief’s side. Born in 1920, 
by his teenage years Ngwira had taught himself to repair bicycles and build rudimentary 
shotguns which he sold to people in the area so that they could control pests in their gardens 
and hunt game when they needed to. His services were in such great demand that he was asked 
by the then chief Dukamayere to set up a stall offering his bicycle repair skills in the new trading 
centre which had built up at Chiteshe.123 His social and economic position dramatically 
improved throughout the next couple of decades and once he became a Master Farmer in the 
mid-1950s his advantages were secured. Under this scheme he was one of the few farmers in 
Hewe to greatly benefit from the change in policy by the agricultural department to 
“concentrate on the more progressive elements of the population and not to dissipate its 
energies on trying to convert the more conservative villagers”.124  
 Ngwira explains that he was selected for the scheme because “whenever there was a 
meeting or a course on agriculture to remind farmers, I was there.” His participation increased 
and before long, by 1956, he was receiving bonuses “of 38 pounds, and a plough”.125 He went to 
Mbawa training college “to learn about livestock for two weeks […] I learned quickly and the 
government made us role models for the people”. Through this scheme not only did he grow in 
stature, by 1958 he had accumulated six pairs of oxen for farming in 1958 and was given the 
opportunity to raise cattle, pigs and goats for milk production and meat on 58 acres of land. 
Unsurprisingly the benefits to him and his family were significant: 
  
“I educated the children; all seven children have secondary school education. I had no problems 
paying fees, I even sent some daughters to a private primary; we assist girls so they can school 
safely. I had lots of cattle. After selling a cow I could deposit money to the account of each of the 
children and the children could learn without any problems. The eldest child went up to university. 
This house that you see, I paid the builder who built this house a cow. Even though I have worked for 
the court for 35 years this house I built because of the cattle before I started working. To enable my 
four sons to marry, it is down to these cattle. When the daughters are getting married I provide a 
cow for the wedding and those they get married to just wonder”.126 
 
The Master Farmers not only received special benefits, they interacted one-on-one with 
government officials and could by-pass the chiefs on certain matters. This position not only 
enabled him to establish significant farming activities it brought the motivated and self-made 
man local respect and extra prominence in the community (as well as the inevitable jealousy). It 
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was his vocal and active participation in the political battles for independence though which 
secured his future opportunities as the death knell was rung on colonial rule. Through his 
activism and eventual arrest by the colonial authorities he gathered the necessary credentials 
for his future role in the MCP organizational structure. 
Having been the MCP District Chairman Ngwira says that he was elected, under the new 
constitution, to become court magistrate for Hewe in January 1963. He attended a short course 
which he did well on, so much so that he was sent to college to learn “legal English”. By 1967 he 
took on appeal court duties and became chairman of the District Appeal Court in addition to his 
day-to-day duties in Hewe he would manage any appeals in the wider district. By assuming the 
judicial function that had long been in the hands of native authorities his presence was greatly 
resented by the chief. It is said that Ngwira had a few run-ins with Chawinga in the latter years 
of his chieftaincy127 and in relation to Timothy’s leadership, though diplomatic, Ngwira did not 
speak with the same enthusiasm or unreflective praise as most other people did about their 
former chief; mysteriously he commented that “[Kamangilira] could do some evil things but I 
wasn’t counting”.128 In answer to questions about Chawinga’s reaction to this loss of 
responsibility he avoided answering directly but tellingly his response shows where he knew 
the power was beginning to lie: “there was no chance for anyone to accept or refuse these 
things. The law says that an appointment can be revoked any time and you cannot make any 
appeal […] and this is what happened to the chiefs. The chiefs were very angry but they had no 
chance because there was nowhere to go instead they were against court proceedings”.129 
Ngwira’s story shows that it was possible to navigate an independent path in rural areas 
where chiefs had reigned supreme. It was not his economic standing that threatened Timothy’s 
position, at least not during the colonial period, his success in creating his own spaces of 
empowerment through his commercial mindedness – gun making, bicycle repairs and especially 
farming – meant that he was simply less subjected to the same structures of control as others; 
he chose not to interact with customary authorities and on account of his economic position this 
was possible. He had regular correspondence with government officials, this was especially easy 
for him in his role as Master Farmer in the colonial period, and Magistrate during Independence. 
Few individuals managed to negotiate themselves into an independent position in Hewe as 
successfully as Ngwira had done. 
Another character who was on less than amicable terms with Timothy during the years 
of early independence was a youth leader from the local NAC branch, Elias Jato Kawonga. 
Largely on account of his activities during the nationalist campaigns, and in particular his 11 
month imprisonment along with Ngwira at Kanjedza during the Emergency in 1959-1960, 
Kawonga would also eventually take up a prominent role in the local MCP organisation on 
Independence. Having been organizing secretary for the Hewe branch of the Nyasaland African 
Congress during the 1950s he was given the position as court clerk in 1963 – again serving 
alongside Ngwira - up until his retirement in 1996:  
 
“I was arrested in 1959 and put in Kanjedza for eleven months. I refused to go back into teaching 
when I returned as I wanted to know why I had been arrested. So I continued politics with Chiume 
until Independence – I was an area organising chairman. Then in 1963 I was chosen to be a court 
clerk – until 1996 I was a clerk”.130  
 
The performances of these people in the build up to the State of Emergency protests, 
and their direct punishment by the colonial government, gave them a significant footing in the 
nationalist organisation; they were local heroes honoured for their participation in the 
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campaign for freedom and the incarceration this led to. In a report on discussions between 
Hastings Banda and the Chief Secretary, the Governor Glyn Jones pondered that Banda’s 
imprisonment “was a necessary stage in his progress towards leadership of his people in a free 
Nyasaland”;131 similarly the harsh conditions that Kawonga and Ngwira endured in Kanjedza 
elevated them for a time into political heroes in Hewe. 
“These local leaders met secretly in the bush, only a few knew about what was going on 
the rest were drunkards”, remembers Lyton Karua.132 Kawonga himself, one of those local 
leaders, also recalls that those who were “politically minded” in Hewe were relatively few, and 
those who got involved with the Nyasaland African Congress at an organizational level were 
fewer still; as a result the reputation that they had as ‘political activists’ in the area was 
prominent. “Very old people and those who were not educated […] did not know politics, they 
were only staying and eating”, says Kawonga, “we the party leaders, Chamang’anga, Ngwira, 
Chafwakali - went around villages telling people that you have to show that you are not happy 
with colonial rule”.133  
Chawinga managed to see out the colonial years as a popular figure in Hewe, but for 
Ngwira and Kawonga this was a period in which their loyalty to the MCP was cemented. Not 
much is known at present about how these characters worked together with the chief in the run 
up to the Emergency, and whether their agenda’s were in fact the same, but whilst they might all 
have desired independence once this had been attained it was there their co-operation ended. 
The ascent of characters in Hewe such as Ngwira and Kawonga reflect how much the Nyasaland 
African Congress had changed by the middle of the 1950s. Gone was the influence of the 
educated ministers and clerks of the 1940s who believed that the politics of tradition was the 
most effective way of carving out political space in the local setting, and they were overtaken by 
young people who had not left Hewe either for work or education but had been captured by a 
new radical politics as represented by Chiume, Chipembere and Chisiza.  
The ongoing transformation which took place in the relationships between Chawinga 
and the local NAC branch members will be considered to some extent in the next chapter. 
However it should be noted that figures at the district level such as Mikeka Mkandawire, from 
Bolero, need to be looked at closer if a more complete understanding of the challenges to 
Chawinga’s authority is to be reached. A leading light in Congress during the 1950s, 
Mkandawire went on to become the first MP for Rumphi before being later deposed by Banda 
during the cabinet crisis. His activities in Hewe and those of his presidentially-endorsed 
replacement Daniel Mkandawire present notable gaps in this history; deeper insights into their 
influence would add a great deal to our current understanding of Chawinga’s management of 
Hewe at this late colonial stage. 
Despite the increasing influence of these overtly political characters, the role of the 
educated elements in the village did not lose its importance and characters such as John 
Mwangonde and Levi Kaleya,134 the teachers at the school in Katowo, played an important role 
in Hewe for both the chieftaincy and the nationalist struggle, propagating the message and 
giving intellectual support. Mwangonde had an impressive reputation in the region having risen 
to become one of the first African headmasters in Nyasaland and the reputation of the primary 
school in Hewe, which he had been brought in by Chief Dukamayere to run, had been an 
influential factor in the local politics of the chieftaincy and the importance of the area in the 
early colonial period. He had, therefore, a longstanding association with the Katumbi 
chieftaincy.  
Mwangonde’s friendship with Chawinga was an important source of information, 
guidance and support; in some ways he was Timothy’s right-hand man. Mwangonde was a 
206 | p l a y i n g  t h e  l o n g  g a m e  
 
 
regular visitor to Chawinga’s home, as Chawinga was at his. The teacher had a library of books, 
regularly received the newspapers and news from abroad, and was one of the only people to 
have a saucepan radio in the early 1950s; as a result his home become a place where people 
gathered to listen to the BBC and where many discussions about the future of the Protectorate 
took place. The school was the destination for many other African teachers in the 1950s135 and 
as a result there was a keen atmosphere of debate in which the work of the Nyasaland African 
Congress, the problems of Federation and the trouble with the agricultural conservation rules 
were discussed by teachers and students alike.  
Aside from his professional duties Mwangonde became directly involved in the 
preservation of the chieftaincy and the administration of the native authority. Along with Levi 
Kaleya, who would later become the first M.P from Hewe, Mwangonde assisted with the 
gathering of information for the Livingstonia publication Midauko, a history of the area. And on 
a less high profile set of historical questions the teachers were said to have helped in the 
preparation of the Mulindafwa narrative, the central part of the annual ceremony which 
Timothy inaugurated in 1954 and which would cement his authority firmly in ‘official’ history. 
He often drafted letters to the government from Chawinga and even became a court assessor. 
Like his father before him, who had helped mediate disputes in Nkamanga for Chikulamayembe, 
he played a central role in mediating the border discussions between Katumbi and 
Chikulamayembe. He petitioned the Government on Timothy’s behalf and on any matter of 
importance the chief requested Mwangonde’s help, “they worked together a lot”.136 Mwangonde 
understood the difficult position that Chawinga found himself as the contradictions of indirect 
rule became harder to manage, and having also been the beneficiary of significant assistance 
from the mission at Livingstonia and the Colonial administration he was sympathetic.  
Their relationship, however, was not without its tensions. In allowing Mwangonde to 
contribute all these things to his leadership the chief also put himself in a position of 
indebtedness, a position he hated to be in. As one of the few people in Hewe who had the 
resources buy the most prestigious luxury items he also represented a threat to Chawinga’s 
economic prestige and his own attempts at aggrandizement did not always appear so special in 
comparison137. As a person who selected people to go and further their studies Mwangonde 
gained prestige by paying and investing in education, an increasingly valuable display of 
largesse. He also benefited when these educated people returned and were happy to return the 
favour to their teacher, it was help that was never forgotten. Unlike Timothy his manner meant 
that he was much more approachable “he spoke a lot […] and told many jokes”, and he knew 
how to look after himself so as to avoid the inevitable jealousy that such a position in society 
provoked; “of course people spoke a lot of things, but ufwiti can only get you if you are careless, 
drink and eat anywhere. But he was clever and knew what to do”.138 Mwangonde was in a much 
freer position than Timothy and although his civil servant status meant he could not be openly 
pro-Congress he was able to lend his support to the political activities of the nationalists in 
Hewe, among the key members his brother Donald.139 But whilst Mwangonde was clearly a 
person who had influence like the previously mentioned Abraham Munthali, he was not in a 
position, or in possession of the desire, to wrench any political authority from Timothy; in that 
Chawinga was secure for the time being.  
 
Competing with a respectable and wealthy man 
“The African who believes that Jesus is preparing for him a glorious mansion in Heaven will 
endeavour to build for himself a decent house on earth”, a young missionary is quoted by John 
Iliffe as having said in 1858.140 As Iliffe has highlighted, all across the continent this need to 
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demonstrate respectability was achieved by Africans through a variety of moral and material 
achievements which taken together could be seen as a “cultural package” which “displayed their 
distinction”.141 One of the few characters in Hewe, beside Chawinga, to achieve this level of 
distinctiveness was Abraham Munthali.  
Munthali had been selected in around 1935 to go to Livingstonia Mission by John 
Mwangonde, in order that he should “learn shop”. His training to become a carpenter lasted five 
years and would set him up to become an extremely successful businessman in the district. 
Equipped by his teachers at Livingstonia with not only the knowledge but the material tools of 
his new trade, and a loan to establish his first workshop, once he had established his own 
woodlot Munthali quickly became a truly independent entrepreneur. 
Starting out with a bicycle, the first thing he bought after leaving the mission, his 
business grew from its initial small scale operation, “at first we just made chairs for 3/9p and 
people from the village were buying them”,142 he recalled. As men returned from the mines and 
farms with some small disposable income Munthali began to regularly benefit as many spent 
their money on ordering these chairs and eventually tables, cupboards and benches too. His 
own growing wealth reflected a more general increase in the consumption of ‘luxury’ household 
items that some years before would have been impossible to find in people’s homes. With such 
items in mind men went back to South Africa and Northern Rhodesia to earn more money, and 
as they gathered it some were even in a position to buy the increasingly sought after European 
style doors and bed frames from his store. The carpenter provided the first wooden coffins to 
the people of Hewe, and they quickly became the most popular item, something that has 
remained the same to this day.  
“Supply” quickly gained an excellent reputation in the wider region for his fair prices 
and craftsmanship of such goods and with Hewe’s position so close to isolated communities in 
Northern Rhodesian he is said to have captured the market across the border too. People came 
from Muyombe and Malambo to buy products from his shop and would then sell these original 
items on in their own stores at higher prices.143 He won contracts for the building of new school 
blocks, the welfare hall and renovations to the maternity ward which saw his business grow 
beyond carpentry to construction, and in this he also cornered the market with his greater 
access to resources, transport, and investment capital.144  
By establishing several shops and eventually providing training for a number of young 
men from the area he was by the end of the 1950s probably the wealthiest person in Hewe, 
aside from perhaps Timothy Chawinga himself, and local respect for this disciplined, self-made 
man was significant; his prominent position was reflected in the fact that his was the first house 
by some years to have a full iron sheet covered roof, the materials for which he had purchased 
in Mbeya, Tanganyika, in 1953 at “10 Kwacha per sheet”.145 Other mission trained craftsmen 
from the area such as Joseph Munthali’s father left the village setting to practice their trade 
elsewhere, in Northern Rhodesia or South Africa.146 Munthali, however, remained local with his 
production and distribution; and with no one else around to compete with his experience, the 
decision to remain in Hewe proved a most lucrative choice. Efrida Mhango, the woman whom 
Abraham had married whilst undergoing his training at Livingstonia in 1938, remembered 
distinctly the feeling her family had on account of her husband’s business: “we were on top of 
the world”.147 Without any conscious attempt to do so, his “cultural package” of respectability 
inadvertently undermined Chawinga. 
In addition to his carpentry business the shop he had established, which stocked many 
sought after goods, meant that it was Munthali’s name that became synonymous with 
prosperity; “People called us rich because everyone bought clothes from our store”148, Efrida 
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recalls. However, staying ‘local’ came with its own difficulties. Jealousy was a difficult aspect of 
life to manage and caused many problems for Munthali’s family who were regularly the targets 
of witchcraft, theft and other threatening behaviour. And the jealousy did not only come from 
the poor relatives and neighbours, one of the people who began to get distressed by his 
accumulation of wealth was Timothy Chawinga. Reflecting upon the chief’s reaction to the 
Munthali’s newly iron-roofed properties Efrida Mhango remembers that he had not been too 
happy about it. “My husband told Chief Zolokere and Kamangilira” about his new purchase and 
whilst “Zolokere said he had done a good thing, because he was developing the area, 
Kamangilira kept silent […] he didn’t even really know about iron sheets at that time”;149 within 
months he too ordered up iron sheets for his own roof from Abraham, who had been charged to 
collect these prestige goods from Tanganyika on his behalf. Whoever was able to was “investing 
almost as heavily in cement and corrugated iron as in education”, it was deemed that 
important.150 
Timothy still purchased items from Munthali, increasing the carpenter’s own fortune as 
he did so but he also had to ensure that he was able to distinguish himself from his population 
through the display of new goods; European furniture, for example, that “only a square house 
could accommodate”.151 Munthali remembers the chief purchasing many items which “no-one 
else in Hewe could have done”.152 Yet, he also felt that the carpenter was beginning to 
undermine his own prestige and efforts at patronage. As msambazgi (a wealthy man) he, like 
Timothy, was socially obliged to pay school fees for relatives, buy necessities for neighbours and 
help various other people in the area when they were in difficulty “munthu uyu walela wanthu”, 
this person assisted many others, it was said by several community members.153 There is no 
denying that belief and investment in education formed a part of the modern Christian man’s 
package; and “educational benevolence” was greatly admired.154 Iliffe’s example of a Ugandan 
chief, Kibedi Zirabamuzale, who “reportedly paid the school fees for ninety-eight young people 
who reached university”,155 was not an unusual display of largesse during this period in African 
history; both Munthali and Chawinga were capable and obliged to contribute to their 
community in such ways.  
Interestingly, Munthali started using fertilizer on his crops well before anyone else, 
including Chawinga. People had been skeptical at first, saying that they didn’t want to use 
chemicals on their garden, but after they had seen how his maize grew with this novel input it 
was to his example they looked. His wealth had given him the opportunity to take risks, and 
enabled him to set an example in agriculture as well as in business, something Timothy had 
always striven to do. Furthermore the colonial officials also worked with him, using his office as 
a place to discuss local affairs and land disputes in the area whilst they were on ulendo.  
With the profits from his carpentry business, grocery and maize mill Abraham even 
attempted to register himself eligible to vote for the 1961 constitutional elections.156 20 out of 
the 28 seats for the Legislative Council were decided by the predominantly African lower roll 
electorate at these elections; “the nature of the franchise strongly favoured people with 
education, money or status. On the lower roll over 10,000 chiefs, headmen and councillors were 
enfranchised as a consequence of their position. Others were required to be literate in one of a 
number of languages, to have a minimum income, or to possess a certain amount of 
property”.157 In the end the government was not convinced by his claims of having an income 
over £700 per year, the requirement for the franchise, so he was denied the opportunity.158 
There is not enough evidence to suggest why he was not believed, or whether he had earned 
such an amount. What is known is that in this same year he had been able to purchase a new car 
in Blantyre for £400 and had built bridges for his car to pass by within Hewe, organising and 
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paying for the local labour himself in order for him to be able to drive all the way to his front 
door. He was a man of significant standing yet he never seriously threatened Chawinga’s 
authority, primarily this was because he did not have the political ambition that the ‘new men’ 
Bond describes in Muyombe did or like those that threatened the Kyungu chieftaincy in 
Karonga. 
 One reason why Abraham Munthali was not so grave a threat to the authority of 
Timothy was due to his Christian faith; his major objective being not the attainment of power in 
this world but the attainment of salvation in another. The message of the Gospel, which he had 
taken authentically onboard during his time at the C.C.A.P Mission at Livingstonia, underpinned 
his living and working life;159 his example represented everything the missionaries had wanted 
their graduates to be and his financial successes marked him out as the perfect illustration of 
what a dedicated Christian work ethic could achieve. His ex-teachers regularly came to visit him, 
especially as they prepared to go on leave or as they departed from the colony for good, in order 
to encourage him in “this work that is not easy” and to spur him on to “have courage” in his 
material and spiritual labours. They warned him of the many others who had received the same 
opportunities but who had fallen under the influence of alcohol once they returned to the 
village, squandering their chances in the process. “Be brave with your shop, they told me, you 
will encounter many problems! Remember to remain with our teaching”.160 
 
Monopolising major profits 
Aside from the example of Munthali, a particularly successful individual, the opportunities to 
make money within Hewe were limited to the running of small stores, maize mills and some 
cash-cropping. The general level of wealth in Hewe may have risen significantly throughout the 
colonial period – mainly on account of money from labour migration which was used to invest 
in small businesses – but the growth was relatively even and, as table (i) in the appendix clearly 
demonstrates, the only significant earners at the close of the colonial period were Munthali and 
Timothy Chawinga. Besides these no-one made more than £120 in the year from their business 
and 19 out of the 36 stores in Hewe made less than £61 in the year in question, 1962. Even the 
impact of the co-operative movement in Hewe was limited and no individual gained a lot in 
personal status through these initiatives, as the table shows the combined efforts of the co-
operative did no better than the most successful individual. In Rumphi, and in particular at the 
Chikulamayembe’s headquarters in Bolero and in the Rumphi Boma itself, there were many 
more businesses; coffee co-operatives, maize mills and hotels, as well as the ubiquitous and 
ever-expanding selection of stores whose fortunes ebbed and flowed over time.161 Some 
commoners were able to establish two or three maize mills and were able to stump up the 
significant amount of tax which was required to run such businesses. In Rumphi aside from L & 
B Coy of the Bookers Group (Kandodo) and the Africa Lakes Corporation (Mandala stores) who 
had made over £600 in 1962, there were the Asian traders A.L.H Osman and the Geloo Brothers 
who made between £300 to £600 in their stores.162   
In 1962 only three maize mills existed in Hewe. Two of them were positioned in the 
busy area of Chisimuka and only one was constructed in the more central Katowo trading 
centre; this one was owned by the chief himself and it made double the profits of those in 
Chisimuka. Aside from his extremely lucrative hunting exploits this was Chawinga’s main 
income generating activity and he was keen to protect its advantageous position near to the 
road and main stores. More mills may have been introduced throughout the 1960s but as far as 
Timothy Chawinga was concerned he fought to protect the monopoly he had on grinding maize 
in his area right up until his deposition in 1974. One case was discovered from May 1973 which 
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highlights this protectiveness; just a few hundred metres from Chawinga’s maize mill Joffrey 
Kachari had set up his own near to Kabrufu school. No sooner had it been erected then it was 
ordered by the Themba to be moved away from the area of the trading centre: 
 
“Chief Katumbi stopped him from grinding he sent a messenger to tell Kachari to go down to sub-
Chief Zolokere. But Kachari refused and is still refusing. I also agree with Kachari because he has got 
buildings and a garden of cassava and potatoes around his grinding mill. People with all vge 
headmen around the grinding about 1 sqr mile like the machine not to move and go down Zolokere. 
I agree with them because people at sub-chief Zolokere are near by Kabulufu T center and they also 
appeal to Chief Katumbi not to worry Mr. Kachari because of refusing to come to Zolokere. They say 
that Kabulufu is near why for Chief Katumbi to worry? Please would you settle the matter”?163  
 
Timothy’s son disputes the fact that his father had been this monopolistic in his business 
activities, saying that he also liked people in his area to be rich and powerful164 but the evidence 
suggests very much otherwise. Whilst this behaviour may have been viable in his position as 
Native Authority in the setting of indirect rule, it quickly became untenable as his base from 




VH/place Number of stores Number of maize 
mills 
Other business 
 > £61 < £61 > £61 < £61 > £61 < £61 
V.H Makanga 3      
V.H Makula/Kaduku  2     
V.H Kasalika/Katowo 7 3 1    
V.H Mikule/Katowo      1 
(hotel) 
V.H Chipofya/Katowo 3      
V.H Kampuzunga/Katowo 1      
V.H Thanila/Katowo  1     
V.H Zolokere/Katowo  2     
V.H Mgungu/Katowo  1     
V.H Mwachibanda/ 
Chisimuka 
3 5 2  1 (carpentry 
shop) 
 
V.H Chembe/Chisimuka  2     
V.H Mteweta/ Chisimuka  3     
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Name of taxable 
person 











Katowo Kasalika Store £200-£300 £7: -: - 
Abraham 
Munthali 
Katowo Mwachibanda Store and 
carpentry shop 




Katowo Kasalika Grinding mill £120-£200 £4: 10: - 
Simon S. Luhanga Katowo Makanga Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Clement Mfune Katowo Makanga Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Brown J. Mhango Katowo Makanga Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Gibson Mtambo Katowo Chipofya Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
J. M. Nundwe Katowo Chipofya Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Jackson B. Mfune Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Tenson Chisi Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Rodwell D. 
Chavura 
Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
C. N. Kalea Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
B. W. T. Mvula Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Lighton Harawa Katowo Kasalika Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
John Nundwe Katowo Chipofya Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Sandress 
Mkandawire 
Katowo Kampuzunga Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Stephen Mfune Katowo Mwachibanda Store £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
K. W. Mkandawire Katowo Mwachibanda Maize mill and 
store 
£61-£120 £2: 10: - 
Lennard Chilambo Katowo Mwachibanda Maize mill £61-£120 £2: 10: - 
 
Table 2: Hewe residents with taxable businesses in 1962166 
 
Spiritual authority and chieftaincy in the context of British Central Africa 
Highlighting the interpretation of chiefs’ actions during the Emergency as representing some 
kind of customary failure to protect their people opens up the need for another discussion about 
the possibility of regaining a position in the local context through custom. When the promise of 
Independence forced a renewed attempt to find authority and support at the local rather than 
national level, there were questions raised throughout much of the Protectorate about the 
spiritual authority of customary leaders. The emergence of the witchdoctor Nchimi Chikanga,167 
who began practicing his divinations from his home village Thete, in the Northern Province of 
Nyasaland, spoke to these vulnerable places of chiefly authority; Timothy’s own response to 
such a witch-finding movement as Chikanga’s, and to the issue of witchcraft in general, is worth 
noting. Maintaining a powerful spiritual authority, whether it was drawn from customary 
narratives or mission values, was fundamental. Unlike many chiefs in surrounding territories 
his refusal to allow Chikanga to come and practice in his area encourages a re-examination of 
these movements from the perspective of different chiefly authorities. 
 Lighton “Chikanga” Chuma was born in Rumphi District in 1934, at the age of 19 it was 
said that he had died from witchcraft only to be resurrected soon afterwards equipped with the 
divination skills required in order to “rid the world of sorcery”.168 His headquarters was not 100 
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miles from Themba Katumbi’s own chiefly base and the most intense part of the spirit-medium’s 
career in Nyasaland spanned the Federal period (1953-64) with his powers at their height 
during the uncertain years after the Emergency and just before independence, 1959-1963.169 At 
this time regular bus services were known to have transported people from all over the country 
straight to his headquarters for “treatment”; and not only from Nyasaland, people came to him 
from Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Zaire, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, 
“even the Masai of Kenya came here”, he remembered.170 Headmen and chiefs wrote to the 
Nchimi for a variety of reasons including to see if a death in their village was caused by 
witchcraft, to cleanse a village where many people were dying, to help discover the culprits in 
cases of theft, to discover who had bewitched a person, and to prepare medicine for victims of 
sorcery.171 
Of course Chikanga’s activities were not without precedent in Central Africa. Similar 
“witch crazes” had occurred at various times which often coincided with major health crises, 
cultural shifts and/or economic change.172 The rise of Chikanga, as well as that of Alice Lenshina 
and her semi-religious cult the Lumpa Church in Northern Rhodesia,173 could more likely be 
related to the dramatic political change that was underway in the closing years of colonial 
control in British Central Africa, and with the renewed feeling of insecurity around customary 
authority that this brought.174 Commonly a proliferation of witchcraft accusation has 
accompanied the liberation of African nations, periods of civil unrest or civil war and at other 
times of extreme spiritual and/or social uncertainty which were most often characterized by the 
collapse, or gradual disintegration, of institutions.175  
The crisis in customary authority which was at its height in British Central Africa in the 
1930s was reflected in the spread of the bamucapi, arguably the most famous witch-cleansing 
campaign of the colonial period,176 it was a movement which dominated district commissioners 
thoughts and village processes of justice. The activities of bamucapi forced a rethinking of the 
Witchcraft Ordinance which had been created a decade or so earlier in both Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland territories. It questioned the practicalities of this law which had “removed the 
offense of witchcraft from the purview of the law altogether”, turning witchcraft “from the 
status of a crime to the status of a superstitious belief that merely generated recognised 
crimes”.177 By doing this some colonial officers came to a realisation that now these portents of 
“social disorder”, being neither chargeable by customary leaders in colonial courts178 nor 
controllable by them through the more traditional application of poison ordeal, would make a 
mockery of these leaders local authority, the very basis of indirect rule; the colonial regime had 
“chosen chiefs and headmen as executors of colonial order; it was up to them to control social 
evil in their own terms and up to the local administrations to support them”,179 but without the 
wherewithal to punish such threats they were left a little bereft of authority.  
Bamucapi had operated effectively for a time in this “new world of colonial space”, 
existing “outside the powers of chiefs and traditional diviners, as new cultural bricoleurs and 
entrepreneurs”180. Fields demonstrates that there was also a fair amount of “enthusiasm” 
amongst chiefs and headmen to the bamucapi; this is a crucial point.181 The loss of control over 
the spiritual well being of their communities added to a more fundamental loss of “resources” 
which had been guaranteeing the authority of customary leaders. Fields analyses these spiritual 
“crises” in the same terms as she looks at the loss of customary control of labour, or marriage 
and divorce proceedings: it formed a part of a wider erosion of customary standing which 
undercut the moral and political influence of chiefs and headmen who were trying to implement 
indirect rule.182 Chiefs had enthusiasm for these witch-cleansers because, if Fields’ argument is 
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to be followed, if they did not welcome these external arbiters of justice into their territory their 
own place in the political order would be under threat.  
Whilst this particular movement was eventually suppressed by the British and petered 
out by 1935, the contested spaces of customary power remained vulnerable to further economic 
and political ‘shocks’. Chikanga’s campaign, much like the slightly earlier “modern anti-
witchcraft” movement of Bwanali-Mpulumutsi (1947-1949) behaved quite differently to the 
more commercially minded bamucapi183 and with their use of Christian symbol and ritual, 
emphasis on divine inspiration and back-to-God philosophy they evoked more of a religious 
revivalism.184 However there were similarities; Behringer describes the mode or organisation of 
these campaigns “as supra-national movements” which “served the purpose of exonerating the 
village elders from their legal responsibility, imposed by the colonial – and post-colonial – 
justice administration.185 As with bamucapi there was much pressure on chiefs, and much 
benefit to be gained from, allowing Chikanga in to their villages to cleanse them.  
 
Witch-cleansing and authority in Northern Nyasaland 
Chikanga was not welcome in Hewe. This is perhaps all the more surprising for the fact that the 
paramount chief of the Mzimba Ngoni, M’mbelwa Inkosi ya maKosi, Katumbi’s powerful 
southern neighbour, was more than happy to invite the diviner into his territory to perform a 
general cleansing in 1959 when he “ordered that all the people under his jurisdiction in Mzimba 
district should be searched”.186 Chikulamayembe was known to also have “considerable belief in 
Mr Chikanga”,187 and he admitted to the D.C in 1960 that he had told everyone in his area to 
attend Chikanga who was “a good man”.188 Despite the fact that the DC had warned him against 
such threatening orders and that “nobody who told people their houses would be burned down 
if they did not attend could be a chief”,189 he continued to lean heavily on the diviner’s 
judgments and there is evidence that he deposed village headmen on the basis of his 
divinations.190 As McCracken has put it a large percentage of the population in the northern part 
of Nyasaland “were at least as much caught up in Chikanga’s crusade for spiritual cleansing as 
they were in the struggle for political independence”.191 
Chikanga’s activities were not initially popular with the Nyasaland administration who 
envisaged that he would break villages with his witchcraft accusations.192 However, by the early 
1960s he was no longer so sidelined by them, whilst they abhorred forced trial by Chikanga 
district commissioners did not mind people going to see him out of their own volition and he 
was also sometimes even allowed to be called in to investigate criminal activities within his 
local district council193. Such was his reputation that the district commissioner in Rumphi began 
to receive calls – sometimes from people in other countries – asking for the Nyasaland 
government to send Chikanga to hastily proceed to see them; “The services of Nchimi Chikanga 
are now much in demand and the boma has frequently to advise callers that it is not his 
agent”,194 the DC reported in August 1963.  
To understand Timothy’s less than enthusiastic response to Chikanga, and for that 
matter witch-doctoring of other kinds, it is worth remembering one of the most significant 
sources of his authority was based in his management of spiritual landscapes within Hewe. 
Timothy trod a very careful line; on the one hand he was a “morally upstanding” Christian, this 
was very much part of his public – or at least ‘official’ – persona, on the other it was “well-
known” that he had his own extremely powerful protective medicine; these two sources of his 
authority both required his rejection of Chikanga’s activities. He was, in fact, consistent to both 
when he refused Chikanga to cleanse villages in Hewe.195 The language of the Katumbi 
chieftainship, and its political highs and lows, is consistently associated with witchcraft. The 
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narrative of struggle against enemies within and external to the chieftainship has been a strong 
one and having the ability to overcome material and spiritual enemies is still a fundamental 
attribute for successful leadership in Hewe. Chapter three described how Timothy’s rise was 
accounted for locally on account of his spiritual strength which is a key motif in the narrative of 
his chieftaincy. But whilst his predecessor Dukamayere had been happy to advise people to go 
to the witchdoctor to garner the source of their personal and economic problems, Kamangilira 
was more likely to order the witchdoctors out of the village; he “didn’t want to hear anything 
about witchcraft cases, he believed witchdoctors bring in lots of confusion”, said Dambazuka 
Nundwe.196 Whilst Samson Mumba reflected that he had heard Chawinga was involved with 
such things himself, but he did not accept it from others, “today it is worse”, he said “people 
freely accuse one another all the time”.197 
Perhaps it was easier for him to manage the local landscape of witchcraft, and the 
insecurity it suggested, in the relatively small area of Hewe than it would have been for 
Chikulamayembe and M’mbelwa. In any case it is not easy to garner whether or not this control 
lead to less occurrences and accusations of witchcraft in Hewe, people certainly suggest that 
with Timothy as chief a definite lid was kept on these “malevolent” forces. He was less tolerant 
of the way people talk of it and freely accused others of it. Once, in order to demonstrate to his 
people that witchdoctors had no authority in his area, he arranged that a performance of ‘witch 
finding’ be undermined publicly. Chawinga had been handed some cloth which had been 
dropped by a woman from Chisimuka who had purchase it at the trading centre in Chiteshe, 
near the chief’s own home. He predicted that the woman, not imagining that the cloth could 
have just been innocently picked up, would immediately cry that this was a case of witchcraft 
and seek out the witchdoctor – at this time it was likely to have been a man called Mung’anja 
Munthali – in order to get some knowledge as to whom had stolen it from her. Knowing that this 
man would say that it had been stolen by magic and that he would look for medicine to bring it 
back the Themba called for a big meeting, asking all village heads to come with one person, he 
also called the woman who cried witchcraft and the person who had found the scarf on the 
road.198 At this meeting he is said to have exposed the lies of the witchdoctor and demonstrated 
that such people were not to be trusted with such things.  
 It should not be underestimated how significant such a demonstration of authority 
would have been. The causes of most non-medical troubles were referred to witchdoctors or 
nchimi like Chikanga in this part of Nyasaland. The reason being that because “lost or stolen 
personal effects may be used by a fwiti to fabricate nyanga capable of ensorcering their 
erstwhile owner”, a suitably qualified person was needed to deal with the spiritual threat which 
such a theft posed.199 Since it often cost more for people to travel to see famous nchimi than the 
value of the item stolen it is evident that the concern for people was not the good itself “but over 
its possible use by a sorcerer”.200 
As well as dealing with these accusations in his own way, Chawinga would also refer 
cases of witchcraft to the police, in accordance with the anti-witchcraft legislation.201 Whether 
such practices demonstrate his show of keeping the colonial authorities on side by occasionally 
sending them appropriate cases, or indeed was one of his ways of showing that he had no 
tolerance for such practices, it is clear that he would have rather sent for the police than 
Chikanga. Yet this was not the whole story, privately he was said to have indulged in his own 
magic practices which ensured his own protection in the short term. As well as the widespread 
rumours about the medicine he had got from Zambia, or Tanzania, which ensured that nobody 
could kill him, some heard that he had a “maginet”, some kind of crystal ball through which he 
could see when witches would visit his house, and also that he was friends with powerful people 
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who could bewitch those who were looking to take his life.202 He understood that “access to 
spiritual power” ensured his “social effectivity”; furthermore, he was aware that this very same 
spiritual power had the ability to “place limits on the hegemonic power of the state”.203 It had 
the potential to assist his ambitions vis a vis the government and with his people. Ironically, 
however, dabbling in these very same activities might indeed have contributed to his 
downfall.204 
 
The religious foundations of chiefly authority 
The customary responsibility of chiefs to deal with uncertainty was not only expressed in terms 
of witchcraft. Fields’ contention that the growing power of missionary institutions within the 
territories of chiefs affected customary authority detrimentally is also interesting to consider. 
She writes how by “displacing the religious foundations of African rulers’ legitimacy”, mission 
activity violated the logic of indirect rule as keeping the colonial peace.205 However, in the case 
of Timothy Chawinga, the influence of converts such as Munthali and the work of Mission 
teachers and church leaders within his area – in the arena of spiritual authority in any case – 
had the effect of actually being quite useful to him. The aspects of custom that the C.C.A.P. 
wished to influence: marriage, the consumption of alcohol, praying to ancestors, were not at 
odds with Timothy’s own public agenda as chief whose commitment to an ordered disciplined 
population who took responsibility for their families and eschewed idleness was celebrated.  
As has been discussed in previous chapters his authority did not rest so fundamentally 
on “customary foundations” but on a more territorially based, historically determined, economic 
monopoly, which was dynamic though it drew upon traditional motifs. The “religious 
foundations” for legitimacy had never customarily been in the hands of Katumbi. The role of 
rainmaker had enabled the chieftaincy to distance its ritual authority from possible weaknesses 
created by colonial and mission values. Though the rainmaker, and the rainmaking family was 
crucially connected to Katumbi in terms of both kinship and political ritual, the foundational 
underpinnings of legitimacy in the land was out-sourced and thus the chieftaincy itself was less 
affected by ritual disruptions to it. It existed in another landscape, so whilst the rainmaker could 
be criticised for the lack of rain during crises and other “natural disasters”, Katumbi himself 
could get away with limited culpability for the loss of order, and even for its ritual restoration.206   
Timothy managed to convert mission authority by co-opting it as his own, taking a 
position as church elder within the C.C.A.P. and maintaining the dominance of this one 
particular church within the area. The Watchtower Movement didn’t get much of a foothold in 
Hewe, and Timothy famously clashed with the Catholic Church when there were plans to build a 
large station in Hewe; in both instances he played the tune of the colonial administration for his 
own benefit. His ability to be adaptable ensured the mission did not undermine his authority. It 
was only after the people in Kabrufu complained bitterly that his refusal would also put pay to a 
primary school being planned in the early 1960s by the Catholic missionaries, and that more 
opportunities for paid labour in this area would be lost on account of this, that he finally 
conceded to have a small presence of Catholics in the area, which he nevertheless continued to 
monitor carefully, and certainly not allowing their activities to expand beyond his control or for 
a full-blown mission station to be established.207 The result of this tension saw much distrust 
and competiveness between the pupils of the Catholic and C.C.A.P. schools and a tense 









As the introduction to the thesis made clear and chapters three and four have illustrated, 
Chawinga policed the boundaries of his political space meticulously, and was able to do so 
largely unhindered during the colonial period. The mediation of his territorial ambition became 
less and less viable, however, after the State of Emergency as his opportunities to accumulate 
personal wealth decreased and the growing politicisation of his area brought more attention to 
it. Increasingly Timothy retreated into tradition convinced that claims to historical legitimacy 
would bolster the position of chiefs, at least from the point of view that local people would be 
encouraged to stay loyal. In addition to ‘tradition’ Chawinga leaned more strongly upon the 
narratives and rumours of his spiritually significant sources of power. With his judicial power 
dwindling, his access to wealth production and his territorial independence curbed, these 
spiritual and traditional aspects of his authority became increasingly important in enabling 
Chawinga to keep the bubbling threats in the local context at bay. Those individuals, who 
perceived that they had been wronged by the chief in the latter part of the colonial period, and 
the ambitions of the local party faithful, were given increasing opportunities to make their 
voices heard. These elements which had been irritating to Chawinga before began to become 
thoroughly undermining as he entered the last decade of his rule from 1963 to 1973. As the 
spatial emphasis of the post-colonial state’s administrative and economic designs altered, his 
chieftaincy no longer occupied a space which lay outside of state interest, in fact by the late 
1960s Hewe was anything but peripheral to the eye of the one-party government of Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda. The techniques which had been successful in establishing and maintaining his 
authority throughout the 1940s and 1950s were decreasing in effectiveness as a new landscape 
of power and politics was being shaped. 
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The nation in the locality: 





On 25 March 1965 an alarming letter was sent to the Rumphi District Secretary of the 
Malawi Congress Party, Timothy Chawinga was copied in: 
  
 “You should be very careful to look out strange faces in the district mostly those entering Malawi. 
The rebels are intending of also attaching [sic] Rumpi this is Kanyama [Chiume] group and they 
want to enter by the west of Rumpi mostly Hewe area of our Themba Katumbi”.1  
 
This warning given by J.C. Nyirongo, Chairman of the League of Malawi Youth in Chitipa, 
highlighted imminent threats which were allegedly posed by the rebellious Cabinet ministers of 
the first independence government. All but one of these ministers had resigned or been 
dismissed by Banda during an episode, less than three months after the official declaration of 
Malawian Independence, now known as the ‘the Cabinet Crisis’.2  
After fleeing into neighbouring countries for refuge these former close allies of Banda 
now presented a serious threat to state security. Zambia and Tanzania, Malawi’s western and 
northern neighbours not only “harboured” these malcontents they were thought to be working 
with them against Banda who had adopted quite a different ideological stance to them, choosing 
to maintain diplomatic and trade links with the white minority regimes of Mozambique and 
South Africa.3 For a chiefdom such as Katumbi’s which lay on the border with Zambia, the 
postcolonial diplomatic milieu completely redefined its relationship with the state. No longer 
left alone, as a remote place, it had become a possible entry point for rebels and thieves and as 
such had to be monitored closely.  
 In one respect these “external” threats could be seen to have increased the value of 
efficient and effective chiefs to the government; such figures were now relied upon to ensure 
security and to help maintain state sovereignty especially in the more inaccessible border areas. 
However, as chapter three and four illustrated, chiefs did not only look directly to the state for 
their continued relevance; where they could they exploited their territories to increase their 
own material and political resources which were fundamental bases for their local authority. 
 Under colonial administration there were prevalent opportunities for Chawinga to 
shape and exploit the space of Hewe on account of its limited relations with the government. 
The colonial state was less concerned to compete with chiefs for territorial control at the very 
local level and rather more interested in using their authority to its advantage: stemming 
political radicalism and ensuring a more conservative countryside, as well as enabling and 
policing agricultural production. The “indirect rule” chief, who had been all the stronger and 
more influential for his ability to develop a local territorial identity, was, however, at odds with 
Banda’s vision.  
Whilst the President did turn, soon after the “Cabinet Crisis”, to re-embrace traditional 
African institutions as the basis for his own brand of Malawian democracy, and resolved that the 
institution of chieftaincy had a crucial part to play in nation building,4 he also made it clear that 
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chiefs would not be able to act alone in their isolated territories as they had done formerly; as 
he reminded an assembly of chiefs from the Southern Region in 1966: 
  
“If we stay the way our forefathers used to stay or live – this tribe by itself, that tribe by itself, this 
chief by himself, that chief by himself, - we will never develop this country. One tribe is not enough to 
do everything by itself in this country. One chief is not enough to do everything by himself”.  5 
 
In the light of the troubled relationship which the period running up to independence 
had engendered between traditional leaders and African nationalists, Banda’s public statements 
about the role of chiefs in the development of the country proved reassuring for many, at least 
in the short term. Chiefs would be “real chiefs” in his Malawi, he exclaimed, not the “glorified 
messengers” or “clerks” to the district commissioners which he concluded they had become by 
the time he arrived in Nyasaland in 1958.6 This had the effect at first of increasing their self-
confidence, especially when dealing with the young and educated members of their 
communities.7  
However, as agricultural reforms and marketing controls began to squeeze the peasants 
and Banda increasingly looked to invest in private capital in order to run the state, chiefs came 
to be cast more as clients in need of his patronage. Building on the personality cult which had 
been developed for him during the final years of the nationalist struggle, and now with his most 
threatening rivals out of the picture, he turned increasingly towards patrimonial rule. He 
developed a “system of rewards that would co-exist with the threat and reality of punishments”, 
which he would finance through the resources derived from his tight control of the state.8 In this 
context “real chiefs” came to be supported by the state not according to the legitimacy which 
their customary credentials brought them, but rather whether they were loyal supporters of 
Banda’s leadership style. 
Timothy Chawinga experienced firsthand the benefits which a close relationship with 
Banda brought. As the previous chapter showed, theirs was a relationship that had its roots in 
the final years of the nationalist struggle. Though it is unclear how they first met and how often 
they corresponded, the first sign of Banda’s courting of Chawinga was when he was chosen to 
accompany him to Ghana for the All African People’s Congress in 1958 and again as a hand-
picked representative of the MCP in the official chiefs delegation to the constitutional talks in 
London in 1961. In the new Malawi Chawinga might have been less able to act territorially but 
he was led down other pathways to accumulate personal power. For some years he remained a 
“real chief” in the President’s eyes and he made considerable gains as a result, most notable 
were the unofficial salary increases he received and his being made a traditional judge at the 
new provincial level court in 1967.  
Being close to the President though also came with significant disadvantages; as Banda 
himself announced later in a speech in 1976: “so far as I am concerned, the nearer to me anyone 
is the worse for him. Yes anyone near me must keep up to my standards. If he or she does not 
they just have to go”.9 Timothy Chawinga’s time to “go” came following the annual party 
conference of 1973 which was held that year in the northern town of Mzuzu. When delegates 
were asked to say freely whether they thought one of Banda’s former colleagues, Manowa 
Chirwa, should be allowed to return to Malawi from exile, Chawinga along with a few other 
chiefs – including Mwase Kasungu, Malenga-Mzoma, and Mankhambira – agreed that indeed he 
should. Power describes that they were “beaten then and there, expelled from the party, and 
deposed”.10 Chawinga’s arrest and detention followed a few months afterwards.  
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In light of this picture of national politics it would be easy to interpret the maintenance 
and then fall of Chawinga’s position in the first decade of independence as a story solely related 
to Banda. However, as the rest of the thesis has argued, a full picture of what happened and how 
it took place is missing if his downfall and arrest are not contextualised in the political economy 
of authority at the local level. This can be useful not only in understanding Chawinga’s story but 
also in how changing agricultural policies interplayed with the local economy, and how the 
party machinery operated amongst the grassroots.  
Observing the relationship and struggles between Timothy Chawinga and the Malawi 
Congress Party (M.C.P.) from 1961, when the party won a landslide victory in the General 
Election, will reveal some more complex dynamics which take into account the varying paths of 
change which were unfolding in the context of very local politics. In Hewe, as elsewhere, the 
Native Authority now jostled for position alongside a plurality of different institutions at the 
local level and tried to hold onto a legitimacy which was being wrestled from it by various 
elements of the Malawi Congress Party. An array of overlapping jurisdictions emerged. The 
most serious of threats in Hewe eventually came from one of the youth wings of the Party, the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (M.Y.P.); working alongside the new court magistrate, former Master 
Farmer Jim Ngwira, they developed their potential to undermine Chawinga’s authority 
throughout the 1960s.  
Whilst the period running up to Independence, was generally characterized by a move 
away from chiefs as the main implementers of change in the local setting, Banda’s support for 
Chawinga surely shored him up during the difficult years in-between 1961 and 1964 when the 
future of chiefs was unclear and local Party members took advantage of their dwindling formal 
authority. This stood him in good stead when there was a more determined return to use the 
chiefs from 1964 to 1968 in the context of Banda’s personalized rule. Independence brought 
with it a growing concern with the tightening of security at borders and a clearer national 
territorial vision, something which chiefs could be used to enforce. However from 1968 
individuals who were profit-focused were prioritized by Banda, and the interests of the general 
population fell by the wayside. Borders were shut down and a dramatically increased presence 
of party machinery appeared in the countryside. This chapter will argue that Banda’s approach 
to nation building, in addition to his agricultural and foreign policy, diminished Timothy 




Part one. To reign and not rule: Chiefly institutions in the transition to 
independence 
 
“They have no future”: a transitional discourse on chieftaincy  
In the period from 1961 to the end of 1964 the expectation of the newly elected administration 
regarding the future of chiefs in an independent Malawi was that they would continue to hold a 
position in their local communities – if they were wanted – but with greatly reduced 
responsibilities. The policy of indirect rule, which placed traditional leadership at the helm of 
local politics, was considered by 1961 to be too riven with “divided loyalties” to operate 
effectively. It was thought that the chiefs’ dilemma during the nationalist struggles to support 
either the government or the NAC left them open to criticism and attack from one side or the 
other; an untenable position to carry into an independent Malawian civil service.11  
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Whilst it was made clear that it would be up to the people themselves to “make up their 
minds as to what they themselves require of their old traditional leaders”12 it was thought that 
the people would most likely only chose to retain their chiefs as customary figureheads. The 
ineradicable connection which many of these traditional leaders had forged with the colonial 
regime in the decades before was surely enough, they thought, to relegate these indirect rule 
leaders to obscurity; they could not possibly still be seen by people as their true representatives. 
These assumptions that were made about the impact of nationalist politics upon native 
administration laid the groundwork for a bundle of reforms in which “chiefs and traditional 
authorities as a class” were to “be placed in a state of suspended animation”.13 Plans were 
drawn up to “respectfully” do away with them; chiefs would essentially be pensioned off in their 
official state-endorsed capacity, with any opportunities to assert significant influence on the 
system of local government closed to them.  
Chipembere, the first African Minister of Local Government, announced new policies 
which sought to make local politics “more representative”, most significantly through the 
democratisation of the District Councils. As a part of this reform chiefs were no longer able to 
automatically stand as unelected ex-officio members and voting was introduced with a 
universal adult franchise;14 the outcome of which saw many MCP representatives elected onto 
the Councils. This was clearly a major boon for the Party, as Chipembere proudly announced in 
a speech not long after the changes had been put in place. One of the “many remarkable things” 
which these local reforms had achieved, he exclaimed, was that they “have been accepted by the 
public, by the African people, as leaders of their wards under the general umbrella of the Malawi 
Congress Party”.15 There is not a great deal of evidence to draw upon in order to establish how 
these changes were felt in Hewe but in the sources that are available it is reported that village 
headmen were happy that these councils would represent their needs more successfully. In 
Mwachibanda during the elections for the district council in February 1962, it was recalled in 
the district commissioner’s ulendo notes that the headmen were saying that “the best men” had 
been chosen for the job in hand.16 
In keeping with a policy which had gradually been reducing the duties of chiefs 
throughout the 1950s, the Local Court Ordinance was also passed in 1962; this had a major 
impact as it officially “separated the hitherto largely inseparable functions of the judiciary and 
the executive”.17 In doing this the government not only cut back on the chiefs’ responsibilities in 
the community, they crucially severed an authoritarian link which they had over their 
community by curtailing what appeared to be their main source of authority, the position they 
held as “native judges”. By formally removing the powers native authorities had to make rules 
and orders – which were then enforceable in the native court – this piece of legislation left 
chiefs with responsibility for little more than the collection of tax, the settlement of local land 
disputes, and in matters concerning tribal law and custom; tasks made less easy for them as 
many of the new district councils had also elected to get rid of their old employees. With their 
tax clerks, messengers, and advisors laid off the retinue of chiefs was much reduced at this 
point, and as a result so was a significant and visible source of their authority.  
 
Criticising and competing with Kamangilira 1961-1964 
During this ambiguous time native authorities found themselves in a potentially difficult 
situation: most of the responsibility for the general maintenance of law and order in the 
countryside continued to lie with them, but now they had no official capacity to meet out 
punishments which kept their population in-line, nor had they the security of a future role in the 
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civil service planned out for them; both of these aspects had the distinct potential to erode their 
position amongst their people and therefore their ability to practice power. 
 One of the ways in which the day-to-day administration of native authorities was most 
affected was with the encroaching of Party members, and in particular the Youth League, over 
the task of tax collection. Alongside their often violent efforts to force people to buy Party 
cards18 - a new priority – these radical youth also began to take on the role of bringing tax 
defaulters to justice; some 1500 to 2000 were recorded as having been brought to court in 
Rumphi “with the assistance of the Malawi Congress Party”19 by as early as November 1962. 
This immediate and direct affront to chiefs’ authority was organised by the emerging local 
political elites who, buoyed up by their affiliation with the M.C.P., sought to use their new 
position to revenge some of the excesses of chiefly behaviour which they remembered sorely 
from throughout the colonial period. 
The posturing of local Party branches, “intoxicated with their new found power”,20 
showed how the transitional reforms around local government had opened up new spaces in 
which people, tried to wrestle a bit of control from the traditional authorities. It was a situation 
which Terence Ranger had predicted; writing anonymously in his radical newspaper Dissent, in 
1960, his concern had been how this inevitable tension between the interests and influence of 
headmen and “‘emergent’ Malawi branch officers” would play out and be reconciled.21  
One of the major ways in which these new tensions manifest themselves in Hewe was 
with a growing confidence amongst the people to be more vocal about highlighting their chief’s 
shortcomings where they had hardly ever dared to before. As the previous chapter showed, 
some of Chief Katumbi’s more self-interested intentions had been annoying those for whom it 
had serious implications. Complaints about his heavy monitoring of gun ownership emerged as 
people who had struggled to control pests in their own fields found alternative channels, often 
through the local branches of the M.C.P. and through the Youth League, to vent their evidently 
long-standing grievances.22  
The farmers in the rather remote village of Mowa, which lay close to the border with 
Zambia and was perhaps ten miles from the trading centre and administrative headquarters at 
Katowo, held increasing hostility toward him over his refusal to allow them to own shot-guns. 
Suffering badly from the plentiful number of garden pests and game which were running amok 
in amongst their crops these villagers are recorded as having pleaded with the D.C in 1962 to 
have the tools to more effectively scare the animals away:  
 
“They complained bitterly of elephants, bushbucks and pigs eating up their crops. It is true that no 
one in this village owns a gun. The Village Headman told me that Themba Katumbi would not allow 
anyone with a gun in that area because he did not wish to see anyone shooting in the whole of Hewe 
even for the sake of scaring the animals that were eating crops except himself. The people have 
looked on their chief as a selfish chief”.23  
 
Chawinga’s Katumbi chieftainship, faced with the challenge of operating within the 
framework of an emerging new government who were legislating around the idea that chiefs 
ought to be “seen to reign rather than rule”,24 began to be accused of “backwardness” in 
agriculture and over-confidence in leadership; Chawinga was not the chief with a monopoly of 
force that he had once been, he was now charged more openly with thinking himself “more than 
his people”.25 
A further challenge to his position came as the M.C.P. began to take a greater interest in 
directly intervening in local agricultural matters. The new African leadership was aware that in 
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order to gain more support in the rural areas the basic needs of the population would have to be 
addressed by them. Whilst the colonial state had relied upon the native authorities the M.C.P. 
government proposed to be far more present in the basic aspects of people’s lives, and by using 
the local branches, which had proliferated in the final years of colonial rule, they could be. In 
becoming more involved, which they did increasingly, they displaced chiefs’ from the forums 
and processes of agricultural development which had been such a key role for them during the 
colonial period. The sources of authority that were to be found through managing the agrarian 
landscape and the relationships of labour and exchange at the local level were significantly 
affected, as the former rather authoritarian stance of chiefs like Chawinga was undermined by 
the force of the Party in his area.26  
Observing how the building of political power could be enhanced through creating a 
framework for securing people’s livelihoods at the local level, the M.C.P. began endorsing more 
directly the popular policies which helped people protect their crops. With pest control 
measuring high amongst the concerns of local farmers, it was identified as a useful way by 
which people could be won over. As was discussed in chapter four, controlling pests, of every 
variety, had been one of the most significant ways in which Timothy developed his reputation 
and built his authority in the local community.27 In one example of this new commitment 
Kanyama Chiume, one of the leading nationalist politicians from the Northern Province, came 
out to inaugurate the Rumphi district wide baboon hunt in 1962;28 it just so happened that this 
was timed to coincide exactly with the district council elections. 
This increasingly hands on approach to local issues and concerns impinged on chiefs’ 
modus operandi; they had used the indirect system of native authority rules and orders, which 
organised and framed such activities in the past, to build their authoritative advantage. The 
colonial government had a vested interest in perpetuating the false impression that these 
agricultural rules and orders were done on chiefs’ initiative rather than theirs; the oral evidence 
from Hewe shows clearly that this was the case as people spoke highly of Chawinga’s “biggest 
achievements” being his organisation of pest drives. The implication being that the majority of 
activities he undertook throughout the colonial period were inspired by his own moral ambition 
as guardian of his people’s livelihoods. The new African government saw the benefit to them of 
getting more involved in people’s day to day lives. In fact, such activities still remain 
fundamental to the success of any political campaign in Malawi; which is why the Malawian 
government of today, for example, regularly distribute fertiliser coupons at election time.29 
 
Consistency in confusion: the practice of chiefly authority, 1961-1964  
Whilst there may have been some grand gestures in the countryside during this transitional 
period, many of the early speeches and policies of the M.C.P. turned out to be largely rhetorical. 
The promise of new infrastructure, for example, was undermined by limited resources and was, 
in the event, not easily able to uproot a well-established and surprisingly adaptable system of 
chiefly control. In light of more cuts in spending on the civil service at this time30 the 
government could not afford to rely entirely on a new cadre of elected African elites to carry out 
all of the aspects of local governance that the native authorities had been implementing for 
many decades. This lack of funds meant many ambitious early plans remained unfulfilled; 
extension services did not operate as they had been planned and District Councils also lacked 
impetus; all of this meant that responsibility soon pragmatically fell back to traditional leaders 
for the organisation of local government policy.31  
Despite the ambition of the national leadership, the behaviour of party members in the 
village setting also saw to it that people’s hopes and expectations of a more lenient and fairer 
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new government were tempered from an early stage. Chawinga easily maintained his 
reputation amongst the more conservative members of the community in Hewe as more and 
more complaints were levelled at the Malawi Youth League over their handling of the most basic 
of tasks. In one instance “the youth of Malawi League” who were newly charged with arranging 
the facilities for visiting government officials, “did not arrange for enough food for an African 
officer and his carriers to eat”; in this they proved themselves extremely unpopular amongst the 
local village headmen.32 
Furthermore, there was a lack of uniformity when it came to policy objectives and much 
ambiguity when it came to understanding what people’s responsibilities were in the local 
branches. An early statement delivered by Chipembere, the first African Minister for Local 
Government, insisted that members of the Legislative Council were “working hand in hand with 
District Councils giving them advice and giving them guidance without trying to dominate 
them”.33 Yet, as courts were reformed and district councils elected more confusion occurred 
over who represented what. People were treating members of the Legislative Council (M.L.C’s) 
as the local officials of the party political organisation and saw the chairmen of District Councils 
as the executives of Central Government at Provincial and District Level.34 The division of 
functions between the party cadre, district councils, native authorities, local courts, and later 
District Development Committee’s, was not a simple matter. Each one overlapped with the 
others in terms of roles and responsibilities and the early period of Independence involved 
much negotiation over the practicalities of these reforms.35 This led to much disorder in the 
organisation of the Party itself. Such a lack of clarity played into the hands of Timothy Chawinga 
who continued to work consistently through the cracks in this period of transition. 
Whilst Ching’ola Chirwa, the first African Justice Minister – one of the politicians later 
removed from office by Banda during the Cabinet Crisis and re-labelled a ‘rebel’ – promised that 
the long awaited reform of the native court system would bring people “freedom from the 
arbitrary treatment which was frequently associated with those courts”,36 more confusing 
remits and limited resources saw to it that little changed. If anything the framework of 
discipline and punishment was less even-handed than before as it was members of the M.Y.P. 
who were tasked with bringing it about; accusations of prejudice were soon directed at local 
branch leaders of the M.C.P. who had begun administering the court fines, using the youth 
leaguers to brandish their own form of justice.  
Seeing, perhaps, that the role of the native authorities was being diminished local 
members of the party saw a chance to interpret the law themselves, and in some cases even 
attempt to change it.37 Ching’ola Chirwa implored local court presidents to notify the 
community that now no one was “exempt from normal processes of your court”, including those 
employed by it,38 but the opportunities for these same people to operate corruptly, and without 
remonstration, remained significant. What was promised at the national level: fairness, equality 
and impartiality, filtered down to the people differently at local and regional level on account of 
rivalries and personal ambition amongst party members. This created a lot more tension than 
the Party leadership cared to admit.  
Constitutional changes which took place between 1961 and 1964 may have weakened 
traditional authorities institutionally, which can be seen in their reduction in salary39 and the 
growth of importance in District councils and magistrates courts, but local traditional sources of 
authority continued to exist. The reforms which promised uniformity in the practice of local 
governance was an ambition never to be realised during this transition to independence, in 
many ways it only created more confusion. The national discourse about chieftaincy, which was 
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responding to the pressures of decolonisation and which forced a discussion about their value 
as a group of people, was quite different from the practical reality of local governance. 
 
“Real chiefs not glorified messengers”: recasting the role of chiefs after the Cabinet Crisis 
The four year period of self-government up until the “Cabinet Crisis”, a time soon after 
independence, was a time in which the powers of native authorities and district commissioners 
were diminished, district councils “democratised”, and new magistrate courts established. The 
political game changed, however, when the young ambitious ministers were cleared out of the 
cabinet; whatever the causes of this constitutional crisis might have been, what is undisputed is 
that it proved the perfect opportunity for Banda to establish a political culture centred on his 
personality and from this point onwards no criticism was tolerated. For chiefs this initially 
proved to be a useful turn of events. As McCracken has recently pointed out, after the “Cabinet 
Crisis” Banda began to lean increasingly on the “traditionalist” sectors of society;40 his strategy 
was to actively go after the chiefs’ support “as a way of reducing reliance on the educated 
elite”.41  
 At the M.C.P. Convention in October 1966 Banda was explicit that the party would 
respect chiefs. He stressed that there should be “co-operation” between party leaders and civil 
servants such as chiefs; “there must be no interference with the work of the civil servants 
anywhere by any party leader, no matter what his rank in the party…no civil servant must be 
forced to attend any Party meeting by anyone, not even by a Minister or a Member of 
Parliament”.42 Furthermore, he stressed that these positions could co-exist quite easily: “Party 
leaders are popular political leaders in their respective areas and districts. Chiefs are traditional 
rulers. The two are complimentary (sic)… [The chief’s role] is to look after the area or the 
district in those aspects of life where custom and traditional laws still function or are still 
operative”.43 
 Yet, reaffirming chiefly importance did not mean reaffirming their right to rule their 
own territories as they had done before. In fact, the recognition of chiefs was done in the context 
of a central government that was extending its arm ever further into matters of local 
administration. By 1966 the decision had been taken to abandon the much lauded democratic 
elections for district councils and to move instead to a system of patronage in which Banda 
himself made the appointments. Chiefs were no exception to this, and he began to embark “on a 
policy of selecting and deselecting chiefs according to his own interpretation of Malawian 
history”, consigning them to operate within the context of the Banda autocracy and subject to 
his interpretation of loyalty.44  
The activities and choices of traditional leaders during the years of nationalist struggle 
and during the transition to Independence were not quickly forgotten and the importance of the 
allegiances which had been forged during these times was demonstrated in a speech made by 
Banda also in 1966:  
 
“When I came here in 1958 the government tried to stop the chiefs from having anything to do with 
me and the Nyasaland African Congress. But they did not stop at that. When we were going to 
London in 1960, to the constitutional conference, the Government and the Constitutional Party 
joined hands and persuaded a number of chiefs to go to England to oppose me at Lancaster House 
[…] chiefs opposed me, opposed me strongly […] ‘We don’t want self-government […] because if self-
government comes by Dr Banda, we chiefs will be nowhere’ […] But we had chiefs too.”45 
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It is certainly true that Timothy Chawinga had been one of those chiefs which Banda saw 
as on his side. Having first met Banda in London in 1951 they became more closely acquainted 
in Ghana in 1958 at the All Africa People’s Conference. There is limited information about what 
Chawinga was doing during these trips, what was required of him and what his interaction was 
like with Banda, but as the previous chapter outlined since Banda’s return to Nyasaland in 1958 
there is evidence that the two men had respect for one another. After Banda was released from 
detention Chawinga worked with him becoming involved in the consultation processes in the 
run up to the signing of the new constitution in 1961. He went with Banda to Guinea in 1961 
and to Ghana again in 1963 to discuss constitutional change.  
Yet, at the same time, Chawinga had had his own ambiguous relationship with some of 
the “rebel” ministers who were blacklisted by Banda in 1964. He had regularly hosted Kanyama 
Chiume in his home where they are said to have spent evenings discussing the nationalist 
struggle and the future of Malawi. It is difficult to know what he really thought of Chiume but it 
is probably the case that given the strength of both these characters, each with their own 
ambitions, whilst they probably respected one another they might have struggled to agree if 
their ambitions clashed. If there was little trust between them it didn’t appear so, although their 
“friendship” could have been a case of keeping ones nearest rivals and biggest enemies closest 
to hand.  
As has been demonstrated Chawinga was a man who could be extremely pragmatic and 
his relationship with different politicians would have been no different. Although at times a very 
principled man, Timothy Chawinga was ultimately a chief wedded to his territory, and he took 
decisions and stances based on his desire to defend his land, and to further his ambition for it; 
this proved quite beneficial for Banda in the early years of his leadership. During this time he 
showed willing by agreeing to police his borders strongly against these “enemies of the state”; 
an aspect of governance to which we will return later in the chapter. 
 
Rewarding loyalty, punishing subversion 
So then connections to the President became increasingly important and as Dr Banda had 
promised to all chiefs, loyalty was rewarded.46 In the increasingly patrimonial context of 
Banda’s rule the official role of “the chief” turned out to be highly malleable. Banda maintained a 
creative tension in the practice of chiefly politics by restoring certain functions to traditional 
leaders, whilst providing incentives and warnings designed to strengthen or weaken their own 
individual position. 
When he turned to the subject of chiefs at the 1966 M.C.P. Convention, in keeping with 
his reprioritisation of traditional elements in society, Banda tackled the subject of chiefs’ 
emolument and salary, and his general dissatisfaction with the system of remuneration.47 “At 
present” he said, “there are chiefs who are getting more money when they have fewer people 
than other chiefs who are getting less money than they are getting. This is unfair”.48 However, 
behind the scenes, the reality of Banda’s patrimonial politics was unfolding; he was already in 
the process of raising Timothy Chawinga’s salary to within £14 of Chief Chikulamayembe, a 
chief who had significantly more people under his authority. This happened despite the 
animosity that had already been acknowledged this would engender, and the fact that 
Chikulamayembe’s area was almost three times as large. 
This recognition of certain chiefs over others – distinctions which were neither based on 
the size of territory nor the number of subjects – saw unofficial hierarchies emerge between 
chiefs or further differentiation to take place between already historically tense relationships. 
Furthermore, these decisions were taken quite apart from any official statement that was being 
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made on the matter. The discussions around the raising of Katumbi’s salary present a clear case 
study which shows up the gulf that was emerging between discourse and practice.  
When Chawinga wrote to the District Commissioner, in May 1967, to ask the 
Government to raise his remuneration from £267 by an increase of half, he was told that such a 
significant increase was highly unlikely. It was agreed, however, that an increase of £62, raising 
his salary to £329 “would be reasonable”.49 In pursuit of this increase Chawinga continued to 
argue his case that the salary was “insufficient in accordance with the present cost of living”.50 
He used his experience during the “struggle” for independence and his credentials as a stalwart 
supporter of the M.C.P. to look for recognition: 
 
“The colonial Government did not consider me due to political urgement (sic) about Federation and 
in 1959, my salary was even up held for three months and I really suffered. I am always working 
together with the Government as well as with the party”.51  
 
The tensions over salary, which threatened to disrupt the district officials 
“development” plans, were discussed at some length by the DC Rumphi and the M.C.P. District 
Secretary in 1968. With people still creating trouble over chieftainships in the area, the DC 
wrote, any elevation of Katumbi’s salary ought to be undertaken with caution. He feared that 
any unfair remuneration would see old arguments re-surface.52  
‘Official’ correspondence displayed reticence over these salary demands, scribbled notes 
in the files reveal a district administration that was concerned by the local tensions between the 
two leading Tumbuka chiefs. “Chief Katumbi already receives a substantial salary by 
comparison with chiefs and sub-chiefs of Rumpi District”, explains a note from an unclear 
source about a memo which was to be sent to Dr Banda, “The increase he seeks from 257-329 
would bring him very close to Chief Chikulamayembe who has three times the population. The 
memo is accordingly so loaded as to indicate to H.E that to accede to this request would cause 
difficulties”.53  
Indeed the memo warned that although Chief Katumbi was “the most influential Chief in 
Rumpi District, population-wise the area of his responsibility is far smaller than that of Chief 
Chikulamayembe”.54 A tone was set in these notes that, with Chikulamayembe’s salary standing 
at £336 per annum, it would be a dangerous move to put Katumbi so close to it. However, 
patrimonial decisions made by the national leadership took little account of the local political 
context, and the deeply held narratives of local disputes were of little interest to the Party 
bureaucracy. The President was evidently not dissuaded from approving a significant salary 
raise; his motivations can only be guessed at but it is clear that for one reason or another he 
wished to reward Chawinga in some way. His notes on the returned memo agree fully to the 
salary increase and it was finally put in to effect in the July of 1967. 
Inevitably it did cause some upset. The level of Chikulamayembe’s salary was now a 
concern of Gondwe the district commissioner who wrote to Mr Kalilangwe, the Secretary to the 
President and Cabinet:  
 
“This has caused great unrest and suspicion as to what would have caused this over-look. My 
suggestion is that as from 1st January, 1968, NA Chikulamayembe should also be given some 
consolation by increasing his salary to or nearer £460 p.a in order to appease him. NA 
Chikulamayembe has several times complained to me over this issue but I have always dodged his 
questions because I did not know the main reason for this variation and still now I am not in a 
position to answer him. Could you please enlighten me on this vital question?”55 
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Kalilangwe replied quite simply, that Katumbi’s pay rise had not been a part of the 
general review of chiefs’ salaries which had been carried out in 1967. This decision was a 
“separate and later direction by H.E”, which had arisen directly, he said, “out of a special 
recommendation” by the D.C himself,56 bizarrely and confusingly the very same Mr Gondwe who 
was now arguing for a better deal for Chikulamayembe too. The discussions around 
Chikulamayembe and Katumbi’s salary continued to drag on for a number of years. In the see-
saw of local politics these early years of independence did not weigh in the favour of 
Chikulamayembe who received few favours from the Government.57  
In simple terms, the attitude towards chiefs at this time was that they were either 
greatly rewarded for their loyalty, or seriously punished, should they prove subversive and 
irreverent in any way; and the President’s ability to take action against such chiefs was made 
legal in 1967 with the Chiefs Act. In Section 8 (1) of the act it is plain to see: “The President may, 
by order, withdraw recognition accorded to any person under this Act if he is satisfied that […] 
the person has lost support of majority of people in his area; or if it is necessary in the interests 
of peace, order and good government”.58 If chiefs worked effectively and loyally for Banda, and 
the nation, then they would see rewards which were not contained within policy documents and 
official discourse. As the report from one chiefs’ seminar summed up, “A chief who is behind His 
Excellency the President the Government and the Party has nothing to fear from Government. 
Government will protect all those who abide by the law”.59  
The discussions about Chawinga’s salary increases over the period 1967-1968 give 
some indication that Banda was impressed by the chief’s loyalty. This can also be seen in the 
elevation of Chawinga to one of Banda’s new traditional court judges at the provincial level (the 
creation of these new courts to dispense justice according to “custom”, alongside the magistrate 
courts at district level, was one way in which Banda tried to court traditional sectors of society). 
In sum, the arenas in which chiefly authority thrived in the post-colonial period were quite 
different. During the colonial period Timothy Chawinga’s attendance and performance at local 
government committee meetings, for example, had been crucial to his identity as a “progressive” 
and co-operative chief; an identity which enabled him to excel in at least one of the arenas 
where their authority could be sourced at that time, as a civil servant. In the post-colonial 
setting where his negotiation of patronage politics mattered more than his participation in the 
state as a civil servant, he no longer found it a priority to participate regularly at the D.D.C. 
meetings and other local committees for example, where he was often notable by his absence.  
Chapter four concluded that Timothy Chawinga’s authority was greatly dependent on 
the socio-economic context in which he performed his duties as chief. Given that his 
management of the agrarian and ecological setting of Hewe was an important aspect of his 
power base, it is pertinent to suggest that as the post-colonial era ushered in a very different 
approach to small holder farmers, to the production and marketing of crops, and indeed to the 
links that border communities had with one another, the ways in which Chawinga responded to 
these changes was crucial in his ability to maintain tight control over his territory. The following 
section will critically examine the impact of the Malawi Congress Party policies on day to day 
life in Hewe and why changes in attitude towards agricultural development ultimately had such 
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Part two. Agricultural change, communal labour and MCP control in the 
countryside 
 
A new approach to agriculture: the Rumpi Development Plan  
“The way to reach our target [of development] is for all holders of land to turn farming into a 
money making business”,60 so stated the Rumpi Development Plan of 1963-65;61 in an 
independent Malawi, it was decided early on that the building blocks of change would have to 
remain firmly within the realms of agriculture.62 The principles behind the development plans 
differed little from colonial approaches which were designed to increase the productivity of the 
land, to increase the wealth of local farmers and to ensure a functioning economy that would 
not have to rely on outside support. As the colonial D.C’s, agricultural officers and extension 
agents before them had also advocated, the designers of the Rumpi Development Plan promoted 
the adoption of suitable and “recommended cultural practices” in order to increase the amount 
of exportable agricultural produce. It was in the plan that by using these approaches family 
income would increase by a staggering ten-fold after two years.63  
Yet the same old difficulties dogged the Northern Province and “the physical barriers of 
distance, terrain and sparse population” remained major factors militating against the much 
hoped for development which was laid out in the plan.64 Whilst long term objectives included 
the much needed establishment of better trading and communication links between areas of 
surplus and shortage in the north, as well as a reshaping of the ways in which peasant crops 
were marketed, in the short term responsibility for development continued to be placed on 
District Councils and the Farmers Marketing Board.65  
They had a difficult job on their hands as the extension services which they had 
inherited from the colonial administration were now seen to be “totally disillusioned” and the 
land reform and reorganisation schemes had nearly all collapsed in the context of the anti-
colonial campaigns.66 Agricultural officers in Rumphi noted a significant decline in enforcement 
by extension officers as early as 1961 when agricultural regulations were being widely 
disregarded and many of the prohibited activities, such as the opening of visoso gardens, 
increased throughout the district. Part of the reason for this was that it had been vitally 
important for Banda to distance his new government from the harsh regulations which had 
characterised the colonial period.  
One way he did this was by replacing the Natural Resources Ordinance, the crucible of 
so many of these regulations, by the Land Use and Protection Ordinance in 1962. This proved a 
significant change for chiefs like Chawinga who had greatly benefitted from the framework of 
control which the Natural Resources Ordinance had offered. The population at large, however, 
who had greatly disliked the ways in which the Ordinance had regimented their agricultural 
activities had reasons to celebrate when Banda, derogatorily comparing it to systems of 
organisation that one might find behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, swiftly put an end to it.67 
The emphasis was shifted away from the strict conservation of soil to increasing the potential of 
soil that was there with fertilisers. The direct management of farms was ended, and increasing 
importance was placed on the “slow process” of “education”;68 something that the Malawi Young 
Pioneers would become implementers of and in so doing would undermine yet another aspect 
of chiefly concern; something that will be explored in more detail later in the chapter when 
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The “soil is our mine” 
With the government desirous of a step change in production more attention was placed on the 
use of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser. Alongside this came the need for increased training 
around its use, as well as the adoption of other inputs such as improved seeds. At first farmers 
had to be “persuaded” of the benefits of these new technologies, mainly through the tours of 
extension workers, without whom it was concluded “villagers could do nothing”.69 
Announcements were broadcast on the radio and courses were run by the District Development 
Committees (DDC), where advice and reassurance were given to farmers who could not see its 
benefit. At one such course for Rumphi and Chitipa Districts held in September 1966: 
 
“The importance of early fertilizer application was explained, and also that it could not be applied 
with the seed as it would burning. Farmers were unfortunately suspicious or even frightened of new 
ideas. One reason which they gave for not using fertilizer was that it made weeds grow more 
vigorously. Wood ash was a good manure in itself, but tended to wash away very quickly. It was also 
wasteful, because it used 20 years’ growth of trees for one year’s fertilizer.70 
 
The Government had established District Development Committees (DDC) in 1965 as a 
way of improving the extension services needed to distribute the technical advice regarding 
these new inputs, and they became the important channels through which farmers were taught. 
At the M.C.P. Convention of 1966 the Permanent Secretary for Natural Resources, R. J. Dewar, 
was praising the activities of the DDC, boasting that as soon as the Committees became involved 
in administering advice, local leaders were realising how important the uprooting and burning 
of cotton, the application of fertiliser and the early preparation and planting was and their 
“response was immediate”.71  
This rather rosy picture was backed up by the Minister at the convention with a reeling 
off of impressive crop production statistics: a record crop of 40,000 tons of groundnuts was 
bought in 1966; tea had the highest production yield on record; and a surplus of 50,000 tons of 
maize, acknowledged as the most important crop in Malawi, was sold to the Farmers Marketing 
Board (FMB). These achievements, he said, reflect “the call for better husbandry and the use of 
fertiliser [...] our economy is dependent on the level of production of cash crops and I am 
delighted to say that this year the F.M.B. have paid out about 6 million pounds to the farmers”.72  
This state managed marketing board became a very important institution in the north, 
and soon becoming a key determinant within farmers’ decision making. Not only did it control 
the distribution of artificial fertilisers and hybridised seed, having aggressively advocated that 
these improved technologies were the only way to improve yields, quality and exports, but it 
had also become one of the only reliable suppliers of surplus crops when food insecurity was 
imminent. Furthermore, at the same 1966 DDC course where application techniques had been 
explained, it was emphasised to farmers that the F.M.B. had not only “promised to supply 5 ton 
loads of fertilizer to farmers’ clubs, etc. when called upon” but would also “provide transport for 
this”.73  
As well as transporting the items to and from rural centres, permanent markets and 
stores began to appear from where fertiliser, equipment and produce could be bought and sold 
on their behalf.74 Many farmers took the opportunity to sell their crops through these channels 
but with these services came a growing expectation on the smallholder farmer to not simply 
produce more crops but to make sure that they were of much higher quality. The F.M.B. helped 
the local farmer in buying his crops, but would only continue to do so if they put more effort into 
increasing the quality of their yields; the offers of fertilisers, farm carts, spraying machines and 
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insecticides were pushed onto the farmer as a means of doing so.75 Reminding the farmers of 
their duty to the Board, Katengeza the F.M.B. General Manager, reminded them in 1966 that 
120,000 bags of fertiliser had been sold the previous year to farmers at less than half the cost 
price,76 but that now farmers should think about “quality first and then quantity”.77  
 
Market mechanisms and the beginning of the end of populist agriculture 
These market mechanisms of controlling crop production and sales began to take more control 
away from the farmer, however. This would become increasingly important in the move away 
from peasant agriculture as the foundation of Banda’s plans for economic growth shifted 
towards individual profit focused farmers, individuals who were invariably loyal and influential 
members of the party. In this context peasant growers became increasingly subject to corrupt 
practices at local markets where certain marketing board liaison committee members, board 
members, M.P.’s, district area and branch chairman and members of their committees 
sometimes “used their position to dictate or meet their ends in various ways at some of our 
markets”.78  
The Farmers Marketing Board was haphazardly organised after independence. In Hewe 
it was reported in 1966 that farmers “were unable to sell their crops due to the fact that the 
FMB left the area before everybody sold his or her crops”.79 The farmers’ distress at the 
stagnation of F.M.B. markets urged them to request that the Board make proper arrangements 
for them in future years. However farmers were not only losing out in these local contexts, “with 
a complete monopoly in the marketing of most smallholders’ cash crops, the Farmers Marketing 
Board (later A.D.M.A.R.C.) was in an ideal position to squeeze the African farmer”.80  
The idea that Colby had had when he introduced the marketing boards during the 
colonial period was that the money drawn off from the peasants through these mechanisms 
would be used to improve agriculture more generally. However, it was not the peasant farmers 
who would be receiving the overall benefit from this investment in the post-colonial context, 
instead it was beginning to be fed back, through one means or another, into developing 
“progressive” large farms, amongst them Banda’s own.81  
Ultimately, after a couple of disastrous years of over-production, poor quality yields 
(especially of tobacco), and huge losses to the Farmers Marketing Board, the populist 
philosophy that had set out to “improve the performance of the average farmer” was put to bed. 
Banda justified his unwillingness to nationalise anything, his cut backs to the civil service and 
his focus on private capital by suggesting that Africans had enough land to be capable of looking 
after themselves without social support.82 His response to the widespread peasant grievances 
that were felt throughout the country by the early 1960s had been to retreat from interfering 
with their lives, but whilst this looked at first looked rather beneficent these reforms “also 
provided Banda with the opportunity to introduce economic structures that he would use to his 
own advantage after Independence”.83  
In August 1969 the M.C.P. announced a new agricultural approach; its implications were 
summarised by the Minister of Agriculture, Gwanda Chakuamba: 
 
“Up to now too much time has been spent trying to raise the productivity of the mass of the farmers. 
There is no telling whether this work has had any measurable effect. What I do know is that the 
larger farmers, and in particular the farms of my brother Ministers, have not been receiving the 
attention they require […] I want the whole attention of the extension services of this Ministry 
directed towards the individual progressive farmer. No more time-wasting meetings and 
demonstrations! The mass approach must be left to the radio and mobile units”.84 
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Having realised that continued concentration on smallholder production was neither going to 
enrich his country, nor enrich himself and his cronies Dr Banda embarked on a policy where 
“progressive farmers” or the Achikumbe85 would be given priority in terms of resources, credit 
facilities and extension services; it was a further shift towards “individual farmers who showed 
themselves eager to make the leap from subsistence cultivation into treating their farming 
operations as a commercial business”;86 a process which had been set in motion during the 
colonial period. The majority of rural families, for whom regular participation in the cash 
economy was not the main objective of their farming operations, were to be educated through 
radio and film screenings, at large village level meetings and agricultural shows; the most 
important shift for the mass population was that this training would be delivered by the Malawi 
Young Pioneers.87  
Despite his shift in priorities Banda nevertheless stick to the basic principle that in 
Malawi “developing the country means hard work in the fields, using axes and hoes, because we 
have no mines”.88 Addressing a group of Malawi Young Pioneers at Youth Week in 1969 he re-
emphasised to them that “the soil is our mine”.89 The M.Y.P. had already been used extensively to 
implement Party principles; it was this youth organisation that came to play a significant role in 
village agriculture. By the late 1960s the idea that the M.Y.P. was an organisation created purely 
for the good of the farmer no longer stands up to the evidence which showed them up to be 
more of a personal police force for the President. The following section will illustrate some of 
the ways in which the M.Y.P. came to occupy an influential role; and why this was important for 
Banda’s control of the state. 
 
Communal labour and local party control  
In Hewe the main differences that people identified between the colonial period and the early 
MCP era, in terms of agriculture, were focused on either the use of fertiliser – with a stress on 
the fact that it was free during the time of Dr. Banda – or the noticeable increased use of force in 
managing production. Robert Chawinga reflected upon the differences in the following, almost 
contradictory way: “Whites were training people to farm without any punishment. Kamuzu was 
punishing those who didn’t follow his rules. Do this, do this. [But] during Kamuzu’s time there 
was good agriculture, plenty more food than under the colonial government”;90 his testimony 
suggests that he saw a direct relationship between this force and the increased productivity it 
led to. Jakob Chawinga, on the other hand, made the connection between the food security of the 
area with the better provision of agricultural inputs and crop marketing; “during Kamuzu’s time 
there was a lot of food here. We were given fertiliser; prices were fair and much lower 
compared to colonial”.91 It is likely that this divergence, particularly with regard to whether or 
not the force used to get people to farm was greater in the colonial or the Independence period 
and whether inputs and marketing helped or hindered farmers, depended a great deal upon the 
crops that were being grown from place to place, even within a relatively small area;92 it also 
probably reflects the variable impact that the M.Y.P. were having on labouring practices. 
The consensus from the villagers’ comments appears to be that they felt farming 
practice was left largely unmanaged during the M.C.P. era, but when it came to specific 
communal work and self-help projects it was widely recognised that force was visibly and 
regularly employed, most often by the Malawi Young Pioneers. The youth wing of the Party 
often used violent behaviour to urge farmers to participate, and to punish non-adherence of 
work activities. This use of force was increasingly possible in the confusing atmosphere over 
where “the right” to punish labour contraventions such as the lack of participation in 
community activities, such as chidikiti, lay.93 The practice of performing chidikiti, a form of 
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communal labour, had been long used by the missionaries at Livingstonia as a way of raising 
money, but after Independence this way of organising labour began increasingly to be used by 
the M.C.P. In one of the few ethnographic observations of agricultural change during early 
Malawian independence Gregson’s data collection from the Henga village of Chimwemwe – a 
Tumbuka settlement just 70 miles from Hewe –can be usefully employed in the analysis of 
M.C.P. policy from this time.94  
Gregson records that seven chidikiti groups were in operation in Chimwemwe during 
the 1967-68 hoeing season, and only one of these groups was organised by what had previously 
been the only instigator of such activity, a local parish of the C.C.A.P synod. A further group was 
organised by the local Youth League – under the umbrella of the local branch of the M.C.P., and 
five were organised directly through the M.C.P. local branch itself).95  
At this time the way they operated was that the M.C.P. at district level would “levy each 
branch a certain amount of money, a demand which had originated on the national level”.96 The 
village headmen had, at first, taken on the responsibility of turning “the money over to the local 
branch, with or without compensation from their villagers”; this he had raised at first by 
himself, arranging chidikiti through the usual methods of patronage, but the M.C.P. organisation 
was on hand to assist, with Youth Leaguers available to “convince” noncompliant villagers.97  
Chidikiti, however, meant labouring for nothing material. Workers received neither beer 
(as they would have done with Kulimizgo group labour) nor reciprocal labour for their efforts, 
and the rate in which people worked on such projects reflected this lack of reward.  “When at 
the completion of a chidikiti, the party official receives the cash from the garden owner and 
flourishes it for all to see, there is no apparent indication that the workers feel in this way 
compensated”;98 a villager in Chimwemwe suggested to Gregson that a large number of people 
ignored vidikiti and refused to contribute money to the party, “another man complained that 
villagers shouldn’t have to work to raise money for the purpose of feeding Party visitors, since 
they are on expense accounts anyway. This man was nearly imprisoned”.99 
As Gregson observed it in Chimwemwe village, the effectiveness of traditional methods 
of calling for this type of labour soon changed, with the authority of chiefs waning in some 
places and the rewards apparently non-existent: “With the failure of Village Headmen to 
mobilize villagers for work, the M.C.P. Branch Chairman elected in 1967 made two innovations. 
First, he decided to bypass Village Headmen completely, dividing eight villages into two vidikiti 
areas cutting across village boundaries, and secondly he instructed Youth Leaguers to tour the 
villages before and during vidikiti in order to discover shirkers”,100 with those in the advanced 
stages of pregnancy, sick and aged persons given exemption.  
This ethnographic description is backed up by other archival sources from Rumphi 
recorded around the same time, which suggest a broader district-wide concern about the 
Party’s behaviour when dealing with labour and taxation. The chidikiti projects were said, by 
some, to be ‘voluntary’ but there was a lack of clarity around how they were really supposed to 
operate, particularly when it came to the role of force in ensuring it got done. Whilst some said 
that it was possible to get out of doing it by paying a fine, there are several recorded cases from 
Rumphi of those who deliberately “fail[ed] to go and do voluntary work” and were told to pay 
1/;101 but much harsher punishments were also regularly given and the villagers of 
Chimwemwe also complained of overzealous Youth Leaguers who beat people regularly. 
 
Confusion and inconsistency 
Banda made out that he had wanted to “establish a more compliant, better disciplined youth 
movement” early on in 1961, but it was not until 1964 after he suspended the wayward and 
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headstrong leader of the youth movement, John Chikwawa, that his control over the M.Y.P. 
became fully cemented and his aspiration to use the organisation as his own private police 
force, on the lines of Nkrumah’s Young Pioneers in Ghana took shape.102 It was from this point 
that they began to operate under the patronage of the President, receiving material support for 
policing internal dissent, as well as many of the new external threats the country was facing. 
Nevertheless, even whilst their use of force was relatively effective in attaining a powerful 
position within rural communities, their often grave errors of judgment in the village setting 
ensured that chiefs of long-standing repute such as Timothy Chawinga would not easily be 
displaced. 
The police and army were also beginning to resent the youth leaguers for their tendency 
to usurp their function as keepers of order103 and examples from the archive demonstrate that it 
was the M.Y.P. that increasingly meted out the “punishments”, the right to which the chiefs 
claimed belonged to them. These activities rather call into question whether the Party was 
really trying to instil a “self-help spirit” into communities, or was simply trying to control them 
more closely.  
Chipembere’s early conclusions that people were now willing to build roads, schools and 
clinics without any financial assistance or initiative from the Government, and that this showed 
the confidence that people had in the Party,104 seemed more than a little exaggerated in this 
confusing landscape of enforcement where the Malawi Young Pioneers movement thrived as “a 
law unto themselves, creating tension between their members, civilians, and the police force 
which while charged with preserving law and order had little control over them”.105 
In one example of such behaviour, drawn from Hewe in September 1965, Godfrey Mfune 
a resident of Kaduku village wrote to the Government Agent exposing certain violent acts 
undertaken by the Party branch in his area: 
 
“The thing that troubles me very much is this, is it a rule or is it allowed that if a person is late in 
paying the money that he was told to pay in the branch we should kick him? I don’t know whether I 
have done a mistake to write you this question. I am the one who is kicked for such a reason. I am 
kicked by the one of the cabinet members of the Kaduku branch. My M (sic) is to know whether we 
are allowed to kick one another”.106 
 
In light of the rise of such activities in the countryside, chiefs continued to complain that 
they did not know what was expected of them anymore. They had been given no guidance as to 
how they were supposed to exercise their duties, particularly when it came to the practicalities 
of having and maintaining the authority to administer “development”.  
Even after the Chiefs Act was drawn up some years afterwards in 1967 in order to deal 
with some of the confusion, many were left disappointed by the lack of explanation given by 
District Commissioners who had not taken any steps to relay to them what powers the Act gave 
to them, and they continued to “carry out their official duties with some appreciable 
uncertainty”.107 After this time they took to warning the government that unless the ability to 
administer penalties to their people was restored to them, the population at large would 
continue to be lazy in their application of government initiatives: 
 
 “The chiefs asked if government could consider the question of allowing Chiefs as in the past to 
punish members of their community who slacked in participating in self-help schemes. This 
punishment should take the form of asking such people to perform double work of any work 
specified to be done in the area or village. In this way the chiefs hope to ensure that everybody 
participated in self help schemes from which they too benefited in the end”.108  
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The random acts of violence which the M.Y.P. were continually associated with were 
officially condemned but whilst their behaviour was discouraged it was inconsistently dealt 
with. As late as 1968, following a lengthy observational tour of the district, letters from the D.C. 
Rumphi to the District Secretary of the M.C.P. in Rumphi warned against violence, that no one 
should be “beaten up […] if they did not co-operate in Chidikiti. Whilst chidikiti is a very very 
useful thing there is no law which authorises certain members of the public to force or beat 
people for chidikiti. This should be achieved by persuasion and cooperation and nobody is 
entitled to under the Law to charge a levy for people who are not able to go for chidikiti”.109 The 
promised “training” of these M.Y.P. members who patrolled borders, policed agriculture and 
upheld “Party values”, had little if any quantifiable effect upon this thuggish behaviour; an 
upsurge in violent incidents, rather than a decline, was more notable over time. 
The case of Chief Mwalweni,110 another chief in Rumphi District, illustrates that control 
over this sort of voluntary labour was still highly contested almost five years after 
Independence. When Mwalweni’s wife, Nyashawa, excused herself from chidikiti with no valid 
reason and was punished by the Youth League for it, the chief questioned their right to do this: 
“I do not want a strange chairman to do this with my family and I can close the Youth League 
office and the branch too can stop Youth League”.111 Following this dispute Mwalweni called his 
village headmen to him to tell them that there should be a division between them (and their 
people) and the party “such that the party should be left alone completely and he and his v. 
headmen should be together on the other side independently without any connections being 
maintained between”.112  
Mwalweni was convinced of his own authority and right, being the owner of the land 
and the traditional leader of the people who lived there, he told the government in no uncertain 
terms that this branch of the party was under him: “I can close this M.C.P. office […] From now 
any matters concerning chidikiti should be referred to me and my cases regarding those who 
will fail to go to chidikiti will be taken to court by me only, and not by any youth leaguer”.113 The 
line from the government too was clear; that such behaviour by the Youth Leaguers was not 
acceptable: “I have heard several complaints from people in sub-chief Mwalweni’s area of old 
people being beaten up by Youth Leaguers if they did not co-operate in chidikiti. Whilst chidikiti 
is a very very useful thing there is no law which authorises certain members of the public to 
force or beat people for chidikiti. This should be achieved by persuasion and cooperation and 
nobody is entitled to under the Law to charge a levy for people who are not able to go for 
Chidikiti”.114  
This form of communal labour provided an opportunity for the party to become an 
increasingly felt force in the countryside, however. Even in the areas where traditional authority 
was able to stand up for itself the pressure which the M.Y.P. brought to bear on local 
communities to purchase membership cards and tow the party line was increasing. Chidikiti was 
more than simply a tool for Party fundraising; its very nature was creating new expressions of 
hierarchy and new fault lines within the agricultural communities in which it operated that 
would play to the advantage of the party in the battle versus the old order. 
 
Old chiefs vs. the new party men 
Chidikiti was a form of labour which could be called upon by those farmers within the 
community who were wealthy enough, and well aligned with the Party to gain access to it. The 
example of a Chimwemwe storekeeper “contributing cash to the Party in lieu of his wives’ 
participation in vidikiti”, in Gregson’s account of these labour practices shows clearly that 
“chidikiti labor is viewed as a contribution of time and effort which has cash value”.115 The 
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farmer in question preferred that his wives worked for him, on his own farm, and he knew the 
value of their labour. In Rumphi there was a scarcity of agricultural labourers and as such all 
forms of labour to assist with garden preparation, weeding and other one-off jobs was in high 
demand. Not only could you pay your way out of this commitment you could, if one had enough 
capital and “an inside track”, “contract with the Party for this labor at a rate about half that of a 
casual labourer, laborers who work alone or in pairs at rates based on acres”.116  
The vidikiti hosts whom Gregson observed in 1967-68 were all of some standing in 
Chimwemwe: 3 headmen, 2 maize mill owners, a commercial farmer and storekeeper, a Youth 
League official (and his mother), an official of the local MCP branch, and a prominent millet 
farmer.117 These trends reflect the growing Party concern of supporting loyal farmers who were 
commercially minded, investing their money into agriculture and selling much of their crop at 
the ADMARC markets. 
This trend where growing numbers of independent entrepreneurial voices were 
emerging took place in Hewe too. In some of the correspondence written by Timothy Chawinga 
to his headmen after 1967 an attempt to uphold his authority in the face of these new elements 
is clear. Firstly he continues to promote these activities himself for the general betterment of his 
area; in one letter he praises his people for putting their hearts in to vidikiti and making lots of 
money for building the secondary school, getting a maize mill, contributing to the regional office 
in Mzuzu.118 But he made sure that the DC, MP’s and MCP District Chairman119 were all made 
aware of his anger over the party’s increasing interference in his area. On one occasion in 
November 1967 he wrote to his chiefs with concerns about the party branches and their poor 
handling of things in Hewe. “I have seen in most villages that some of the people whom they say 
are leaders of MCP misled people not to put heart on self-help projects […] I will speak to them if 
they continue misleading people”.120  
Munthali, the chairman of the Hewe area MCP branch, evidently paid no mind in taking 
decisions about local issues without consulting either Chief Katumbi or the higher branch of the 
MCP at District or National level. At the Area Conference held on 27th April 1968 he, with his 
members, took the decision that “there should be no one in Hewe whether with a store, grinding 
mill, to sell his goods with maize e.g. clothes, soap and sault (sic), or else paying maize as money 
at the grinding mill. This starts from 1st April 1968. The one who is found doing so his or her 
store or grinding mill will be closed down. Most of the people waists a lot of maize at the stores 
and grinding mills. When the FMB markets come they sell nothing and they do not find money 
for their taxes”.121  
The local branch was trying to compete directly with Katumbi, trying to change laws in 
arenas where the chief had always presided; about the price of beer, about the presence and 
activities of the market (conference lodged a complaint to build a market for 1968 to sell the 
beans, maize and tomatoes widely available), and in establishing and maintaining local 
amenities. Making a swipe at Chawinga, who had organised the building of the maternity clinic 
in the first instance, the Hewe branch conference discussed at some length the terrible state of 
this amenity; “There are no beds for babies, no beds for mothers, the floor is bad, the roof is bad 
but they pay after their births. This should be put in order”.122 
These tensions did not reflect a straightforward battle between “the Party” and “the 
chiefs” though; divisions were growing within the party structures too and in particular 
between the branch, district and national levels of command. Whatever the reason for the MCP 
branch to try and introduce new local “laws” in Hewe, whether it was an attempt to get money 
circulating for their own enrichment through taxes and fines or for some other reason, it 
generate a serious reaction from the District level who admonished the branch members for 
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constructing their own legislation: “It is not up to you to make such laws. It is up to the Council 
or our main government, if we have given them our complaints about the same matters as you 
have said. Please never do such things on your own wills. We are more concerned on law 
making. Let the laws be made by the government, and I am speaking as a District Chairman of 
MCP Rumpi”.123 Furthermore, economically significant individuals began to play an increasing 
role in decision making at the local level, often usurping Party officials and chiefs.  
 
Achikumbe farmers: linking agriculture and patrimonial politics 
In Hewe Jim Ngwira was recognised as one such farmer and was invited along in May 1967 to 
attend a meeting about the Government’s direction for agriculture by the Minister of 
Development and Planning; Ngwira was, at this time, also the MCP local court magistrate at 
Katowo.124 Whilst farmers like Ngwira were prioritised the average farmer continued to be 
penalised in the process; “production quotas were introduced to restrict production and 
exclude the inefficient producer”125 and the world tobacco boom and increasing emphasis on 
estate development was managed by placing a heavy tax on smallholder agriculture through the 
state marketing board.126 There began a growing disparity between the trend of prices paid by 
the grower of, for example, dark fired tobacco (the principal peasant-grown tobacco variety) 
and that received by the marketing board at auction. “It is clear that the price differential began 
to widen in the later 1960s when ADMARC failed to pass on to the peasant grower any 
significant proportion of world price increases”,127 write Kidd and Christiansen.  
By changing its pricing policy “from paying out as near world prices as possible to one of 
deliberately creating an invisible surplus, the FMB moved from a deficit of nearly K4m in 1967-
8 to large profits in 1969-70 and even larger profits after 1971”.128 Most of the profits were sunk 
into the development of African owned estate production which does not sound so problematic, 
but in real terms this meant that the marketing organisation was in fact financing individual 
farms owned by Banda and other senior members of MCP.129  
Along with the investment in these estates there came a lean towards the privatisation 
of land. The Land Law of Malawi – which had hitherto been based on 1902 English land law – 
was amended in 1966 and three new Land Bills were enacted; the Customary Land Bill; the 
Registered Land Bill; and the Local Land Boards Bill.130 Indeed certain chiefs “won” some 
recognition and status in the light of these changes. Some land was considered more 
agriculturally valuable, especially in terms of the potential it had to attract more settlers and 
produce more crops.  
The salary of chiefs, which we have already touched upon in a more general sense, also 
increasingly reflected this potential. The case of sub-chief Mwankunikila illustrates this trend; 
the MP, NA and MCP District chairman all agreed that his salary should be increased as “it must 
also be remembered that his area is the main coffee producing area and as such, it is likely that 
in future many people will want to settle in his area in order to open coffee farms”.131  
The main aim of all of these reforms was to benefit large landowners with privately 
owned farms such as Banda himself and the political elites gathered around him. It was one 
thread of a party hegemony that was maintained through “a system of patronage and asset 
entitlement that guaranteed the support of a loyal bourgeoisie and a kulak class of 
entrepreneurial farmers”.132 In this context where emerging local political elites found new 
opportunities for wealth and influence more directly through the Party organisation as well as 
indirectly through large-scale farming activity, chiefs had to manoeuvre in new landscapes of 
power. Bond’s study of Muyombe, barely 50 kilometres to the west of Hewe on the Zambian side 
of the border provides some more detailed sense of how such change afoot in these 
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communities. Bond noted that by 1964 local UNIP leaders had access to new wealth 
“accumulated from the sale of UNIP membership cards”133 and new influence through their 
political organisation which forcibly included most of the people living in the area. Bond 
described their position at this time as being very powerful. This power transformed into 
authority as these UNIP local leaders manoeuvred themselves into positions within the chiefly 
court, thereby influencing its policies as well as making their own decisions “within the context 
of the UNIP subregion branch”.134  
Whilst Chawinga himself gave little scope for similar elements to break in within his 
own chiefly organisation he was unable to stop their more general influence on the population, 
as the previous chapter has shown. The main challenge to his leadership came through personal 
relationships in the context of local politics and not through Banda’s own decision to go after 
him as a threat. Banda was still, after all, raising his salary even as Chawinga was making serious 
complaints about the Malawi Young Pioneers. It was not so much that Banda himself wanted to 
get rid of Chawinga, but the growing distrust between the M.Y.P. and the chief, plus the rising 
opportunities for alternative authorities both economically and politically in Hewe were enough 
to ensure that his position was increasingly insecure from 1968 onwards. 
It was the local Party membership, as well as key members of the community such as 
Ngwira and Mwangonde, with whom he had begun to fall out with, who were the ones who set 
his decline in motion. It is instructive to consider the downfall of Chawinga through the familiar 




Part three. From Borderland to Border Post 
 
Strange faces, refugees and thieves: The advantage of being a chief in a borderland  
The fact that Hewe occupied a place so close to the international border, and the historical 
interconnection it had with both the chieftaincy and the people in the Isoka and Lundazi, and 
latterly carved out Chama, Districts, has been explored repeatedly throughout the book. In 
relation to Timothy Chawinga’s chieftainship in particular it has been shown how he used this 
position to try and strengthen his standing in the area, to increase his population, land and 
prestige through joining together the Katumbi chieftainship on the other side of the border, a 
chieftainship that contained a community with ambiguous allegiance to both the Katumbi chiefs 
and to other chiefs in the Northern Rhodesian territory. To some extent the border enabled 
certain practices, hunting and trading in particular, to carry on with little policing. Moreover it 
provided a certain “escape route” that was used either in times of famine, or indeed political 
unrest, as happened during the State of Emergency.135  
The borderland position of Hewe became precarious in the eyes of the new African 
government. Both for the fact that it was now an entry point for so-called “thieves” and “rebels”, 
and because it was a more difficult place to police internal dissent. From the state’s perspective 
it also posed difficulties of policing tax evasion and monitoring an extremely mobile cross-
border population. Timothy Chawinga was perhaps able to maintain his position in the first few 
years of independence as the Government needed a strong presence to police movement and 
keep out “the rebels”. With no court, no scope to make official orders as he had done under the 
colonial regime, and a limited body of staff to help him carry out his duties, Katumbi was reliant 
on M.C.P. structures to ensure the smooth running of his area,136 however there are certain 
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cases which demonstrate how he continued to use this locality, and the authority he had here, to 
his advantage.  
One unexpected benefit of policing a border area, and one that he knew very well, 
occurred when in the run up to Zambian Independence the witchcraft eradication movement of 
Alice Lenshina and her Lumpa Church began to have an impact on communities not far from the 
Nyasaland border. Lenshina had attracted many followers to her church especially in the 
uncertain times before Zambian Independence, but the popularity of the movement became a 
direct threat to the African nationalist party in Zambia, United National Independence Party 
(U.N.I.P.), who competed with it for members of disenfranchised rural communities.137 The 
conflict between U.N.I.P. and the Lumpa Church reached a climax in between July and October 
1964, just before Northern Rhodesia's independence. The violence spread across the northern 
and eastern provinces of the country, where support for the Church was at its strongest. Many 
people who were being terrorized by Lumpa members fled their villages and sought refuge 
elsewhere. The movement itself had no impact within Hewe, but the fallout from its violent 
campaigns within the districts immediately neighbouring Katumbi’s chiefdom did send people 
running his way. 
This activity presented several unexpected benefits for Chawinga, who used it not only 
to swell his coffers but as a self-promotion exercise, during which time he represented himself 
as an efficient, helpful representative of Government. Chawinga was not only close in proximity 
to certain of the hotspots during this campaign, as we know he had familial connections 
there;138 the archive records that Chawinga went to Muyombe and Sitwe at the height of the 
terrors in order to “reassure” the people in those places of the support of their Malawian 
neighbours at this time.139 
After the “mopping up” operations had ceased across the border, at the end of 1964, 
Chawinga submitted his claim for expenses incurred from a thirty day period of supporting the 
five women and five children who had fled to Hewe during the troubles; “I claim £45 for feeding 
the refugees, (4/- per day for the adults) 2/- per day for the children”,140 he demanded. These 
somewhat extreme claims did not pass through unexamined. The Government Agent in Rumphi 
questioned his request, writing to the Secretary to the Prime Minister that both he and the 
Officer in Charge of Police in Rumphi found the claim “exorbitant”.141 The Police Military Force 
(P.M.F.) Platoon which was based at Katowo reported no significant numbers of refugees and 
not one of them believed that the refugees who had come were there for the thirty days that 
Chawinga spoke of. The immediate response of the Government Agent to Chawinga’s request 
had been to tell “the Themba that Government would help with a few bags of maize and I 
imagined two or three bags would suffice the refugees that I saw”.142 Nevertheless, Chawinga is 
highly praised in the same correspondence for the efforts that he did make in the area; so much 
so that he is painted to be somewhat of a hero for the people involved:  
 
“The Themba was most useful both to the PMF and the Malawi Rifles and Police and his going 
forward to Muyombe in the early stages with the Royal Rhodesian Platoon (who were the escort 
platoon of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment P.O.L) no doubt saved or at least reassured the 
Muyombe people, who had been surrounded by Lenshina followers. It is also true to say that there 
were no killings in the mopping up of Lenshina camps near our boundary and good relation 
exist”.143  
 
Just as would be seen a few years later with the private discussions which take place 
about increasing Chief Katumbi’s salary, it is in the unofficial file notes attached to these pieces 
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of correspondence where more revealing aspects of the Government’s actions toward Timothy 
Chawinga can be witnessed. “The feeding of refugees was supposed to have been undertaken by 
the [Farmers Marketing Board], but, Chief Katumbi being in rather a remote area and pretty 
close to the trouble I do not think we need quibble about this”, the Secretary to the Prime 
Minister scribbles in response to the rather cynical view of Katumbi’s expense claims. “The 
charges are perhaps somewhat excessive, but I take the view that in present circumstances the 
chief should be reimbursed in accordance with the amount he claims. The chief obviously 
cooperated fully at this time and was of considerable assistance”.144 
It is possible to imagine that the chief had the welfare of these people foremost in his 
mind but besides offering protection and assistance to them his responses to the troubles 
clearly had the additional benefit of augmenting his regional prowess and enhancing his 
reputation. People from Hewe remember him welcoming these refugees into the community, 
and far from them being the financial “burden” he depicted them to the Government as, he was 
said to encouraged them to stay and marry within the area,145 despite the fact that both the 
Government Agent and the Officer in Charge of the Police instructed the PMF Platoon and the 
Themba to encourage them to go back to Northern Rhodesia as soon as was possible.146 
 
A territorial challenge: from “remote” to “threatening”, 1964-1974 
The diplomatic context of Malawi changed considerably with Zambian Independence; from this 
time forth, and especially after the Cabinet Crisis, border areas were watched and boundaries 
more rigorously enforced. Chawinga co-operated in these campaigns to increase security, 
reporting ‘strangers’ coming from Tanganyika and Zambia to MCP representatives within Hewe 
as he had been asked to do. In one example, a letter he wrote to Gondwe the DC of Rumphi in 
March 1965, he reassured him that he was watching carefully for these unwanted elements; “we 
are well united here”, he wrote “you will remember that 3 men from Tanganyika ware (sic) 
caught by the villahe (sic) headman Chembe in December, and handed over to the Youth League 
and then to the Police at Rumpi and we shall go on like that”147.  
It was not only Banda’s fears about the rebels covertly returning to disrupt his rule 
which forced him to reconsider the role of such borderlands. Antagonism had developed 
between Zambia and Malawi over the decision of the Malawians to maintain diplomatic 
relationships with the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. One of the consequences of 
this decision was that clearer guidelines had to be established on how to interpret the 
immigration regulations which had been put in place at the end of Federation in 1963.  
The Zambians had closed their southern border with the white regime of Southern 
Rhodesia following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. The closure of the 
border with Rhodesia sent many Zambian migrant workers back to their home country and as a 
result a tighter border control was desired with Malawi, as well as a change in the regulations 
for their entrance to work in Zambia. This was required in order “to ensure fuller employment 
for Zambians”148 who were being repatriated from Rhodesia. Various interpretations of the 
immigration regulations had been employed to refuse entry to one or other of the Malawian or 
Zambian nationals who wished to migrate, or simply visit, the other country since the end of 
Federation in 1963.  
By 1966 it had become imperative that the border be defined and clear policy guidelines 
developed on the approach of Government Agents to all forms of local immigration into Malawi; 
a significant shift from the federal system, in which no strict demarcation of borders had been 
necessary. Of course this was not an easy task in a place such as Hewe, especially with regard to 
those people who lived and farmed close to the border, and whom often had family in the other 
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territory and whose livelihoods depended on this ease of movement across the ‘divide’. At first 
it was agreed that to solve these problems a Resident’s Border Pass – first used by Rhodesians 
during Federation – might be usefully distributed to those living within a distance of perhaps 
ten miles of the Malawi/Zambia Border with the idea of giving these populations a certain 
freedom to still come and go.149 However these had first been used for the purposes of 
regulating employment during the Federal period and there was a reticence to retain any form 
of legislation from this time, especially from the Zambian point of view.150  
The harsh policing by the Malawi Young Pioneers against local people in the border 
areas not only incensed the Zambian government, it caused serious tension amongst the local 
populations. Reports came in from Zambians who had been beaten badly whilst involved in 
“unfortunate incidents at border controls” managed by an “uncontrolled group of bully-boys 
enforcing the party line”.151 Zambian officials regularly complained about the security measures 
experienced when “forced to pass through Malawi. On occasions the pretext of a search had 
been extended to MYP to include beatings and damage to property”.152  
Rather than training the local branch members whose role it was to patrol the borders 
and tempering the violence they were so often associated with, the young party faithful became 
increasingly militarised and the MYP progressively became “a law unto themselves, creating 
tension between their members, civilians, and the police force which while charged with 
preserving law and order had little control over them”.153 They operated within the patronage 
of the President and received rewards for policing internal dissent, as well as external threats.  
Relations with neighbouring villages across the border from Hewe – neighbours who 
were historically strong trading and familial partners - became strained as the ‘work’ of the MYP 
took on an ever more defensive agenda. Villages such as Kanyerere in Zambia were vulnerable 
to MYP aggression as they were considerably closer to the Malawian border, which was a mere 
two miles away, than to the nearest Zambian Boma at Chama, which was 90 miles by road. The 
district annual report for 1970 highlighted this as a major concern: Kanyerere “is outside 
Zambian police coverage and as such has experienced sporadic incidents of lawlessness and 
criminals abound”;154 the “roving and not too peaceful Malawi Young Pioneers”155 were quickly 
blamed as instigators of this insecurity.  
Whilst people still moved back and forth to sell their goods at markets on both sides of 
the border, more formal interactions such as using the postal office and the health clinic became 
more risky prompting the villagers of Kanyerere to ask for their own services to reduce 
dependence on Malawi for them.156 From the Malawian point of view times were also troubling. 
Buses carrying passengers and trucks carrying Malawian goods were reportedly attacked as 
they made their way through Zambian territory; a tricky new road was cleared through the 
Nyika Highlands by the Royal Engineers in 1973 which was difficult to negotiate but at least 
enabled Malawians to avoid the Zambian “thieves” or vigwegwera as Kamuzu Banda famously 
began to refer to his easterly neighbours. When a new Lundazi-Isoka Road was built, it was 
reported that villagers were relieved at the prospect of this new route which would “save 
residents the embarrassment of having to pass through Malawi in order to get to other parts of 
Chama via Northern Province”.157 
Assurances had been made that M.Y.P. behaviour would improve as they were better 
trained,158 and further emphasis was placed on the organisation as the spearhead for an 
“agricultural revolution”, but the truth is that their “security duties” increasingly became the 
main task, particularly in border areas like Hewe. From 1968, when a new MYP base was 
established in the heart of Hewe, new threats to Chawinga’s authority were established. 
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The establishment of the Malawi Young Pioneers in Hewe 
One of the first Malawi Young Pioneers bases was built in Chitipa, in the far north of the country. 
This area had limited Government presence but with its open and porous border with Tanzania 
and Zambia to the north and west it needed more support once Federation ceased. It contained 
extremely mountainous and difficult to traverse landscape which easily accommodated anyone 
wishing to hide from the authorities. It had been one of the most difficult areas to police during 
State of Emergency less than 10 years before and was well known for harbouring “rebellious” 
elements.159 Chitipa was the obvious choice in which a strong Party presence would need to be 
established, and this came with a MYP base as early as 1963.   
Not long after the base had been established in Chitipa a warning came to Hewe from 
the League of Malawi Youth chairman there, J.C Nyirongo; writing to the Rumphi District 
Secretary of the MCP he copied Themba Katumbi in on his alarming letter of 25th March 1965: 
 
“You should be very careful to look out strange faces in the district mostly those entering Malawi. 
The rebels are intending of also attaching [sic] Rumpi this is Kanyama group and they want to enter 
by the west of Rumpi mostly Hewe area of our Themba Katumbi. Kanyama and Ching’Oli Chirwa 
would like to enter through that west Rumpi which is possible the road going to Mowa. People must 
be told of this so that they are aware of the rebels plan. Here at Chitipa they have tried and they are 
still trying to come but we are kept well tight and awareness of their plan to attack us here. The 
people and chiefs in this district they are really very strong and they have done a very wonderful job 
towards these rebels without the chiefs and the people in the villages these rebels would have 
managed to enter Chitipa but Youth League very tough and the people are really tought (sic) they 
don’t even give any way to these people and I wish you do the same as per your telegram to Ngwazi 
which you have sent to him asking him if people could go and fight Chipembere in Fort Johnson […] 
We are well armed and equipped but the villagers are very encouraging they are also armed 
patrolling as we do during the night. These rebels actually comes during the night and afternoon 
time. Warn people in Rumpi particularly in the area of Themba Katumbi (Hewe)”.160 
 
These warnings prompted a very quick response from Hewe where Katumbi made sure that the 
Party knew he was aware of the dangers and he would do his utmost to keep things under 
control. He organised a meeting in which all the people would be told to “watch carefully”, 
especially those in the more vulnerable places such as Mowa and in the Nyika highland areas. 
These warnings prompted him to request a visit to the MYP base in Chitipa in order for him and 
his people to learn how best to keep the rebels out.161  
By May 1965 Katumbi, along with a team of eight Malawi Congress Party Chairmen and 
the League of Malawi youths, went on “approved official journey”, to Chief Nyondo’s 
Headquarters in Chitipa; Katumbi had personally requested that this be made possible for him 
“to get real picture of the guard which is now being carried by the villagers of which I must 
teach my people here”.162 
In his report from the “study tour” he spoke highly of the healthy team of MYP based 
there and was impressed by the farming techniques used. Nyondo’s area lies adjacent to 
Tanzanian territory, with the Songwe River acting as the natural border. After they had visited 
the gardens and seen the kitchens the group was taken to see the boundary to visit some of the 
villages along the Songwe where Chawinga describes they saw “the people solidarty (sic) 
behind the Ngwazi and how they watch the new faces coming in the area and the team was very 
much impressed of this and how courage they are all the time”.163 Katumbi’s report is extremely 
enthusiastic and upbeat, and it finishes by describing how the group returned to Katowo 
“singing and rejoicing all along”.164 Of course such correspondence is routinely riddled with 
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plenty of lip-service and more than a peppering of Party propaganda. Chief Katumbi, it appeared 
from such reports, was a paid up supporter of the Government, a chief whose priorities were 
oriented to the Nation, and to the service of Dr Banda. 
The feeling that these places were under threat is tangible. Nyirongo, who had 
accompanied the group made sure to peddle his own brand of Party devotion by encouraging 
them all to be loyal to the Prime Minister, to help him “build our country”, to ensure that taxes of 
all kinds were paid as quickly as possible and to work together with chiefs and the Party to 
develop the district, and as such, the country. In the next couple of years, through an assortment 
of other correspondence and activities, it would become clear, however, that Timothy Chawinga 
was not entirely willing to simply be a cog in the Party machine.  
 
Policing Production: The Malawi Young Pioneers and MCP Youth League in Hewe 
In a 1973 Chancellor College Seminar paper entitled “A Survey of Hewe Young Pioneer Training 
Base” Austin Mkandawire sketches the background and aims of the movement, and its 
particularities in Hewe. This training base, he writes, “Has not restricted itself to nation building 
but has at one time worked hard to protect the country, especially the Hewe area in Rumphi 
District against outside forces”.165 Claiming that the aims of the Youth League had changed from 
its late colonial roots in smashing Federation, Mkandawire suggests that Dr Banda shifted their 
activities away from political organisation; “he turned the Youth League from a tool for breaking 
up of the federation to a ‘weapon’ to fight ignorance, disease and poverty, a tool for 
development”.166  Dr Banda set about informing his people that the MYP, a movement born out 
of the Youth League, would be formed to teach people, especially the future leaders – boys and 
girls – good methods of farming; by 1973 there were 21 bases around the country.  
The base at Hewe opened on the 20th January 1968 was envisaged as “playing a major 
role in nation building by making people interested in agriculture”.167 No mechanism farming 
was used simply the ‘traditional tools of the peasant farmer’ with the intention being that any 
agricultural practice which might be adopted by the small scale farmer with an absolute 
minimal of capital investment should be demonstrated. Field days were organised in order to 
instruct people on farming methods and “participation in field days cements relations with 
surrounding people”.  
From 1968-1973 20 men from the surrounding area, stirred by the activities of the base, 
have been selected to join the MYP. The impact of the base in Hewe was considered to be more 
than agricultural though.168 Being situated near or on the boundary between Malawi and 
Zambia “because of its strategic or frontier position here it could have a different history from 
other bases which are inland in respect of policing duties […] in 1964 and again 1967 there 
were moments of internal crises which involved border areas among other things. In such 
situations a base strategically placed would have policing duties to perform. Though the Hewe 
Base was started after these events its future role cannot be minimized with regard to help in 
maintaining law and order which is an important aspect of nation building”.169  
Chief Katumbi had been keen that the Government establish the Base in his territory, 
possibly not only for the attention this would bring the area but also for the added benefits such 
as the electrification of the part of the Valley in which the base was opened: “For the first time 
some people in Hewe saw electricity in 1968 […] Electricity gave most people in Hewe pride. 
Hewe was looked at as a very important place in Rumphi and it is said that at one time, the ex-
chief Katumbi told his people at Katowo Headquarters that he wanted electricity from Katowo 
to the base, a distance of one mile. If he had the money he should have put electricity all along 
the way”.170  
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Equally Chief Katumbi had been a traditional leader who had been granted a fair amount 
of local freedom and the government augmented his local prestige through an endorsement of 
salary increases and other privileges that few other chiefs were permitted. A battle over the 
naming of the MYP base in Hewe, however, reveals that there were more tensions, or at least 
growing ones, between the Government and this very single-minded chief than previous 
correspondence had perhaps let on.  
In the run up to the official opening of the Base Chawinga left Hewe in order to attend to 
various other business; whilst he was gone some correspondence had been passed confirming 
some of the details about the base, details which the chief could not agree on: “When I was in 
Blantyre this Base was named Hewe Base this was without consultation with the people and my 
village headmen. You asked me for a Land and I consulted my people and the Village Headmen 
and happly (sic) we gave the Land at that place, and when naming it you could still ask us what 
should be the name of the Base, as it stands at that place. I now tell you that at that place, the 
base muct (sic) be called KATUMBI BASE (his emphasis)”.171  
He followed up this rant to the DC Rumphi with a further letter to the Rumphi District 
Chairman of the MCP just 5 days later, and he had no intention of keeping it a private quarrel, 
copying all MCP areal chairmen in Rumphi, the MPs for Rumphi West and East, and all chiefs 
and sub-chiefs of the district.  It is worth quoting at length: 
 
“You asked us for a Land and we voluntary gave up the Land you do not know what the place must 
be called, in turn you could ask us again what this place should be called. We could tell you the 
names of that place, I as a chief I am concerned of the Land and the names of all the places in this 
area, it was no good for you your self to nem (sic) that part of the Land as Hewe, as you approached 
us for the Land you could also approached us for the name I think, I am right on that. Your letter is 
an abusive one to me, I do not agree with that name either, do not make me fear you, you are 
writing to some people who are not concerned of that particular Land and the name of the Land, 
there are 6 names if you asked us, but because you as chairman then you named it your self, I am 
sure you do not know the name of all the portions of the Land in Katumbi’s area, therefore, I do not 
agree with you at all. I am not indulging my self into Politics I am speaking about the Land and the 
names of that particular Land, to some people your writing are not concerned of that Land or the 
name of that Land. I cannot agree because you are the District Chairman chiefly on this matter, not 
at all, the Base can not be called Hewe”.172  
 
What goes on in-between is only to be guessed at as no interim letters are to be found, but what 
is observable is that only a week or so later, on 25 January 1968; Timothy has written a letter to 
the Rumphi Police Office referring to a house available for an officer to be posted to the “Hewe 
Training Base”.173 And by 12 February any dispute with the base he seems to have had is not 
apparent asking as he does for all his chiefs to send children in their areas who are in standard 8 
to “Bezi” (base) where they would “Master muwemi wakumanya kulima” (“master very well 
how to farm”).174  
Just when it seems that no more is to be said about it a letter comes from the Office of 
the Regional Minister to the DC Rumphi, some three months later warning that Katumbi must 
“put in a direct apology in connection with Hewe Young Pioneers Base. The first letter he wrote 
to this Office is not accepted. I would suggest that you help the Chief in drafting this second 
letter which should reach this office not later than 30 June, 1968, and if by this date the letter is 
not received the base will be removed”.175 We can only assume that Katumbi’s “apology” was 
accepted as the base continued to be known as ‘Hewe’ and it remained in the area for many 
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years to come; perhaps, however, the beginning of a breakdown in relationship between 
Katumbi and the Party had its origins in this fractious time.   
 
 
Part four. The end of the road 
 
Timothy’s Arrest 
During the MCP Convention of 1973 a question was asked to all attendees: whether Manowa 
Chirwa, one of the former members of Banda’s government who had been swept out during the 
cabinet crisis, should be allowed back into his country for the few remaining years of his life. 
Several chiefs, including Timothy were in favour of the motion. After the convention the 
chairman of the MCP, Egbert Chilambo demanded that all those chiefs who would have invited 
this “thief” back into the country to apologise, and Timothy refused. “What should I apologise 
for, I’ve done nothing wrong!”176 He did not get arrested immediately but he was restricted by 
the Party from moving freely around in Hewe and specifically barred from participating in any 
of the development activities in his area. Chawinga had never liked being told what to do in his 
area, so predictably he went about his business as usual even after these warnings. On one 
occasion as he went to visit a project in Chisimuka, surveying the area to find an outlet for piped 
water, it is said that Party members reported him to the Government; it was at this point that 
they took his title from him. Village Headman Chembe, Austin Mfune, who was with Timothy 
whilst he was searching for water at the springs, remembers that people had been spying on 
them at the time and reported that “we were having a meeting”, which was not permitted. 
Chembe and other chiefs friendly with Kamangilira were called and asked for statements.  
The real reasons for Timothy’s arrest are difficult to pin down, some say it was on 
account of his stubbornness (“nkwesa”) in wanting his own way;177 this was demonstrated at 
the time of the convention to which he turned up late178. In typical style he had chosen to forego 
attendance at the opening ceremony, clashing as it did with his own local Mulindafwa 
celebrations; it was just another in a long string of decisions which unapologetically placed his 
agenda before that of the government. Others, however, imagine that his arrest was part of a 
more systematic attempt to get rid of people who were not on good terms with the local party 
organisation; the many others who were arrested around Chawinga at the time is perhaps 
evidence of this. Munthali, the District Commissioner at this time, identified seven people who 
had been “influenced” by Chawinga “to create conflict among the people in Hewe area”: Golden 
Chawinga (Village Headman Thanila); Nathaniel Kachali (Village Headman Khutamaji); John 
Nundwe (Village Headman Mgugu), who was identified in the letter as “leader”; Joshua 
Chilambo (Village Headman Nteweta); Elton Munthali (Village Mwachibanda); Study Luhanga 
(one of Chawinga’s councillors from Chikunguweya village); and Donalise Ng’ambi, “a woman 
friend of Mr. Timothy Chawinga”.179 Austin Mfune remembers that these people, as well as the 
acting headman Kasalika, and other councillor Yotam Chawinga, were arrested at night whilst 
plotting a plan for their chiefs release.180  
Timothy himself was never told the reason why he had been arrested and at first he 
even refused to come out of jail as a protest against this injustice. Even for the historian it is 
hard to piece together the turn of events as only scant evidence has so far been found; further 
research and more interviews around these matters are certainly needed to verify and deepen 
the discussion about what really happened. There is, according to Mapanje, “irrefutable oral 
knowledge, commonly shared by those who knew what was going on under Banda” that the 
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arrests and harsh treatment associated with the one party state – particularly in the last 15 
years of Banda’s rule – were not done on Banda’s initiative but were discussed and ordered 
mainly through his cronies, in particular John Tembo and his niece Cecilia Kadzamira, who 
would become Kamuzu’s mistress.181 Van Donge argues however that this “Tembo-Kadzamira 
Syndrome”, was just a way of displacing blame from Banda.182  
When comparing the case study of the M.Y.P. base, which relates the growing 
resentment amongst the local MCP branches toward Chawinga, and using the ample evidence 
from within Hewe itself which suggests strongly that the arrest of Chawinga in 1974 was stage-
managed by Tembo and Gwanda Chakwamba and not Banda;183 tensions that were forged at the 
local level, and manipulated rather by party elites who had other things to lose, must be taken 
seriously. One of Timothy’s sons was convinced of Tembo’s involvement in his father’s arrest. 
Using the Malawi Young Pioneers encampment in Hewe as a base, it is said that Tembo visited 
Hewe “secretly” to spy on his activities and get information from them in order to collect 
evidence for his arrest; he had been “fearing” the rise of Timothy Chawinga, Norman claims, on 
account of his close relationship with Banda, and he wanted his deposition.184  
The fact that after Timothy was arrested, 12 other people, including 9 village headmen, 
were later also taken to prison demonstrates perhaps that the problem did not rest with one 
chief who had become too self-important but that it was a more systematic sweeping out of 
“disloyal” elements.185 Timothy had become rather high profile, he was increasingly outspoken 
following the shift towards a Chewa centred politics and civil service. After it had been decided 
that Chichewa would be brought in as the official language of the nation, it is reported that 
Chawinga spoke against this policy on the radio and from this time had fallen out of favour with 
Banda.186 
However, it is likely that things were a little more complicated in this patrimonial state 
which had weaved a complex web of highly sensitive relationships and shifting loyalties. From 
oral sources it is known that Timothy was not on such good terms with the local members of the 
MCP.187 He spoke out against the dominance of the Party in creating new laws in Hewe saying 
openly that “the chairman of the MCP cannot rule us”.188 Other stories tell of a new tension 
which emerged between Chawinga and the headmaster of the school, John Mwangonde, his 
formerly close friend and ally, after they quarrelled about something which can only be guessed 
at, though many allege was on account of Timothy’s love affair with the teachers wife, 
NyaZgambo.189  
A large number of sources spoke of Chawinga “going about” with other women during 
his time as Themba Katumbi, but that he managed to keep their husbands close to him at the 
same time, so there might be more than a little truth in tales of this rumoured affair.190 The 
reasons behind it are also not perhaps as straightforward; perhaps it was a way of wrestling 
back some power from the teacher, in light of Mwangonde’s local popularity. The adulterous 
relationship is nevertheless unverifiable; it remains – like so many of the actions of Timothy 
Chawinga – as a fragment in the collective imagination of the Hewe people.191 Yet, whatever did 
happen between Mwangonde and Chawinga it had the effect of augmenting a serious dispute 
which as a consequence meant the headmaster allied himself more with the MCP elements 
within Hewe, even if their association was conducted on a more private basis.  
By the end of the 1960s Mwangonde had found a new ally in Jim Ngwira, who was the 
court magistrate and at this stage a leading member of the local Party branch. The rupture 
between the teacher and chief saw animosity toward Chawinga increase amongst school 
children, and letters were found in the school rooms written by students against the chief’s 
“unreasonable” behaviour. This reaction amongst the youth of Hewe tallies with what was 
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taking place throughout the country; McCracken highlights that “protests and demonstrations in 
schools were a regular feature of political activity from the late 1950s”, and a great many of the 
people turning up to Banda’s rallies after his release from prison were under the age of 20.192 
The young people in Hewe and the MYP often overlapped in their disillusionments with 
the old guard and students were said to have been susceptible to the propaganda of the Young 
Pioneers. The local MYP members invented a song, for example, which imagined the chief as a 
big terrible snake (chinjoka) who wanted to kill “our children, Mwangonde and Ngwira”; this 
spread throughout the area.193 The narratives of Chawinga’s powerful medicine re-emerge in 
this story, and the teacher and magistrate were told repeatedly not to go and eat food or drink 
anyhow, as they were now in serious danger.194 It was a song that spread like wildfire around 
the area. 
In the light of this scanty, but hard to ignore evidence, it cannot be concluded that 
Chawinga’s arrest and imprisonment was a decision driven entirely by Banda, but rather that it 
also involved some serious crisis of authority internally. In this atmosphere the behaviour 
which Chawinga had displayed both publicly and privately could easily be framed differently 
and used against him. The loss of authority made bravery look like arrogance, cleverness look 
like corruption, and entitlement look like adultery. As one villager reflected, Chawinga took 
advantage of his chiefly status during the colonial period, and that this was a time in which he 
had been “storing good things up for himself (iyo ndiyo akatukukanga wanthu cha)”; he was 
able to build up the wealth to buy cars and build a nice house. This may have been good for him 
in the short-term, but his “corrupt ways” of getting money were his undoing this villager 
reflected. “At first people were afraid to report him but some started to talk about him with the 
government and then he was arrested. If he had avoided corruption he would have died a very 
popular chief. He started very well and ended up swindling people”.195 
 
 
Conclusion: Native Authority to Nationhood 
 
Malawi adopted a republican constitution in 1966 and the country officially became a one-party 
state with Hastings Banda as its first president.196 From this point the Malawi Congress Party 
government began stretching its arm to reach people even in the most remote of settings. The 
territorial monopoly that Chawinga’s chieftainship used to guard “his” native authority land, 
something which the policy of indirect rule had enabled, was now under threat. Under the 
colonial administration the territorial integrity of chieftainships, particularly in the more 
remote Northern Province, was not only upheld but positively promoted. After independence 
the local historical stories which had been so encouraged when distinct “native” identities were 
the key building blocks to colonial administrative control were largely disregarded and stories 
of nation building took their place; the focus of political narratives shifted from native authority 
to nationhood.  
 With this new drive for nationhood came the need to redefine international borders, 
particularly as tense relationships with other newly independent African states developed 
throughout the 1960s. The border with Zambia to the west of the Hewe Valley which witnessed 
the regular movement of people and goods back and forth was much more tightly monitored 
after independence; re-imagined as a political threat rather than an economic opportunity. The 
closing and policing of such previously permeable borderlands became a priority for the Party 
and as a consequence any advantages that had been gained – economically through trade or 
socially through sharing the resources of different colonial administrations – were put into 
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jeopardy. One of the most significant sources of Chawinga’s personal income was through the 
hunting and exploitation of the plentiful game present in this cross-border region; the closer 
policing of borders meant he could no longer achieve the same levels of economic independence 
that he had done during the colonial period.   
Alternative authorities also began to emerge in the local setting which had the effect of 
unsettling the chiefs position further: politically minded villagers who saw that they were able 
to go far through the Party structure; wealthy businessmen and farmers; educated “marginal 
men”; and, of course, the Malawi Young Pioneers, who could be Banda’s eyes and ears in the 
remote peripheries of his state. Chawinga had always been a difficult individual to manage; not 
too dissimilar to Banda, he did not like criticism and became ever more intolerant of being 
challenged as the 1960s wore on. The growing presence of the MCP in Hewe, especially of the 
Malawi Young Pioneers who increasingly provided the means by which the state achieved 
coercion and control, offered new opportunities to undermine Chawinga’s authority. In this 
context local people who had been discontent with the chief felt able to be more critical. 
Banda’s vision for postcolonial Malawi, meanwhile, began to look increasingly like that 
of a vast chiefdom with the Chewa identity forming the cultural and ethnic basis on which this 
new “chiefdom” nation was built. In this context the manipulation of tradition and territoriality 
which were the hallmarks of “successful” indirect rule chiefs such as Chawinga were 
unachievable, especially in later years as the state became fixated on weakening the position of 
Tumbuka elites in public office by pushing an exclusively Chewa agenda.197 Using cultural power 
to “engineer consent”, as Forster has described it,198 was not the only similarity in leadership 
style between Banda and Chawinga. Both toured their territories regularly, courting the masses 
by holding rallies and meetings; “there can hardly have been a Malawian who had not seen or 
heard Banda personally many times”,199 and the same was true for Chawinga. Both prioritized 
the needs of women and as “Nkhoswe” number one – the Chewa term for uncle or brother – 
Banda modeled himself as the main guardian of these women’s interests, something that 
Chawinga had also maintained was of great importance. The fact that the main supporters of 
both of these men after their deaths continue to be women is surely telling. But there was only 
room for one “big man” in this nation. 
McCracken has reflected on how Banda began constructing his one party state and 
strengthening his own power by “personally nominating all MCP candidates, in some cases in 
the face of opposition from within constituency branches”;200 as such they became 
“representatives of Kamuzu” first and foremost. Previous chapters have shown how such 
favoured individuals could easily fall from grace if they put a step wrong and it is in this context 
that the demise of Timothy Chawinga must also be seen. The example of Kanyama Chiume’s rise 
and fall, as recounted by Kayuni and Tambulasi, aptly demonstrates how Banda developed these 
relationships of dependence with politicians and chiefs. Recognising the importance of the 
northern factor “in his quest for total control over the country” Banda closely monitored the 
local district committee selections for candidates in the run up to the 1961 general election.201 
On discovering that the MCP committee in Rumphi had declined the nomination of Chiume, 
Banda set about persuading them that this was not a good idea; this was no easy task, it took 
“two bitter face to face confrontations with Banda before they finally backed down and accepted 
the nomination”.202This assistance in getting Chiume elected was not a “gift” that could be 
forgotten by the politician. When he did not reciprocate this loyalty during the cabinet crisis 
Banda was quick to remind, and warn, MPs that this traitor’s position had only been made 
possible through the President’s own powers of persuasion: “I will tell you. Kanyama Chiume is 
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not wanted in Rumphi (Prolonged applause). I took him there. I had to force him on the people of 
Rumphi (Interjection: That is true)”.203 
 Chiefs like Mwase and Katumbi had also received considerable support from Banda both 
during the struggle for independence and in the first ten years of his premiership. Salaries had 
been increased and positions had been given as traditional judges in provincial level courts after 
their judicial roles were taken away from them at the local level. So when Chawinga reacted 
badly to some of the Party’s activities in Hewe, and when he and Mwase dared to question 
Banda’s decision over the fate of the rebel Manoa Chirwa, it was inevitable that they were taken 
to task. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Chawinga’s downfall was a decision taken 
by the President alone.  
Power and Kalinga have called into question the force behind the raft of arrests which 
took place after the MCP Convention in 1973; the chiefs’ position on the return of Manowa 
Chirwa to his homeland could not in seriousness have been seen as anything other “rooted in 
compassion”, and was not intended as a challenge to Kamuzu’s authority.204 They even forward 
the contention that it was “possible too that Banda agreed” with the idea that Chirwa “deserved 
to live out his last years on his home soil”.205 Rather it was those vying for control in the upper 
levels of the Party organisation who took this opportunity to present Banda “with their own 
interpretation of the proceedings”.206 Older, less educated but more experienced men like John 
Tembo and Gwanda Chakuamba, whose long term success could be put down to “their ability to 
run the party machine at local and regional level”, came to the fore after the cabinet crisis.207 
Chawinga’s own description of events immediately following the 1973 MCP Convention is 
revealing: 
 
“Just from nowhere I was found amongst 9 chiefs tortured, bitten (sic) by Chakuamba, assisted by 
the Youth and Malawi Young Pioneers (M.Y.P.) and dismissed from my position as chief”.208 
 
Chakuamba and Tembo’s influence in orchestrating Timothy Chawinga’s arrest is not easy to 
find evidence for, but given the discussions around their close relationship with the Malawi 
Young Pioneers in Hewe it should not be underestimated.  
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Timothy Chawinga was released on 20 July 1982 and returned to Hewe after having spent nine 
years in detention; he was never given the full explanation for why he had been incarcerated but 
in the end he counted as only one among many thousands of Tumbuka clerks, teachers and 
businessmen who fell foul of the Malawi Congress Party line during the 1970s. Others from 
Hewe included Charles Munthali, Dickson Mzumara and Joseph Munthali, all of whom had been 
working as young civil servants during this time. Mzumara remembers seeing Timothy 
Chawinga in prison: 
  
“I used to see him spend time with other detained chiefs. He also used to spend long hours, day after 
day, with one old man from Kasungu who was reported to us to have been a senior advisor to Chief 
Mwase of Kasungu. I cannot remember his name now, but even now I see them walking and talking 
in the yard in front of our detention cells”.1 
 
Whilst he was away from his family his wife NyaBota, who had reputedly suffered badly from 
recurring headaches passed away,2 and most of his possessions were removed or destroyed; 
this included, according to his letter of complaint, his Landover and Fiat cars, house furniture, 
grinding mill and all his livestock. Chawinga was virtually blind by this point after suffering 
serious ill health in prison yet, with the pugilistic spirit which had been such a trademark during 
his time as Themba Katumbi he took up a new task: to fight for compensation from the Malawi 
Congress Party government for the fruit trees, the chickens, the goats and the maize mill that he 
had lost during this time.3  
 Whilst he was welcomed back with great celebrations his return to Hewe was not 
without its problems for the chiefs who had followed in his footsteps. This was largely to do 
with the significant legacy which his leadership had left, and also on account of the fact that 
previous to this no former chief had still been alive whilst another was serving on the throne. 
The power that Chawinga had to command respect from the people of Hewe did not diminish 
and neither did the stories about his spiritual strength; whilst he did not openly contest the 
chieftaincy his influence within the royal family was considered significant up until his death in 
1997. 
The narratives about Chawinga’s death are full of rumour and suspicion that are difficult 
to substantiate, yet they remain useful to consider and put in to context, both in order to make 
sense of his considerable influence in colonial Hewe, and as a way of broadening out the 
discussion about chiefly authority, land and power in post-colonial Malawi. Given the sensitive 
nature of this subject and the relevance it has in relation to contemporary disputes in Hewe the 
accusation so often made, that Chawinga was poisoned by an infamous witch in the area, and a 
relative of his at that, must be handled with some care. 
It is no secret, however, that when Peter Kamaiza Chawinga, the first Themba selected 
from the Chikunguweya royal clan since the early colonial period, took the throne in 1995 he 
was uncomfortable with Timothy’s influence in the area; more specifically he was afraid of his 
long reputed magical strength. So much was this so that he refused to use the same office that 
Timothy had occupied or utilise various other chiefly items – including the ceremonial 
Mulindafwa stone that he had “recovered” from the mountain Kapiri Themba to use in the first 
of many annual chiefs ceremonies in 1954. The stories in Hewe suggest that Kamaiza arranged 
for Kamangilira to be killed. Since the erstwhile chief’s strength as “a witchcraft” himself was so 
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significant it is said that the only person who could successfully kill Chawinga would be 
Mgugweta Nyirenda an infamous witch in Hewe and the son of his the chiefs cousin Mzelemeka 
Nyirenda, the man who had helped to ritually “prepare” Timothy Chawinga over fifty years 
before as he had stepped into his role as Themba Katumbi.  
The tensions and battles between the five royal clans of the Katumbi chieftainship have 
deepened, especially since Kamaiza was deposed in 2004. A severe split in allegiance occurred 
whilst he was chief due to his allegedly inappropriate and illegal behaviour, and whilst some 
headmen remained loyal to him others flatly refused to work under his leadership prompting 
his appointment of new ones. In 2009 Thompson Nundwe, then Senior Group Village Headman 
Chipofya a key negotiator in the anti-Kamaiza Chiefs’ Council, died suddenly. Raising the alarm 
about the behaviour of these new pro-Kamaiza headmen, his wife NyaKalua the local primary 
school teacher pointed the finger for her husband’s “murder” squarely at them; all of those 
selected by Kamaiza were “witchcrafts, magicians and ruffians”, she said, “they had drawn up a 
list of maybe thirty people who they wanted dead, and Chipofya’s name was second only to the 
proposed chief-in-waiting Kelvin Chawinga”.4 
One of the legacies of this tragic set of circumstances is that there are now over 300 
village headmen acting under Themba Katumbi in contrast to just twelve that existed at the 
start of Timothy Chawinga’s reign in 1942. There are constant disputes over who has the 
legitimate right to manage land disputes, deliver development projects and claim the resources 
which government has set aside for traditional authorities with the outcome being that few 
NGOs now want to work there.  
At the root of this conflict there are certainly a number of historical factors; not least the 
confusing rotation of chieftainship between what remains an unclear structure of royal clan 
inheritance (see appendices 2 and 3), something which can be put down to the royal family’s 
dispersal just before colonial rule followed by its rigid institutionalisation during it. Perhaps 
more important, however, is the process whereby chiefly authority has become increasingly 
territorialized. Timothy Chawinga was one of the first chiefs to benefit from this and over time, 
as access to land and natural resources have become more finite in the Northern Province, the 
stakes in chiefs contesting their legitimate claims to these territories have increased.  
In the Tumbuka areas of Northern Malawi the historical contestation for superiority 
between Chikulamayembe and Katumbi has now swung back in favour of the former. Whilst the 
Katumbi chiefs have been battling their own internal crises of legitimacy within the royal family 
itself, the current Chikulamayembe – on the throne now for over 40 years – has risen to become 
paramount chief of the other Tumbuka chieftaincies; insistent since 2007 on being known by 
the local praise name, Themba ma la Themba (chief of chiefs), a status held up by the Malawian 
government. The contemporary positioning of Chief Chikulamayembe and his use of custom 
within regional and national politics brings the discussion about the still pertinent use of these 
historical traditions – a key instrument of Timothy Chawinga’s leadership – up to date. As the 
introduction outlined, the contests for cultural hegemony have brought increasingly rich 
rewards and, though couched in the language of local politics and regional supremacy, the 
financial and political benefits are now much more significant, and the drawbacks of losing 
position much more serious. 
Since the Malawian constitution has recently recognised chiefs as an important 
ingredient for achieving a successful democratic culture they have become powerful local 
partners to the state.5 With “tradition” on their side they are able to claim the ownership of 
villages and thus are in a strong “legitimate” position to manage access to this land;6 all 
development and other government related projects must now be discussed with them. In a 
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2006 interview Chief Chikulamayembe summarised this position to Chinsinga by saying, “all 
people whether councilors, MPs or even the President are subjects of traditional leaders in 
which case we have to be primary institutions of leadership at local level otherwise nothing can 
happen on our land”7. 
In this statement there are echoes of Timothy Chawinga’s proclamation barked at 
intruders onto his territory: “you cannot kill me, this is my land!”; and after the end of Kamuzu 
Banda’s one-party state, the decentralisation policies of multiparty Malawi likewise seem to 
echo the discourse of indirect rule with their return to the discourse of tradition. This re-
emergence of the usefulness of traditional leaders is held up in twenty first century Malawi as 
“the panacea for the achievement of decentralized, pluralistic democratic cultures and the 
strengthening of civil society”.8 Just as indirect rule was devised as a way of broadcasting 
colonial power through respected local leaders, so the decentralisation of governance in the 
postcolonial setting uses these same figures to further their agenda. 
Democratic processes continue to hold little truck in these contexts where livelihoods 
remain precarious and elections are therefore open to bribery and abuse. Chinsinga’s study of 
the dynamics of political space in these settings since 1994 clearly demonstrates that politicians 
across the whole spectrum have “strategically turned to customary authorities in order to 
entrench and consolidate their legitimacy”; especially in areas like the north where electoral 
success for politicians is hard fought and hard won.9 Chiefs are courted with the promise of new 
houses and offices; they have been put on the government pay roll once more; deposed chiefs 
have been reinstated; and new positions of seniority at the local level have been introduced. It is 
in this context that Themba Peter Kamaiza Chawinga thrived. Bakili Muluzi, the first 
democratically elected president of Malawi, enabled this political culture to thrive with his 
emphasis on crony-capitalism, but the seeds of this system of governance were planted long 
before.  
The strong position that chiefs can now find themselves in has much to do with the 
territorialising processes which had begun under colonialism, spatial changes which have been 
the main focus of this thesis; most especially the fact that they have become gatekeepers to “the 
land”. This is significant for the local people, as this requires them to maintain good 
relationships with chiefs, as it is for politicians who use them as brokers in the electoral process. 
Through them they can deliver agricultural inputs – such as fertiliser – which can persuade 
farmers to vote in their favour.  
In the lively neo-liberal debates around “indigenous rights”, customary law has been 
reappraised as “a local regulatory system” where “customary norms form the lived reality 
whereas state law and state courts are remote, strange, expensive and difficult to access”.10 This 
decentralisation has benefitted both chiefs and the postcolonial governments who want to 
distance themselves from the grievances of rural communities whose votes they now need. 
Several scholars writing on chieftaincy in West Africa today have highlighted this problematic 
coalition of interests and warn that leaving the redefinition of customary land tenure systems to 
these actors alone is hugely problematic. “The strengthening of chiefly control over land”, has 
created the perfect conditions for exploiting of the peasantry, according to Amanor. Whilst 
extending chiefs ability to “disempower individual cultivators of land, while promoting the 
customary as an egalitarian system which stands for the interests of the community”, it 
simultaneously “absolves the state from blame for expropriating the rural poor”.11 Sara Berry 
concurs; serious conflicts over land and authority can take place, she posits, “without bringing 
down the government”, whilst “chiefs wield power, but don’t stand for election [...] placing them 
beyond meaningful public accountability”.12  
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The jury remains out, as it does for the case of colonial native authorities, on the extent 
to which the state is responsible for enabling the accumulation of chiefly authority. Amanor 
seems convinced that without support and recognition from the state “chiefs would have little 
power to enforce their versions of customary tenure”,13 but this surely does not tell the whole 
story. Vaughan’s study of Yoruba chieftaincy in Nigeria offers a slightly more nuanced 
understanding of the enduring importance, and influence, of chieftaincy. By emphasising the 
relevance not of peoples “loyalty to tradition” but rather individual chiefs ability to integrate 
“into regional alliances of power and privilege”, it is possible to move away from, whilst not 
excluding, the significance of the state’s ambitions.14 This is a good place to conclude since it is a 
statement which reflects one of the main objectives of this thesis: to see beyond both the state 
and the rather static characterisations of colonial chiefs in order to better grasp the mechanisms 
behind the production of chiefly authority. 
 What Timothy Chawinga grasped during the period of indirect rule was that this 
“relationship” with the land, mediated as it is by an economy of legitimacy, is not 
straightforward; it is contested and framed by changes in policy and changes in socio-economic 
conditions. One had to fight to establish oneself as a legitimate chief over a given territory 
during colonial rule, and one has to fight to establish oneself now.  
“The struggle over political space [...] entails an interplay between social and power relations 
shaped by locally situated knowledge and practices in which the contestants often take recourse to 
planes of discourse, influence, legitimacy and authority in which they have visibly and symbolically 
significant comparative advantage. This therefore implies that there are multiple political space(s) 
in which the very same actors might interact but in which they may invoke widely different registers 
of discourse, influence, legitimacy and authority befitting the context or encounter at a particular 
point in time”.15  
 
Controlling “the entry” to these spaces is critical to who accesses resources and decisions, 
argues Chinsinga; the same was as true in colonial Malawi as it is now. 
 Timothy Chawinga took the initiative to demarcate two areas of Hewe as nature 
reserves during the 1950s; the Vwaza Marsh in the southern part of his territory and an area 
which would become part of the Nyika national park in the north. He did this at a time when 
chiefs’ powers over land were diminishing in the local setting, but the opportunities for well 
positioned individuals were perhaps increasing. Whilst in Hewe there was enough land for 
everyone to comfortably farm the processes of titling and “conservation” nevertheless provided 
the chief with an opportunity too good to miss. By taking a leading role in securing these areas 
as controlled zones and negotiating himself a new role as honorary game warden over them, he 
was able to establish new spaces of potential exploitation.  
This understanding of his knife-edge position is in keeping with Carswell’s observations 
of colonial chiefs in Kigezi who seeing their power over land squeezed began to try and 
“redefine their authority by re-creating this authority through their position as clan elders” or 
as the managers of “new” land with ambiguous access rights as swamps were reclaimed for use 
by the community.16 As land ownership became more individualized and “progressive farmers” 
were encouraged she highlights that prominent people, “often chiefs or others with strong 
connections to the colonial state” were in fact able “to strengthen their control over the land”.17 
Chawinga’s efforts in helping to create these national parks have not been forgotten. As 
population increases and access to land becomes problematic new lines of debate have been 
opened up around the legitimacy of ownership over these precious fertile areas demonstrating 
that nothing is set in stone. The former chief has become the subject of much criticism over 
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these issues in the last few years and his “selfishness” in establishing these places the focal point 
of much debate.   
 Maintaining a distinct territory in Hewe was the key to Chawinga’s success. It became a 
historically bound, socially coherent unit only because, using colonial frameworks as well as 
local resources, he made it to be so. Make no mistake being an effective and successful native 
authority chief at this time required a number of registers of power; one had to rest on more 
than “invented tradition” and a colonial salary, but equally a historically rooted strong local 
legitimacy was not enough to guarantee longevity. An indication of Chawinga’s recognition of 
these multiple spaces of authority and the various perspectives that might be required to enter 
them is perhaps reflected in the names which he gave to his children. Mtemi Churchill was born 
in 1942, at the start of Chawinga’s reign and in the middle of the Second World War, his first 
name means ‘chief’ in Nkonde, the language of Chief Kyungu a powerful historical ally to the 
Katumbis. Mulindafwa, a son, was born in the early 1950s and his name refers to the 
grandfather of all Katumbi chiefs, it was at this time that Chawinga was planning the 
inauguration of what would become an annual celebration of the chiefs’ arrival in Hewe; a key 
performance of his power. His last child, born at the end of the 1950s, was sanguinely named 
Malawi in anticipation for what was to happen next; she is now known as Mary.18 
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The History of Katumbi Mulowoka 
Contributed by Chief Katumbi, Timothy Chawinga to L. H. Vail, November 1970 
 
The history is built up by those who heard stories from their grandfathers. They say that Katumbi and his 
family emerged from Egypt in the seventeenth century. When they left Egypt they settled in Uganda at a 
forgotten place. At that place they learned much about the use of ivory and rhinoceros horns, and also he 
uses of lions and leopards skins. He, Katumbi and his party, collected many of them and seeing that they 
were saleable to the Arabs he moved from place to place to collect more. 
 When he saw that those things were not available in the local places there so he moved to 
Tanzania and he settled at Unyamwezi on the Northern Side of Lake Tanzania. At that place her stayed for 
several years because he was able to collect plenty of ivory and useful skins which he sold to the Arabs in 
Mombasa and Zanzibar. 
 The traffic between him and the Arabs was successful so he became wealthy in cloth, beads, salts 
and shells. With those things he could get more ivory and skins from adjacent districts and he took them 
to the Arabs for exchange with cloth, beads, salt and shells.  
 When his trade dwindled, he left Unyenyembe to look for other places where he could find those 
ivory and skins in plenty. On his journey he passed through Mbeya and he turned eastwards until he 
reached Ukinga on the Eastern side of Lake Malawi. There he found a prominent man called Mapunda 
who received him kindly. This was about 1750. Chief Katumbi the leader of the party was then named 
Themba Mulindafwa, and his children whose names are remembered were Chimbavi the elder, and 
Kasalika the younger, and also Yapatura the daughter who afterwards was called NyasMwathecha. 
 Chipofya and Chikulamayembe his nephews were also with him and also Mwattanga and 
Mwamlowe his close relatives were also with him. At that place his trade was reorganised and as usual it 
was carried on successfully with the Arabs. 
 He settled there for more than thirty years at Mapunda; while carrying on his trade, he also 
learned a new hobby and that was to make canoes and to sail on the lake. By knowing all these, Katumbi 
Mlowoka therefore decided to cross the lake and see the other side where he could probably find ivory, 
rhinoceros horns and useful skins. So he ordered his party to pack and they set sail, that was about 1770. 
 He and his party landed at Chirumba on the lakeshore, a thought came to him if he could settle 
there permanently. This thought died quickly when he met Kyungu at Vuwa who informed him that the 
source of wealth was on the hills and on the other side of the hills meaning the Henga and Nkamanga-
Hewe areas. He told the story of the news to his party and they were ordered to prepare for the hilly 
expedition. 
 The carriers packed up. The heaviest things were tridents of iron which were used as hangers for 
their robes. The iron tridents had branching arms each terminating in a leaf blade, spear blade, a spoon, a 
hoe, a knife, an axe and the like. One of the tridents was found near Katowo headquarters in 1914 and 
another one was found at Rumpi. It is difficult to trace where they got a supply of these tridents. 
 
THE ADVENTURE 
This party acceded to his decision to set up. Leaving Chirumba, they passed through Fulirwa and Kackuru, 
on the Nyika Plateau, and then from there they came to Mwaphoka. Leaving Mwaphoka they passed 
through many places in the Henga Valley with short halts at places where they could find things to collect. 
At length they reached Rumpi, the place at which they made their trading centre. Katumbi at Rumpi 
became a monopolist and his activities were soon known by the Tumbuka.  
 While carrying his trade far and wide among the Tumbuka, he easily became an acquaintance of 
all the people in Tumbuka land. North of Rukuru region he married many wives, the daughters of 
Tumbuka. The children he bore are now the heads of many families in Tumbuka country. 
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 After several years at Rumpi, the party consisting of Katumbi, the leader, Chikulamayembe and 
Chipofya, agreed together to explore the countries in the Southern side of Rukuru and he decided to leave 
Chipofya at the centre. So only the two, Katumbi and Chikulamayembe, left. They travelled widely with 
short stops at places where they found useful things for trade. These when they collected they posted 
back to the centre. They did so while proceeding with their expedition until at last they reached Dwangwa 
in Kasungu’s area where they stopped. They travelled without any show of force to the people they 
passed through. 
 When Katumbi decided to stop to return to Rumpi, he shot an arrow on a baobab tree, leaving it 
sticking there. This was the sign of his stoppage or to mark the place where he stopped as a record of his 
journey. Having acquainted himself with the situations, he, on his journey, collected all his goods he left at 
every halt and when he reached the Themba hill, Chikulamayembe asked Katumbi to be permitted to 
return to the trading centre Rumpi; so he left with his carriers. 
 When Chikulamayembe reached the centre he helped Chipofya to look after the goods and to 
send carriers to the coast to sell them. 
 Katumbi with a small party consisting of his sons and some friends settled at Themba hill for a 
while. He afterwards left to survey the Ruangwa Valley where he met Tumbuka and Senga people, but 
most of them were aliens in the region. From there he collected plenty of rhinoceros horns, ivory, lion and 
leopard skins. For his good nature he was liked by all people there. Some of the goods he was given as 
gifts. 
 Later he reached Sitwe where he settled for several years and there he was able to visit Kajumba 
and Chikpata. After exploring the remaining parts of the Ruangwa region, he travelled eastwardly until he 
climbed the (unreadable) hills and descended to Mwenechifungwe. There he remembered his trading 
station Rumpi. But as he was by then exhausted, he could not return to see how the world was getting on 
so he exercised patience. 
 From Mwenechifungwe he came to Chigoma or Chipera in Nthalire, there he settled. While at 
Chigoma, he was able to communicate with his friend Kyungu. He sent to his gift of goods. As his sons 
were acquainted with hunting, he had a big stock of ivory, rhinoceros, and skins. That why Kyungu could 
get gifts regularly. At Chigoma or Chipera in Nthalire he died a private death because he was advanced in 
years. 
 At that time Chipofya and Chikulamayembe began to be worried about the whereabouts of their 
uncle. Soon after their discussion Chipofya set out and he came to Hewe where he settled for a while. 
 During his stay in Hewe, he tried hard to learn from the people if they had heard rumours about a 
man called Mulindafwa. The notable people he met in Hewe were Zolokere, Nchuka and Kanyerere who 
very soon after his arrival became his friends. All these denied that they had heard about Mulindafwa. 
Later or sooner he happened to collect news about him from the Arabs who passed through Hewe from 
Chipera or Chigoma in Nthalire area. These Arabs told Chipofya that Mulindafwa was dead. But his 
children Chimbavi, Kasalika and Yapatula were still living.  
 So Chipofya rose quickly with his party and met on his journey to Chigoma and he really found 
his cousins. 
 To his cousins Chipofya greatly expressed his condolence and he ordered them to pack up and 
leave Chigoma fir Hewe. Before they left Chipofya took a whip and he went to the grave with it. He 
whipped on the grave which traditionally meant that he was calling the spirit to accompany the family. 
When they reached Hewe Chipofya buried the whip at Vuvu stream. 
 This was the beginning of the chiefs’ graveyard at Vuvu stream and a centre of worshipping the 
spirits of the Balowoka. 
 When this was done, they started to build a village at Makongowa stream and later they moved to 
Katowo where they built ‘phondo’ which means Headquarters. It must be mentioned here that on their 
arrival, Chipofya reported to Zolokere. Zolokere came to greet them and he gave them gifts of ivory. 
Katumbi Chimbavi also gave them cloth, beads and shells. So they respected him greatly. 
 While at Makongowa, Chimbavi was given the title of Themba Katumbi in place of his father. He 
successfully won the friendship of the inhabitants, then he had a chance to introduce to the head men the 
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use of a black cloth on the headman’s head. He advised that a headman in order to win the respect of his 
subordinated must tie a black cloth on his head, which is the sign of a crown and so he tied black cloths to 
the heads of all the headmen, namely Zolokere, Kanyerere, Nchuka and Mwavitintiza. This introduction 
has been carried on and on until now. 
 Very soon he came into contact with Mulomboji of Mwanda Hill and he ordained him a high 
priest of religion in Hewe to conduct special services on Mwanda to pray for rain during droughts. But 
intercessional services during times when disease and deaths over took the village or area were 
conducted by assistant priests, at the chiefs’ graveyard at Vuvu streams. They carried either a white dove 
or a white fowl and a calabash of beer to offer them to the spirits. There are so many points in their 
religion, but they are not necessary as they do not convey prime facts in the modern history. There were 
ceremonies for girls at the time of puberty, but there is no mention about circumcision.  
 After many years of stay at Phondo, they moved to Mawuwu near Katowo. There they built a 
strong stockade for fear of invaders. There they stayed peacefully for many years but he continued to 
trade with people in Hewe and in all the adjacent tribes. Very soon he won the title of paramount in 
Rumpi. 
 
INVADERS IN HEWE 
Chepela, a Mubemba warrior of Zambia, came and invaded the Mawuwu stockade about 1845 at the time 
of Themba Katumbi Chivwalenkwende. They captured the stockade and the Themba with his people were 
forced to leave and they found refuge at Mwanda where his priest was living (Mlomboji). The goods in the 
stockade were taken, and Chepera made the stockade a camp. The Themba at Mwanda had no cloth, so he 
was forced to use Mkenda (bark cloth) and he called himself Chivwalenkwende. 
 The trouble with Chepela increased and no Chivwalenkwende sent message to Kyungu, 
Muyombe and Chikulamayembe to come to his aid. Then Chipela was driven out and his women were all 
captured. Most of those women were married by the Tumbuka in Nkhamanga and they are now the 
grandmothers of many families in Nkhamanga. 
 In order to deal with the fierce Chepela at Mawuwu, the forces from Kyungu and 
Chikulamayembe heated their arrows on a blacksmith’s fire and they shot them on the roofs of all the 
houses in the stockade and as a result all the houses there were set on fire. Chepela was then forced to 
run away. So Katumbi Chivwalenkwende died, Katumbi Chikunguweya was given the title. The Ngoni 
invaders found Katumbi Chikunguweya. 
 
THE NGONI INVADERS 
The Ngoni came to Hewe in about 1855 at the time of Katumbi Chikunguweya. When the rumours of their 
coming came to their ears, the Themba and his people found refuge in Zolokere’s stockade in Khata (a 
place in Vwaza Marsh covered with reeds). Some went to hide at (unreadable) near Yembe Hill – near 
Songwe. When the trouble grew Katumbi and Zolokere surrendered and they became the subjects of the 
Ngoni. 
 Most of the families were taken to Ngoni land to live there more or less as captives until they 
broke away from the Ngoni rule in 1881. Those who ran to Karonga remained there and they crowned 
their own Themba Katumbi Chibumira. Afterwards they crowned Themba Katumbi Chimgwayo whom 
they sent to rule in Hewe in place of Chikunguweya who died. 
 When Katumbi Chimgwayo died Katumbi Mutengacaro was crowned Themba. This Themba went 
to Sitwe to rule there because he wanted to oppose Kambombo who was threatening to invade the 
country. 
 Now in Hewe Mwanedayekha Chipili was crowned Themba Katumbi to rule in Hewe. In Sitwe 
Katumbi Limilizamba was crowned Themba, after the death of Mutengacharo. 
 In Hewe when Katumbi Chipili died Katumbi Yiteta was crowned Themba Katumbi. After his 
death Katumbi Dukamayere was crowned Themba in Hewe and in Sitwe they crowned Themba Chitanda. 
In Hewe after Themba Dukamayere they had Themba Chifwange and now they have Themba 
Kamangilira. 




A Note on the Government boundary which has divided the Nkamanga and the Ruangwa Regions; 
This boundary follows the Chiri Watershed on the southern side of the river. It continues to follow the 
water shed until it takes the Rukuru water shed. 
 In October 1943 I Katumbi wrote a letter to the Colonial Office pleading that the boundary should 
be disbanded because it has lessened my authority and has broken the ties of relationship with the 
Tumbuka of Ruangwa Region. The Colonial Office in reply pointed out that it was difficult to break that 
boundary because a large sum of money was spent on making it. I Katumbi pressed on and at last decided 
to stop. 
 
The name of the chiefs in Hewe and their successors: 
1. Katumbi Mulindafwa in the seventeenth century 
2. Katumbi Chimbavi in 1780 nearly 
3. Katumbi Chivwalankwende about 1845 
4. Katumbi Chikunguweya about 1860 
5. Katumbi Chibumila in Kalonga about 1870 
6. Katumbi Chimgwayo about 1880 
7. Katumbi Mtengacharo about 1890 
8. Katumbi Chipili in 1902 
9. Katumbi Limilizamba in 1906 
10. Katumbi Yiteta in 1922 
11. Katumbi Dukamayere in 1932 
12. Katumbi Chitanda in 1940 
13. Katumbi Chifwembe in 1942 
14. Katumbi Chitanje in 1943 
15. Katumbi Kamangilira in 1943 
 
Chipofya Family 
1. Chipofya Tuduru, 1700-1780 
2. Chipofya Chiltala 1882 – 
3. Chipofya Chiluvya 1888 
4. Chipofya Chiduni who went to Mwazisi and settled at Matelo where the Ngoni invaded him 
5. Chipofya Bingiza 
6. Chipofya Kasendamafwa 
7. Chipofya Sindamalongo 
8. Chipofya Mujanike 
9. Chipofya Paulosi 
10. Chipofya Johane 
 
JUDICATURE 
When there was a case all the councillors of the Themba met to hear the case at their gathering place. 
When the accused did not admit that he was guilty, the final decision was to give him an ordeal to prove 
the truth of his denial. All criminal cases were judged in a different way. The sentence was given 
according to the nature of the case to burn the criminal or to put him to death in any way or else to make 
him pay a man or woman to take the place of the one he killed. 
 
CELEBRATION AND HOLIDAYS 
Katumbi and his people in Hewe have fixed a day to celebrate the time of their arrival in Hewe. They have 
taken a stone from Themba hill which they have kept in a small box in the Themba’s house. The day of 
their celebration is the first day of September. They say that they entered Hewe at the time of bush fires. 
As bush fires are in September, so they confirm that they entered Hewe in September. On this day all the 
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councillors are dressed in traditional attire. But the Chief and Chipofya put on traditional robes. All the 
people dance traditional dances. The time comes to exhibit the stone; then a procession of about half a 
mile marches to the place where the stone is exhibited. The Chief and Chipofya climb the anthill (in place 
of Themba hill). This is what is done to commemorate their arrival in Hewe. Themba Katumbi and 
Chipofya stand on an anthill, he then takes the stone which they say it was Mulindafwa’s seat at Themba 
hill. He exhibits it to the crowd. 
 
THE COMING OF MISSIONARIES  
Katumbi and Zolokere heard rumours about Dr. Laws’ arrival at Livingstonia. It is not known if he visited 
Hewe or not. It is only mentioned that in 1903 Mr. James Henderson visited Hewe to collect young men to 
train as teachers to open schools in Hewe, but he collected only two lads namely Jamo Chawinga, the son 
of Katumbi Mtengacharo and Yoram Chawinga the grand son of Katumbi Chivwalenkwende. The first 
school was opened at Chitunguru village in 1906. The teacher was Jamo. Later it was moved to Katowo 
headquarters. 
 
THE COMING OF BOMA 
Mr Wales came to Karonga in 1903 and in 1904 he visited Katumbi Chipili in Hewe. He told the Themba 
and the Headmen about his work as a government agent, that his people must pay three shillings as tax to 
the Boma. This was the beginning of the Boma at Karonga. 
 It is said that there were many Europeans who visited Hewe before the instruction of the Ngoni 
but there is no sufficient information concerning them. 
 
 
    
  






Genealogy of Katumbi Chiefs 
 




Mulindafwa   Chipera 
(Zambia) 
 
Chimbavi  Mikule Hewe  
Chivwalankhwende  Chikunguweya Hewe  
Chikunguweya  Chikunguweya Hewe  
Chibumila   Karonga  
Chimugwayu Kukhata   Hewe  
Mtengacharo   Sitwe 
(Zambia) 
 
Chipiri I  Thanila Hewe  
Limilazamba   Sitwe 
(Zambia) 
 
Yiteta  Yiteta Hewe  
Dukamayere I Zakeyo Chawinga Bongololo Hewe 1932 
Chitanda  Bongololo Sitwe 
(Zambia) 
 
Vwende Isaac Chawinga Chikunguweya Hewe 1940 
Chitanje Jakobe Chawinga  Sitwe 
(Zambia) 
1941 
Kamangilira Timothy Chawinga Mikule Hewe 1942 
Dukamayere II Matati Chawinga Bongololo Hewe 1974 
Mbiriyawaka Rowland Chawinga Bongololo Hewe 1987 
Chankhwakhwa  Peter ‘Kamaiza’ 
Chawinga 
Chikunguweya Hewe 1995 
Chipiri II Kelvin Chawinga Thanila Hewe 2008 
 
As written by the Chiefs Council of Katumbi Chipiri II (Kelvin Chawinga); prepared for the 2009 
Mulindafwa Ceremony by Martin “Chibumila” Chawinga, in consultation with other councillors. 
Additional information about the clans of different Katumbi chiefs, and their Christian names, collected by 
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Chawinga royal family tree, as described by Peter “Bongololo” Chawinga, (Interview 




























































arrived from Sitwe 
in Zambia at the 
time of chief Chipiri 
I. He came with 
respect and was 
given a 
headmanship. It is 
said he sold his 
children to the 
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became known as 
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Chawinga royal family tree, as described by Patstone Chawinga, Group Village Headman 














































Yiteta Kasalika or 
Bongololo 
Zamangwe Amwase Wachedwa 
Kampazunga Wamuzale 





Chawinga royal family tree, as described by Efram Chawinga, Senior Group Village 
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(i) Interviews from fieldwork, collected 2008-2009  
 
Mary Davies (MD): January to May and August to October 2009 
 
Village Headman Jomboli Nyirenda, Jomboli Village, 6 January 2009 
NyaGondwe, Yiteta village, 10 January 2009 
Kelvin Chawinga, Themba Katumbi, 12 January 2009 and 24 September 2009 
NyaGondwe and Noel Gondwe, Yiteta Village, 12 January 2009 
Robert Peter Bongololo Chawinga, Bongololo Village, 13 January 2009 and 10 September 2009 
Daniel Zunda, Village Headman Chitunguru, Chitunguru Village, 14 January 2009 
Jakob Chikunguweya Chawinga, Chikunguweya Village, 15 January 2009 
Principal Group Village Headman Mikule and David Chawinga, Mikule Village, 16 January 2009 
Godwin Chawinga, Acting Senior Group Village Headman Thanila and Nyamnyirenda, Thanila Village, 16 
January 2009 
John Nyirenda, Jomboli Village, 18 January 2009 
Thompson Nundwe, Principal Group Village Headman Chipofya, Chipofya Village, 19 January 2009. 
Kaligomba Zgambo and Vanya Zgambo, Nthawathawa Village, 19 January 2009 
Jim Ngwira, Thiti Farm, Chivwalenkwende Village, 20 January 2009 and 19 September 2009 
Senior Group Village Headman Mteweta Chilambo, Mteweta Village, 20 January 2009 
Norman Chawinga, Yiteta village, 21 January 2009 
David Nyirenda, Group Village Headman Ching’anya, Ching’anya Village, 22 January 2009 
Roosevelt Mwangonde, Katowo Trading Centre, 22 January 2009 
Lyton Karua, Mgugu village, 23 January 2009  
Efram Chawinga, Principal Group Village Headman Chilikunthazi and Nyamfune, Chilikunthazi Village, 23 
January 2009 
Samson Mumba, Chipofya village, 27 January 2009 
Elias Jato Kawonga, Nguwoyang’ombe village, 29 January 2009 
Austin Mfune, Principal Group Village Headman Chembe, Chembe Village, 29 January 2009 
Abraham Munthali, Kawulumira Village, 30 January 2009 
Gideon Luhanga, Mwatanantha Village, 30 January 2009 
Moses Khunga, Sub-TA Zolokere, Chatumbwa Village, 4 February 2009  
Julius Zgambe, Village Headman Chondoka, Julius Zgambe, Chondoka Village, 4th February 2009 
Dixon Kachalie, Village Headman Khutamaji, Khutamaji Village, 5 February 2009 
Nyachawinga, and Austin Khunga, Chatumbwa Village, 5 February 2009 
NyaHarawa, Zingatikome Village, 13 February 2009 
Hedson Nyirenda, Principal Group Village Headman Mowa, Mowa Village, 16 February 2009  
Edson Chilembo, Group Village Headman Nchuka, Nchuka Village, 19 February 2009 and 21 September 
2009  
Gerard Nyirenda and Hedson Nyirenda, Principal Group Village Headman Mowa, Jomboli Village, 12 May 
2009 
Benson Nyirenda, Group Village Headman Mzelemeka, Mzelemeka Village, 14 May 2009 
Nyachavula and Mgugweta Nyirenda, Bwanyonga Village, 15 May 2009 
Edwall Muwowo, Themba Muyombe, Muyombe, Zambia, 8 August 2009 
Nyakhunga and Nyazunda, Chiteshe, 25 August 2009 
Nyachawinga and others, Jomboli Village, 27 August 2009 
Village Headman Dambazuka Nundwe, Dambazuka Village, 28 August 2009 
Patstone Chawinga, Group Village Headman Yiteta and Laugh Wazumale Chawinga, 17 September, 2009 
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Nyanyamsulu and others, Thanila Village, 18 September 2009 
Abraham Munthali and Nyamhango, Kawulumira Village, 22 September 2009 
Joseph Munthali, Mwachibanda Village, 23 September 2009 
John Mwangonde, Katowo Trading Centre, 24 September 2009 
Martin Bongololo Chawinga, Katowo Trading Centre, 25 September 2009 
Charles Munthali, Blantyre, October 2009 
Cosmo Haskard, Bantry Bay, 5-6 November 2009 
 
  
H. L. Vail (LV): 1970-1971 
Nthawathawa Zgambo, 17 October 1970 
Village Headman Mwachibanda Munthali, 7 August 1971 
Nthawathawa Zgambo and Zolokere Khunga, 1971 
Tadeyo Harawa, 10 August 1970 
Nkhota Kachale, 12 August 1970 
Group Village Headman Ntumbatumba Luhanga, 13 August 1970 
Mwachibanda Munthali, n.d. 1971 
Group of S.G. Gondwe, Village Headman Bongololo, Chipula Gondwe, J.L. Chilambo, 11 August 1970 
Group Village Headman Chicinde Luhanga, 12 August 1970.  
Walutundu Luhanga, 5 August 1972 
Sub-Chief Zolokere, 5 August 1971 
Kabazamawe Cilambo, n.d. 1970 
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Discussions about colonial chieftaincy in Africa have tended to focus upon the ways in which 
indirect rule structured and framed traditional authority; for the majority of contemporary 
historians of British colonialism the question has been to what extent Lugard’s blueprint for 
effective native administration, The Dual Mandate, invented, shaped, and restructured political 
and social identity. Whilst acknowledging the importance of this neo-traditional perspective 
which focuses much on how colonial frameworks ethnicised and tribalised African society, this 
thesis argues that indirect rule was as much a spatialising process as it was a tribalising one. 
Colonial tools of territoriality mapped politics in geographically bounded ways and as a result 
associating power with place began to assume new importance in the ways African leadership 
was defined, and given authority. By further exploring the spatial context of traditional power in 
colonial Malawi through the example of a chief named Timothy Chawinga, this thesis reveals 
new conclusions about the nature of chieftainship there.   
The accounts of Chawinga, and other peripheral chiefs like him, have been sifted out of 
the story of Malawi as they do not fit with the questions which historians have typically tended 
to address of this period and with the political geography that has been favoured for 
contextualizing chiefly behaviour. This favoured political geography has rather drawn out 
examples from places where “things happen”: where significant cash crop schemes were 
implemented and radically transformed farmers lives for the better and worse; where co-
operative movements politicised the local population; where conservation measures were 
harshly and violently enforced; and where chiefs rebelled and vocally took part in the 
nationalist struggles. Concentrating on highly visible areas, which were economically or 
politically important to the state leads into making wrong assumptions about the character of 
the colonial state and the patterns of state intervention in colonial Malawi. The forms of rule and 
governance were multiple and reflected the dynamic association between administrative 
institutions and other institutional practices found in the everyday associational life of people. 
In Africanist historiography the spatial turn has enabled scholars to move away from 
these political narratives of the nation-state towards discussions about the ways in which a 
wide range of actors contest different kinds of political, economic, social and religious space for 
their own gain. Surprisingly, however, the spatial turn is only beginning to have an impact on 
the way in which the production of chiefly authority in Africa is understood. The notion of 
locality is used as the central conceptual tool in this thesis, since it can accommodate both the 
historicity and spatial specificity of chieftainship. It is argued that the locality of chieftainship is 
the most crucial factor in determining colonial chiefly identity; in other words, the geographical 
boundaries drawn up in the context of indirect rule offered chiefs opportunities to exploit the 
material and spiritual resources within these bounded spaces in new, sometimes highly 
productive, ways which were crucial for increasing both their customary authority and personal 
fortune. For as much as indirect rule enabled the reach of the Native Authority, through 
customary law, to gain authority over social domains like the household, it also gave many 
chiefs the opportunity to assert a territoriality over space, over land, and over fixed natural 
resources as they never had done before.  
By re-locating the historiographical gaze upon “regional” and “local” landscapes it is 
argued that historians can better catalogue the diversity in these opportunities to act 
territorially. Timothy Chawinga – the main protagonist of this story – became the fifteenth Chief 
Katumbi in 1942. He successfully ruled over a modest territory of about 200 square miles in 




throughout this time. This thesis presents evidence of how Chawinga employed the strategy of 
territoriality – the control of people and things by controlling an area – to do this. In order to 
understand the mechanics of this strategy it is argued that Chawinga should not be considered 
simply as “a Native Authority”; one cannot get a sense of how varied chiefs’ position and roles 
were if this reductive perspective is taken. Furthermore, whilst national policy changes in 
Native Administration did have some bearing on what was expected from chiefs such as 
Chawinga, it did not create the same framework of opportunity for everyone; especially since 
local conditions had the effect of producing different expressions of indirect rule chief. This 
thesis uses the example of Timothy Chawinga, therefore, to unsettle assumptions about the 
determining role of the state in the production of local authority.  
The thesis moves away from treating Timothy Chawinga’s Hewe, the place of his 
chieftainship, as merely a conventional geographical space. Rather, Hewe represented a set of 
relations between things as well as a space which contained and dissimulated social relations. 
At the height of his powers, this thesis argues, Chawinga contributed significantly to the 
production of Hewe as a locality, by constructing as a structure of feeling, a property of social 
life, and an ideology of a “situated community” for his own purposes; primarily the extraction of 
wealth and power. The result being that in between 1942-1974 the space in which Timothy 
Chawinga practiced his authority was used by him as a powerful “tool of thought and of action”, 
not simply as a place in which he could perform his administrative, and formal, role as Native 
Authority. Whilst he did take advantage of the position which the state enabled to use tradition 
and custom, perhaps most important was his ability to build his authority through a material 
exploitation of his land; this had not been a main pathway to power in the past. Prior to the 
period of European expansion claims to having a territorial identity hardly figured in the 
political imagination of African leaders who mainly grew their wealth and power by capturing 
people rather than gaining control over territory. Chawinga and his contemporaries were using 
their new “customary rights” to contest borders and boundaries in ways their forebears had 
never considered useful and to allocate access to land to “natives” whilst denying it to 
“strangers”; the ramifications of which continue to unfold today.  
As well as reconsidering the spatial context of chiefly authority, this thesis calls for our 
analyses of local authority to be placed within a deeper historical time-scale. Chieftainships are 
constructed and contested within the context of rural histories and regional contestations, as 
well as through the eyes of the State. Timothy Chawinga inherited a title which was loaded with 
certain meanings but was an economic and political leadership that was flexible in its 
inheritance structures and rested upon an authority that could be easily co-opted by 
charismatic individuals. Less marked by centralised ritual authorities and more by mobility, 
interdependence and varied involvement in trading networks, the Balowoka chiefly tradition - 
of which the Katumbi chieftaincy is a part - had been highly adaptable even in the pre-colonial 
period. Wielding only a loose grasp on ritual authority, as they did and still do, the fight to grab a 
more formal authority is therefore a constant feature of the chiefly political landscape of these 
Tumbuka communities. With each chiefly succession, authority has needed to be reasserted and 
maintained. Since these chieftainships had been established with new royal lineages which 
lacked significant depth, there was plenty of room for new interpretations of authority and 
more spaces in which individual people with power could challenge the tradition.  
As authority became more easily sanctioned through performance than heritable 
privilege, at least by the beginning of the twentieth century, personality politics thrived amongst 
the Balowoka chieftainships. Bearing this milieu in mind, alongside a new spatial analysis, this 
thesis presents the emergence of Timothy Chawinga as a regionally significant, charismatic 
 
 
personality whose concern lay primarily with the protection of his position within the regional 
political and moral economy. His personal vision did not in fact extend much beyond the pursuit 
and production of authority within his own and his immediately neighbouring territories. That 
he was able to pursue this agenda, and develop a strong territorial claim over the Hewe Valley, 
as a geography and a place of social relations, has much to do with the limited geographical and 
economic significance which Hewe had, if we “see” it as the colonial state might have. Hewe’s 
position in the eyes of the administration inevitably enabled this regional locality to emerge as it 
did, and as such enabled Timothy Chawinga to practice a territoriality that served, in various 
ways, to augment his historically specific customary authority.  
Making statements as to what extent colonial chiefs were “invented” or “authentic”, 
“traditionalists” or “modernisers” as much of the historiography is wont to do is considered 
ineffectual. This thesis argues that questions should be posed which bring no structural, 
temporal or spatial assumptions. A more apt line of questioning revolves around the nature and 
use of authority rather than upon the structures in which authority supposedly operates: Where 
do chiefs in the colonial period draw their authority from? What does this authority enable them to 
do? And what are the stakes involved in having it? When Chawinga was arrested in 1974 by the 
Malawi Congress Party government of Hastings Banda, the matrix of factors that had shaped his 
particular brand of territorial politics had shifted. The colonial framework of indirect rule had 
enabled Chawinga to grow in personal wealth and power, but at independence he was 
confronted with new challenges which transformed his opportunities to accumulate authority 
through territoriality. Hewe was transformed from peripheral “border zone”, with little 
attention being paid to it, to that of crucial “border post”, a key check point in the war against 
Hastings Banda’s political rivals and unwelcome neighbours. The tension which these changes 








Discussies over koloniale chiefs in Afrika hebben zich voornamelijk gericht op de manieren 
waarop indirect bestuur traditionele authoriteit heeft gestructureerd en omkaderd; voor het 
merendeel van de contemporaine historici van het Britse kolonialisme was het de vraag tot op 
welke hoogte Lugard’s blauwdruk voor effectieve inheemse administratie, The Dual Mandate, 
politieke en sociale identiteit heeft uitgevonden, gevormd en geherstructureerd. Terwijl het 
belang van dit neo-koloniale perspectief, dat zich erg richt op hoe koloniale raamwerken de 
Afrikaanse samenleving geetniseerd en getribaliseerd hebben, erkend wordt, beargumenteert dit 
proefschrift dat indirect bestuur evenzeer een ruimtelijk als een tribaliserend proces was. 
Koloniale hulpmiddelen van territorialiteit schetsten politiek in geografisch begrensde 
manieren en als gevolg hiervan begon de associatie tussen macht en plaats een nieuw belang in 
te nemen in de manieren waarop Afrikaans leiderschap gedefinieerd werd en autoriteit kreeg. 
Door verder in te gaan op de ruimtelijke context van traditionele macht in koloniaal Malawi, 
door middel van het voorbeeld van een chief genaamd Timothy Chawinga, komt dit proefschrift 
tot nieuwe conclusies over de aard van de macht van chiefs aldaar. 
De verhalen van Chawinga, en andere periferale chiefs zoals hij, zijn uit het grote verhaal 
van Malawi geschift aangezien zij niet passen bij de vragen waaraan historici typisch aandacht 
hebben besteed in deze periode en bij de politieke geografie die voorrang heeft gekregen om het 
gedrag van chiefs te contextualiseren. Deze bevoorrechtte politieke geografie heeft liever 
gebruik gemaakt van voorbeelden uit plaatsen waar “dingen gebeuren”: waar invloedrijke 
markt gewasplannen werden geïmplementeerd die het leven van boeren radicaal hebben 
getransformeerd, ten goede of ten kwade; waar co-operatieve bewegingen de lokale bevolking 
gepolitiseerd hebben; waar conservatiemaatregelen met kracht en geweld werden 
doorgevoerd; en waar chiefs in opstand kwamen en actief deel namen in de nationalistische 
strijd. Concentreren op hoogst zichtbare gebieden, welke politiek of economisch belangrijk zijn 
voor de staat, leidt tot verkeerde vooronderstellingen over de aard van de koloniale staat en de 
patronen van staatsinterventie in koloniaal Malawi. De vormen van bestuur en regering waren 
pluriform en reflecteerden de dynamische associatie tussen administratieve instituties en 
andere institutionele praktijken die te vinden waren in het alledaagse associatieve leven van 
mensen.  
In de Afrikanistische historiografie heeft de ruimtelijke wending het voor 
wetenschappers mogelijk gemaakt om afstand te nemen van politieke narratieven van de 
natiestaat, om richting discussies te bewegen over de manieren waarop een breed scala aan 
actoren verschillende vormen van politieke, economische, sociale en religieuze ruimte voor hun 
eigen belang hebben bevochten. Verrassend genoeg begint de ruimtelijke wending pas net 
invloed uit te oefenen op de manier waarop de productie van autoriteit van chiefs in Afrika 
wordt begrepen. De notie van lokaliteit wordt gebruikt als het centrale conceptuele hulpmiddel 
in dit proefschrift, aangezien het ruimte biedt aan zowel de historische dimensies als aan de 
ruimtelijke specificiteit van het ambt van chiefs. Het wordt beredeneerd dat de lokaliteit van het 
ambt van chiefs de meest cruciale factor is in het vaststellen van de identiteit van koloniale 
chiefs; met andere woorden, de geografische grenzen die werden vastgesteld in de context van 
indirect bestuur boden aan chiefs de mogelijkheid om materiële en spirituele hulpbronnen te 
exploiteren binnen deze begrensde ruimtes in nieuwe, soms hoogst productieve, manieren, die 
cruciaal waren om zowel hun traditionele (gewoonterechtelijke) autoriteit te vergroten als om 
hun persoonlijk lot te verbeteren. Indirect bestuur maakte het mogelijk dat de Native Authority, 




huishouden, maar het gaf ook vele chiefs de mogelijkheid om een territorialiteit over ruimte, 
over land en over begrensde natuurlijke hulpbronnen, uit te oefenen, zoals zij dit tot dan toe nog 
nooit hadden kunnen doen. 
Door de historiografische blik te verrichten naar “regionale” en “lokale” landschappen 
wordt het beredeneerd dat historici de diversiteit aan mogelijkheden om territoriaal op te 
treden beter kunnen vastleggen. Timothy Chawinga – de belangrijkste protagonist van dit 
verhaal – werd de vijftiende Chief Katumbi in 1942. Hij regeerde succesvol over een bescheiden 
territorium van ongeveer 200 vierkante mijl in noordwest koloniaal Malawi gedurende een 
periode van 31 jaar. In deze tijd groeide hij in regionaal aanzien. Dit proefschrift presenteert 
bewijs van hoe Chawinga de strategie van territorialiteit – de controle over mensen en dingen 
door de controle van een gebied – gebruikte om dit te bewerkstelligen. Om het functioneren van 
deze strategie te begrijpen wordt het beredeneerd dat Chawinga niet simpelweg gezien zou 
moeten worden als een “Native Authority”; men kan geen idee krijgen van hoe gevarieerd de 
positie en rol van chiefs was, als men zo een reductionistisch perspectief neemt. Verder, terwijl 
veranderingen in nationaal beleid omtrent Native Administration wel hun weerslag hadden op 
wat verwacht werd van chiefs zoals Chawinga, creëerde dit niet dezelfde mogelijkheden voor 
iedereen; vooral aangezien lokale omstandigheden verschillende expressies van indirect 
bestuur produceerden. Dit proefschrift gebruikt het voorbeeld van Timothy Chawinga, daarom, 
om vooronderstellingen over de determinerende rol van de staat in de productie van lokale 
autoriteit aan de kaak te stellen.  
Dit proefschrift behandelt het Hewe van Timothy Chawinga, de plaats van zijn ambt als 
chief, niet als een conventionele geografische plaats. Hewe representeerde daarentegen een set 
van relaties tussen dingen, zowel als een plek die sociale relaties omvatte en verspreidde. Dit 
proefschrift beredeneert dat Chawinga op het hoogtepunt van zijn macht aanzienlijk heeft 
bijgedragen aan de productie van Hewe als een lokaliteit, door het gebied te construeren als een 
structuur van gevoel, een eigenschap van sociaal leven en een ideologie van een “gesitueerde 
gemeenschap”, voor zijn eigen doeleinden; welke primair de extractie van rijkdom en macht 
omvatten. Het resultaat was dat tussen 1942-1974 de ruimte waarin Timothy Chawinga zijn 
autoriteit uitoefende door hem werd gebruikt als een machtig “hulpmiddel van gedachte en van 
actie”, niet simpelweg als een plaats waar hij zijn administratieve en formele rol als Native 
Authority kon uitvoeren. Terwijl hij wel gebruik maakte van de positie welke de staat hem gaf 
om traditie en gewoonte te benutten, was het meest belangrijke misschien zijn vermogen om 
zijn autoriteit op te bouwen door een materiële exploitatie van zijn land; dit was in het verleden 
nooit een grote machtsbron geweest. Voorafgaand aan de periode van Europese expansie 
speelden claims tot het hebben van een territoriale identiteit nauwelijks een rol in de politieke 
verbeeldingen van Afrikaanse leiders, die hun rijkdom en macht voornamelijk vergrootten door 
mensen te veroveren in plaats van door controle te krijgen over territorium. Chawinga en zijn 
tijdsgenoten maakten gebruik van hun nieuwe “gewoonterechten” om grenzen te betwisten in 
manieren die hun voorvaders nooit nuttig hadden geacht en zij deelden toegang tot land uit aan 
“inheemsen” terwijl zij dit aan “vreemden” ontzegden; de gevolgen hiervan spelen zich vandaag 
de dag nog steeds af.  
Naast het herzien van de ruimtelijke context van de autoriteit van chiefs, vraagt dit 
proefschrift er ook om dat onze analyses van lokale autoriteit in een diepere historische 
tijdsframe worden geplaatst. De ambten van chiefs worden geconstrueerd en betwist binnen de 
context van rurale geschiedenissen en regionale machtsstrijden, alsmede door de ogen van de 
Staat. Timothy Chawinga erfde een titel die vol was van bepaalde betekenissen, maar ook een 
economisch en politiek leiderschap was dat flexibel was in zijn structuren van erfenis en 
 
 
gebaseerd was op een autoriteit die gemakkelijk uitgebaat kon worden door charismatische 
individuen. Minder gemarkeerd door gecentraliseerde rituele autoriteiten en meer door 
mobiliteit, interdependentie en een gevarieerde inmenging in handelsnetwerken, was de 
Balowoka traditie van chiefs – van welke het Katumbi ambt van chief deel uitmaakt – zelfs in de 
pre-koloniale periode hoogst flexibel geweest. Omdat zij, zowel in het verleden als vandaag de 
dag, slechts een losse grip op rituele autoriteit hadden, is het gevecht om een meer formele 
autoriteit te bemachtigen een constante factor van het politieke landschap van chiefs van deze 
Tumbuka gemeenschappen geweest. Met elke opvolging van chiefs moest autoriteit opnieuw 
worden bevestigd en behouden. Aangezien deze ambten van chiefs voortgekomen zijn uit 
nieuwe koninklijke afstammingslijnen welke geen significante diepte hadden, was er veel 
ruimte voor nieuwe interpretaties van autoriteit en meer plaats waarin individuen met macht 
de traditie aan de kaak konden stellen. 
Aangezien autoriteit, ten minste aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw, makkelijker 
gesanctioneerd werd door prestatie dan door erfbare privileges, bloeide 
persoonlijkheidspolitiek op onder de Balowoka chiefs. Door te letten op dit milieu, samen met 
een nieuwe ruimtelijke analyse, presenteert dit proefschrift de opkomst van Timothy Chawinga 
als regionaal relevant. Hij was een charismatische persoonlijkheid wiens belang primair lag bij 
het beschermen van zijn positie binnen de regionale politieke en morele economie. Zijn 
persoonlijke visie reikte feitelijk niet veel verder dan het behalen en produceren van autoriteit 
binnen zijn eigen en zijn direct omliggende territoria. Dat hij dit doel kon bereiken en een sterke 
territoriale claim over de Hewe Vallei kon ontwikkelen, als een geografie plek en een plaats van 
sociale relaties, heeft te maken met het beperkte geografische en economische belang van Hewe, 
als wij het “zien” zoals de koloniale staat het gezien zou hebben. Hewe’s positie in de ogen van 
de overheid maakte het voor deze regionale lokaliteit mogelijk om te verschijnen zoals het deed. 
Dit maakte het mogelijk voor Timothy Chawinga om een territorialiteit uit te oefenen die in 
verscheidene manieren diende om zijn historisch specifieke gewoonte autoriteit te vergroten.  
Stellingen maken over de graad waarin koloniale chiefs “verzonnen” of “authentiek” 
waren, “traditioneel” of “moderniserend”, zoals veel van de historiografie doet, wordt 
ondoeltreffend geacht. Dit proefschrift beargumenteert dat vragen gesteld zouden moeten 
worden die geen structurele, tijdelijke of ruimtelijke vooronderstellingen met zich meebrengen. 
Een meer productieve manier van vragen stellen gaat uit van de aard en het gebruik van 
autoriteit in plaats van van de structuren waarbinnen autoriteit zogenaamd opereert: Waar 
halen chiefs in de koloniale periode hun autoriteit vandaan? Waartoe stelt deze autoriteit hen in 
staat? Wat zijn de gevaren en mogelijkheden van deze autoriteit? Toen Chawinga gearresteerd 
werd in 1974 door de regering van de Malawi Congress Party van  Hastings Banda veranderde 
de mix van factoren die zijn specifieke vorm van territoriale politiek tot dan toe had 
vormgegeven. Het koloniale raamwerk van indirect bestuur had het mogelijk gemaakt voor 
Chawinga om te groeien in persoonlijke rijkdom en macht, maar bij de onafhankelijkheid werd 
hij geconfronteerd met nieuwe uitdagingen welke zijn mogelijkheden om autoriteit te 
accumuleren door territorialiteit getransformeerd werden. Hewe veranderde van perifere 
“grenszone”, waar weinig aandacht aan geschonken werd, naar een cruciale “grenspost”, een 
strategische check point in de oorlog tegen de politieke rivalen en ongewenste buren van 
Hasting Banda. De spanningen die deze veranderingen produceerden tussen de chief en de post-
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